2010 AA POI.pdf

PLAN OF INSTRUCTION: AAC-A/AAC-I

(PDS CODE: XN0/XN1)

PLAN OF INSTRUCTION/LESSON PLAN

Air Advisor Course

HQ AIR EDUCATION & TRAINING COMMAND

RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

1 Aug 2010 i

LIST OF CURRENT PAGES

PAGE NO.

ISSUE

Title………………………………………………………………………………………………....... Original

A……………………………………………………………………………………………………… Original i…………………………………………………………………………………………………….... Original

I. Mission Training (MT)

USAFCENT Mission and Operations Briefing pages 1-2 ....................................................... Original

ITAM-AF Mission Operation Briefing pages 3-4 ................................................................... Original

CAPTF Mission Operation Briefing pages 5-6 ....................................................................... Original

ITAM-AF VTC pages 7-8 ....................................................................................................... Original

CAPTF VTC pages 9-10 .......................................................................................................... Original

Surveillance Detection and Attack Recognition pages 11-20 .................................................. Original

Introduction to Insurgency/Counterinsurgency and Aviation Foreign Internal Defense 21-33 Original

Advisor Roles and Responsibilities pages 34-42 ..................................................................... Original

Introduction to Security Cooperation Management 43-51 ...................................................... Original

Iraqi Insurgency and Counterinsurgency pages 52-61 ............................................................ Original

Afghan Insurgency and Counterinsurgency pages 62-71 ........................................................ Original

Communications Equipment and Operations pages 72-80 ...................................................... Original

High Risk of Isolation and Capture pages 81-82 ..................................................................... Original

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) , Aviation FID (AVFID) pages 83-96 ................................... Original

Joint and Army Command Relationships pages 97-105 .......................................................... Original

Foreign Disclosure and Security Awareness 106-107 ............................................................. Original

Public Affairs 108-113 ............................................................................................................. Original

ISOPREP/Intel Briefing 114-115 ............................................................................................ Original

II. Culture Training (CT)

Arabic Language pages 116-118 ............................................................................................. Original

Dari/Pashto Language pages 119-120 ..................................................................................... Original

Interpreter Support pages 121-126 ........................................................................................... Original

Social Skills with the Middle Easterner pages 127-137 .......................................................... Original

Social Skills with the South Asian pages 138-148 .................................................................. Original

Cross-Cultural Communication for Air Advisors pages 149-150 ........................................... Original

Introduction to Afghan Culture151-157 .................................................................................. Original

Introduction to Iraqi Culture 158-164 ...................................................................................... Original

Introduction to Islam 165-181 ................................................................................................. Original

Cross-Cultural Negotiations 182-183 ...................................................................................... Original

Cross-Cultural Relations for Air Advisors 184-185 ................................................................ Original

III. Combat Skills (CST)

Roll Over Simulator pages 186-194 ........................................................................................ Original

High Threat Driving pages 195-206 ........................................................................................ Original

Advance Weapons Training pages 207-242 ............................................................................ Original

Convoy Operations pages 243-255 .......................................................................................... Original

Counter Improvised Explosive Device Awareness 256-274 ................................................... Original

Combat Lifesaver pages 275-276 ............................................................................................ Original

Small Team Tactics pages 277-294 ......................................................................................... Original

Land Navigation pages 295-310 .............................................................................................. Original ii

LIST OF CURRENT PAGES (cont)

ISSUE

IV. Mission Support (MS)

Course Introduction 311-317 ................................................................................................... Original

Weapons Issue 318-319 ........................................................................................................... Original

Equipment Issue 320-321 ........................................................................................................ Original

Equipment/Weapons Turn-in 322-323 .................................................................................... Original

Graduation 324-325 ................................................................................................................. Original iii

DISTRIBUTION:

1. HQ AETC/A3R 1 F Street East, Randolph AFB, TX 78150-4321 Phone: (DSN) 487-9881

2. SCG-5656 Texas Ave, Fort Dix, NJ 08640 Phone: (DSN) 650-7158

3. CCAF/ADYM-1 130 W Maxwell Blvd Maxwell AFB, TX 36112-6613 Phone: (DSN) 493-6577 iv

1. PURPOSE: The Air Advisor Ground Training Course provides just-in-time pre-deployment ground centric training for USAF General Purpose Advisors in advanced weapons handling, combat lifesaving, enhanced force protection, improvised explosive device (IED) awareness, high threat driving, language, cultural awareness, Irregular

Warfare (IW), counterinsurgency, convoy and other combat/advisor critical ground skills. This course meets the requirements set by the USCENTCOM Joint Source

Training Requirement (JSTR) as well as the Mission Essential Task List (METL) set by

USAFCENT for USAF Advisor personnel. This publication consists of three volumes and is the Plan of Instruction (POI) when the pages listed on page A are bound into a single set. It contains the qualitative requirements of course AAC-A/AAC-I, Air Advisor

Course in terms of training objectives for each unit of instruction and shows time, support materials and guidance. When separated into units of instruction, it becomes the Lesson

Plan, Parts 1, 2 and 3. The three volumes prescribe the requirements for the Air Advisor

Course. This POI was developed under the provisions of AFM 36-2234, Information for

Designers of Instructional System Development (ISD) and AFM 36-2236, Guide Book for Air Force Instructors.

