Appendix F Examples.pdf

Appendix H Examples

Example A Flow Diagram

Best Practices for PAC Project and groov

PAGE

4 TECHNICAL NOTE • Form 2073-130625 the Powerup chart to reset values for important variables in case of a power cycle. Instead of making each variable persistent, you can write their values periodically to a persistent table. The default values block checks to see if a value is zero; if it is, it’s replaced by the value from the table.

Add a block named End (empty) to the end of the Powerup chart (and other flow-through charts) just to make it clear that the chart stops. By the way, you don’t need to put the Stop Chart command at the end of a chart; if there is no more logic, the chart will stop by itself.

Charts that monitor essential or time-critical pieces of your process, such as emergency stops on dangerous equipment or I/O that must be monitored continuously, should use looping logic so they are constantly running. Looping logic should also be used for alarm control and communication with an external program or device.

Take advantage of sample charts and code shared by Opto 22 engineers as well as by other customers on the OptoForums. Here’s a list of the greatest sample hits available on the forums. Pay special attention to the samples under “Our Product Support Group (PSG) Recommends.” Your strategy should include a chart similar to the I/O Enabler, for example, to make sure that any I/O unit that inadvertently goes offline is promptly re-enabled.

For a complex strategy you may want to create a marshalling chart—a chart to monitor all charts. The marshalling chart can gather status data, check chart sequencing, perform simple error checking, and act as the “glue” for a large strategy.

Space within Charts

Keep charts as simple as possible. Lay out your charts neatly, so it’s easy to follow chart logic. Keep all your blocks the same size, and make your connection lines neat and clearly visible.

Try to keep charts compact so you don’t have to scroll side to side. When possible, standardize on a size for Action blocks that is not as tall as the default. The smaller size saves vertical space in the chart. Use the smallest reasonable space between blocks to keep the chart more compact, but make sure connections and arrowheads are clearly visible.

http://www.opto22.com/community/showthread.php?t=453

Example B One Line Network and Peripheral Diagram

H1ECXDMB

Text Box

11"X17" PLOT SET 25 JAN 2010

Example C Table for Data List

RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 - Tag Listing Page 3 RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 (Controller) 2/27/2012 1:58:58 PM

... Program\Pierhouses\Final Programs\Gate 1\RCB_LTU_PH1_4_12_11_312ctsperrevFinal.ACD

RSLogix 5000

Name Value Data Type Scope Alarm_Ack_from_OS_1_or_2 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1

Input for alarm acknowledgment. (This is used to acknowledge all alarms) Alarm_Ack_from_OS_1_or_2 - MainProgram/Alarms - 17(XIO), 19(XIO), 20(XIO), 22(XIO), 23(XIO), 5(XIO), 7(XIO), 8(XIO)

Alarm_at_Gate 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Alarm_at_Gate - MainProgram/Alarms - *26(OTE)

Alarm_at_Gate_to_Shutdown 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Alarm_at_Gate_to_Shutdown - MainProgram/Alarms - *25(OTE) Alarm_at_Gate_to_Shutdown - MainProgram/Gate_Position_Setpoint - 7(XIC) Alarm_at_Gate_to_Shutdown - MainProgram/Raise_and_Lower_Gate - 1(XIO), 7(XIO) Alarm_at_Gate_to_Shutdown - MainProgram/Stop_Gate - 1(XIC)

Aux_Lower_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s TIMER RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 This timer is initiated after the gate is initiated to lower and the gate lowering aux. contact is not energized.

Aux_Lower_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s - MainProgram/Alarms - *21(TON) Aux_Lower_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s.DN - MainProgram/Alarms - 22(XIC)

Aux_Lower_Contacts_Failed_to_Close 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Aux_Lower_Contacts_Failed_to_Close - MainProgram/Alarms - *22(OTE), 17(XIC), 22(XIC), 23(XIC), 25(XIC), 26(XIC)

Aux_Raise_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s TIMER RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 This timer is initiated after gate is initiated to raise and the gate raising aux. contact is not energized.

Aux_Raise_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s - MainProgram/Alarms - *18(TON) Aux_Raise_Cntacts_Failed_to_Close_in_10s.DN - MainProgram/Alarms - 19(XIC)

Aux_Raise_Contacts_Failed_to_Close 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Aux_Raise_Contacts_Failed_to_Close - MainProgram/Alarms - *19(OTE), 17(XIC), 19(XIC), 20(XIC), 25(XIC), 26(XIC)

Battery_not_Detected 0 BOOL RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Battery_not_Detected - MainProgram/Operating_Screens_Interface - *15(OTE)

Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts 0 DINT RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Gate position in feet entered by the operator is converted to counts. 0-68 ft.=100-65,000 counts.

Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts - Gate_Position_Program/Gate_Position_Routine - *0(CPT), *1(CPT), *2(CPT), *3(CPT), *4(CPT), *5(CPT), *6(CPT) Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts - MainProgram/Raise_and_Lower_Gate - 0(LES), 2(ADD) Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts - MainProgram/Stop_Gate - *2(SUB)

Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts_With_Offset 0 DINT RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1

The addition is needed to compensate for the GTor = to in the Lower Rung.

Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts_With_Offset - MainProgram/Raise_and_Lower_Gate - *2(ADD), 4(GEQ), 6(GEQ) Commanded_Gate_Pos_In_Counts_With_Offset - MainProgram/Stop_Gate - *3(ADD)

Counter_for_Counts_to_Feet_PB COUNTER RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1 Counter_for_Counts_to_Feet_PB - MainProgram/Manual_Feet_to_Counts_via_PB - *0(CTU), *203(RES)

Example D Table for Data List I‐O

AC_Inputs - Ladder Diagram Page 27 RC_Byrd_Local_Pierhouse_1:MainTask:MainProgram 2/27/2012 1:59:04 PM Total number of rungs in routine: 8 ... Program\Pierhouses\Final Programs\Gate 1\RCB_LTU_PH1_4_12_11_312ctsperrevFinal.ACD

RSLogix 5000

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.1

Input from Local/Remote Switch

(Local) Sel_Sw_In_Local_Mode

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.2

Input from Local/Remote Switch

(Remote) Sel_Sw_In_Remote_Mode

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.3

Aux. contact indicating gate is lowering (input from PCLR Lower Relay).

Gate_Lowering_Aux_Cont

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.4

Aux. contact indicating gate is rising (input from

PCRR Raise Relay).

