17.0_NIST_FIPS201-2.pdf

FIPS PUB 201-2

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of

Federal Employees and Contractors

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

August 2013

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Penny Pritzker, Secretary

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.201-2

PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

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Acknowledgements

NIST would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of the Identity, Credential, and Access Management Subcommittee (ICAMSC) and the Smart Card Interagency Advisory Board (IAB) for providing valuable contributions to the development of technical frameworks on which this Standard is based.

Special thanks to those who have participated in the business requirements meeting and provided valuable comments in shaping this Standard.

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FOREWORD

The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.

Comments concerning FIPS publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900.

Charles H. Romine, Director Information Technology Laboratory

ABSTRACT

This Standard specifies the architecture and technical requirements for a common identification standard for Federal employees and contractors. The overall goal is to achieve appropriate security assurance for multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals seeking physical access to Federally controlled government facilities and logical access to government information systems.

The Standard contains the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identity verification system that meets the control and security objectives of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], including identity proofing, registration, and issuance. The Standard also provides detailed specifications that will support technical interoperability among PIV systems of Federal departments and agencies. It describes the card elements, system interfaces, and security controls required to securely store, process, and retrieve identity credentials from the card. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data elements that make up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card architecture for storing and retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special Publication 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. The interfaces and data formats of biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76, Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are specified in Special Publication 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for the accreditation of the PIV Card issuers are specified in Special Publication 800-79, Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers. The unique organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special Publication 800-87, Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations. The requirements for card readers are specified in Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for encoding the chain-of-trust for import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156, Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing PIV derived credentials are specified in Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.

This Standard does not specify access control policies or requirements for Federal departments and agencies.

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Keywords: architecture, authentication, authorization, biometrics, credential, cryptography, Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), HSPD-12, identification, identity, infrastructure, model, Personal Identity Verification, PIV, public key infrastructure, PKI, validation, verification.

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Federal Information Processing Standards 201

Announcing the

Standard for

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of

Federal Employees and Contractors

Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.

1. Name of Standard.

FIPS PUB 201-2: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors.1

2. Category of Standard.

Information Security.

3. Explanation.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], dated August 27, 2004, entitled “Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” directed the promulgation of a Federal standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for Federal employees and contractors. It further specified secure and reliable identification that—

(a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s identity;

(b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation;

(c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and

(d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.

The directive stipulated that the Standard include graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, to ensure flexibility in selecting the appropriate level of security for each application. Executive departments and agencies are required to implement the Standard for identification issued to Federal employees and contractors in gaining physical access to controlled facilities and logical access to controlled information systems.

4. Approving Authority.

Secretary of Commerce.

1 This Standard is in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, which states that it is “intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government.”

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5. Maintenance Agency.

Department of Commerce, NIST, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL).

6. Applicability.

This Standard is applicable to identification issued by Federal departments and agencies to Federal employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining physical access to Federally controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems, except for “national security systems” as defined by 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)(2) [SP 800-59]. Except as provided in [HSPD-12], nothing in this Standard alters the ability of government entities to use the Standard for additional applications.

Special-Risk Security Provision—The U.S. Government has personnel, facilities, and other assets deployed and operating worldwide under a vast range of threats (e.g., terrorist, technical, intelligence), particularly heightened overseas. For cardholders with particularly sensitive threats while outside the contiguous United States, the issuance, holding, and/or use of PIV Cards with full technical capabilities as described herein may result in unacceptably high risk. In such cases of extant risk (e.g., to facilities, individuals, operations, the national interest, or the national security), by the presence and/or use of full-capability PIV Cards, the head of a department or independent agency may issue a select number of maximum security PIV Cards that do not contain (or otherwise do not fully support) the wireless and/or biometric capabilities otherwise required/referenced herein. To the greatest extent practicable, heads of departments and independent agencies should minimize the issuance of such special-risk security PIV Cards so as to support interagency interoperability and the President’s policy. Use of other risk-mitigating technical (e.g., high-assurance on-off switches for the wireless capability) and procedural mechanisms in such situations is preferable, and as such is also explicitly permitted and encouraged. As protective security technology advances, the need for this provision will be re-assessed as the Standard undergoes the normal review and update process.

7. Specifications.

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors.