2. COURSE DESIGN DESCRIPTION: The instructional design for this course is modified Group/Lock Step. The course was designed IAW AFM 36-2236, Guidebook for Air Force Instructors, to provide training for all Air Advisors of the Air Force, Air

Force Reserve and other interagency organizations prior to their deployment to the theater. The scope of training includes training in fundamentals, knowledge, skills, and attitudes requisite for effective performance as a Air Advisor in the United States Air

Force. Emphasize and apply safety in all applicable areas.

3. TRAINING EQUIPMENT: Power Point presentations, Maps, AN/PRC -148 radios, Combat Lifesaver kits, AK-47 weapons, M9/M4 weapons, blank ammunition, live ammunition, DAGRs, Combat Gear (helmet, web belt and individual body armor (IBA), Blast Simulators, sedans and SUVs.

4. REFERENCES: Provided by multiple sources and organizations.

5. INSTRUCTION SEQUENCE: In order to reduce printing costs, POIs are organized functionally rather than sequentially. Sequence of instruction varies according to the schedule. Air Advisor Course is organized to follow an AEF cycle – preparation for deployment, deployment and reconstitution.

6. CORE VALUES / OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT: Woven throughout the entire curriculum. In addition, instructors will complete operational risk assessments prior to all Combat Skills courses.

OPR: AETC/A3Q

Certified by: Mr. Philip Senna

Distribution: Listed on Page C v

PLAN OF INSTRUCTION PART I

NAME OF INSTRUCTOR: COURSE TITLE:

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

Mission Training

COURSE CONTENT TIME

LESSON TITLE: USAFCENT Mission Operations Briefing

COURSE DEVELOPER: USAFCENT

COURSE DIRECTOR: On Site QA

METHOD/LENGTH: Lecture/Conducted by USAFCENT Personnel.

OBJECTIVE: Students should know USAFCENT Mission and their role as Air Advisor‘s.

SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR:

1. Explain 9AF/USAFCENT mission, area of responsibility and chain of command.

2. Describe AOR operations.

3. Define the Air Advisor mission in USAFCENT.

REFERENCES:

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3

2. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1

3. Material and Briefer for this lesson is provided by USAFCENT.

AIDS/HANDOUTS:

1. Power Point Presentation

2. Audio/Visual Equipment

3. Laser Pointer

1.0 hr

SUPERVISOR APPROVAL OF LESSON PLAN

SIGNATURE AND DATE SIGNATURE AND DATE

PLAN OF INSTRUCTION:

AAC-I/AAC-A

BLOCK

I

UNIT

MT-201

DATE

01-Aug-10

SUPPORT MATERIALS AND GUIDANCE

Source Documents

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1

Material and Briefer for this lesson is provided by USAFCENT.

Aids

Audio/Visual Equipment

Power Point presentation

Laser pointer

Training Methods

Lecture

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: ITAM-AF Mission Brief

COURSE DEVELOPER: ITAM-AF

METHOD/LENGTH: Lecture

OBJECTIVE: Students should know ITAM-AF organization, mission and operating locations.

1. Identify the mission of ITAM-AF

2. Explain how ITAM-AF is organized.

3. List ITAM-AF operating locations.

Material for briefing provided and presented by ITAM-AF Personnel.

AIDS/HANDOUTS

2. Audio/Visual Equipment

3. Laser Pointer

4.0 hr

AAC-I

MT-202

01 Aug 10

Provided by ITAM-AF

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: CAPTF Mission Brief

COURSE DEVELOPER: CAPTF

OBJECTIVE: Students should know the CAPTF organization, mission and operating locations.

1. Identify the mission of CAPTF.

2. Explain how CAPTF is organized.

3. List CAPTF operating locations.

Material for briefing provided and presented by CAFPT Personnel.

4.0 hr

AAC-A

MT-203

Provided by CAPTF

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: ITAM-AF VTC

COURSE DEVELOPER: ITAM-AF

METHOD/LENGTH: Classified Video Tele-Conference

OBJECTIVE: Students should know chain of command and mission objectives of ITAM-AF.

1. Identify the ITAM-AF organization.

2. Define leadership expectation.

3. Explain ITAM-AF mission and goals.

None

AIDS:

2. Video Projection Equipment

3. Secure room required for classified VTC

1.5 hr

MT-204

Visual Aids/Equipment

2. Video Tele Conference Equipment

3. Door Guard

VTC

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: CAPTF VTC

COURSE DEVELOPER: CAPTF

METHOD/LENGTH: Classified Video Tele-Conference

OBJECTIVE: Students should know chain of command and mission objectives of CAPTF.

