CY08'IndustryDay'--Form82-83Completion(2).ppt

Headquarters Air Mobility Command Enabling the “Global” in “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power!”

FORM 82 & 83 COMPLETION

Mr. Mark Caslen Mr. Dennis Lyon

AMC / A3BC

OVERVIEW

FY09 Changes

Highlight FY08 Requirement

The Form 82 & Form 83, and Computer Flight Plan (CFP)

SIGNIFICANT FY09 CHANGES

Mode S, EHS – “… long-range aircraft must be equipped to operate in EUROCONTROL and North Atlantic Minimum Navigation Performance Specification airspace and possess the applicable VHF, Mode S (EHS) and RVSM communication and navigation capabilities.”

Enabling the “Global” in “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power!”

SIGNIFICANT FY09 CHANGES

All Carriers – Include Certified CFP for Applicable Long-Range or Short-Range Segment

“A complete response to this solicitation shall consist of the following completed documents as applicable … associated Certified Computer Flight Plan (CFP).”

Draft Solicitation, Para 2.(10), pg 74

Long-Range (3,500 NMs) -- KPIT–EDDK Short-Range (1,500 NMs) -- KPSM–TJSJ Validate Information On Forms 82 & 83 Promised Improvements For FY09

Enabling the “Global” in “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power!”

HIGHLIGHT FY08 REQUIREMENT

Operating Weight Empty – “Include standard items, crew, equipment, and supplies necessary for standard, routine CRAF operations.”

Instructions, AMC HQ Forms 82/83, Para. 2.b.4., pg 2

“Self-Support: Contractors are allowed 3% of available ACL, by weight, for necessary self-support. For ETOPS purposes, the ACL is increased to 7.5% for aircraft committed to the AE segment.”

Atch 1, Appendix 5, Para. 3.1, pg 5-3

Atch 7 is instructions on completing the Form 82/83 Atch 1 is the Performance Work Statement

FY 08 HQ AMC FORM 82 (Front)

FY 08 HQ AMC FORM 82 (Back)

FY08 HQ AMC FORM 83

Enabling the “Global” in “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power!”

SOLICITATION

Where Is It?

Posted at FedBizOps (http://www.fbo.gov) Solicitation # HTC71108R0003

Questions

HQ AMC/A3K – 618-229-4796

HQ AMC/A3B – 618-229-1751

QUESTIONS?

UNKNOWN-0.ppt Headquarters Air Mobility Command

CRAF EMPLOYMENT

OVERVIEW

The Genesis of CRAF

Activation Process

Capability

Trends

CRAF Access to a Combat AOR (Anti-Access)

DOD Authority Over CRAF Assets

CRAF--

CAN’T GO TO WAR WITHOUT ‘EM

Supporting War-Fighter For 53 Years

War Plans Rely on CRAF:

Long Range Int’l Capability – 202+ MPM/D In Stage III

“Example” OPLAN - 52K+ STons Bulk Cargo In Stage III

Approximately 73% Pax Moved By CRAF During GWOT FY03; Approximately 93% For OEF/OIF

Great Capability – But With Limitations

CRAF has been supporting the war-fighter for over 50 years now, and the DOD heavily relies upon CRAF to execute the war plans.

Sir, you and the rest of the GOSC understand the importance of CRAF and what capabilities it brings, but before you are a couple examples

For instance, just the international, long-range segment of CRAF provides a robust capability of providing slightly over 202 million-passenger-miles per day

The cargo capability of CRAF is similarly impressive such that planners for an “example” OPLAN count on CRAF to move over 52,000 short tons of bulk cargo.

May I caution you not to be misled by these statistics? Because as impressive as they are, and as much as we rely on CRAF to execute the war plans, it all comes with limitations, which will be discussed as this brief unfolds.

