TE-35_MCTP_Trends_in_a_Decisive_Action_Warfighter_Exercise.pdf

MISSION COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise

COL Edward T. Bohnemann Commander, MCTP

UNCLASSIFIED

MCTP FY14 Trends in a Decisive Action WFX

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. WFX Execution

1.1. Trends by Warfighting Function

1.1.1. Mission Command:

1.1.1.1. Inconsistent Use of Operational Frameworks

1.1.1.2. Linking Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) to Decisions

1.1.1.3. Battle Rhythm Management

1.1.1.4. Knowledge Management Framework

1.1.1.5. Special Operation Forces (SOF)/Conventional Force (CF) Interdependence

1.1.1.6. Shaping Operations in the Deep, Close, and Security Fight at the Division Level

1.1.1.7. Planning Horizons and Plans Management

1.1.1.8. Rehearsals

1.1.1.9. Command Posts (CPs)

1.1.1.10. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Synchronization

1.1.2. Movement and Maneuver

1.1.2.1. Common Operational Picture (COP)

1.1.2.2. Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC) Functionality

1.1.2.3. Responsibilities for Support Area Management and Movement Control Planning

1.1.2.4. Wet Gap Crossing

1.1.2.5. Understanding Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Capabilities

1.1.3. Intelligence

1.1.3.1. Product Support to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

1.1.3.2. IPB and Running Estimates that Assess the Hybrid Threat

1.1.3.3. Predictive Analysis

1.1.3.4. Intel Inputs to Targeting Working Groups (TWG)

1.1.3.5. Information Collection Asset Prioritization and Synchronization

1.1.3.6. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Integration

1.1.4. Fires

1.1.4.1. Division vs. Brigade Fight (Deep Attack)

1.1.4.2. Linking Targeting to Shaping Operations

1.1.4.3. Airspace Control and Fires De-confliction

1.1.4.4. Combat Assessments in the Planning Process

1.1.4.5. Integration of Information Operations into the Targeting Cycle

1.1.4.6. Graphic Control Measures

1.1.4.7. Fires Planning

1.1.5. Sustainment

1.1.5.1. Distribution Management

1.1.5.2. Organizing Sustainment Staffs by Warfighting Functions

1.1.5.3. Operational Area Security

1.1.5.4. Sustainment Running Estimates

1.1.5.5. Conducting Parallel Planning

1.1.5.6. Sustainment Reporting

1.1.6. Protection

1.1.6.1. Oversimplification of Protection Efforts

1.1.6.1. Critical Asset List/Defended Asset List – Usage, Revision, and Linkage

1.1.6.3. Protection Working Groups

1.1.6.4. Development of the Critical Asset List/Defended Asset List

1.2. Missions Aligned to Organic Capabilities

1.3. Integration of Functional and Multifunctional Brigades

1.4. Special Staff

1.4.1. Operational Law (OPLAW)

1.4.1.1. OPLAW Integration with Staff

1.4.1.2. Staff Judge Advocate’s (SJA) Role in the MDMP

1.4.1.3. Workstation Locations in the Command Post

1.4.2. Religious Support

1.4.2.1. Religious Support Common Operational Picture

1.4.2.2. Religious Support Integration in the MDMP

1.4.2.3. Religious Support to Mass Casualties (MASCAL)

1.4.2.4. Religious Battle Tracking

1.4.3. Public Affairs

1.4.3.1. Integration of Public Affairs in Staff

1.4.3.2. Public Affairs Annex and Guidance

1.5. Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)

1.5.1. Trained Personnel to Plan, Coordinate, and Integrate Cyberspace Operations

1.5.2. Integration of Electronic Warfare

1.5.3. Organic CEMA equipment

2. Warfighter Exercise Design

2.1. Exercise Planning (Exercise Lifecycle Events)

2.1.1. Establish Effective Training Objectives for a Warfighter Exercise

2.1.2. Preparation

2.1.3. Mission Command Training

2.2. HICOM Manning

2.3. Participants in a Warfighter

2.3.1. Task Organization (Annex A)

2.3.2. Training Level (Perishable/Non-Resident)

2.4. Orders Production Timeline

2.5. Joint Force Component Integration

3. Warfighter Technical Design

3.1. Mission Command Information Systems (MCIS)

3.1.1. Equipment Availability

3.1.2. Version Control

3.1.3. Home Station Training

3.1.4. Field Service Representative Support

3.2. Pre-Start Exercise (STARTEX) – Communication Exercise (COMMEX)

3.3. Network Management/Architecture

3.4. DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and Other

Accreditation

3.5 Intel Data Flow

3.6. Warfighter Technical Design Conclusion

4. Conclusion – Trends for the Larger Army

Figure List

Figure 1: CCIR Process

Figure 2: 7-Minute Drill

Figure 3: Planning Horizons (FM 6-0)

Figure 4: Plans Transitions

Figure 5: Aviation Brigade’s Roles

Figure 6: Suggested Sustainment Brigade WFF breakdown

Figure 7: Suggested Expeditionary Sustainment Command WFF breakdown

Figure 8: Technical Design Current Conditions

Figure 9: Technical Design Intermediate Conditions

Figure 10: Technical End State

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to gather and disseminate MCTP observations in order to inform decisions that shape our future force. Our observations will focus on trends, defined as practices or actions seen on multiple occasions during multiple training events by a number of different units.