1. Identify the CAPTF organization.

2. Define leadership expectation.

3. Explain CAPTF mission and goals.

2. Video Projection Equipment

3. Secure room required for classified VTC

1.5 hr

MT-205

2. Video Tele Conference Equipment

3. Door Guard

VTC

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: Surveillance Detection and Attack Recognition

COURSE DEVELOPER: AETC/A3Q

OBJECTIVE: Students should know proper procedures for surveillance detection and attack recognition to avoid or mitigate terrorist attack.

1. Describe common techniques of terrorist activity.

2. Describe how to recognize opportunities and events that often precede terrorist events.

3. Explain methods of surveillance employed by criminal/terrorist personnel.

4. Explain techniques to detect surveillance.

5. Select a safe route of travel on roadways.

6. Identify safe routes, safe havens, choke points, and signs of an IED.

DOD O-2000.12-H, Antiterrorism Handbook

FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Targeting

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Student Ref, Surveillance Detection Training

Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks: Selected Case Studies, June

Combat Airmen Skills Training POI

AIDS/HANDOUTS:

2. Audio/Visual Equipment

4. Case Studies

2.0 hr

MT-206

DOD O-2000.12-H, Antiterrorism Handbook

FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Targeting

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Student Ref, Surveillance Detection Training

Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure of Terrorist Attacks: Selected Case Studies, June 2007

Combat Airmen Skills Training POI

Power Point presentation

Case Studies

LESSON PLAN, PART II, TEACHING GUIDE

UNIT TIME: 2 hrs

INTRODUCTION

ATTENTION:

MOTIVATION:

REVIEW:

OVERVIEW:

MP1: Why Air Advisor‘s are targets

MP2: How terrorists plan an attack in Iraq/Afghanistan

MP3: How to break the ops cycle of an attack

MP4: Case studies

TRANSITION:

MP1: Why Air Advisor’s are targets

a. You will have direct influence on host nation counterpart.

b. You will have direct impact on Foreign Internal Defense.

c. You represent the United States Air Force and its Airpower.

d. Take the will to fight out of the U.S.

MP2: How terrorists plan an attack Iraq/Afghanistan

a. They plan and use tactics stolen from United States Army, Special Operations Forces, thanks to man named Ali Mohamed.

1. Ali Mohamed—born in Egypt, 1952. Major in Egyptian Army.

a Educated, fit, skilled linguist, clever, and member of Egyptian Islamic

Jihad.

b Immigrated to U.S. and married U.S. woman, joined U.S. Army.

Stole U.S. military information and produced training manuals for al-

Qaeda and other Muslim militants, and wrote al-Qaeda‘s multivolume terrorist training guide.

c Traveled on weekends to train Muslim militants in military tactics--

New York and New Jersey.

d Arrested but not sentenced. News source suggested that he is providing information on Bin Laden and al Qaeda in attempt to reduce sentence.

2. Terrorists use the internet and training camps to improve TTPS. Good example in a case study later in the lesson.

b. Target Analysis Process-utilizing the CARVER system to select the best targets or components to attack. Factors are:

a Critically—Means target value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic operations.

b Accessibility—A target is accessible when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish the mission—even if it requires knowledgeable insiders.

c Recoverability—A target‘s recoverability is measured in time, how long will it take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target.

d Vulnerability—Specifically, vulnerability depends on the nature and construction of the target, the amount of damage required, and the assets available to damage the target.

e Effect on Populace—Effect of a target is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond.

f Identification—A target‘s identification is the degree to which it can be recognized by an operational element and/or intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets under varying conditions.

c. These CARVER factors and their assigned values are used to construct a CARVER matrix. This is a tool for rating the desirability of potential targets and wisely allocating attack resources. Normally ―soft‖ targets are selected. Reference case studies at end of lesson.

d. Surveillance by enemy is woven throughout the CARVER process. It may involve a number of people working in coordinated teams. There may be drivers, foot surveillants, trigger men, team leaders, and large stable of vehicles.

1. Surveillance must be discreet to be effective and will provide information about the target unobtainable in any other manner.

2. Initial surveillances may be carried out by support personnel who may not be skilled in best techniques—not KGB agent, i.e., children on street corners in

Afghanistan.

e. Bottom line for U.S. Forces, acts of terrorism are not random acts, they are planned and analyzed before executed.