Gate_Rising_Aux_Cont

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.0

Current Sensing Relay CSRR Relay

(Hoist Motor Overloads)

Gate_Hoist_Motor_OLs

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.5

120V Input from Surge Protector

Primary Side

TPD1

AC Input Module 1 Slot 3

Local:3:I.Data.6 Pushbutton_for_Counts_to_Feet

Example E Hardware Inventory List

Hardware Inventory Table

Hostname Make Model Location Funciton IP Address MAC Address OS OS Version Memory Hard Drive Capacity

No. Of Network Interfaces

Special Purpose Communcitaions Cards Video Card(s)

OP_WRKSTA DELL OPTIPLEX 990 Control Room Operator's HMI 192.168.1.150 0A:11:0B:43:12:SV

Microsoft

Windows 7 SP1 4GB 700 GB 1 None None (on board)

Example F Device Wiring Diagrams

0 0

IP

P

W P :d m s \E -1

A .d g n

H E

C X J J

.1

:1

/1

/2

L

R H -N

E T

A P

P \C

A D

A P

P S \A

P P

S \L

R H

W o rk s p a c e \W o rk s p a c e \P ro je c tW is e I n te rP lo t

O rg a n iz e r\ m is c \d e s ig n s c ri p t\ s td v .p e n

C P ro g ra m F il e s x

C o m m o n F il e s \I n te rP lo t\

IP

L O

T \m is c \c o lo r.

c tb

-A

U G -2

:3

W

IR

IN

G D

IA

G R

A M

C H

IC

A G

O S

A N

IT

A R

Y S

H

IP

C

A N

A L

C H

IC

A G

O F

IS

H B

A R

R

IE

R S

R O

M E

O V

IL

L E

IL

B A

R R

IE

R

B

J

H U

N T

IN

G T

O N D

IS

T R

IC

T

U .S

A R

M Y C

O R

P S O

F E

N G

IN

E E

R S

N T

IN

G T

O N

W E

S T V

IR

G

IN

IA

E

E T O

F

E-107 A

E -1

A .d g n

C O

N T

R O

L B

O X

O P

E R

A T

O R R

O O

M

-S

+S

-OUT

+OUT

G N

D

IHN 24-3.6

INTERNATIONAL POWER

POWER SUPPLY

24V DC, 3.6A

4 2 3 1 5

JUMPERS

V

V

V

V

ETHERNET SWITCH

N-TRON 306FX2-N-ST

BLACK

RED

POWER SUPPLIES

CAN USE REDUNDANT

RX

TX

1 2

3 4

CONNECTIONS

ST

CONNECTIONS

RJ45

P R

O C

E S

S O

R

S N

A P P

A C

R

O P

T O

TX

RX

COM

RTS

CTS

COM

DTR

DCD

E-NET

E-NET

OFF

ONAUTO

OFF

ONAUTO

1 2

M0-1

M0-2

M0-3

M0-4

M0-5

M0-6

M0-7

M0-8

M1-1

M1-2

M1-3

M1-4

M1-5

M1-6

M1-7

M1-8

3 4 5 6 8 9

10 11 12

SNAP-PAC-RCK16

OFF

ONAUTO

OFF

ONAUTO

OFF

ONAUTO

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

13 14 15

POWER SUPPLY

5V,4A LOGIC

SNAP-PS5

OPTO 22

GND

120VAC

GND

RED

BLACK

10A, 120/250V

10VN1

EMI FILTER

LOAD

LINE

M O

D U

L E

S

A

D

A

P

BROWN BLUE

LEGEND

TO 2 POLE CB (BROWN)

TO 2 POLE CB (BLUE)

GND

F

S E

B

R O

W N

E M I F

IL

T E

R

V N

B

L U

E

C A

C A

B L

OPTO 22 CONTROLLER

THE CHART BELOW DETAILS THE CORRELATION.

**NOTE: SOME WIRES HAVE WIRE DESIGNATIONS THAT DIFFER ON EACH END,

L E

A V

G

N

C L

O S

U R

E

F

IB

IC

B L

E S

EXTERIOR

ON ENCLOSURE

INDICATING LIGHT

21 46

12VAC-C

120VAC-H10

120VAC-H11

120VAC-H12

120VAC-H13

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

GREEN

WIRE CORRELATION CHART

NOTES

CUT LINE A

CUT LINE A

CUT LINE A

CUT LINE A

G

R E

Y

T P

U T

S N

A P

O A

C

M A

T P

U T

S N

A P

O A

C

M A

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

M0-2

M0-4

M0-6

M0-8

M1-2

M1-4

M1-6

M1-8

120VAC-H9

120VAC-H8

120VAC-H7

120VAC-H6

120VAC-H5

120VAC-H4

120VAC-H3

120VAC-H2

120VAC-H1

WIRE NO.

DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

WIRE NO.

BLOCK

TERMINAL

WIRE NO.

DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

WIRE NO.

BLOCK

TERMINAL

WIRE NO.

DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

WIRE NO.

BLOCK

TERMINAL

WIRE NO.

DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

WIRE NO.

BLOCK

TERMINAL

ASSEMBLY (BLUE)

TO RESISTOR

TERMINAL BLOCK-DIN RAIL

JUMPER

FUSE INDICATOR-DIN RAIL

FUSE BLOCK WITH BLOWN

BLOCK-DIN RAIL

MULTI-LEVEL TERMINAL

m

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

A

IM

A iS

R C

CH0

CH1

A-D

CHANNEL

TWO

OFF

ONAUTO

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

OFF

ONAUTO

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

OFF

ONAUTO

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

IN PARALLEL

BROWN/RED/RED/GOLD

A 1.2KOHM RESISTOR

CHANNELS SHOWN HAS

OFF

ONAUTO

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

OFF

ONAUTO

A C

D C

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

ID

C

M A

OFF

ONAUTO

T P

N

A P

O D

C

M A

T.B. 127

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

A

IM

A iS

R C

CH0

CH1

A-D

CHANNEL

TWO

IN

P U

T

S N

A P

A

IM

A iS

R C

CH0

CH1

3.6A P.S.

TO 24VDC

A-D

CHANNEL

TWO

CH0

CH1

3.6A P.S.