While recognizing that one fiscal year is a limited period, we believe this timeframe provides a sufficient sample of units, scenarios, staffs, and commanders to consider these observations representative of our Army’s efforts to transition from counterinsurgency operations to operationalizing the tenets of Unified Land Operations (ULO).

MCTP stands at the forefront of supporting the training of Army brigade, division, corps, and

Army Service Component Command (ASCC) headquarters in Mission Command and ULO. In accordance with the Army’s Combat Training Center Programs and the Chief of Staff of the Army’s

Training Guidance, MCTP conducted four multi-echelon Warfighter exercises, two Unified

Endeavor exercises, four ASCC exercises, two culminating training exercises (CTE), and one brigade-level Warfighter Exercise (WFX )during Fiscal Year 2014. Together, these exercises met the training objectives of more than 65 units. Each exercise integrated functional and multi-functional brigades, sustainment units, and multi-component forces to include Army National Guard (ARNG) brigade combat teams (BCTs). MCTP works very closely with the Joint Staff, J7-South and other training partners to support exercise design with additional joint context infused throughout to support the training of units designated as future joint task forces (JTFs).

A WFX is a distributed, simulation-driven, master scenario events list (MSEL) supported, and multi-echelon tactical command post exercise. Training audiences fight against a live, freethinking adversary designed to train and rehearse units in the train and ready force pool for missions as a contingency expeditionary force or regionally aligned force as designated by Forces Command

(FORSCOM). MCTP conducts WFXs directed by the CSA and scheduled by FORSCOM.

MCTP develops the exercise scenario derived from the operating environment outlined in the

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2-approved Decisive Action Training Environment

(DATE). Incorporating CSA, FORSCOM, and Army Command (ACOM) guidance, MCTP adapts the exercise scenario from a common base scenario to meet each training audience commander’s training objectives, and end state.

MCTP uses a computer simulation to provide representative combat and battlefield effects during the exercise and provides feedback to the commander in the form of detailed observations, which allow for the commander’s own training assessment. During those training events, the

Observer, Coach, Trainers (OC/Ts) observe and provide feedback on each unit’s staff functions and processes. Further, retired general officers serve as senior mentors during the exercises, providing invaluable feedback to unit commanders through coaching and mentoring throughout the entire process. MCTP provides these observations and feedback to their training audiences through a formal and fully instrumented after-action review process. These unique, first-hand observations have yielded valuable insights into our Army: how it trains, how it thinks, and how it fights under the construct of Unified Land Operations.

In general, we have witnessed the challenges facing a division headquarters tasked to transform itself from the role of resource provider to a higher headquarters responsible for establishing a concept of operations, directing how its subordinates will cooperate to accomplish the mission (ADRP 5.0). Repeatedly, leaders struggle to clearly articulate their visualization of

EDWARD T. BOHNEMANN

COL, IN

Commanding operations in time, space, and purpose, often resulting in a lack of synchronization integral to achieving unity of effort.

From our observations, the friction inherent in the contiguous operating environment occurs more frequently and compounds at a more rapid rate in the dynamic environment of Decisive Action than in a more static environment. These differences exacerbate difficulties for unit commanders and their staffs attempting to synchronize efforts in time and space to achieve the commander’s desired end state. This friction often results in units committing to action piecemeal, diluting the capabilities each brings to bear rather than capitalizing on the capabilities of integrated combined arms operations. As the lead agent of synchronization during the tactical execution of a Warfighter exercise, a division headquarters must provide for its subordinates a clear delineation of the operational framework — such as the deep, close, and security areas — and assign clearly understood roles and responsibilities within each. Two critical mechanisms for this delineation are the doctrinal use of graphic control measures and the development and dissemination of a synchronization matrix.

The intent of this paper is to share best practices for commanders and their staffs on doctrinal trends observed during MCTP support exercises. There is no intent to provide criticism or praise to any particular training audience; instead, this document will provide warfighting function trends from the WFX exercise design, scenario design, and technical design to improve brigades, divisions, corps, and ASCC’s processes in Mission Command and the conduct of ULO in a Decisive Action

Training Environment.

Decisive Victory!

1. WFX Execution

1.1. Trends by Warfighting Function

1.1.1. Mission Command:

“Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP 6-0). The philosophy of Mission Command is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment. Observer, Coach, Trainers (OC/Ts) enable the Army's senior commanders and staffs to develop current, relevant, campaign quality, joint and expeditionary Mission Command instincts, and skills.

1.1.1.1. Inconsistent Use of Operational Frameworks

Observation: Units often improperly use the three operational frameworks: deep-close-security, decisive-shaping-sustaining, and main and supporting concurrently in operational planning.