MP3: How to break the Ops Cycle of a terrorist attack

a. Attack recognition defined, ―Is the mental prepardness necessary to reacting to an attack‖. When pre-atttack indicators are recognized, pre-planned avoindance manuevers are employed to escape attack. You know you are a target! So be prepared mentally and physically using the following:

1. Surveillance Detection – the key is awareness. Defined, ― The process of determining whether or not surveillance is present‖ a Location: identified areas where surveillance is likely occurring.

b Correlation: Activity directly corresponding to target. Look for;

Same/different people surveilling facility/area, Repeated sightings to vulnerable areas or service/delivery areas.

c Mistakes: Surveillance team members make mistakes Look for;

Individuals whose profile does not match the norm. signaling others when specific activities occur checking time, make a call, taking picures, or taking notes.

d Observe what someone looks like vs what someone is actually doing:

For example; A truck marked with a delivery logo should making frequent stops, not parked for long periods of time. Toursists travel in pairs/groups and take pictures of tourist attractions, not individual homes or government facilities. Cars break down in inconvenient locations and drivers appear frustrated. Construction workers wear hard hats and boots and are focused on tasks, not standing idle and watching traffic, jotting down notes or signaling.

2. Observant public and vigilant security services is key to stopping terrorist attacks. Terrorists are rarely caught in the act during the exceution phase of an attack, other than instances which their equipment or weapons fail. Rather, plots are most often foiled during the pre-execution phase. The best known way to influence the success or failure of an attack—at the tactical, operational, or strategic level is to interdict the plot before the terrorists deploy to exceute their plan. Interdiction most likely will come in the form of reporting suspicious people/actions/things to security forces.

3. Reporting; Must report suspicious activity and must be acted on to be effective. Examples of activities reported/not reported/acted on/not acted on:

a Attack: March 20, 1995, Sarin gas attack aboard five trains in Tokyo.

Reporting: Families near terrorist cults notified authorities that leaves were turning brown on trees, terrible smell, eyes watering, and nausea. Police did not act due to concern of treading on cult‘s religious freedom.

b Attack: July, 1997, New York City subway bomb plot.

Reporting: The plot was discovered when a roommate, to whom they had shown one of the assembled devices, notified police.

Believing the attack was imminent—possibly planned to occur as soon as the next day—the New York City police department raided the suspects‘ apartment, arrested the suspects, and seized two

IEDs.

c Attack: July, 7, 2005, London transit bombings.

Reporting: There is only one, unconfirmed, report regarding a tip from a member of the public. A computer expert named Martin

Gilbertson claimed to have notified police in 2003 that Khan and

Tanweer had asked him to create an email encryption program and firewall, presumably to mask their activities from authorities. West

Yorkshire Police state that they have no record of this incident. If it did occur, this would be an informative case of a lucky break falling into the hands of security services, upon which they failed to act, possibly missing an opportunity to halt the attack.

d Attack: August, 2006, Liquid explosives airline plot in the United

Kingdom.

Reporting: One of the clearest reasons that this attack did not go forward as the terrorist‘s had planned was an informed and motivated public. According to a senior European intelligence official, British authorities opened their investigation into the plot after receiving the report about the angry young Muslims from worried residents of

Walthamstow, who were Muslims themselves.468 If these citizens had not called the authorities, this plot might have developed as the suspects had intended.

4. Identify potential attack sites. Government buildings/FOBs are always targets.

a Facility Security Measures – Changes in security profiles; Briefings of security personnel; Security exercises; Analysis of points of potential interest; Offensive measures; Documentation and reporting;

Analysis of reports data.

b Facility Analysis (Vulnerabilities) – Building Design; Proximity to

Uncontrolled Areas; Portals (Vehicle and Pedestrian); Barriers

(Fences, Walls, Strand-Off); Access by Un-cleared Personnel;

Required Service Access.

5. Current trend are attacks on vehicles, convoys, and personnel outside wire, when most vulnerable. IEDs have been the weapon of choice. Beware of:

a Choke Point: Areas where vehicular movement is restricted and you are forced to slow down. Examples: a bridge, a tunnel, an s-curve, one-way street, construction zones, traffic lights, stop sign, rotary, and blind curve.

b Danger Zone: Similar to a choke point, a danger zone is an area where movement is not only restricted, but additionally you may have to stop due to circumstances not under your control and concealment is offered to a potential attacker. If obstacles are present (fixed, as in construction, an accident –staged) or (mobile, as in a-vehicle) this becomes a point of likely ambush. A choke point can become a danger zone when the above factors are present.

c Zone of Total Predictability: Is that part of a route where you must go that way. Example: a single road into a cul-de-sac a single road that must be taken to get to a highway, a dead end street.

d Reference Point: Something in the terrain in that is visible day or night in any weather. Example: skyscraper, cellular tower, a railroad crossing, and large bridge.

e Observation Point; an observation point is a location such as a dominant terrain feature where covert observation may be conducted over a critical portion of the route. This location may be a building, a hill, or even something overt such as a sidewalk café.

f Check Points--The 4P Test-- Legitimate checkpoints will have more pluses than minuses assigned to the ―4P‖s.

1 Position – at entrance to legitimate facility, roadway, and town.

2 Profile – permanent structure, uniform personnel, flags.

3 Pass – multiple lanes, allow passing of authorized vehicles.

4 Park – controlled parking area to delay inspection vehicles.

6. IED Indicators.

a Environmental Indicators (Things to be aware of and look for in your operating environment).