THE GENESIS OF CRAF

Established 1951 – Presidential Executive Order 10219

National Airlift Policy 1987 (Presidential NSDD 280)

Recognizes That Commercial Airlift Augments Organic Military Airlift, Does Not Substitute For It

Protects Those National Security Interests Contained Within the Commercial Air Carrier Industry

Economical Method to Meet DOD Airlift Requirements in Excess of Organic Capability – But Not “Free”

DOD Funds Indemnification – War Risk Insurance

Limits to Employment Capability – Carrier Has OPCON

Transload Ops Routinely Required Based On Threat

Business Relationship – Financial Incentive for CRAF Participation

CRAF established w/ Truman Administration

Reagan Administration re-affirmed CRAF’s importance w/ 1987 Presidential Nat’l Security Decision Directive, which created the National Airlift Policy

MUST understand CRAF augments organic capability, it does NOT, nor was it ever intended to, substitute for organic capability.

Other non-direct and “non-dollar” costs to keep CRAF viable:

War Risk Insurance – DOT writes the policy, DOD reimburses DOT, and gov’t fund pays for loss. One B-747-400 loss will wipe out fund

Carrier continues to have OPCON, limiting assurance job will get done

“Right to refuse” - at both company and at aircraft captain levels;

Carrier switching out equipment (i.e., substitute MD-11 for B-777 if latter has mx problems);

Carrier sets up tech stops between APOE and APOD.

Joint Pubs, theater war plans, and AMC and USTC OMNIBUS all identify transload doctrine

Carriers’ decision to participate in CRAF based on an economic decision, balancing risk of activation with peacetime incentives

GSA City Pairs; World-wide Express; Domestic Express; Peacetime business interrelated to MV Point System

VOLUNTARY PROGRAM

CRAF Participation Is A Business Decision

Carrier’s Goal – Maintain / Expand Market Share & Profitability

“Profit” Driven

Participation Rate Financial Incentives

Loss of Aircraft While Activated Will Impact Air Carrier Participation Decisions

Air Carriers “Sign Up” Via Annual Contract

No Guarantee They Will Sign Up ‘Next Year’

Crews Are Volunteers – Not Obligated To DOD

In the previous slide, we mentioned CRAF participation is a “business decision”. Air carriers want to expand their market share, and at a minimum, maintain what they have.

The decision-making process whether or not to participate in CRAF is, to a large degree, profit driven. The carriers’ participation rate is directly attributable to the financial incentives

Any loss of aircraft, whether to a MANPAD, a terrorist/war event while on the ground (RPG attack for instance), or the like – by any air carrier – will have serious repercussions throughout the industry affecting continued CRAF participation. Through conversations with the carriers, we believe the flow would come close to shutting down.

Must never forget a driving factor for the air carriers – expand, or at least maintain, market share, and posture to ensure continued profitability

Air carriers answer first and foremost to share holders and Board of Directors

Carriers contribute those resources that benefit their financial goals, not necessarily what meets DOD requirements

Air carriers decide whether or not to participate on an annual (FY) basis

Events from previous year, and incentives included in gov’t’s contract proposal affects participation renewal decisions, and to what level of participation the company will agree to.

Although the company is contractually obligated to the gov’t, the crew members are not. Union relationships and work rules, albeit somewhat modified during CRAF activation, still allow for the captain to exercise “right of refusal” at any point.

CRAF SEGMENTS

Each Player Critical to Completing the Team Roster

Specialized Roles

Int’l Long & Short Range

21 Pax Carriers

16 Cargo Carriers

Nat’l - Domestic & Alaskan

4 Pax Carriers

2 Cargo Carriers

Aeromedical Evacuation

2 Carriers, Exclusively B-767s

Must not get this confused with the different stages (Stage I, Stage II, and Stage III) of CRAF – this slide reflects the segments of CRAF

(See B/U slide # xyz for reflection of total number of tails in each segment, and the ston or pax capability.)

CRAF brings a lot of capability to the war-fighter, and together field an awesome capability

But not every player can be a quarterback – cannot efficiently utilize a Domestic carrier (Southwest Airlines) in an international role, so there are inherent limitations.

Not everything in CRAF is a B-747 offloading 330 passengers in Kuwait.

Again, the equipment committed to CRAF is designed to meet civilian requirements, not necessarily military utilization; and what is offered by the air carriers may not be exactly what the DOD needs.