Discussion: Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their vision of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in this task. Training audiences often fail to use Operational Frameworks (ADRP 3-0) to articulate the visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources to generate options.

During years of Wide Area Security (WAS) operations, higher headquarters often divided supporting and enabling headquarters amongst BCTs based on a fixed set of conditions in relation to main and supporting efforts. Units fail to recognize that during Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) there are constantly shifting priorities, not only during transitions but potentially even within sub-phases.

Using all aspects of the operational framework to describe decisive-shaping-sustaining, close-deep-security, and main-supporting efforts allows subordinates to understand changing roles as operations progress. Additionally, demands strain the unit’s span of control and logistical support in a rapidly evolving environment while executing Mission Command on the move. Maintaining those enabling and supporting units within the higher headquarters will allow greater flexibility to exploit a unit’s successes and to better protection their critical systems and capabilities.

Recommendations:

- Use all appropriate Operational Frameworks to describe shifting priorities between phases and sub-phases (see ADRP 3-0).

- Strongly consider the impacts of excessive task organization; maintaining enabling headquarters allows for more rapid shifts as priorities change.

- Higher headquarters should direct the specific frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters; the frameworks should be consistent throughout all echelons.

References: ADRP 3-0, FM 6-0, ADP 5-0, ADRP 6-0

1.1.1.2. Linking Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) to Decisions

Observation: Units are not directly linking the CCIRs to decisions that the commander needs to make.

Discussion: Mission analysis identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decision making during preparation and execution of the operations process. Regardless of the type of operation or mission, the staff should identify decision points to identify opportunities or risks that affect the unit’s ability to achieve the commander’s intent. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. Staffs struggle to develop and refine CCIRs (Priority Intelligence

Requirements [PIR] and Friendly Forces Information Requirements [FFIR]) that support the commander’s decision-making. CCIR development begins during mission analysis (ADRP 5-0) by taking into consideration friendly forces and the enemy threat templates developed during

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The IPB process and identification of enemy courses of action lead to the identification of the initial Targeted and Named Areas of Interest (TAI/NAI).

The TAIs and NAIs should have associated PIR and be linked to a decision point. Often, that is not the case.

Recommendations:

- Begin CCIR development during mission analysis and continue to refine throughout the planning and execution. Involve the commander early in CCIR development (see Figure 1).

Ensure to link CCIRs to the commander’s decision points and develop an information collection plan that will assist in answering CCIRs (see ADRP 5-0, FM 3-55, and FM 6-0).

Figure 1: CCIR Process

- Conduct IPB during the planning process to identify enemy courses of action. These courses of action, when overlaid on a scheme of maneuver, will identify the commander’s decision points, with associated CCIRs and NAI/TAIs. This forms the initial information collection plan where the G3/S3 assigns a unit or asset to monitor the NAI/TAIs and answer the associated CCIR. Ensure the synchronization plan shows the earliest and latest time intelligence is of value so units know the period of time they need to monitor the NAI/TAIs.

- The G3/S3 should manage the information collection plan. The G3/S3 will have to assign new tasks to subordinates, reprioritize information collection assets, adjust CCIRs, or modify the friendly course of action for answered CCIRs. The G3/S3 should develop the Decision

Support Matrix (DSM) and Decision Support Template (DST) in order to assist the commander in his decision-making. An effective DST/DSM has CCIR linked to NAIs or

TAIs with possible courses of actions.

References: FM 6-0, ADRP 5-0, ADRP 6-0, FM 3-55, JP 5-0

1.1.1.3. Battle Rhythm Management

Observation: Unit battle rhythms do not follow a logical process and lack procedures for refinement and adjustment.

Discussion: A battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (JP 3-33). The battle rhythm enables decision-making by synchronizing current and future operations planning with scheduled meetings and planning efforts.

Too often, battle rhythm events are scheduled without the clear purpose, inputs, requirements, desired outputs and whom from the staff should attend. Frequently, there is not a clearly identified process to refine and adjust the battle rhythm, nor to notify the staff and outside agencies of changes.

Recommendations:

- Sequence battle rhythm events so they support the commander’s decision-making process

(see FM 6-0).

- Schedule enough time between events to allow participants to synthesize information and complete their input/output requirements.

- Utilize the 7-Minute Drill (see Figure 2). At the minimum, the 7-Minute Drill should have a purpose, the lead staff section or agency, location, frequency, required participants, the identified inputs and outputs, and who from the command group will participate.

- The chief of staff or XO should retain the approval authority for modifying the battle rhythm and approve all 7-Minute drills, ensuring changes continue to support the commander’s decision cycle.

References: FM 6-0, ADRP 5-0, JP 3-33, ADRP 6-0

Figure 2: 7-Minute Drill

1.1.1.4. Knowledge Management Framework

Observation: Units Lack an understanding of the components of Knowledge Management (KM) and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff (CoS), Knowledge Management Officer (KMO), and staff for sharing information.

Discussion: Knowledge management is crucial to Mission Command and leader development.