1 Changes in patterns of life (atmospherics)—be alert to fewer people/vehicles and the absence of and children playing in normally busy areas.

2 Colors—Contrasting colors, freshly disturbed earth (it will be darker in color), concrete that doesn‘t match the surrounding areas.

3 Markers—Watch for indicators by the side of the road such as tires, rock piles, ribbon or tape that may identify an IED‘s location, or serve as an aiming reference.

4 Shapes—Take note of object outlines that seem out of place for the environment that you are in.

5 Graffiti—Be aware of symbols or writing on buildings and walls that might serve as a warning to locals (interpreters usually needed).

6 Signs—Pay attention to newly erected placards and signs that seem out of place or might serve as warning to locals and/or messages to insurgents.

7 Potential Hit Site Indicators—Vehicles following or preceding your convoy for a long distance and then pulling off the side of the road. Dead animals along the roadways. Freshly dug holes or pavement patching on or along the road that may serve as possible IED emplacement sites. New dirt, rock or gravel piles. Obstacles and craters in the roadway used to channel the convoy. Personnel on/under overpasses. Signals with flares or city lights (switched off/on) as convoy approaches. People videotaping ordinary activities or military movements. Wires laid out in plain sight.

(a) When faced with an unexpected threat that poses an immediate danger, the average individual will react unconsciously for the first 3-5 seconds. After the first 3-

5 seconds the conscious mind begins to regain control of the physical reactions and will start the process of making conscious decisions to remediate the danger.

MP4: Case Studies

NOTE to Instructor: Time permitting both case studies should be discussed. Use the

CARVER process as a template to each study. Hand out studies to group of 4-5 Air

Advisors. This should be a discussion based exercise.

1. KHOST, AFGHANISTAN SUICIDE BOMBING (2008)

Incident Date: 03 March 2008

Location: Sabari District, Khost Province, Afghanistan

Terrorist Group: Islamic Jihad Union (Taliban affiliate)

Tactical Design: Vehicle-Borne Breaching Attack

Fatalities: 5

2. MUMBAI COORDINATED CITY ATTACKS (2008)

Incident Date: 26 November 2008

Location: Mumbai, India

Terrorist Group: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Target: Passenger Vehicle, Hotels, National Monuments/Icons, Rail

Infrastructure, Places of Worship, Tourists and Tourism Sites, Mass Transit, Healthcare Facilities, Restaurants, Target of Opportunity, Theaters

Tactical Design: Kidnapping/Hostage Taking, Coordinated Attack, Support /

Small Arms Gunfire

Fatalities: 188

Injuries: 372

Questions

Summary

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: Introduction to Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Aviation Foreign Internal

Defense

OBJECTIVE: Students should know the basic principles of Irregular Warfare, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Building Partnerships.

1. Describe Irregular Warfare.

2. Describe Insurgency Warfare Doctrine and the nature of insurgent movements.

3. Describe nature, phases and framework of insurgency operations.

4. Explain the infrastructure and strategies of insurgencies.

5. Identify root causes of insurgencies.

6. Summarize motivation, organization and operations of the insurgency.

7. Describe Counterinsurgency Doctrine.

8. Recognize the fundamentals to execute counterinsurgency.

9. Identify actions that can lead to successful and unsuccessful COIN operations.

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 Irregular Warfare, 1 Aug 2007

2. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense, 15 Sep 2007

3. Airman‘s Guide to Irregular Warfare 1 Feb 2009

4. JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

5. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006

6. USAF Irregular Warfare Strategy, Jan 2009

7. DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare, 1 Dec 2008

8. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 11 Sep 2007

MT-207

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1

Airman‘s Guide to Irregular Warfare

JP 1-02

MP1: Principles of Irregular Warfare (IW)

MP2: Principles of Insurgency

MP3: Principles of Counter Insurgency (COIN)

MP4: Principles of Building Partnerships (BP) and Security Force Assistance (SFA)

MP1: Principles of Irregular Warfare (IW)

a. Irregular Warfare (IW) defined: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary‘s power, influence and will.

b. Traditional Warfare verses Irregular Warfare.

1. What makes IW different is the focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and support of, that relevant population. In other words, the focus is on legitimacy of a political authority to control or influence a relevant population.

a Traditional warfare seeks a change in the policies and practices, if not in the outright existence, of a government by coercing key government leaders or defeating them militarily.

b IW, conversely, seeks to undermine a group, government, or ideology by influencing the population, which is often the center of gravity.

The focus of IQ is not primarily on the military or destructive capability of an adversary (state or non-state).

2. IW is not a lesser-included form of Traditional Warfare.

a Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict.

b Traditional warfare can rapidly evolve into an irregular war and vice versa, requiring the military force to adapt from one form to the other.

3. Each IW contingency is different and unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall strategic success: Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME).

c. IW can be defined in several ways.

1. The actors involved, the methods employed or the strategic purpose.

a The conflict should be first described based on its strategic purpose and its effect on the relevant population. However, analysis of the actors and methods may also have a greater impact on the development of an overall strategy than in the past.