8. Implementations.

This Standard satisfies the control objectives, security requirements, and technical interoperability requirements of [HSPD-12]. The Standard specifies implementation of identity credentials on integrated circuit cards for use in a Federal personal identity verification system.

A PIV Card must be personalized with identity information for the individual to whom the card is issued, in order to perform identity verification both by humans and automated systems. Humans can use the physical card for visual comparisons, whereas automated systems can use the electronically stored data on the card to conduct automated identity verification. In implementing PIV systems and pursuant to Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act), as amended, agencies have the responsibility to accommodate federal employees and contractors with disabilities to have access to and use of information and data comparable to the access to and use of such information and data by federal employees and contractors who are not individuals with disabilities. In instances where Federal agencies assert exceptions to Section 508 accessibility requirements (e.g., undue burden, national security, commercial non-availability), Sections 501 and 504 of the Act requires Federal agencies to provide reasonable accommodation for federal employees and contractors with disabilities whose needs are not met by the vii baseline accessibility provided under Section 508. While Section 508 compliance is the responsibility of Federal agencies and departments, this Standard specifies options to aid in implementation of the requirements:

+ Section 4.1.4.3 specifies Zones 21F and 22F as an option for orientation markers of the PIV Card.

+ Section 2.8 describes an alternative to the National Criminal History Check (NCHC) in instances where an applicant has unclassifiable fingerprints.

+ Sections 2.8, and 2.9 specify alternative methods for the 1:1 biometric match required at PIV Card issuance, reissuance, and reset.

+ Section 6 defines authentication mechanisms with varying characteristics for both physical and logical access (e.g., with or without PIN, over contact, contactless, or virtual contact interface).

Federal departments and agencies must use accredited issuers to issue identity credentials for Federal employees and contractors. For this purpose, NIST provided guidelines for the accreditation of PIV Card issuers in [SP 800-79]. The Standard also covers security and interoperability requirements for PIV Cards. For this purpose, NIST has established the PIV Validation Program that tests implementations for conformance with this Standard as specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78]. Additional information on this program is published and maintained at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp/. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) has set up the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program to evaluate conformance of different families of products that support the PIV processes of this Standard – see Appendix A.5.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides implementation oversight for this Standard. The respective numbers of agency-issued 1) general PIV Cards and 2) special-risk PIV Cards (issued under the Special-Risk Security Provision) are subject to annual reporting to the OMB under the annual reporting process in a manner prescribed by OMB.

9. Effective Date.

This Standard is effective immediately and supersedes FIPS 201-1 (Change Notice 1). New optional features of this Standard that depend upon the release of new or revised NIST Special Publications are effective upon final publication of the supporting Special Publications.

10. Implementation Schedule.

This Standard mandates the implementation of some PIV Card features that were optional to implement in FIPS 201-1. To comply with FIPS 201-2, all new and replacement PIV Cards shall be issued with the mandatory PIV Card features no later than 12 months after the effective date of this Standard.

Accreditations of PIV Card issuers (PCIs) that occur 12 months after the effective date of this Standard shall be in compliance with FIPS 201-2.

FIPS 201-2 compliance of PIV components and subsystems is provided in accordance with M-06-18 [OMB0618] and M-11-11 [OMB1111] through products and services from GSA’s Interoperability Test Program and Approved Products and Services List, once available. Implementation Guidance to PIV enable federal facilities and information systems, in accordance to M-11-11 will be outlined in the “Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation Guidance.”

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11. Qualifications.

The security provided by the PIV system is dependent on many factors outside the scope of this Standard.

Upon adopting this Standard, organizations must be aware that the overall security of the personal identification system relies on—

+ assurance provided by the issuer of an identity credential that the individual in possession of the credential has been correctly identified;

+ protection provided to an identity credential stored within the PIV Card and transmitted between the card and the PIV issuance and usage infrastructure; and

+ protection provided to the identity verification system infrastructure and components throughout the entire lifecycle.

Although it is the intent of this Standard to specify mechanisms and support systems that provide high assurance personal identity verification, conformance to this Standard does not assure that a particular implementation is secure. It is the implementer’s responsibility to ensure that components, interfaces, communications, storage media, managerial processes, and services used within the identity verification system are designed and built in a secure manner.