Commanders need knowledge and understanding in order to make effective decisions (ADRP 6-0).

Knowledge management begins with educating leaders on the systems available, followed by how leaders operate those systems. Staffs use various information and knowledge management frameworks to assist commanders in processing information (FM 6.1.1). Units tend to focus on the tool component of knowledge management: specifically, SharePoint. The KMO should focus on people and processes within an organization to assist in creating a shared understanding (FM 6.1.1).

A focus on a single tool often contributes to a deficient understanding of knowledge management, and thus leads to an underutilization of KMO. The CoS/XO must ensure that all staff members understand the purpose and function of the KMO and KM Section. The staff should assist the KMO in identifying knowledge or performance gaps. The KMO must continuously identify knowledge management gaps and, with the assistance of knowledge management representatives (KMR) from the staff, work through the KM process to eliminate those gaps.

Recommendations:

- Schedule the Army Knowledge Management Office Proponent for Senior Leader Workshops and KMR Training.

- Establish a functional KM working group chaired by the CoS and facilitated by the KMO.

- Establish KM functions early in the planning process with a KM assessment.

- Write and publish ANNEX Q (Knowledge Management) with guidance from the Chief of

Staff in the orders process.

References: FM 6-0, FM 6.1.1, ADRP 6-0

1.1.1.5. Special Operation Forces (SOF)/Conventional Force (CF) Interdependence

Observation: SOF critical capabilities are not fully understood by CFs.

Discussion: In many conflicts, Special Forces operations occur before the initiation of hostilities through regional mechanisms and a theater security cooperation. This includes collaboration with local national forces conducting Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance and preparation of the environment (ADRP 3-05). After CF occupies an AO, units often have difficulty understanding SOF critical capabilities and assets. Conventional forces further fail to understand how to integrate SOF within CF at varying levels of command decisive and supporting operations. This leads to a misunderstanding of the supported/supporting roles between SOF and CF within the operational phasing. The Commander Joint Task Force (COMJTF) base order identifies transitions from supported to supporting roles. These transitions must be clearly understood and planned so that each element works in unison to achieve objectives within the Lines of Operations (LOOs). Phase III operations largely depend on conditions set by SOF during Phases 0-II. SOF’s critical capability of special warfare helps shape the AOR prior to CF introduction into the theater. The CF must be aware of SOF’s ongoing operations and then include the forward SOF elements into the overall concept and scheme. The existing SOF regional mechanisms develop civil and military assessments; influence operations and indigenous force capability/capacity; and, when necessary, provide a surgical strike option. These activities are designed to help shape the battle, deter enemy forces, and seize the initiative, and must be synchronized with any CF force in order to achieve unified land operations.

Per ADRP 3-05, many factors must be considered prior to employing SOF, such as availability of CF resources to support the mission. Support could involve aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF units. Support also can include airlift, intelligence, communications, inform-and-influence activities (IIA), medical, logistics, space, weather, and numerous other types of support.

Recommendations:

- The SOF representative working as part of the CF staff must provide a capabilities brief and must disseminate the SOF CDR’s mission and intent to the CF.

- SOF must be integrated into all battle drills.

- CF should plan to complement the ongoing SOF special warfare plan.

- Both CF and SOF forces should fully understand each other’s missions, systems, capabilities, and limitations.

References: ADRP 3-05, ADRP 6-0

1.1.1.6. Shaping Operations in the Deep, Close, and Security Fight at the Division Level

Observation: Units struggle with managing shaping operations in the Deep and Close fight, specifically when planning security and reconnaissance operations.

Discussion: An operational framework helps Division and higher headquarters establish priorities and achieve the commander’s vision and end state (FM 3-94). Staffs often struggle with understanding their responsibilities concerning collection, reconnaissance, and security operations in the Deep and Close fight. Security operations are particularly important in the Deep fight for areas of operation not assigned to subordinate headquarters. Similarly, collection planning often lacks sufficient oversight from operational planners, leading to desynchronized activities. Time-distance considerations for deployment of reconnaissance or security elements (often days prior to execution of an operation) are not utilized, thereby preventing effective collection. Planning factors for survivability, support, and recovery are often neglected or inadequate for the reconnaissance/security

11 | P a g e

12 | P a g e fight. Lack of detection capability degrades the effectiveness of shaping operations in support of

BCTs. When collection results are not adequate in answering information requirements, plans are rarely refined or adjusted, nor do staffs adjust collection priorities to support shifting main and supporting efforts in pursuit of decisive operations. This lack of emphasis and coordination in the

Division’s area (AOs not assigned to subordinate headquarters or security areas) hinders subordinate headquarters executing the close fight. The rear or support area is also the location to base sustainment assets and provide logistics. The mission to coordinate and synchronize security operations within the support area is often tasked to the under-resourced Maneuver Enhancement

Brigade (MEB). The MEB headquarters must plan and execute numerous other missions. Unless properly augmented by higher headquarters, it lacks an internal Tactical Combat Force (TCF), artillery, and aviation support needed to accomplish its security tasks in the support area (FM 3-81).