2. IW model shows key activities and capabilities.

a Key IW Activities: COIN, Support to COIN, Support to Insurgency, Counterterrorism, and Shaping and Deterring.

b Key capabilities of the IW model include: Information Operations, Building Partnership Capacity, Unconventional Warfare, Intelligence/Counter Intelligence Operations, Mobility, Agile Combat

Support, Precision Engagement and Command and Control.

3. IW environments range from supporting failed states on one end of the spectrum to supporting operations of the cooperative and non-cooperative governments on the other.

a Situations most likely to involve Air Force IW activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive by Western standards.

MP2. Principles of Insurgency

a. Insurgencies are more prevalent than most think and are not well-understood.

1. Insurgencies are not necessarily synonymous with guerrilla or unconventional warfare.

b. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies. Each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Political legitimacy is the central issue in an insurgency – the center of gravity is the indigenous population.

1. In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be:

a An activity minority for the cause.

b A neutral or passive majority.

c And an active minority against the cause.

c. Definitions.

1. Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

2. Terrorism: Calculated use of violence of threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.

d. Insurgent goal is to replace the government, while a terrorist wants the government to do something different.

1. Insurgencies sometimes use terrorist like acts to accomplish their goals, but can accomplish these things without terrorist activities.

2. Because terrorists do not want to replace the government they do not necessarily need popular support.

e. An insurgency is not simply random violence, it is directed and focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective.

1. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination and organizational coherence.

a Break the ties between the people and the government.

b Establish credibility for their movement.

c Gain popular support.

2. Factors effecting Insurgency leadership.

a Education, background, family/social connections, and experiences.

b Contributes to their ability to organize and inspire the people

(insurgents).

f. Insurgency Network Infrastructure.

1. Leaders.

2. Combatants – main forces, regional forces and local forces.

3. Political cadre – also called militants or the party.

4. Auxiliaries – active followers who provide important support services.

5. Mass base – the bulk of the membership.

g. Insurgency Objectives.

1. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its objectives.

a Strategic – is the insurgents desired end state.

b Operational – are those that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy and establish their desired end state.

c Tactical – are the immediate aims of insurgent‘s acts.

d Objectives can be psychological or physical.

h. Ideology and Narrative.

1. Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities.

a Insurgencies, whether religious, revolutionary or nationalist.

b Appeal to the same human instincts of dedication, faith, pursuit of power, unity and self sacrifice.

c Attracts the true believer, a man of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for a ―holy‖ cause.

d The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative.

e They are also inspired by hatred, reaction to abuses, suspicion, imitation and persuasion/coercion.

f Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others‘ intentions.

2. To undertake a vast change, people must be intensely discontented but not destitute.

a They must have feeling that a potential doctrine, infallible leader, or new technique gives them access to irresistible power.

b They are attracted by the prospect of sudden and spectacular change in their conditions of life.

c Ignorant of the difficulties (experience is a handicap).

d Those who fail should incline to blame the world for their failure

(―…it‘s the West, Israel‘s etc, fault‖).

i. Geography and Environment influence insurgency operations.

1. Geography.

a Creates advantages and disadvantages for both sides.

b Planning considerations: rural vs. urban.

c Border Access.

2. Environment affects all participants in a conflict.

a Physical: heat/cold/maritime/mountains/desert.

b Cultural and demographic factors.

j. Sanctuary and Support.

1. Sanctuary.

a Physical – internal (urban and rural); external (NWF of Pakistan).

b Virtual – internet, global financial systems, international media.

2. Support.

a Religious schools and mosques.

b NGOs.

c Political parties.

d Business and financial institutions.

e Militia organizations.

f Terrorist training camps and organizations.

k. Insurgents do have vulnerabilities to exploit.

1. Insurgents‘ need for secrecy.

2. Inconsistencies in the mobilization message.

3. Need to establish a base of operations.

4. Reliance on external operations.

5. Need to obtain financial resources.

6. Internal divisions among insurgents.

7. Need to maintain momentum.

8. Informants within the insurgency.

MP3: Counter Insurgency (COIN)

a. Definition: Counterinsurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

b. Successful COIN operations depend on several factors:

1. Level of legitimacy of the government.

a Safety of security of population.

b Selection of leaders by population.

c High levels of support for political process.

d Culturally acceptable levels of corruption.

e Political, economic, and social development.

f Regime acceptance by social institutions.

2. Organizations for unity of effort—a whole of government approach is needed for success: Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic.

a Type and consistency of support to the targeted government.

3. Intelligence.

4. Discipline and capability of a government‘s armed forces.

5. Ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents.

c. Generalized Rules of Success for COIN Practitioners.

1. No two insurgencies are alike.

a Define operational environment.

b Describe environment effects.

c Evaluate the threat.

d Determine threat course of action.