“National” segment does little for international, long-range capability; designed more to move resources within CONUS and/or Alaska

Wary of the “two” carriers currently participating in the AE segment, Delta Air Lines and US Airways.

US Airways in bankruptcy, and threatening possibility of liquidation; Delta on verge of bankruptcy.

United Airlines submitted participation proposal to FY05 solicitation – but their financial health is in jeopardy as well.

ACTIVATION

Activation (can be ‘selective’):

Minimum of 30 Days – 15 Days Notice to De-activate

Pay For A Minimum Of 8 Hours Per Day – Regardless Of Use (Approx $1.46B Per Month For Stage III Pax)

Tasked Same As Organic – Through TACC; Although Air Carriers Retain ‘Right to Refuse’

Request

Approve

Direct

Implement

Work historical timelines here – and have b/u slide available.

You’re familiar with the Stages of CRAF activation, Stage I, Stage II, and Stage III. In addition to activating the different stages of CRAF, the Commander, USTC also can select what portions of that particular stage to activate – a “selective activation” if you would.

For instance, in the Feb ’03 CRAF activation, only Stage I was activated, and in that Stage the Long-range, International Passenger capability was targeted.

Desire for all CRAF stage activation to be preceded by “warning order” prior to execution order, or “Activation Message.”

Upon receipt of the activation message, the carriers have 24 hours (Stages I and II) or 48 hours (Stage III) to have their aircraft ready for positioning.

Must be tasked w/ specific mission w/in 72 hours or affected tail numbers are automatically released back to the air carrier and cannot be re-activated for a period of five days.

RELIANCE ON CRAF

(MRS 05 – Stage III)

PERCENT CONTRIBUTION

37%

63%

93%

7%

Civil Aviation Is A Prime “People Mover”

Based on long-range international ops / JCS requirements.

Overall capability.

Chart1

Pax Pax

Cargo Cargo

Military

Civil

CATEGORY

Sheet1

Pax Cargo

Military 7 63

Civil 93 37

Sheet1

0 0

0 0

Military

Civil

CATEGORY

Sheet2

Sheet3

OVERSIZE & OUTSIZE CARGO

No Outsize Capability

Cannot Airlift US Army’s Blackhawk, Patriot, Tracked Vehicles, etc.

Limited Oversize Capability

Primary LIMFACs Are Cargo Door Size and Floor Strength

Capability Varies By Carrier, Aircraft Type (MDS) and Tail Number of Similar Aircraft Types

Specialized Materiel Handling Equipment Required

Increased Ground Times (Up To 5 Hrs For Cargo Handling)

B-747F Twice As Efficient Carrying Bulk vs. Oversize

There is no outsize cargo capability in CRAF; for instance, cannot carry US Army’s high priority cargo such as US Army’s Blackhawk helicopter, Patriot Missile Battery, and tracked vehicles

Oversize cargo capability is limited:

Non-standard cargo loading doors – visor (i.e., 35 of 82 B-747Fs), side loading doors of differing dimensions – affect pallet buildup.

Floor strengths differ between aircraft type (or MDS), and even by tail numbers of the same aircraft type (MDS) – affect pallet gross weight

All vehicles must be palletized prior to loading (or a “floor” of pallets created in cargo hold, over which vehicle is driven and then tied down)

Vehicles limited to HUMVEE-size vehicles and limited weight (no armored HUMVEEs), a selection of M-9 series 5-ton trucks (and these limited to visor B-747 only); no tracked vehicles.

[[MHE required to load pallets of vehicles – no roll-on/roll-off capability increased ground times (approximately twice std organic fleet ground time).]]