Recommendations:

- Operational planners must be involved early in the planning of reconnaissance and security operations in the Division’s AO (Deep or unassigned areas); enemy intelligence templates and collection priorities serve only as a starting point for planning these activities.

- Execution of reconnaissance and security planning must occur well ahead of refined planning efforts for the remainder of the Division in order to be effective; this may require a back brief to the decision authority prior to finalization of the larger plan.

- A command post must be resourced to control operations in the support area.

- Resources (TCF, artillery, security) must be allocated to MEB to secure the support area.

References: ADRP 3-0, FM 3-94, FM 3-81, ADRP 6-0

1.1.1.7. Planning Horizons and Plans Management

Observation: Units have difficulty with plans management, assigning and prioritizing planning efforts, and developing a “plan to plan”.

Discussion: Units divide staff into three sections: Personal Staff, Special Staff, and Coordinating

Staff. Within the Coordinating Staff, the G3/S3 is further split into Current Operations (CUOPS), Future Operations (FUOPS), and Plans. The other staff sections organize cross-functionally with representatives from all warfighting functions using the traditional G-Staff model (i.e. G1, G2, G3, G4, and G5). Depending on the staff organization, a commander may assign a planning effort to the section he deems more appropriate to handle the problem set. One of the critical factors in assigning a planning effort is time. Some planning efforts will require a quick turn, sometimes with only hours to execute the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), while others may require months until execution. Generally, commanders assign difficult, long-term planning efforts to Plans or the G5, while short-term problems, regardless of difficulty, go to CUOPS or FUOPS. During the course of an operation, the CUOPS and FUOPS sections become overwhelmed with planning efforts. They have limited time and assigned planners to work on their efforts, while the Plans section has only a few efforts to develop. When a plan transitions from one section to another, there is often a loss of planning momentum until the new planners become familiar with the effort.

Although staffs may conduct deliberate Military Decision Making Process when developing their initial plan, they often fail to formally determine what steps must be executed or abridged when conducting subsequent planning. The Division and lower HQ particularly assign branches and sequels to an order to individual action officers within Plans or FUOPs, rather than Operational

Planning Teams. These junior officers often take on much of the work and begin executing without considering what MDMP steps are required. Consequently, when the staff assembles, the junior officers have little or no guidance as to inputs required to start planning. When this occurs, forces

13 | P a g e available and a directed course of action drive maneuver plans, rather than the enemy situation.

Usually work is compartmentalized, and collaboration and cross-functional discussion do not occur.

This means that shaping and supporting efforts are routinely addressed post-development of the maneuver plan instead of considered as limiting or enabling factors. Protection and risk mitigation are rarely considered sufficiently, if at all. Time spent laying out a deliberate planning time line and conducting as many of the MDMP steps as possible, with all WfF members understanding their inputs, results in a more coherent and effective plan.

Recommendations:

- Establish a standard operating procedure for assigning planning horizon efforts (see figure 3).

The commander or chief of staff/XO should set priorities and provide direction and guidance.

- Assign planning efforts with a short time to execution – generally no more than 24 hours – to

Current Operations. Assign problems with 24 hours to several weeks until execution to Future

Operations. The Plans cell can receive problems that have weeks to months to execute. As plans are refined, develop a transition plan where the different staff sections have time to learn and become intimate with the plan. The transition plan (see figure 4) should designate a point in time or event for transition to officially occur, but should also incorporate a “left seat/right-seat” period for the transition to occur (see FM 6-0).

- Approach subsequent planning efforts in a deliberate manner and clearly articulate a timeline, and responsibilities. Conduct some type of cross-functional analysis before setting a scheme of maneuver.

- Ensure integration of all staff in planning efforts for orders production.

References: ADRP 3-0, FM 3-94, FM 3-81, ADRP 6-0, FM 6-0

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UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3: Planning Horizons (FM 6-0)

Plans Transition - “A Way”

FUPLANS FUOPS CUOPS

Wargame

Order/

Plan Dev/

Issue

Combined

Arms

Rehearsal

Execution

Mission

Analysis

COA

Dev G5-G35

Transition

Brief

G35-G33

Transition

Brief

(24-48) Hrs prior to execution

FUPLANS Lead FUOPS Lead CUOPS Lead

Figure 4: Plans Transitions

Planning Horizons - “A Way”

Plans

OPLAN/OPORD

Future Operations Current Operations

“What next?” “What if?” “What is?”

OPLAN/

Transition**

OPORD/

OPORD/

Transition**

Weeks-Days Days-Hours

CONPLAN

WARNO

fragmentary order

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1.1.1.8. Rehearsals

Observation: Rehearsals in orders transitions (Plans, Future Operations, and Current Operations) are inadequate.