Similarly, the use of a product that conforms to this Standard does not guarantee the security of the overall system in which the product is used. The responsible authority in each department and agency shall ensure that an overall system provides the acceptable level of security.

Because a standard of this nature must be flexible enough to adapt to advancements and innovations in science and technology, NIST has a policy to review this Standard within five years to assess its adequacy.

12. Waivers.

As per the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 [FISMA], waivers to Federal Information Processing Standards are not allowed.

13. Where to Obtain Copies.

This publication is available through the Internet by accessing http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/.

14. Patents.

Aspects of the implementation of this Standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose

1.2 Scope

1.3 Change Management

1.3.1 Backward Compatible Change

1.3.2 Non-Backward Compatible Change

1.3.3 New Features

1.3.4 Deprecated and Removed

1.3.5 FIPS 201 Version Management

1.4 Document Organization

2. Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements

2.1 Control Objectives

2.2 Credentialing Requirements

2.3 Biometric Data Collection for Background Investigations

2.4 Biometric Data Collection for PIV Card

2.5 Biometric Data Use

2.6 Chain-of-Trust

2.7 PIV Identity Proofing and Registration Requirements

2.8 PIV Card Issuance Requirements

2.8.1 Special Rule for Pseudonyms

2.8.2 Grace Period

2.9 PIV Card Maintenance Requirements

2.9.1 PIV Card Reissuance Requirements

2.9.2 PIV Card Post Issuance Update Requirements

2.9.3 PIV Card Verification Data Reset

2.9.4 PIV Card Termination Requirements

2.10 Derived PIV Credentials Issuance Requirements

2.11 PIV Privacy Requirements

3. PIV System Overview

3.1 Functional Components

3.1.1 PIV Front-End Subsystem

3.1.2 PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem

3.1.3 PIV Relying Subsystem

3.2 PIV Card Lifecycle Activities

4. PIV Front-End Subsystem

4.1 PIV Card Physical Characteristics

4.1.1 Printed Material

4.1.2 Tamper Proofing and Resistance

4.1.3 Physical Characteristics and Durability

4.1.4 Visual Card Topography

4.1.5 Color Representation

4.2 PIV Card Logical Characteristics

4.2.1 Cardholder Unique Identifier (CHUID)

4.2.2 Cryptographic Specifications

4.2.3 PIV Biometric Data Specifications

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4.2.4 PIV Unique Identifiers

4.3 PIV Card Activation

4.3.1 Activation by Cardholder

4.3.2 Activation by Card Management System

4.4 Card Reader Requirements

4.4.1 Contact Reader Requirements

4.4.2 Contactless Reader Requirements

4.4.3 Reader Resilience and Flexibility

4.4.4 Card Activation Device Requirements

5. PIV Key Management Requirements

5.1 Architecture

5.2 PKI Certificate

5.2.1 X.509 Certificate Contents

5.3 X.509 CRL Contents

5.4 Legacy PKIs

5.5 PKI Repository and OCSP Responder(s)

5.5.1 Certificate and CRL Distribution

5.5.2 OCSP Status Responders

6. PIV Cardholder Authentication

6.1 PIV Assurance Levels

6.1.1 Relationship to OMB’s E-Authentication Guidance

6.2 PIV Card Authentication Mechanisms

6.2.1 Authentication Using Off-Card Biometric Comparison

6.2.2 Authentication Using On-Card Biometric Comparison (OCC-AUTH)

6.2.3 Authentication Using PIV Asymmetric Cryptography

6.2.4 Authentication with the Symmetric Card Authentication Key (SYM-CAK)

6.2.5 Authentication Using the CHUID

6.2.6 Authentication Using PIV Visual Credentials (VIS)

6.3 PIV Support of Graduated Assurance Levels for Identity Authentication

6.3.1 Physical Access

6.3.2 Logical Access

List of Appendices

Appendix A— PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation A.1 Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers (PCI) A.2 Application of Risk Management Framework to IT System(s) Supporting PCI A.3 Conformance Testing of PIV Card Application and Middleware A.4 Cryptographic Testing and Validation A.5 FIPS 201 Evaluation Program

Appendix B— PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension B.1 PIV Object Identifiers B.2 PIV Certificate Extension

Appendix C— Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations C.1 Glossary of Terms xi