TO 24VDC

D-A

CHANNEL

TWO

T P

U T

S N

A P

A O

A iS

R C

CH0

D-A

CHANNEL

SINGLE

V

T P

U T

S N

A P

A O

V

M3-1

M3-2

M3-3

M3-4

M3-5

M3-6

M3-7

M3-8

M4-1

M4-2

M4-3

M4-4

M4-5

M4-6

M4-7

M4-8

M5-1

M5-2

M5-3

M5-4

M5-5

M5-6

M5-7

M5-8

M6-1

M6-2

M6-3

M6-4

M6-5

M6-6

M6-7

M6-8

M7-1

M7-2

M7-3

M7-4

M7-5

M7-6

M7-7

M7-8

M8-1

M8-2

M8-3

M8-4

M8-5

M8-6

M8-7

M8-8

M11-2

M11-4

M11-6

M11-8

(RED)

M15-1

(BLACK)

M15-2

G N

D

G

N D

G

N D

G N

D

G

N D

G

N D

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

G

R E

Y

B

L A

C K

G

R E

Y

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

B

L A

C K

WIRE NO.

DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

WIRE NO.

BLOCK

TERMINAL

SPARE (PAIR 8)

GENERATOR #1

SPARE (PAIR 7)

GENERATOR #1

SPARE (PAIR 6)

GENERATOR #1

SPARE (PAIR 5)

GENERATOR #1

SPARE (PAIR 4)

GENERATOR #1

SPARE (PAIR 1)

CONTACT CLOSED=AUTO

GENERATOR #1 MAN/AUTO

SPARE (PAIR 2)

CONTACT OPEN=RUN

GENERATOR #1 RUN

SPARE (PAIR 3)

CONTACT OPEN=FAULT

GENERATOR #1 FAULT

B

L A

C K

R

E D

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

B

L A

C K

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

R

E D

W H

IT

E

B L

A C

K

IN

P U

T

S P

A R

E m

A T

T

S H

IE

L D

B L

A C

K

R E

D P

O

IN

T

D E

W

B L

A C

K

R E

D

M P

E R

A T

U R

E

C O

N T

R

O M

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

120VAC-N

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

RELAY-16

12VAC-H

RELAY24

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

12VAC-H

24V COM

24V COM

M11-2

M11-4

M11-6

M11-8

M12-2

M12-1

M13-6

M13-5

M13-2

M13-1

M14-1

M14-5

M14-6

M14-2

M15-1

M15-2

(RED)

M14-1

(BLACK)

M14-2

(RED)

M14-5

(BLACK)

M14-6

(RED)

M13-1

(BLACK)

M13-2

(RED)

M13-5

(BLACK)

M13-6

(RED)

M12-1

(BLACK)

M12-2

M3-2

M3-8

M4-2

M4-4

M4-6

M5-4

1. SEE E-31 (AS-BUILT DRAWING DATED 2-28-2011) AND E-107B&C FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

S E

B

R O

W N

I F

IL

T E

R

V N

B

L U

E

SUPPLY (BLUE)

TO OPTO 22 POWER

TO FUSE 6 (BROWN)

TO 1.2A P.S.

TO T.B. 38 WIRE LABELED 52

M10-2

M10-4

M10-6

M10-8

BE LABELED M9-XX.

WHERE THEY SHOULD

ARE LABELED M10-XX

**NOTE**WIRE NUMBERS

TO MOD. 10 M11-7

M10-2

M10-4

M10-6

M10-8

BE LABELED M10-XX.

WHERE THEY SHOULD

ARE LABELED M11-XX

**NOTE**WIRE NUMBERS

SUPPLY OUT+ (RED)

TO 1.2A POWER

M7-1

M7-3

M7-5

M7-7

BE LABELED M11-XX.

WHERE THEY SHOULD

ARE LABELED M7-XX

**NOTE**WIRE NUMBERS

SEE NOTE 2.

TO MOD. 11 AS SHOWN IN CHART AND MODULE NOTES.

2. M10 SERIES WIRED TO MOD. 9, M11 SERIES WIRED TO MOD. 10 AND M7 SERIES WIRED

RELAY-1

RELAY-2

RELAY-3

RELAY-4

RELAY-5

RELAY-6

RELAY-7

RELAY-8

RELAY-9

RELAY-10

RELAY-17

RELAY-18

RELAY-16

RELAY-15

RELAY-14

RELAY-13

RELAY-12

RELAY-11

RELAY-19

RELAY-20

RELAY-21

RELAY-22

RELAY-23

RELAY-24

M3-4,6

2,4,6,8

MOD11-

M7-1

M7-3

M7-5

M7-7

M10-7

TO MOD. 9

M4-8, M7-4

M5-2, M7-2

M5-6, M7-6

M5-8, M7-8

M6-8, M8-2

M6-6, M8-4

M6-4, M8-6

M6-2, M8-8

C O

N N

E C

T

IO

N

N O

12VAC-H 51

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

CH0

CH1

CH2

CH3

S O

L

IC

IT

A T

IO

N N

O

F

IL

E N

A M

E

D W

N B

Y

C K

D B

Y

D E

S

IG

N E

D B

Y

D E

S C

R

IP

T

IO

N

D

2 3

C

4 5

A

B

M A

R K

A P

P R

D A

T E

F

IL

E N

U M

B E

R

S

IZ

E

S U

B M

IT

T E

D B

Y

P L

O T S

C A

L E

P L

O T D

A T

E

D A

T E

M A

R K

D E

S C

R

IP

T

IO

N

C O

N T

R A

C T N

O

IDENTIFICATION

SHEET

D A

T E

A P

P R

SHEET OF

®of Engineers

US Army Corps

Huntington District

P

W P :d m s \E -1

B .d g n

H E

C X J J

.1

:1

/1

/2

L

R H -N

E T

A P

P \C

A D

A P

P S \A

P P

S \L

R H

W o rk s p a c e \W o rk s p a c e \P ro je c tW is e I n te rP lo t

O rg a n iz e r\ m is c \d e s ig n s c ri p t\ s td v .p e n

C P ro g ra m F il e s x

C o m m o n F il e s \I n te rP lo t\

IP

L O

T \m is c \c o lo r.

c tb

-A

U G -2

IN

G D

IA

G R

A M

C H

IC

A G

O S

A N

IT

A R

Y S

H

IP

C

A N

A L

C H

IC

A G

O F

IS

H B

A R

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9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

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9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

IN PARALLEL AS SHOWN. TYPICAL.