2. Do not make the mistake of blindly, or without analysis, applying measures which may have worked in other insurgencies. Instead, use them as a guide for application to your situation.

a Complex vs. Simple.

b Long term Commitment.

c Efforts focused on eliminating root causes.

d Success is never guaranteed, due to all the variety of factors which could occur throughout counter-measures.

3. You must first correctly analyze the problem and the situation you are in to devise the correct counter-measures.

a Generally accepted is the fact that the populace is the center of gravity in any insurgency…however analyze this closely to ascertain other important centers of gravity.

b The Political Objective Outweighs the Military objective.

4. Patience is the key; this effort takes years. Both you policy and the government‘s must have the endurance to go the distance.

a Outlast the will of insurgent and their strategy for protracted war and war of attrition……or fail.

b Political will to finish must be stronger than the insurgent‘s will to continue, or revert to underground activity.

c Clear, Hold and Build.

5. Your COIN forces must be retailored and employed correctly to ensure they can go the distance.

6. Ultimately, the government must maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people and solve the social and political grievances which cause rebellion – this includes reforming the government, if necessary.

a Between civil/military leaders and address PMSE.

b Must address political and social grievances.

c Governance, security, economic success.

d Selection of appropriate and adaptable strategy.

7. Denial of sanctuary and external strategy.

a Insurgent space must be threatened in order to throw off their timing and their will to continue.

b Degrading external financing, equipment and diplomatic support also cuts to their will.

8. Engage the power of culture to help solve problems.

9. Coordinated and multi-layered intelligence and information systems are critical to success.

a Historically, 80% of finding and defeating insurgents has come from police and detective work combined with military intelligence.

10. Principles for Successful COIN operations.

a Unity of effort and unity of command.

b Address the basic needs of the populace.

c Governance, security, basic economic needs.

d Population and resource control is effective, if done correctly.

d. Unsuccessful COIN Practices.

1. COIN efforts focuses primarily on military, excludes other instruments of power/credible institutions.

2. Large unit operations vice small units. Smaller footprints are often more effective and give legitimacy to the partner nation.

3. Military units concentrated on larges bases, vice in the field ―Drive-by

Advising‖.

4. Special Forces focused on direct action instead of advising.

5. Peacetime government processes and institutions ignored.

6. Lack of attention on borders and coastlines.

e. Ten tips and techniques.

1. Intelligence on guerrilla actions, plans and capabilities

(Intelligence=Security).

2. Government credibility: needs to be able to exist (survive) to meet needs of population.

3. Native people‘s incentive to repel guerilla actions (i.e. ―control‖ the population).

4. Understanding the whole environment to include indigenous, cultural, and historical backgrounds.

5. Familiarity with geographical/environmental conditions and factors (is this urban or rural civil war, sectarian? Foreign fighters involved?).

6. Local support for foreign (U.S./Coalition) intervention (examples: national security interest, economic considerations and humanitarian interests).

7. Elimination of sanctuaries for insurgent, guerilla and terrorist operations.

8. Availability of police protection for supporters/civilians/facilities.

9. Sufficient military force, assets and structure to deny insurgents/guerillas their objectives.

10. Comprehensive ―game planning‖…prior to initiating.

f. Effective COIN operation needs to do the following:

1. Take the Strategic Initiative ASAP.

2. Provide Security to the local population.

3. Address the root causes of the insurgency.

4. Provide alternatives to valid grievances.

5. Target or render ineffective insurgent leaders and active supporters.

6. Gain a population‘s support and consent to government rule.

g. Disadvantages to U.S. Airmen supporting COIN.

1. Insurgents may have better knowledge: physical, cultural, religious, historical, geographical, social and political.

2. Non-indigenous forces – language difficulties, stand-out in a crowd.

3. Security concerns often lead to massing of troops, which is not usually as effective.

h. Truths for Airmen.

1. Legitimacy and influence are main objectives.

2. Air Force provides critical capabilities that enable joint force operations in

COIN.

3. Military actions are necessary part of any COIN strategy.

4. Key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace.

5. COIN is a protracted affair.

MP4: Principles of Building Partnerships (BP) and Security Force Assistance (SFA)

a. The U.S. cannot defeat terrorists and insurgents alone. This effort hinges on partner capabilities and cooperation within the global community. Partnerships provide the force multiplier essential to the success of winning today‘s fight while preparing for tomorrow‘s challenges. You are the leading edge of today‘s task!

b. Air Force is in progress of defining doctrine and definitions for Building Partnership

Capacity (BPC) for use across the USAF.

1. Proposed definition: Airmen interacting with international airmen, security establishments and relevant actors to establish, guide and sustain relationships for mutual benefit and in support of U.S. interests.

c. Strategy establishes ends necessary to organize, train and equip the USAF to address the importance of building partnerships. These ends are for the USAF to:

1. Establish, sustain and expand Global Partnerships that are mutually beneficial.

2. Provide global partners the capability and capacity necessary to provide for their own national security.

3. Establish the capacity to train, advise and assist foreign air forces while conducting partnership activities using USAF Airmen with appropriate language and cultural skills.