C.2 Acronyms C.3 Notations

Appendix D— References Appendix E— Revision History

List of Figures

Figure 3-1. PIV System Notional Model Figure 3-2. PIV Card Lifecycle Activities Figure 4-1. Card Front—Printable Areas and Required Data Figure 4-2. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 1 Figure 4-3. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 2 Figure 4-4. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 3 Figure 4-5. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 4 Figure 4-6. Card Back—Printable Areas and Required Data Figure 4-7. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 1 Figure 4-8. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 2

List of Tables

Table 4-1. Name Examples Table 4-2. Color Representation Table 6-1. Relationship Between PIV and E-Authentication Assurance Levels Table 6-2. Authentication for Physical Access Table 6-3. Authentication for Logical Access Table B-1. PIV Object Identifiers

1. Introduction

Authentication of an individual’s identity is a fundamental component of physical and logical access control processes. When an individual attempts to access security-sensitive buildings, computer systems, or data, an access control decision must be made. An accurate determination of an individual’s identity is needed to make sound access control decisions.

A wide range of mechanisms is employed to authenticate an identity, utilizing various classes of identity credentials. For physical access, an individual’s identity has traditionally been authenticated by use of paper or other non-automated, hand-carried credentials, such as driver’s licenses and badges. Access authorization to computers and data has traditionally been based on identities authenticated through user-selected passwords. More recently, cryptographic mechanisms and biometric techniques have been used in physical and logical security applications, replacing or supplementing the traditional identity credentials.

The strength of the authentication that is achieved varies, depending upon the type of credential, the process used to issue the credential, and the authentication mechanism used to validate the credential.

This document establishes a standard for a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) system based on secure and reliable forms of identity credentials issued by the Federal government to its employees and contractors. These credentials are intended to authenticate individuals who require access to Federally controlled facilities, information systems, and applications. This Standard addresses requirements for initial identity proofing, infrastructures to support interoperability of identity credentials, and accreditation of organizations and processes issuing PIV credentials.

1.1 Purpose

This Standard defines a reliable, government-wide identity credential for use in applications such as access to Federally controlled facilities and information systems. This Standard has been developed within the context and constraints of Federal law, regulations, and policy based on currently available and evolving information processing technology.

This Standard specifies a PIV system within which a common identity credential can be created and later used to verify a claimed identity. The Standard also identifies Federal government-wide requirements for security levels that are dependent on risks to the facility or information being protected.

1.2 Scope

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], signed by President George W. Bush on August 27, 2004, established the requirements for a common identification standard for identity credentials issued by Federal departments and agencies to Federal employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining physical access to Federally controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems. HSPD-12 directs the Department of Commerce to develop a Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication to define such a common identity credential. In accordance with HSPD-12, this Standard defines the technical requirements for the identity credential that—

(a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s identity;

(b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation;

(c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and

(d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.

This Standard defines authentication mechanisms offering varying degrees of security for both logical and physical access applications. Federal departments and agencies will determine the level of security and authentication mechanisms appropriate for their applications. This Standard does not specify access control policies or requirements for Federal departments and agencies. Therefore, the scope of this Standard is limited to authentication of an individual’s identity. Authorization and access control decisions are outside the scope of this Standard. Moreover, requirements for a temporary card used until a new or replacement PIV Card arrives are out of scope of this Standard.

1.3 Change Management

Every revision of this Standard introduces refinements and changes that may impact existing implementations. FIPS 201 and its normative specifications encourage implementation approaches that reduce the high cost of configuration and change management by architecting resilience to change into system processes and components. Nevertheless, changes and modifications are introduced. Because of the importance of this issue, this Change Management section has been added to the Standard.

This section provides change management principles and guidance to implementers of relying systems to manage newly introduced changes and modifications to the previous version of this Standard.

Specifically, this section provides a description of the types of changes expected in FIPS 201 revisions.

1.3.1 Backward Compatible Change

A backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature that does not break the relying systems using this feature. For example, changing the Card Authentication certificate from optional to mandatory does not affect the systems using the Card Authentication certificate for authentication (i.e., using the PKI-CAK authentication mechanism).

1.3.2 Non-Backward Compatible Change

A non-backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature such that the modified feature cannot be used with existing relying systems. For example, changing the format of the biometric data would not be compatible with the existing system, because a biometric authentication attempt with the modified format would fail. Similarly, changing the PIV Card Application IDentifier (AID) would introduce a non-backward compatible change. As a result, all systems interacting with the PIV Card would need to be changed to accept the new PIV AID.