RESISTOR GREEN/BLUE/GOLD/GOLD

RELAY SHOWN HAS A 5.6OHM CUT LINE A

CUT LINE A

NOTES

TO T.B. 54

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

RELAY

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

TYPICAL

12VAC RELAY

OMRON MY4

13 14

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

RELAY

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

13 14

RELAY

9 5

10 6

11 7

12 8

TO T.B. 55 TO T.B. 56 TO T.B. 57 TO T.B. 58 TO T.B. 59 TO T.B. 60

TO 4-5

TO T.B. 61

TO T.B. 62 TO T.B. 63 TO T.B. 64 TO T.B. 65 TO T.B. 66 TO T.B. 67 TO T.B. 68 TO T.B. 69

TO T.B. 71 TO T.B. 70

1. SEE E-31 (AS-BUILT DRAWING DATED 2-28-2011) AND E-107A&C FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

TO T.B. 122

SIDE LEFT SIDE (GREY)

TO 3VR1 FILTER LOAD

TO M3-1 TO M3-3 TO M3-5 TO M3-7 TO M4-1 TO M4-3 TO M4-7

CUT LINE A

CUT LINE A

TO M5-1 TO M5-3

RELAY NOT PRESENT

RELAY BASE ONLY

TO M5-5 TO M5-7 TO M6-1 TO M6-3 TO M6-5 TO M6-7

SIDE RIGHT SIDE (GREY)

TO 3VR1 FILTER LOAD

TO T.B. 53

TO M7-1 TO M7-3

TO T.B. 128

TO M7-5

TO T.B. 129

TO M7-7

TO T.B. 130

TO M8-1

TO T.B. 131

TO M8-3

TO T.B. 132

TO M8-5

TO T.B. 133

TO M8-7

TO T.B. 108

TO T.B. 72

TO T.B. 51

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IDENTIFICATION

SHEET

D A

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P

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CONDOR

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PRI

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PIN

NOT USED

12.6VCT 2.381A

TERM 6- TERM 8- TERM 10:

TERM 4- TERM 5:115V

TERM 1-TERM 2:115V

HAMMOND 186D12 TRANSFORMER

G

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G

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G

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NOTES

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THIS ASSEMBLY.

TO THROUGH RESISTORS TO

(COMMON). FUSES 6-18 WIRED

POINTS ARE INTERCONNECTED

RESISTOR ASSEMBLY ALL

09876

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1. SEE E-31 (AS-BUILT DRAWING DATED 2-28-2011) AND E-107A&B FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

TRANSFORMER (BROWN)

TO PT.4 ON 120:12VAC

TRANSFORMER (GREY)

TO PT. 6 ON 120:12VAC

SUPPLY 120VAC-H13 (BROWN)

TO OPTO 22 SNAP-PS5 POWER

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

24V,3.6A P.S. PT.3

120VAC-H12 (BROWN) TO

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H9 (BROWN) (M1-7)

LEAVES ENCLOSURE

120VAC-H10 (BLACK)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H8 (BROWN) (M1-5)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H7 (BROWN) (M1-3)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H6 (BROWN) (M1-1)

120VAC-H2 (BROWN) (MO-1)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H3 (BROWN) (MO-3)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H4 (BROWN) (MO-5)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

120VAC-H5 (BROWN) (M0-7)

TO RESISTOR ASSEMBLY (BROWN)

24V,1.2A P.S. PT. 2

120VAC-H1 (BROWN) TO

LINE SIDE

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TO T.B. 29 (BLUE)LOAD SIDE (BLUE)

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MARKED #8 NOT HOOKED UP

MARKED #9 NOT HOOKED UP

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Example G Fish Barrier Hazard

Assessment

Hazard Assessment for Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal

Fish Barrier

Prepared for:

Chicago District

Prepared by:

Protective Design Center

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Omaha, Nebraska

October 2010

Purpose of Assessment

Electrical equipment containing capacitors similar in design to the capacitors used in the fish barriers have failed in a manner that would be hazardous to personnel present in the vicinity. A failure of a capacitor can cause fire, airblast, and fragment hazards to personnel. A comment by SRI on the final design of CSSC Phase IIB indicated a “blast-proof personnel protection system” was needed for the pulsator rooms. Later correspondence from SRI indicates the module walls will contain fragments, and that pressures inside the module will not cause the cabinet to fail. The following assessment is an independent assessment of the hazards caused by the postulated failure condition.

Hazard Discussion

Electrical discharge and dielectric mist conflagration were observed at LLNL to cause explosive and fragment hazards around the module. This is the cause for concern with the CSSC Barrier capacitors. It is assumed that the potential for hazardous failure is associated with full operation capacity of the fish barrier.

A brief research effort was performed in order to better understand the nature of the capacitor failures. A document was provided to the Protective Design Center (PDC), “Pressure Effects Analysis of National Ignition Facility Capacitor Module Events” (Ref. 1), which was released by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). This document summarizes the pressure effects analysis performed by LLNL for the failure of capacitors. Referenced in this document is another LLNL document titled “Mechanical Engineering Safety Note: Analysis and Control of Hazards Associated with NIF Capacitors Module Events” (Ref. 2). This document summarizes the failures which were experienced at First Article NIF Test Module (FANTM) at Sandia National Laboratory for which these pressure calculations are based, and includes calculations by numerous methods to attempt to characterize the events.

There were 5 recorded failures at FANTM. LLNL states that there have been well over a million capacitor shots without failures. The probability of failure was calculated to be 3.1x10-4 explosions/module-shot with a 95% confidence level. Four of the recorded failures were determined to be caused by an open circuit which was caused by poorly soldered connections.

The other failure was in a resistor which failed, producing hazardous fragments and cabinet damage. The internal collateral damage from the failures was relatively minor for all cases but one, in which it was significant.

The estimated peak quasi-static pressure in the module cabinet that could occur during such an event was estimated to be on the order of 11 psig. This pressure resulted in bay pressures less than the tolerance of the bay walls and no pressure relief was needed. This overpressure is assumed to be a static load, so no dynamic loading was addressed. The LLNL bay size was much larger than the bays for the fish barrier, so a similar failure would put higher pressures into the CSSC bays.

Fire Hazard The presence of flammables should be kept to a minimum around the equipment. No further consideration of fire hazard is included here.