TRENDS IN THE CRAF FLEET

Air Carrier Industry Is Characterized By Volatile Economic Performance (PanAm, Braniff, TWA, US Air, United, Delta)

Fleet Composition - Right-Size Their Fleet

Passenger – Migrating To Low-Cost Carriers (LCC)

25% Today, Expect 40% In 10 Years (Load Factors)

Impact: Most LCC’s Do Not Operate Internationally-Capable Aircraft (B-767, B-777, MD-11)

Increased MOGs & Closure Times, Decreased Throughput

Legacy Carriers Reducing Fleets – Less International Capacity

Cargo – Stable to Minimal Growth In the Next 10 Years

Code Sharing Increasing Each Year – Disincentive For Air Carriers to Expand International, Long-Range Fleets

We’re all familiar with the names of air carriers on this slide – but haven’t seen the particular tail flash of 3 carriers. For good reason, Pan Am, Braniff and TWA no longer exist. United & US Air are in bankruptcy and there is talk of the latter liquidating, and Delta is on the verge of bankruptcy.

Let’s put some numbers to US Air, United and Delta capabilities currently in CRAF, Stage III:

In the next 10 years, we’ll see a continuing shift in passenger fleet composition. Already, about 25% of the market has transformed to a low-cost carrier structure, and predications indicate that will continue to about 40% by 2014.

What this means is that carriers are shifting to a fleet that no longer is long-range international capable, nor able to carry 340 troops at a time.

Obvious fallout is increased MOGs, longer closure times, and decreased throughput

In the next 10 years there will be little change in the cargo carriers that will impact CRAF capability.

As the major carriers transition to a LCC structure and their international, long-range capability is decreased, they will make up for it by code-sharing their seats with other foreign carriers with international, long-range capable aircraft. These aircraft are not available to the DOD as CRAF participants due to several different laws which direct the DOD to use US-flagged carriers.

Tails – Pax Tails – AE Capability - Pax Capability – AE

US Air 9 10 2,160 1,650

Delta 23 35 4,989 7,070

United 127 28,960

Total 159 45 36,109 8,720

Tails – Pax Tails – AE Capability - Pax Capability – AE

US Air 9 10 2,160 1,650

Delta 23 35 4,989 7,070

United 127 28,960

Total 159 45 36,109 8,720

CRAF ACCESS TO A

COMBAT AOR

TRANSCOM/AMC/CC Stated Position: “CRAF Will Not Be Asked To Go Where We Would Continue To Send Organic Aircraft Based On Threat and Risk Assessment”

ADUSD (TP) and AF/XP/XO Supports This Position

Not “Zero Risk” Operation

COCOM Intel & AMC TWG Evaluates Every Mission – Demonstrated Threat; AMC/A3 Decides Go/No-Go

Theater Ballistic Missile Rings, CBRNE, MANPADs

Transload Operations Required

JP 3-17 & 4-0, TRANSCOM & AMC OMNIBUS State The Need For Transload Ops When Employing CRAF Into Areas w/ Unacceptable Threat Levels

No Domestic / Int’l Stds for Chemical “Cleanliness”

CRAF will not be sent into known/demonstrated high risk areas – OSD, AF, USTC, AMC positions

Covenant w/ air carriers, w/ which they use to project “risk”. Remember, CRAF participation is a business decision, where risk is balanced against financial incentives. Increase risk – may reduce/lose future participation.

DOD realizes there is a degree of risk in every mission. Theater Intel, in concert with AMC TWG evaluates risk in each theater. Working to evaluate risk airport by airport, instead of country-wide, or large geographic region-wide.

AMC makes final determination whether or not adequate protection afforded to the CRAF carrier.

Joint Pubs, Warplans, and COCOM / MAJCOM OMNIBUS language acknowledge transload doctrine – CRAF will not go to the FEBA, or where threat is too high.

OK, we understand it is possible to change language in regulations, in warplans, in MAJCOM-level directives. But if a CRAF carrier is exposed to a chemical event, what then? Has the DOD just bought it’s first B-747 static display? And the long-term implications to the CRAF program will likely be minimal participation, or at worst, its dissolution.

There are not domestic nor int’l cleanliness standards established. If that B-747 lands at a contaminated field declared “safe” for off-load ops, to what standard has the field been cleaned to? Will the int’l community accept that standard?

Once the B-747 leaves that airfield, it will again be transiting the capitals of the world – the Frankfurts, the Madrids, the Londons, the Sydneys, the Hong Kongs. Will these host nations allow it to land?