1.3.3 New Features

New features are optional or mandatory features that are added to the Standard. New features do not interfere with backward compatibility because they are not part of the existing relying systems. For example, the addition of an optional on-card biometric comparison (OCC) authentication mechanism is a new feature that does not affect the features in current systems. The systems will need to be updated if an agency decides to support the OCC-AUTH authentication mechanism.

1.3.4 Deprecated and Removed

When a feature is to be discontinued or is no longer needed, it is deprecated. In general, a feature that is currently in use by relying systems would only be deprecated if there were a compelling (e.g., security) reason to do so. Deprecated features may continue to be used, but should be phased out in future systems since the feature will likely be removed in the next revision of the Standard. For example, the CHUID authentication mechanism (Section 6.2.5) has been deprecated, since it provides LITTLE or NO assurance in the identity of the cardholder, and so relying systems should phase out use of this authentication mechanism.2

In the case of deprecated features on PIV Cards, such as the authentication key map, existing PIV Cards with the deprecated features remain valid, however, new PIV Cards should not include the deprecated features.

1.3.5 FIPS 201 Version Management

Subsequent revisions of this Standard may necessitate FIPS 201 version management that introduces new version numbers for FIPS 201 products. Components that may be affected by version management include, for example, PIV Cards, PIV middleware software, and card issuance systems.

New version numbers will be assigned in [SP 800-73], if needed, based on the nature of the change. For example, new mandatory features introduced in a revision of this Standard may necessitate a new PIV Card Application version number so that systems can quickly discover the new mandatory features.

Optional features, on the other hand, may be discoverable by an on-card discovery mechanism.

1.4 Document Organization

This Standard describes the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identification system that meets the control and security objectives of [HSPD-12], including identity proofing, registration, and issuance. It provides detailed technical specifications to support the control and security objectives of [HSPD-12] as well as interoperability among Federal departments and agencies. This Standard describes the policies and minimum requirements of a PIV Card that allows interoperability of credentials for physical and logical access. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data elements that make up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card architecture for storing and retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special Publication 800-73 [SP 800-73], Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. Similarly, the requirements for collection and formatting of biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76 [SP 800-76], Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are specified in Special Publication 800-78 [SP 800-78], Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for the accreditation of PIV Card issuers are specified in Special Publication 800-79 [SP 800-79], Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers. The unique organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special Publication 800-87 [SP 800-87], Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations. The requirements for the PIV Card reader are provided in Special Publication 800-96 [SP 800-96], PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for encoding the chain-of-trust for import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156 [SP 800-156], Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing derived PIV credentials are specified in Special Publication 800-157 [SP 800-157], Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.

This Standard contains normative references to other documents, and to the extent described in each citation these documents are included by reference in this Standard. Should normative text in this Standard conflict with normative text in a referenced document the normative text in this Standard prevails for this Standard.

2 The CHUID data element has not been deprecated and continues to be mandatory.

All sections in this document are normative (i.e., mandatory for compliance) unless specified as informative (i.e., non-mandatory). Following is the structure of this document:

+ Section 1, Introduction, provides background information for understanding the scope of this Standard. This section is informative.

+ Section 2, Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements, outlines the requirements for identity proofing, registration, and issuance, by establishing the control and security objectives for compliance with [HSPD-12]. This section is normative.

+ Section 3, PIV System Overview, serves to provide a PIV system overview. This section is informative.

+ Section 4, PIV Front-End Subsystem, provides the requirements for the components of the PIV front-end subsystem. Specifically, this section defines requirements for the PIV Card, logical data elements, biometrics, cryptography, and card readers. This section is normative.

+ Section 5, PIV Key Management Requirements, defines the processes and components required for managing a PIV Card’s lifecycle. It also provides the requirements and specifications related to this subsystem. This section is normative.

+ Section 6, PIV Cardholder Authentication, defines a suite of authentication mechanisms that are supported by the PIV Card, and their applicability in meeting the requirements of graduated levels of identity assurance. This section is normative.

+ Appendix A, PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation, provides additional information regarding compliance with this document. This appendix is normative.