Discussion: Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. A successful transition from the planning phase in the Military Decision Making Process to execution requires those charged with executing the order to understand the plan fully. Rehearsals, to include confirmation briefings and plans-to-operations transition briefings, improve understanding of the concept of operations, control measures, decision points, and command-and-support relationships. During any Combined

Arms Maneuver, the higher headquarters will conduct a Combined Arms Rehearsal. However, once decisive action begins, higher headquarters rarely conducts subsequent rehearsals when transitioning to new phases of the operation or when executing branches or sequels. Subordinate headquarters and the Current Operations cell often must execute plans with a poor understanding of the synchronization requirements of an operation. Because units rarely conduct orders transition from planners to Current Operations, they lack a clear understanding of execution requirements. One key aspect of rehearsals often overlooked is the transition of Mission Command responsibilities during offensive operations when multiple command posts are employed. Rehearsals should include criteria for transition of responsibility regarding execution of operations, decision-making authorities, and procedures for creating shared understanding.

Recommendations:

- Units must identify clear transition points for orders and must make a deliberate decision on the type of rehearsal that allow transitions from planning teams to CUOPS (FM 6-0).

- Planners must dedicate sufficient time to execute rehearsals within the command post and with subordinates.

- Timelines for development of planning efforts must include rehearsals and must be approved by CoS or Operations Officer.

References: ADRP 5-0, FM 6-0

1.1.1.9. Command Posts (CPs)

Observation: Units consistently take five to seven days to establish their tactical networks to fully-mission-capable (FMC) conditions on all Mission Command Information Systems (MCIS) platforms, and setup always requires substantial support from the field service representative (FSR).

Discussion: Establishing a CP includes setting up DRASH shelters, power grids and generators, and tactical networks infrastructure. This often takes a brigade-size unit 24 to 36 hours. It then takes an additional two to three days to establish interconnectivity between brigade and division units. This lack of proficiency in establishing CPs in a timely manner causes units to rely too heavily on contracted FSR support and jeopardizes full network operational capability in support of the mission.

Recommendations:

- Ensure home-station training plans include multiple iterations of establishing CPs and conducting CP jump operations to build and maintain proficiency of CP staffs.

- Incorporate cross training to relieve the burden on low-density personnel and develop staff competency in all CP operations tasks.

References: ADRP 6-0, FM 6-0

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1.1.1.10. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Synchronization

Observation: Executive Officers/Chiefs of Staff do not synchronize or lead MDMP efforts across the staff.

Discussion: Chiefs of Staff (CoS) and XOs do not understand their role in synchronizing staff efforts during planning. They do not conduct sufficient time analysis, and they do not develop a detailed

“plan to plan.” This detracts from the staff’s ability to execute cross-functional collaborative planning. XOs do not put enough emphasis on developing and enforcing appropriate digital and analog planning SOPs. Personnel understand the basics of MDMP, but the lack of direction results in stovepiped efforts until personnel are directed to compile slides for the MDMP briefing. XOs do not allocate enough time to rehearse and make necessary adjustments. The result is a missed opportunity to help the commander understand and visualize the operation and to provide the guidance needed to begin the next step. Units typically end up completing a major portion of the mission analysis during

COA development. They complete COA development during COA analysis (wargaming).

Recommendations:

- The XO/CoS must lead staff planning efforts to ensure the commander can understand and visualize the operation. They must develop a “plan to plan” that includes time for staff to conduct both internal and cross-functional planning sessions. The timeline must address each step and sub-step of MDMP.

- The XO/CoS should recommend to the Commander what steps to abbreviate (see FM 6-0) and what steps (if any) to skip, to balance the level of detail with timely delivery of planning products to subordinate units. Units should develop a planning SOP that includes an initial timeline and prescribed formats (analog and digital) to reduce time spent on building and refining the mission analysis briefing. Selecting a common map (CPOF, Analog, Sketch or

PPT map shot) can help define the area of operation/area of interest and prescribe a level of detail to focus analysis.

References: ADRP 5-0; FM 6-0

1.1.2. Movement and Maneuver

“The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats.

Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area. It works through movement and with fires to achieve a position of advantage relative to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support” (ADRP 3-0). Observations of the movement and maneuver warfighting function are captured by monitoring the operations process, current and future operations integration cells, plans, and command posts.

1.1.2.1. Common Operational Picture (COP)

Observation: The common operational picture in the Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC) does not promote situational awareness and situational understanding.

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Discussion: The COIC is the focal point for information flowing into and out of the headquarters. A successful COIC should utilize systems and tools that aid in maintaining situational awareness and understanding, synchronizing current operations, reacting to crisis situations (e.g. battle drills) and keeping the commander and staff informed to assist in timely decision making. Information should be clearly displayed for all personnel to see and understand and should be relevant to the common operational picture (CPOF/UAS/FMV feeds, and CCIR).

Recommendations:

- To ensure standardization and the ability to understand the common operational picture

(COP), commanders must designate the standardized system to display, access, and share information (see FM 6-0). Common practice is to use a single display based on time and priority for multiple staff products.

- Unit SOP should define who is responsible for updating and maintaining the COP. It also should define who manipulates which screens to meet the needs of the COIC floor.

- How to share the COP across adjacent and subordinate formations should be determined (see

FM 6-0).