No air carrier will accept that risk, and instead, will elect to not participate, or if in the middle of a contract year, elect to exercise it’s right of refusal.

DOD AUTHORITY OVER

CRAF ASSETS

No Statutory Authority to Force Air Carriers Into Harm’s Way – Work Rules May Restrict Crewing Any Aircraft Scheduled For ‘High Risk Missions’

FAA Rules Still Govern Under Activation

FAA Country Restrictions (OIF - SFAR 77)

Air Carriers Unwilling to Accept Increased Risk

Following DS/DS, Two Air Carriers Did Not Renew Their CRAF Participation

Company and Captain “Refusals” During OIF & DS/DS

Expecting CRAF To Meet Unrealistic Expectations Potential For Adverse Mission Impact

Last law that authorized US to nationalize industrial assets such as aircraft (50 App. USC Section 2081 (Section 201 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 [DPA]) was repealed in 1950s.

Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR)-77: Limits civil air carrier operations into Iraq (restricted overflight only, no landing). Similar FARs have been issued during previous hostilities, and we anticipate them being issued for future hostilities.

LIMFAC: Air carriers still have to comply w/ SFARs as they are published, so no guarantee carriers will have FAA “permission” to fly into forward areas.

Following DS/DS, American Airlines renewed their CRAF participation with only one aircraft and United Air Lines withdrew completely from the program – this action imposed a lost capability of 88 airframes, and 26,303 passenger seats.

During DS/DS, two carriers exercised “right of refusal” – brought flow to a halt for approximately 24 hours, and even then, several carriers returned to operations but only during daylight hours, and other carriers didn’t return to operations until after the cease fire (* IAW legal confines of the contract.*)

During OIF, several instances of captains refusing to fly msns from ISB to AOR (* IAW legal confines of the contract.*)

We have to keep sight of the fact the CRAF is composed of civilian airlines, crewed by civilians, and if we put undue expectations on their contribution to the execution of war plans, we set ourselves up for failure

Some of you may understand that US-flagged carriers can now fly into Iraqi airspace. That’s true, but there are several significant restrictions in place that first must be met:

Compelling need validated by requesting gov’t agency, with accompanying plan to mitigate risk to be approved by FAA

Carrier assumes all risk; will indemnify gov’t for all losses, to include cargo and personnel; will assume risk for crew and hull

Changes have been in place since April, and even today, no air carrier has come forward willing to meet these restrictions. The risk of losing an aircraft is just too huge.

DOD AUTHORITY OVER

CRAF ASSETS (Con’t)

No Authorization / Law to Nationalize Airlines

Challenges to Enacting Nationalization Legislation

Air Carriers & Unions Opposed

No Mechanism to “Nationalize” Crews

US-Registered, but Foreign-Owned Aircraft

Dealing w/ Civilian Companies and Personnel

Expecting CRAF To Meet Unrealistic Expectations Potential For Adverse Mission Impact

Currently there is no legislative authority allowing for the “nationalization” of CRAF carriers, and there is no interest in the Congress or in the industry to get such language instituted

Although existing CRAF contracts dictate that when an air carrier responds to the solicitation, they are stating aircraft being identified for participation will be allowed to do so – “permission granted” if you will, from the agency/bank holding the lease – which may be an off-shore entity.

But after a CRAF activation, the lessor may rewrite the lease limiting the air carrier to prevent use the aircraft as a CRAF participant, limiting future participation rates in subsequent FYs

HERE’S WHAT YOU HAVE

Organic Fleet

We Own Fleet

We Control Support Infrastructure

We Have OPCON

Authority to Put Mission Into Harm’s Way

UCMJ Authority Over Crew

Fleet Equipped & Crews Trained for Combat

HAZMAT Carried In Cargo Bay

CRAF Fleet

Airline / Bank Owns Fleet

Airline Controls Support Infrastructure

Airline Has OPCON

If Mission Directed Into Harm’s Way, Airline / Crew Can Refuse

Fleet Not Equipped, Nor Crews Trained For Combat

No HAZMAT In Cabin

AUGMENTATION, NOT SUBSTITUTION

Cannot plan for war w/ CRAF resources the same way you can plan for war w/ organic assets.