+ Appendix B, PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension, provides additional details for the PIV objects identified in Section 4. This appendix is normative.

+ Appendix C, Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations, describes the vocabulary and textual representations used in the document. This appendix is informative.

+ Appendix D, References, lists the specifications and standards referred to in this document. This appendix is informative.

+ Appendix E, Revision History, lists changes made to this Standard from its inception. This appendix is informative.

2. Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements

This section addresses the fundamental control and security objectives outlined in [HSPD-12], including the identity proofing requirements for Federal employees and contractors.

2.1 Control Objectives

[HSPD-12] established control objectives for secure and reliable identification of Federal employees and contractors. These control objectives, provided in paragraph 3 of the directive, are quoted here:

(3) "Secure and reliable forms of identification" for purposes of this directive means identification that (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.

Each agency’s PIV implementation shall meet the four control objectives (a) through (d) listed above such that—

+ Credentials are issued 1) to individuals whose identity has been verified and 2) after a proper authority has authorized issuance of the credential.

+ A credential is issued only after National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is initiated3 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Criminal History Check (NCHC) portion of the background investigation is completed.

+ An individual is issued a credential only after presenting two identity source documents, at least one of which is a Federal or State government issued picture ID.

+ Fraudulent identity source documents are not accepted as genuine and unaltered.

+ A person suspected or known to the government as being a terrorist is not issued a credential.

+ No substitution occurs in the identity proofing process. More specifically, the individual who appears for identity proofing, and whose fingerprints are checked against databases, is the person to whom the credential is issued.

+ No credential is issued unless requested by proper authority.

+ A credential remains serviceable only up to its expiration date. More precisely, a revocation process exists such that expired or invalidated credentials are swiftly revoked.

+ A single corrupt official in the process may not issue a credential with an incorrect identity or to a person not entitled to the credential.

+ An issued credential is not duplicated or forged, and is not modified by an unauthorized entity.

3 The initiation of a background investigation is defined as the submission of the investigative request to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), or other Federal background investigation service provider (if authorized).

2.2 Credentialing Requirements

Federal departments and agencies shall use the credentialing guidance issued by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)4 and OMB5.

2.3 Biometric Data Collection for Background Investigations

The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant:

+ A full set of fingerprints. Biometric identification using fingerprints is the primary input to law enforcement checks. In cases where ten fingerprints are not available, then as many fingers as possible shall be imaged. In cases where obtaining any fingerprints is impossible, agencies shall seek OPM guidance for alternative means of performing the law enforcement checks.

This collection is not necessary for applicants who have a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation on record that can be located and referenced.

Fingerprint collection shall conform to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76].

2.4 Biometric Data Collection for PIV Card

The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant:

+ Two fingerprints, for off-card comparison. These shall be taken either from the full set of fingerprints collected in Section 2.3, or collected independently.

+ An electronic facial image.

The following biometric data may optionally be collected from a PIV applicant:

+ One or two iris images.

+ Two fingerprints, for on-card comparison. It is recommended that these be different than the fingerprints collected for off-card comparison.

If the biometric data that is collected as specified in this section and in Section 2.3 is collected on separate occasions, then a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant shall be performed at each visit against biometric data collected during a previous visit.

Biometric data collection shall conform to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76].

The choice of which two fingers is important and may vary between persons. The recommended selection and order is specified in [SP 800-76].

2.5 Biometric Data Use

The full set of fingerprints shall be used for one-to-many identification in the databases of fingerprints maintained by the FBI.

4 For example, [SPRINGER MEMO] at http://www.opm.gov/investigate/resources/final_credentialing_standards.pdf and the Federal Investigative Standards.

5 For example, [OMB0524] at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-24.pdf.

The two mandatory fingerprints shall be used for preparation of templates to be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. The fingerprints provide an interagency-interoperable authentication mechanism through a match-off-card scheme as described in Section 6.2.1. These fingerprints are also the primary means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes.

The optional fingerprints may be used for preparation of the fingerprint templates for on-card comparison as described in Section 4.2.3.1. OCC may be used to support card activation as described in Section

4.3.1. OCC may also be used for cardholder authentication (OCC-AUTH) as described in Section 6.2.2.

The electronic iris images may be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. Agencies may choose to collect iris biometrics as a second biometric to support multimodal authentication to improve accuracy, operational suitability, to accommodate user preferences, or as a backup when the fingerprint biometric is unavailable.