References: FM 6-0

1.1.2.2. Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC) Functionality

Observation: The COIC is not anticipating the commander’s decisions and tracking the CCIR.

Discussion: The COIC is responsible for assessing the current situation while regulating forces and

Warfighting Functions in accordance with the commander’s intent. The COIC must anticipate decisions and track associated CCIR to help the commander make required decisions. COIC personnel often are not aware of the commander’s decision points associated with the CCIR, causing the staff to become reactive rather than anticipatory concerning upcoming decisions. This prompts the chief of operations to notify the commander that either a short-notice decision or past-due decision is required. Ultimately, this disrupts Mission Command and limits a shared understanding of the commander’s intent.

Recommendations:

- Develop a decision support matrix with associated CCIR and post it in the COIC for all to see.

- Review and update the CCIR and decision support matrix routinely, in accordance with FM

6-0.

- Assign someone in CUOPs to monitor incoming reports to see if they trigger CCIR.

- Assign someone to monitor the decision support matrix and track upcoming decisions.

- Conduct a battle rhythm event to assess the decision support matrix and make changes as needed.

References: FM 6-0, ADRP 5-0

1.1.2.3. Responsibilities for Support Area Management and Movement Control Planning

Observation: Divisions often fail to conduct sufficient planning and management of movement control activities.

Discussion: Headquarters conducting offensive and defensive operations as part of Combined Arms

Maneuver often assign areas of operation using the linear model. While this places the responsibility

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When conducting a wet gap crossing or a passage of lines, higher headquarters is responsible for movement control. This is critical because not only do multiple BDEs operate within a subordinate

AO; Division also has a responsibility to ensure forces organize to conduct the fight once they depart a subordinate headquarters’ AO (upon reaching the release point). An assigned AO empowers subordinate commanders to use their own initiative; however, it also restricts movement for other units. When higher headquarters directs multiple units through a subordinate’s AO, it must help manage those movements.

Similarly, when security operations in the support area are assigned to a subordinate unit, headquarters often fails to recognize the amount of coordination required to synchronize efforts and ensure support of priorities. A Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), for instance, is not organically able to control fires within the support area, nor does it have the forces to execute security tasks over a wide area without augmentation. A MEB also needs assistance in coordinating sustainment activities that transit the support area with adjacent and higher headquarters.

Division sustainment staffs are not conducting movement control in the division distribution network. Specifically, Division Transportation Officers (DTOs) and their staffs are not executing the four major movement control tasks, outlined by current doctrine, necessary to effectively integrate and manage movement and maneuver across the division’s operational area.

Recommendations:

- Ensure higher headquarters maintains a role in synchronizing movement among subordinate units, in accordance with FM 3-94. This requirement includes establishing control measures, graphics, and mission command nodes.

- Involve movement control experts (DTO, MCT) when planning and directing units to move through an area along a route.

- Assign planning efforts for the support area to one of the integrating cells, and ensure all affected headquarters are tied in to planning movements.

- Ensure Division staffs establish processes to plan for and execute the following four movement control tasks:

- Provide route synchronization in the divisional area

- Ensure uninterrupted movement of theater/divisional/brigade convoys

- Manage the movement request process

- Establish periodic movements boards

References: ADRP 3-0, FM 3-94, FM 3-8, ADRP 5-0

1.1.2.4. Wet Gap Crossing

Observation: Units struggle to plan, rehearse, and execute a wet gap crossing.

Discussion: As division operations, wet gap crossings are exceedingly complex and require early and continuous synchronization of myriad assets at multiple echelons. Mission Command, Movement and

Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, IO, Sustainment, and Protection are all integral to the success of a wet gap crossing and require a combined arms approach. Execution matrices and/or checklists are critical in accounting for these numerous coordination efforts.

Recommendations:

- Early in the planning process, clearly define which assets to task organize to brigades and which to retain at the division level to shape brigade fights. Involve the engineer battalion/MEB early in the planning process. Engineer Brigade commanders and MEB

19 | P a g e commanders best understand how to employ their unique capabilities to support the mission.

- Coordinate the efforts of engineers, military police, fires planners, sustainers, and maneuver forces to ensure mobility. Their combined efforts enable the Multi-Role Bridge Company’s timely arrival at the crossing site with operational equipment.

- Co-locate headquarters by echelon to establish effective mission command nodes [DIV EN with the D-Main, Crossing Force Engineer (CFE) with the D-TAC, and Crossing Area

Engineer (CAE) with the Crossing Force Commander (CFC)]. This simplifies communications and maximizes operational control.

- Maintain Air Defense Artillery (ADA) capabilities at or near the crossing site. ADA is crucial to protecting crossing assets, which present lucrative, stationary targets for enemy air.

In turn, these ADA assets require Engineer assets to dig them in and ground forces to protect them.

- Coordinate fires to ensure that movement to the crossing site, crossing operations, and operations beyond the bridgehead are all properly shaped. The latter is often inadequately addressed. Units find themselves successfully on the far side of the wet gap only to be engaged by indirect fires because they are still under enemy observation. Fire support coordination is the planning and execution of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons (JP 3-09).