With organic assets, war fighter has immediate access to combat-specialized fleet and infrastructure to support flying mission into harm’s way, and authority over crew. Additionally, HAZMAT can be carried in cargo area with troops, so they deplane ready for mission

With CRAF fleet, war fighter has access to logistics-orientated (cargo & pax movement) fleet, but with contractual and real-world limitations.

CRAF fleet control influenced by third party, whether that be a bank or lessor, or perhaps a Board of Directors or Shareholders.

CRAF fleet is more dependent on materiel handling equipment (air stairs, belt loaders, etc.), and other support equipment.

If mission is directed into harm’s way – either perceived or real – airline may refuse, or captain may refuse mission.

No HAZMAT in cabin - troops cannot have their ammo, etc. with them, but have to marry up with it from aircraft’s belly prior to mission execution.

Again, the CRAF augments the organic fleet, it isn’t a substitution for ‘grey tails.’

CRAF – GREAT CAPABILITY WITHIN ITS CONSTRUCT

CRAF Provides Airlift For:

93 Percent of Passenger Movement

37 Percent of Air Cargo Movement

Augmentation Capability That Enables DOD To Meet Its Transportation Requirements …

… With Limitations

Civilian Operators Not Under Complete DOD Control

Focus Is Civilian, Commercial Business

Employed Within Proper Construct, CRAF Provides Reliable, Sustainable & Predictable Support to the War-Fighters

QUESTIONS?

BACK UP SLIDES

Activation (can be ‘selective’):

Minimum of 30 Days – 15 Days Notice to De-activate

Pay For A Minimum Of 8 Hours Per Day – Regardless Of Use (Approx $1.46B Per Month For Stage III Pax)

Stage I = $165M Per Month; Stage II = $535M Per Month

30 Days x 8 Hrs/Day x 500 Miles/Hr = 120,000 Miles/Aircraft

Tasked Same As Organic – Through TACC; Although Air Carriers Retain ‘Right to Refuse’

(Work historical timelines here – and have b/u slide available.)

You’re familiar with the Stages of CRAF activation, Stage I, Stage II, and Stage III. In addition to activating the different stages of CRAF, the Commander, USTC also can select what portions of that particular stage to activate – a “surgical activation” if you would.

For instance, in the Feb ’03 CRAF activation, only Stage I was activated, and in that Stage the Long-range, International Passenger capability was targeted.

Desire for all CRAF stage activation to be preceded by “warning order” prior to execution order, or “Activation Message.”

Upon receipt of the activation message, the carriers have 24 hours (Stages I and II) or 48 hours (Stage III) to have their aircraft ready for positioning.

Must be tasked w/ specific mission w/in 72 hours or affected tail numbers are automatically released back to the air carrier and cannot be re-activated for a period of five days.

Computation:

30 days x 8 hours/day x 500 miles/hour = 120,000 miles/per aircraft

FY05 rate = $0.09149/miles

Stage I costs = $165M; Stage II costs = $535M

Legacy Carriers Reducing Fleets – Less International Capacity

Legacy Carriers Have Lost 10% Of TRANSCON Capability

LCC’s Has Grown From 7% To 23% Of Market In Same Time Period (1997-2003)

Current Trend Will Cost Legacy Carriers Further Market Share Loss And Fleet Downsizing

LCC Fleets Predominately Comprised of B-737 or A-319 Aircraft

Code Sharing Increasing Each Year – Not Promoting Expansion of Long Range, International Fleets – Need Back-Up Slide Data

(Con’t)

Activation

World Events Driving Towards Increased Activation Potential and Frequency (Longer Activation Periods)

Air Carriers Are Activation Adverse

Scheduled Service Providers Lose Market Share (American & United Withdrew From CRAF Following DS Activation)