Fragment Hazard

General fragment considerations: Fragmentation of the capacitor casing generates the hazardous fragment used in this analysis. The driving energy for this calculation is the stored electrical energy in the capacitor and the burning canola oil. Only the stored electrical energy is significant to contribute to the kinetic energy of the fragment. The burning oil deflagrates and does not contribute to the fragment kinetic energy. Two cases were considered to calculate the potential electrical energy to fly the fragment: first, 528kJ which is the result from the maximum design voltage of 3050V; second 650kJ, which is based on 3400V which is the rated capacitor voltage. To convert electrical energy to an equivalent TNT mass the heat of detonation of 4187 kJ/kg for TNT was used (Ref. 4). The corresponding equivalent charge weights are 0.126 kg TNT and 0.155 kg TNT respectively. Based on these charge weights and the capacitor case mass, the gurney equation (Ref. 5) was used to find a mean initial velocity of a fragment from the capacitor case. A steel cube fragment with a thickness of approximately

0.25 inches was used as the critical fragment.

Capacitor Enclosure Description: The pulsator enclosure drawings shows building 2A enclosures have walls are ¾ inch thick plywood encased in 1/8 inches thick aluminum sheet metal. The building 2A enclosures have discharge covers that are 0.08 inches thick aluminum and filter covers that are 1/8 inches thick aluminum sheet metal. The filter cover thickness was used as the worst case scenario because of the amount of capacitor rack material in-between the capacitors and the discharge covers.

Personnel Hazards: Personnel are located outside of the building 2B pulser room during capacitor operation; therefore a fragment would have to leave the pulsar room to be considered a hazard. The ways for a fragment to leave the pulser room are that the fragment could go through the blast damper, pulsator enclosure, blast door, personnel door, pulser room wall or roof. Based on possible the travel paths the discharge cover on the enclosure in building 2A can be eliminated as possible materials in the travel path. The remaining possible materials that may come in contact with a fragment were evaluated.

Building 2B: The steel blast door has steel sheet metal 0.1046 inches thick (12ga) on each face.

The steel personnel door has steel sheet metal 0.0635 inches thick (16ga) on each face. The cubical walls are 12 inches thick 4 ksi concrete, and the roof at its thinnest is 3.5 inches thick 4 ksi concrete. The building exterior double door has steel sheet metal 0.0516 inches (18ga) thick on each face. The galvanized steel blast damper has galvanized steel 0.1382 inches thick (10ga) per blade.

Building 2A: The walls and roof are considered to be galvanized steel 0.0217 inches thick (26ga).

Table 1: Structural Considerations Element Material Thickness (in)

Building 2B Blast Door Steel 0.2092 Building 2B or 2A Personnel Door

Steel 0.127

Building 2A Pulsator Enclosure Wall

Al and Plywood .25 and .75

Building 2A Pulsator Enclosure Vent

Al 0.08

Building 2B Wall Concrete 12 Building 2B Roof Concrete 3.5 Building 2A Wall Galvanized Steel 0.0217 Building 2A Roof Galvanized Steel 0.0217 Building 2B Exterior Door

Galvanized Steel 0.1032

Building 2B Blast Damper

Galvanized Steel 0.2764

The fragment penetration into material was calculated by the computer software ConWep which is based on UFC 3-340-01. The maximum design fragment penetration into materials at a range of 0.00001 feet is shown in the table below and in Appendix B. The maximum penetration shown in this table is the amount of the specific material thickness required to stop a fragment with the given mass and velocity.

Table 2: Fragment Considerations

Volt s

(kJ)

Charge Weight

(kg-TNT)

Fragment Mass (oz)

Fragment Velocity

(ft/s)

Maximum Penetration Aluminum

(in)

Maximum Penetration

Steel (in)

Maximum Penetration

Concrete (in)

528 0.126 0.00214 3110 0.154 0.0671 0.337

650 0.155 0.00214 3434 0.172 0.0747 0.365 Maximum Fragment Penetrations values from ConWep

Blast Pressure Hazard

Blast pressures are potentially generated by release of electrical energy, and by detonation or deflagration of hydrocarbons. The blast would originate in the module cabinet, and vent to the module bay, then vent to outside. Important parameters to consider are module size, room size, air available for burning oil, vent sizes, electrical energy release, and oil properties.

Two methods of estimating blast and gas pressures are considered. First, the energy release is considered as an equivalent TNT detonation in the module cabinet. The analysis is based on finding the gas pressures generated by an amount of TNT with a heat of detonation that is the same as the energy release due to the electrical and oil energy involved. Venting from the module cabinet and room is analyzed.

The second method is based on a method of estimating effects of electrical energy release from a circuit breaker failure used in page 215 of Ref 4.

Method 1: To find the energy produced and convert it to an equivalent TNT, it must be decided if the canola oil will participate in initial gas pressure production, or if it will burn in later times.

Most fuel-air-explosives use an initial dispersing blast, and a second detonating blast is used to detonate the vapor cloud generated by the dispersing blast. In the case of a capacitor failure there is only a dispersing blast. Some fuel-air-explosives use only one blast, but these have a mixture of liquid fuel and solids. Accidental generation of the oil mist and detonation is unlikely, especially with the safeguards designed into the capacitors. The inside of the module cabinet would not allow good dispersal of the oil, or allow a flame front to propagate in any uniform manner. There is enough oxygen in the cabinet to support the chemical reaction for a burn of 229 ml of oil, but the flammability of canola is much lower than hydrocarbon fuels. A blast based on the 100% review comment would account for 528 KJ electrical and 7800 KJ oil combustion for a total of 8.3 MJ energy. This is the energy equivalent of 2 kg (4.4 lb) TNT, which has heat of detonation of 4187 KJ/kg (Ref 4, table 2-4). The blast pressures and impulses from this explosion would be extensive and destroy the equipment and cabinet. The evidence from the LLNL accidents indicates that there was not a detonation of the oil. Therefore, in this first method of calculating pressures, the oil is not included in calculating an equivalent TNT blast. A model of the module, bay, and outdoors was made in BlastX to model the gas pressures and venting from the module to the bay, to outdoors. Shock pressure calculation was not included since there is not a high order detonation occurring.

BlastX model description: Three rooms are in the models with properties as follows. Output from the program is included in Appendix B.