The electronic facial image:

+ shall be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1;

+ shall be printed on the PIV Card according to Section 4.1.4.1;

+ may be used for generating a visual image on the monitor of a guard workstation for augmenting the visual authentication process defined in Section 6.2.6; and

+ may be used for automated facial authentication in operator-attended PIV issuance, reissuance, and verification data reset processes.

2.6 Chain-of-Trust

A card issuer may optionally maintain, for each PIV Card issued, a documentary chain-of-trust for the identification data it collects. The chain-of-trust is a sequence of related enrollment data records that are created and maintained through the methods of contemporaneous acquisition of data within each enrollment data record, and biometric matching of samples between enrollment data records.6

It is recommended that the following data be included in the chain-of-trust:

+ A log of activities that documents who took the action, what action was taken, when and where the action took place, and what data was collected.

+ An enrollment data record that contains the most recent collection of each of the biometric data collected. The enrollment data record describes the circumstances of biometric acquisition including the name and role of the acquiring agent, the office and organization, time, place, and acquisition method. The enrollment data record may also document unavailable biometric data or failed attempts to collect biometric data. The enrollment data record may contain historical biometric data.

+ The most recent unique identifiers (i.e., Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID)) issued to the individual. The record may contain historical unique identifiers.

+ Information about the authorizing entity who has approved the issuance of a credential.

6 For example, ten fingerprints for law enforcement checks may be collected at one time and place, and two fingerprints for PIV Card templates may be collected at a later time and different place, provided that the two fingerprints are verified as among the ten original fingerprints.

+ Current status of the background investigation, including the results of the investigation once completed.

+ The evidence of authorization if the credential is issued under a pseudonym.

+ Any data or any subsequent changes in the data about the cardholder. If the changed data is the cardholder’s name, then the issuer should include the evidence of a formal name change.

The biometric data in the chain-of-trust shall be valid for at most 12 years. In order to mitigate ageing effects and thereby maintain operational readiness of a cardholder's PIV Card, agencies may require biometric enrollment more frequently than 12 years.

The chain-of-trust contains personally identifiable information (PII). If implemented, it shall be protected in a manner that protects the individual’s privacy and maintains the integrity of the chain-of-trust record both in transit and at rest. A card issuer may import and export a chain-of-trust in the manner and representation described in [SP 800-156].

The chain-of-trust can be applied in several situations to include:

+ Extended enrollment: a PIV applicant enrolls a full set of fingerprints for background investigations at one place and time, and two fingerprints for the PIV Card at another place and time. The chain-of-trust would contain identifiers and two enrollment data records, one with a full-set fingerprint transaction, and one with two fingerprint templates. The two fingerprint templates would be matched against the corresponding fingers in the ten-fingerprint data set to link the chain.

+ Reissuance: a PIV cardholder loses his/her card. Since the card issuer has biometric enrollment data records, the cardholder can perform a 1:1 biometric match to reconnect to the card issuer’s chain-of-trust. The card issuer need not repeat the identity proofing and registration process. The card issuer proceeds to issue a new card as described in Section 2.9.1.

+ Interagency transfer: a Federal employee is transferred from one agency to another. When the employee leaves the old agency, he/she surrenders the PIV Card and it is destroyed. When the employee arrives at the new agency and is processed in, the card issuer in the new agency requests the employee’s chain-of-trust from the card issuer in the old agency, and receives the chain-of-trust. The employee performs a 1:1 biometric match against the chain-of-trust, and the interaction proceeds as described in Section 2.8.2.

2.7 PIV Identity Proofing and Registration Requirements

Departments and agencies shall follow an identity proofing and registration process that meets the requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards.

+ The organization shall adopt and use an identity proofing and registration process that is approved in accordance with [SP 800-79].

+ Biometrics shall be captured as specified in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.

+ The process shall begin by locating and referencing a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation record. In the absence of a record, the process shall ensure 1) the initiation of a Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation and

2) the completion of the National Agency Check (NAC)7 of the background investigation. In cases where

7 The NAC is an automated record check.

the NAC results are not received within 5 days of the NAC initiation, the FBI NCHC (fingerprint check) portion of the NAC shall be complete before PIV Card issuance.