- As with fire support, use Information Operations to support all three phases of the wet gap crossing. Properly disseminated information directs internally displaced personnel (IDP) away from key routes to the crossing area, the crossing area, and future routes and areas of operation. IO also supports the deception plan.

- Execute a deception plan – this is key to the success of a wet gap crossing. Whether a physical plan involving maneuver forces and the employment of fires/smoke, a story line reinforcing a false course of action, or a combination of both, the deception plan removes focus from the actual crossing site.

- Emplace Critical Friendly Zones (CFZs) over existing bridges and crossing sites.

- Plan, prioritize and de-conflict the employment of ISR assets. Their use is equally important in the movement to the wet gap crossing, at the crossing, and after completion of it.

References: FM 3-90.12, JP 3-09

1.1.2.5. Understanding Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Capabilities

Observation: Higher Headquarters (Division and above) lack a clear understanding of the Aviation

Mission Planning Responsibilities (by echelon) and do not have situational awareness regarding

Army Aviation in a Decisive Action environment.

Discussion: Units have preconceived notions of how to employ Army Aviation based on multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unit experience typically consists of small two-ship teams rather than large forces employed as a maneuver element. Units frequently employ aviation in small teams in a “fire support” or “close air support” mode without any defined task or purpose. Audiences do not understand Attack and Reconnaissance Aviation doctrine and routinely fail to mass Army

Aviation for decisive effect or integrate aviation into the overall scheme of maneuver. A lack of understanding can prevent the aviation employment headquarters from effectively planning and resourcing future aviation operations. A limited knowledge of the CAB missions (Interdiction

Attacks, Joint Air Attack Teams, Close Combat Attacks, and Unmanned Aircraft Surveillance) can result in a lack of understanding of the brigade’s operational posture and reach. Planning with a lack of capabilities knowledge can result in a reactive approach to the employment of assets.

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Recommendations:

- Review current doctrine (see Figure 5) for employment of Army Aviation (FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, 7 DEC 07 and FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter

Operations, 16 FEB 07) and practice integrating Army Aviation subject matter experts into planning and preparation for warfighter exercises.

- Break habits developed during COIN fights that lead to piece-meal employment and “fire support asset” utilization.

- Integrate Army Aviation as a maneuver force throughout the MDMP; assign task and purpose to aviation units, and mass aviation to achieve decisive effect.

- Ensure that units share an understanding of CAB capabilities and that all units understand the aviation mission planning responsibilities by echelon. The CAB must ensure that the higher headquarters is armed with the most current and accurate information regarding operational capabilities and resources.

References: FM 3-04.11, FM 3-04.126, ADRP 6-0

Figure 5: Aviation Brigade’s Roles

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1.1.3. Intelligence

“The purpose of intelligence is to support commanders and staffs in gaining situational understanding of threats, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence supports the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of operations. The most important role of intelligence is to support commanders and decision makers. The Army generates intelligence through the intelligence

Warfighting Function. Intelligence leaders ensure that the intelligence Warfighting Function operates effectively and efficiently. They are the commander’s primary advisers on employing information collection assets and driving information collection. Predictive threat assessments facilitate the commander’s visualization and support decision-making. Intelligence leaders provide the commander with predictive assessments that consider all aspects of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations, and should provide the commander with an estimate regarding the degree of confidence the intelligence leader places in each analytic assessment. Intelligence analysis is not perfect and can be extremely time consuming and difficult. The G2/S2 staff must provide most likely and most dangerous threat COAs based on threat intent and capabilities during war-gaming” (ADRP

2-0).

1.1.3.1. Product Support to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Observation: Staff officers struggle during the military decision-making process (MDMP) to develop relevant products to help the commander’s decision making.

Discussion: Offensive tasks at all levels require effective intelligence to help the commander to avoid the threat’s main strength and to deceive and surprise the threat. The entire staff, led by the G2/S2, develops IPB products to assist the commander in identifying all aspects within the area of interest that can affect mission accomplishment. During MDMP, intelligence leaders find it difficult to provide detailed products that help the commander visualize decisions. This often happens because

G2s/S2s do not integrate the entire staff in the IPB process and thereby miss opportunities to achieve a shared understanding (e.g. use reverse warfighting function worksheets and incorporate intelligence products). Moreover, the G2/S2s do not collaborate face to face with other staff principals throughout the IPB process, hindering the commander and staff from understanding the environment and the threat, while laying a less than firm foundation for the remainder of MDMP. G2/S2s struggle with developing the event templates and a matrix to help the staff and commander understand and visualize the enemy force in combined arms maneuver. They also struggle with in-depth analysis for the High Value Target List (HVTL), which would assist the staff and commander in understanding how destroying each target will affect the enemy. Furthermore, intelligence collection plans typically lack the prioritization of assets and the understanding of what specific information to collect.

Finally, named areas of interest (NAIs) do not always have Priority Information Requirements (PIR) associated with them or a time that information collection is required to observe the NAI.

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