Building 2A BlastX Model:

Room 1 Building 2A– Pulsator Enclosure: It is sized to have a volume equal to the air volume in the module so that gas pressure and venting will be modeled correctly. The module cabinet is 204” x 92” x 68” inside dimensions. Internal equipment volume was reported to be 1,233,000 cubic inches, but this is almost the entire cabinet volume. So, room 1 is sized based on having 40% air in the cabinet. The explosive source is located in room 1, and since gas only calculation is done, the charge is not located by x, y, z coordinates. The charge in room 1 represents the electrical energy release is 528kJ/4187 kJ/kg = 0.126 kg TNT.

Room 2 Building 2A: Building 2A is approximately 26’ x 70’ x 12.7’.

Room 3 Outside: The maximum room size allowed in BlastX is 1000 ft3 and represents the outdoors.

Building 2B BlastX Model:

Room 1 Building 2B: The pulsator bay is 23’ x 20’ x 16’ but is adjusted to account for volume taken up by equipment. The explosive source is located in room 1, and since gas only calculation is done, the charge is not located by x, y, z coordinates. The charge in room 1 represents the electrical energy release is 528kJ/4187 kJ/kg = 0.126 kg TNT.

Room 2 Outside: The maximum room size allowed in BlastX is 1000 ft3 and represents the outdoors.

Building 2B BlastX Results Summary: The room in building 2B pressure peaked at 0.59 psi with an impulse equal to 11.01 psi-msec.

Building 2A BlastX Results Summary: Building 2A pressure peaked at 0.185 psi with an impulse equal to 27.7 psi-msec.

Pulsator Enclosure: Pressures in the enclosure are a peak of 73.0 psi with an impulse of 45.0 msec. The enclosure wall panels could be damaged by this pressure, and potentially injure personnel in building 2A. Personnel and building components in the room will not be injured or damaged by the pressures.

BlastX output and SBEDS analysis of a wall and a roof beam of building 2B, a wall panel of building 2A and pulsator enclosure wall are include in Appendix B.

Electrical Energy Release Blast Method

The module room has a total volume of 20.9 m3 and a venting area of 3.05 m2. The worst-case 650KJ energy release over one second was used for the maximum rate of energy dissipation for the analysis. With the initial shockwave produced over 10s to 100s of microseconds. The effective heat capacity ratio of 1.4 was also used for the arc. The actual effective heat capacity ratio of the arc will be much less, so therefore 1.4 was conservative. The point used to find the pressure was 0.5 meters from the arc. The method of calculating blast from an electrical circuit breaker was from Fundamental Studies in Engineering 5 by Baker, Cox, Westine, Kulesz and Strehlow. This method produced a shock pressure of 29.19 kPa (4.23 PSI) and a stress rate of

8885.9 Pa/s (1.29 PSI/S). Some assumptions that may need to be adjusted are, over one second the 650KJ is released to get to watts, the effective module volume and the distance from the arc.

Human Tolerance

DOE criteria for protecting personnel is limiting pressure to 5 psi, limiting fragments to11 ft-lb energy, and preventing structural collapse. For DoD there is criteria presented in Reference 4.

Human tolerance for blast with a fast rising pressure wave is about 5 psi for the threshold of eardrum rupture, and 50 percent rupture would be at 15 psi. Lung damage and body impact from translation occur with higher pressures, so the 5 psi threshold for eardrum rupture can be used as a limiting criteria for worker exposure. Fragment tolerance of humans depends on where a person is impacted, and is shown in the table below from Ref 4.

Conclusions:

The calculated blast pressure will not fail either building or the module and create a safety hazard from structural collapse. The design fragment is the controlling safety hazard. The thickness of the structural elements which could be impacted by a fragment and the maximum penetration capability of the design fragment were compared and led to the following conclusion. The design fragment will not perforate building 2A enclosure walls, building 2B blast door or damper, building 2B personnel or exterior double door sheet metal, wall or roof of either building 2A or 2B. The difference in mass of the design fragment and blast damper components engaged in movement will prevent the fragment from escaping the facility though opening of the blast damper. The design fragment can perforate the building 2A capacitor enclosure filter cover (1/8 inches of aluminum), but does not have enough kinetic energy to perforate the walls, roof, or doors of building 2A for either explosive case.

Recommended thickness of the shield plate during startup testing: Any steel plate with a thickness greater than a ¼ inch should work, and during earlier discussions, it was mentioned that street plate of one inch and one and half inch thick were available. The installation of 18 gage galvanized steel exterior double doors would have a thickness of 0.103 inches of steel total. This thickness would be greater than the required 0.0747 inches of steel to stop the design fragment and therefore would stop the design fragment from exiting the facility.

A-1

Appendix A

Data for Phase IIA and IIB capacitor modules:

There are 3 parts to a pulsator module contained in one cabinet enclosure. Overall outside dimensions of the cabinet is 5’-10” high, 8’-0” wide, 17’-6” long.

• Capacitor section with 2 low intake louvers and 4 exhaust vent fans on top

• ABB section with 2 hinged top doors (35” x 61” each)

• polarity switch with 1 low intake vent louver

3 modules per phase – module 1 and 2 have 50 capacitors, module 3 has 25 capacitors. All capacitors are 46 kg in stainless steel case, capacitors are 2270 micro Farads each, 3400 volts.

100% review comment by SRI indicated the hazard they thought was possible:

“A realistic estimate of energy release is for a single capacitor to rupture and ignite a small fraction of the available oil. Specifically, only 229mL of oil vaporized and ignited resulting in the release of 7.8x10^6J. To this number we need to add the electrical energy, 5.27x10^5 resulting in a total energy release of 8.3x10^6J. This figure should probably be used for overpressure calculations and blow-out panel design.”

Later correspondence (July 17, 2009) indicates a 650 KJ energy release from stored electrical energy and the resulting pressure in the cabinet of 1.89 psi.

Room size for phase IIB is 20’ long, 23’ wide, and 16’ height to bottom of roof deck. Personnel and overhead coiling door are on room end by capacitor section, and louver or blast damper is on other end by polarity switch section.