+ The applicant shall appear in-person at least once before the issuance of a PIV Card.

+ During identity proofing, the applicant shall be required to provide two forms of identity source documents in original form.8 The identity source documents shall be bound to that applicant and shall be neither expired nor cancelled. If the two identity source documents bear different names, evidence of a formal name change shall be provided. The primary identity source document shall be one of the following forms of identification:

− a U.S. Passport or a U.S. Passport Card;

− a Permanent Resident Card or an Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-551);

− a foreign passport;

− an Employment Authorization Document that contains a photograph (Form I-766);

− a Driver's license or an ID card issued by a state or possession of the United States provided it contains a photograph;

− a U.S. Military ID card;

− a U.S. Military dependent's ID card; or

− a PIV Card.

The secondary identity source document may be from the list above, but cannot be of the same type as the primary identity source document.9 The secondary identity source document may also be one of the following:

− a U.S. Social Security Card issued by the Social Security Administration;

− an original or certified copy of a birth certificate issued by a state, county, municipal authority, possession, or outlying possession of the United States bearing an official seal;

− an ID card issued by a federal, state, or local government agency or entity, provided it contains a photograph;

− a voter's registration card;

− a U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Card;

− a Certificate of U.S. Citizenship (Form N-560 or N-561);

− a Certificate of Naturalization (Form N-550 or N-570);

− a U.S. Citizen ID Card (Form I-197);

8 Departments and agencies may choose to accept only a subset of the identity source documents listed in this section. For example, in cases where identity proofing for PIV Card issuance is performed prior to verification of employment authorization, departments and agencies may choose to require the applicant to provide identity source documents that satisfy the requirements of Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, in addition to the requirements specified in this section. It is recommended that departments and agencies perform electronic verification of identity source documents, where possible.

9 For example, if the primary source document is a foreign passport (e.g., Italy), the secondary source document should not be another foreign passport (e.g., France).

− an Identification Card for Use of Resident Citizen in the United States (Form I-179);

− a Certification of Birth Abroad or Certification of Report of Birth issued by the Department of State (Form FS-545 or Form DS-1350);

− a Temporary Resident Card (Form I-688);

− an Employment Authorization Card (Form I-688A);

− a Reentry Permit (Form I-327);

− a Refugee Travel Document (Form I-571);

− an Employment authorization document issued by Department of Homeland Security (DHS);

− an Employment Authorization Document issued by DHS with photograph (Form I-688B);

− a driver's license issued by a Canadian government entity; or

− a Native American tribal document.

+ The PIV identity proofing, registration, issuance, and reissuance processes shall adhere to the principle of separation of duties to ensure that no single individual has the capability to issue a PIV Card without the cooperation of another authorized person.

The identity proofing and registration process used when verifying the identity of the applicant shall be accredited by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements above and approved in writing by the head or deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federal department or agency.

The requirements for identity proofing and registration also apply to citizens of foreign countries who are working for the Federal government overseas. However, a process for identity proofing and registration must be established using a method approved by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, except for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. These procedures may vary depending on the country.

2.8 PIV Card Issuance Requirements

Departments and agencies shall meet the requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards. The issuance process used when issuing PIV Cards shall be accredited by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements below and approved in writing by the head or deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federal department or agency.

+ PIV Cards are issued after a proper authority has authorized issuance of the credential.

+ The organization shall use an approved PIV credential issuance process in accordance with

[SP 800-79].

+ Before issuing the PIV Card, the process shall ensure that a previously completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is on record. In the absence of a record, the required federal background investigation shall be initiated.10 The PIV Card should not be issued before the results of the NAC are complete. However, if the results of the NAC have not been received in 5 days, the PIV Card may be issued based on the FBI NCHC. In the absence of an FBI NCHC

10 The identity management system (IDMS) should reflect the adjudication status of each PIV cardholder.

(e.g., due to unclassifiable fingerprints) the NAC results are required prior to issuing a PIV Card. The PIV Card shall be terminated if the results of the background investigation so justify.

+ Biometrics used to personalize the PIV Card must be those captured during the identity proofing and registration process.

+ During the issuance process, the issuer shall verify that the individual to whom the PIV Card is to be issued is the same as the intended applicant/recipient as approved by the appropriate authority.

Before the card is…