Air Carrier Pressure to NOT Activate Stage III During DS

Continued / Frequent Activation Increases Risk

Carriers Will No Longer Participate In Program, or Participate At Reduced Levels

CRAF STAGES & CAPABILITY --

CARRIERS’ PARTICIPATION @ EACH LEVEL

Stage I Stage II Stage III

Passenger Aircraft 50 154 441

No of Pax (400 # ea.) 10,929 35,438 93, 429

Cargo Aircraft 31 74 244

Cargo Amt (stons) 2,574 5,931 16,998

54.5 MTM/D

(MRS 05 – Stage III)

CAPABILITY COMPARISON BULK VS. OVERSIZE

B-747 Twice As Efficient At Carrying Bulk Vs. Oversize

1 B-747s on the ground at one time

5+00 hour ground time

5 aircraft per day (24 hours / 5.00 = 4.8)

59 tons per aircraft

295 tons per day of oversize cargo only

1 B-747 on the ground at one time

4+00 hour ground time

6 aircraft per day (24 hours / 4.00 = 6)

98 tons per aircraft

588 tons per day of bulk cargo only

DESERT STORM

ACTIVATION / DEACTIVATION

8 Aug 90 – First Volunteer Civil Aircraft Departs U.S.

9 Aug 90 – CRAF Activation Seriously Considered

11 Aug 90 – CRAF Activation Warning Message Sent

17 Aug 90 – CRAF Activation Message Released

18 Aug 90 – CRAF Stage I Activated

21 Cargo & 17 Passenger Aircraft Available For Call-Up

17 Jan 91 – CRAF Stage II Activated

Call-Up of Cargo Only to Support Air War

10 Mar 91 – Stage II Passenger Aircraft Called Up

18 Mar 91 – Cargo Aircraft in Stage II Call-Up Released

17 May 01 – CRAF Stage II Deactivated

24 May 01 – CRAF Stage I Deactivated

OP IRAQI FREEDOM

8 Feb 03, 1736Z – CRAF Activation Warning Message Released

8 Feb 03, 2257Z – CRAF Activation Message Released, with Activation Effective At 2222Z.

18 Jun 03, 0001Z – CRAF Deactivated

CRAF--

CAN’T GO TO WAR WITHOUT ‘EM

Supporting War-Fighter For 53 Years

War Plans Rely on CRAF:

Long Range Int’l Capability – 202+ MPM/D In Stage III

“Example” OPLAN - 52K+ STons Bulk Cargo In Stage III

OEF/OIF

Pax = ~93%

Cargo = ~37%

GWOT FY03

Pax = ~73%

Cargo = ~9%

Great Capability – But With Limitations

CRAF has been supporting the war-fighter for over 50 years now, and the DOD heavily relies upon CRAF to execute the war plans.

Sir, you and the rest of the GOSC understand the importance of CRAF and what capabilities it brings, but before you are a couple examples

For instance, just the international, long-range segment of CRAF provides a robust capability of providing slightly over 202 million-passenger-miles per day

The cargo capability of CRAF is similarly impressive such that planners for an “example” OPLAN count on CRAF to move over 52,000 short tons of bulk cargo.

And with a snap-shot in time, there are over 1,000 aircraft participating in the CRAF program.

May I caution you not to be misled by these statistics? Because as impressive as they are, and as much as we rely on CRAF to execute the war plans, it all comes with limitations, which will be discussed as this brief unfolds.

CAPABILITY

Let’s Assume a 16 PAA Flying Squadron…

CRAF I Adds Over 5 Squadron Equivalents

CRAF II Adds Over 18 Squadron Equivalents

CRAF III Adds Nearly 58 Squadron Equivalents

CRAF Can Rapidly “Super Size” AMC’s Capability

Maj Gen Volcheff doesn’t like this chart!!

Daily Slide

CARGO PAX TOTAL 2 Feb 03 Activity CARGO PAX

CRAF I 31 47 78 MISSIONS IN THE SYSTEM 34 32

CRAF II 77 135 212 ORIGINATING MISSIONS/REQ 13/13 11/13*

CRAF III 252 433 685

New Grid

CRAF I CRAF II CRAF III

PAX 50 154 441

CARGO 32 74 244

AE 0 25 45

TOTALS 82 253 730

Sheet3

UNKNOWN-0

UNKNOWN-1.bin