A-2

References:

1. S.Brereton, C. Ma et al, “Pressure Effects Analysis of National Ignition Facility Capacitor Module Events” Proceedings of 8th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Apr 2000

2. S. Brereton, LLNL “Mechanical Engineering Safety Note: Analysis and Control of Hazards Associated with NIF Capacitor Module Events” Aug 2001

3. Conwep “Conventional Weapons Effects” computer program, USACE-ERDC

4. Baker, Cox, Westine, Kulez, Strehlow “Explosion Hazards and Evaluation” Elsevier 1983

5. UFC 3-340-01 “Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects” 1 June 2002

5. UFC 3-340-02 “Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions” 5 Dec 2008

6. F.D.Gunstone, “Rapeseed and Canola Oil, Production, Processing, Properties and Uses,” CRC Press, p91

8. BlastX computer program, Version 6.4.2.2, Science Applications International Corp.

9. SBEDS “Single degree of freedom Blast Effects Design Spreadsheet”, Version 4.1a, USACE

B-1

Appendix B

BlastX Analysis Output Building 2B

BlastX - Explosions Inside Multiple Room Structures

ERDC/SAIC Version 6.4.2.2 (10 January 2006 Watcom Fortran)

Date 10-22-2010

Electrical discharge .127 kg gas pressure

General units 2.0000 tmax 150.0000 maxord 5.0000 icalc 1.0000 mchamsx 2.0000 mventsx 1.0000 mtargsx 0.0000 mexplsx 1.0000 mwallsx 8.0000 iprint 0.0000 plot 2.0000 tcont 0.00000E+00 ht 1.0000

Ambient pressure 15.6959 temperature 59.0000

Room 1 volume 6739.2002 xlength 18.7000 ylength 18.7000 zlength 18.7000 file \\nwo-nas04\pdc_data\projects\assessment\blast\chicago ssc fish barrier\blastx\campbell\\Pulsar room

Room 2 volume 1.00000E+09 xlength 1000.0000 ylength 1000.0000 zlength 1000.0000 file \\nwo-nas04\pdc_data\projects\assessment\blast\chicago ssc fish barrier\blastx\campbell\\Outside

Opening 1 area 24.7500 r1 1 r2 2

Explosion 1 x0 2.6000 y0 2.6000 z0 0.0000 weight 0.2790 iroom 1.0000

B-2 wburn 9.9500 ld 1.0000 Composition Decimal Fraction

314 1.00000 TNT

Summary of Gas Pressure and Temperature Last Time (ms) = 1.5000E+02

Peak Peak Final Final Pressure Time Temperature Time Pressure Temperature Impulse Room (psi) (ms) (Deg F) (ms) (psi) (Deg F) psi*sec 1 5.947E-01 1.000E-03 7.747E+01 0.000E+00 -7.782E-04 7.182E+01 1.101E-02 2 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 5.900E+01 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 5.900E+01 0.000E+00

Opening Summary

Primary Secondary Differential Pressure Opening Room # Room # Failure Failure Pressure Impulse # Side A Side B Time(msec) Time(msec) (psi) (psi*s) 1 1 2 0.000E+00 1.000E+20 5.947E-01 1.101E-02

--- End of case. Elapsed time (msec) Memory(megabytes) 300 1.40

Opening Summary

Primary Secondary Differential Pressure Opening Room # Room # Failure Failure Pressure Impulse # Side A Side B Time(msec) Time(msec) (psi) (psi*s) 1 1 2 0.000E+00 1.000E+20 7.302E+01 3.391E-02 2 2 3 0.000E+00 1.000E+20 5.502E-01 1.107E-02

490 1.43

B-3

Building 2A

BlastX - Explosions Inside Multiple Room Structures

ERDC/SAIC Version 6.4.2.2 (10 January 2006 Watcom Fortran)

Date 10-20-2010

Electrical discharge .127 kg gas pressure

General units 2.0000 tmax 150.0000 maxord 5.0000 icalc 1.0000 mchamsx 3.0000 mventsx 1.0000 mtargsx 0.0000 mexplsx 1.0000 mwallsx 8.0000 iprint 0.0000 plot 2.0000 tcont 0.00000E+00 ht 1.0000

Ambient pressure 14.6959 temperature 59.0000

Room 1 volume 42.0000 xlength 6.6400 ylength 6.6400 zlength 6.6400 file \\nwo-nas04\pdc_data\projects\assessment\blast\chicago ssc fish barrier\blastx\campbell\\Module

Room 2 volume 23114.0000 xlength 70.0000 ylength 26.0000 zlength 12.7000 file \\nwo-nas04\pdc_data\projects\assessment\blast\chicago ssc fish barrier\blastx\campbell\\Room2A

Room 3 volume 1.00000E+09 xlength 1000.0000 ylength 1000.0000 zlength 1000.0000 plot 0.0000

Opening 1 area 32.8000 r1 1 r2 2

Explosion 1 x0 2.6000

B-4 y0 2.6000 z0 0.0000 weight 0.2790 iroom 1.0000 wburn 9.9500 ld 1.0000 Composition Decimal Fraction

314 1.00000 TNT

Summary of Gas Pressure and Temperature Last Time (ms) = 1.5000E+02

Peak Peak Final Final Pressure Time Temperature Time Pressure Temperature Impulse Room (psi) (ms) (Deg F) (ms) (psi) (Deg F) psi*sec 1 7.298E+01 5.637E-04 2.447E+03 0.000E+00 1.852E-01 1.478E+03 6.193E-02 2 1.852E-01 1.423E+00 6.388E+01 1.423E+00 1.852E-01 6.388E+01 2.771E-02 3 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 5.900E+01 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 5.900E+01 0.000E+00

Opening Summary

Primary Secondary Differential Pressure Opening Room # Room # Failure Failure Pressure Impulse # Side A Side B Time(msec) Time(msec) (psi) (psi*s) 1 1 2 0.000E+00 1.000E+20 7.296E+01 3.421E-02

170 1.43

B-5

10/22/2010

Time, msec

Pr es su re

, p si

Im pu ls e, p si

-m se c

Electrical discharge 0.127 kg gas pressure Room 001

0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 -0.08 0

0 1.5

0.08 3

0.16 4.5

0.24 6

0.32 7.5

0.4 9

0.48 10.5

0.56 12

0.64 13.5

Module Blast Load

Building 2B Blast Load

B-6

Building 2A Blast Load

B-7

Fragment Results from ConWep

The controlling case for containing a fragment which is in building 2A is shown below. The two thinnest layers that were analyzed in the critical path are 1/8 inches of aluminum then

0.0217 inches (26ga) of galvanized steel. Two explosive cases, 0.126 kg and 0.155 kg of TNT were used for the fragment analysis.

0.126 kg of TNT

First layer 1/8 inches of Aluminum.

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Aluminum (2024-T3) Weapon .......................................................... Cube Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3110 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 0.25 feet Target thickness ............................................. 0.125 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3086 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.1527 inches Residual velocity of fragment after perforation ........................................... 574.5 feet/sec Residual fragment mass after perforation ........................................... 0.00174 ounces

Second layer 0.0217 inches of galvanized steel.

Fragment Penetration into Steel, Mild Homogeneous Weapon .......................................................... Cube Design fragment weight ................................ 0.00174 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 574.5 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1 feet Target thickness ............................................. 0.0217 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 555.7 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.00922 inches

B-8

0.155kg of TNT

First layer 1/8 inches of Aluminum.

Fragment Penetration into Aluminum (2024-T3) Weapon .......................................................... Cube Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3434 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 0.25 feet Target thickness ............................................. 0.125 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3407 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.1704 inches Residual velocity of fragment after perforation ........................................... 930.3 feet/sec Residual fragment mass after perforation ........................................... 0.001656 ounces

Second layer 0.0217 inches of galvanized steel.

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Steel, Mild Homogeneous Weapon .......................................................... Cube Design fragment weight ................................ 0.001656 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 930.3 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1 feet Target thickness ............................................. 0.0217 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 899.4 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.01538 inches

B-9

ConWep results for maximum design fragment penetration shown in Table 2: Fragment Considerations.

0.126 kg of TNT

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Steel, Mild Homogeneous Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3110 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Target thickness ............................................. 1 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3110 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.06698 inches

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Aluminum (2024-T3) Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3110 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Target thickness ............................................. 1 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3110 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.154 inches

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Concrete Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3110 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Concrete slab thickness ................................. 1 inches Concrete compressive strength ...................... 4000 psi

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3110 feet/sec Penetration into massive concrete ................. 0.3366 inches Minimum concrete thickness required to prevent perforation .................... 0.4166 inches Minimum concrete thickness required to prevent spalling ......................... 0.5115 inches

B-10

0.155 kg of TNT

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Steel, Mild Homogeneous Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3434 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Target thickness ............................................. 1 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3434 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.07472 inches

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Aluminum (2024-T3) Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3434 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Target thickness ............................................. 1 inches

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3434 feet/sec Fragment penetration ..................................... 0.1719 inches

ConWep 2.1.0.8

Fragment Penetration into Concrete Weapon .......................................................... Cube 0.2477" Design fragment weight ................................ 0.002144 ounces Initial fragment velocity ................................ 3434 feet/sec Range to target ............................................... 1e-005 feet Concrete slab thickness ................................. 1 inches Concrete compressive strength ...................... 4000 psi

Fragment striking velocity ............................. 3434 feet/sec Penetration into massive concrete ................. 0.3653 inches Minimum concrete thickness required to prevent perforation .................... 0.4421 inches Minimum concrete thickness required to prevent spalling ......................... 0.5389 inches

B-11

Information from Drawings:

Building 2B

B-12

Building 2A

B-13

SBEDS Results

Building: Component: By: Date:

Span, L: 26 ft Elastic Plastic 4 ft 0.11 0.12

Boundary Conditions: 0.39 0.38

Response Type:

Axis of Bending: Shape Type: Time Pressure Shape Size: (ms) (psi)

Self-Weight, w: 67.00 lb/ft 0 0 Moment of Inertia, I: 954.00 in4

10 0 Section Modulus: Z (hot-rolled beam) or S (cold-formed beam): 130.00 in3 20 0 Inbound Natural Period: 103.11 ms Web Thickness, tw: 0.40 in 30 0 Rebound Natural Period: 103.11 ms Depth, d: 16.33 in 40 0 Max Recommended Time Step: 0.05 ms Area, A: 19.70 in2 50 0 0.05 ms Supported Weight, W: 73 psf 60 0 % of Critical Damping: 2 % Loaded Area Factor Applied to L*B, Af: (Note:Af<=1) 1 70 0 Initial Velocity: 0 in/ms Inbound Unbraced Length for Compression Flange, Lbr,i: ft (0 for fully braced) Rebound Unbraced Length for Compression Flange, Lbr,r: 13 ft (0 for fully braced)

Material Type: W R Inbound Rebound Units Yield Strength, fy: 50,000 psi (lbs TNT) (ft) Mass, M 1613.0 1613.0 psi-ms2/in Ultimate Strength, fu: 70,000 psi Load-Mass Factors, K LM

Elastic Modulus, E: 29000000 psi KLM1 0.78 0.78 Static Strength Increase Factor: 1.05 KLM2 0.78 0.78 Dynamic Increase Factor: 1.19 KLM3 0.66 0.66 Dynamic Yield Stress, fdy: 62,475 psi Stiffness, K

4 Static Axial Load, P: lb K1 4.67 4.67 psi/in Leave blank for No Dynamic Axial Load Wall Height (ft)1 K2 4.67 4.67 psi/in Leave Blank Wall Width (ft)1 K3 0.00 0.00 psi/in

Incidence Angle2 Resistance, R

Inbound Moment Capacity, Mi: 8,121,750 lb-in See notes under error messages R1 13.91 -12.67 psi Rebound Moment Capacity, Mr: 7,400,959 lb-in R2 13.91 -12.67 psi Rebound/Inbound Moment Capacity Ratio, MR: 0.91 Ratio of Axial Load to Axial Load Capacity 0.00 Yield Displacement, x x1 2.98 -2.71 in x2 2.98 -2.71 in

LOP/Type θ (deg) μ Equiv Yield Defl., X E 2.98 -2.71 in 10 12 θmax = 0.05 deg. Design Criteria:

μ = 0.05

0.14 in at time = 39.80 msec -0.13 in at time = 92.50 msec

Notes: 0.67 psi at time = 39.80 msec 1 Used for clearing of reflected load -0.61 psi at time = 92.50 msec 2 Angle in degrees from normal Shortest Yield Line Distance to Determine θ: 156.0 in 3 Entering data in white cells will OVERWRITE formulas and cause ERRONEOUS results!!

To recover formulas, save your input data and reinitiate Component Type on Intro worksheet.

4 Axial load per unit width on analyzed component from saved Dynamic Shear History file for 104,125 lb supported component. The total dynamic axial load is this axial load per unit width multiplied 104,125 lb by the input axially loaded width, Ba. Dynamic axial load includes roof static load.

5 Shear controlled response typically has very limited response criteria, although exact values 221,642 lb are not specified in SBEDS - see Shear Flag section in User's Guide for additional guidance. Shear is OK

* Based on larger of inbound and rebound ultimate…