4. Develop and enhance partnership capabilities to ensure interoperability, integration and interdependence as appropriate.

d. These end states apply to all USAF BP activities. The USAF must build, sustain and expand relationships with partner air forces of all economic means and available resources.

e. BP is applicable throughout many lessons in the course and directly related with

Security Force Assistance (SFA).

f. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) recently defined SFA as, unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host nation and regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

1. SFA consists of organizing equipping, training, rebuilding and advising

(OTERA) foreign security forces (FSF). Traditional ―train the equipped‖ missions have proven inadequate in producing effective foreign security forces in some countries.

2. SFA Imperative include:

a Understanding the operational environment.

b Provide effective leadership.

c Build legitimacy.

d Manage information.

e Ensure unity of effort/unity of performance.

f Sustain the effort.

Summary

Questions

Air Advisor Course

BLOCK TITLE:

LESSON TITLE: Advisor Roles and Responsibilities

COURSE DEVELOPER: AETC/A3Q/6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS)

METHOD/LENGTH: Lecture/Discussion/Practical Exercises. Material should be presented by present/former USAF Air Advisor.

OBJECTIVE: Students should be able to apply Air Advisor skills in relationship with their host nation counterpart.

1. Given a scenario in which a problem has arisen, identify best solutions applying Air

Advisors skills.

2. Develop plans and implements strategies designed to build partner nation‘s capacity.

FM 7-0.1 MTTPs For Advising Foreign Forces, May 2009

Critical Incidents Collected from Returning Advisors/ARI Ft Leavenworth Research Unit

AF Combat Advisor curriculum/6 th

SOS

Air Advisor Handbook, 27 April 2009, Coalition & Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence

(CIWC)

2. Video Projection Equipment

2.0 hr

MT-208

Source Documents

FM 7-0.1 MTTPs For Advising Foreign Forces, May 2009

Critical Incidents Collected from Returning Advisors/ARI Ft Leavenworth Research Unit

AF Combat Advisor curriculum/6 th

SOS

Air Advisor Handbook, 27 April 2009, Coalition & Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence (CIWC)

Lecture/Discussion/Practical Exercises

MP1: Air Advisor Mission

MP2: Advisor Qualities/Pitfalls

MP3: Advisor Role/Guidelines/METLs

MP1: Air Advisor Mission

a. Mission derived from our National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military

Strategy, and other strategic documents. These documents clearly express the need for working closely with our allies, friends, and partners.

b. Air Advisor (AA) defined: an Airman specially trained and educated to apply aviation expertise to assess, train/educate, advise, and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national needs, in support of US interests.

1. Building partnerships: The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. (approved JCA Lexicon, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review; Jan

2009)

2. Irregular Warfare: a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary‘s power, influence, and will. JCS Pub 1-02

c. Air Advisors must;

1. Attain the proper education and training to play a pivotal role in building global air, space, and cyberspace partnerships in support of geographic combatant commanders‘ security cooperation and irregular warfare activities.

2. Be able to operate and survive in semi-austere environments alongside partner nation counterparts.

3. Comprehend the dynamics of joint and combined operations as well as relationships involving the interagency, multi-national and non-governmental organizations.

4. Be capable of operating independently or augment Air Force Special Operations Forces

(SOF) Combat Aviation Advisors in situations requiring SOF capability.

d. History of GPF Air Advisor Mission

1. March 2007-- CSAF directed AETC to stand up an Air Advisor education & training program (GWOT funded) to prepare Airmen to train, advise, and assist partner nation counterparts.

2. Feb 2009 -- CORONA directed FY10 POM insert to establish Air Advisor education & training program baseline to meet AFCENT pre-deployment req‘ts supports OIF/OEF through 2014 -- up to 900 students/yr. Includes AA Academy (basic advisor skills) + flying/mx trng.

3. FY12 POM plan -- supports DoD‘s IW & AF Global Partnership Strategy.

Air Advisors are like a weapons system -- they provide capability across the BP and IW spectrum to enhance these operations --

―Air Advisor‖ is not a mission a Expands AA education & training program to support all GCCs.

MP2: Advisor Qualities/Pitfalls

a. Key Advisor Qualities

1. Patience, Tolerance, Open Mindedness, Flexibility, Sense of Humor, Motivation, Self-

Reliance, Resourcefulness, Professional Competence, and most importantly Language and

Cultural Awareness.

a It is impossible to list all the attributes necessary to attain to become a successful Air

Advisor but studies have stated cultural awareness, language, and patience are the most critical to the advisor‘s success.

b Read/study about the country and culture of your host country. Knowing the political, economical, social, and religious system of your host nation can help you understand where your host nation counterpart is coming from. Know as much about the people you are assisting as possible. Be proactive, the Air Advisor Course can only teach you so much.

b. Advisor Pitfalls

1. Intolerance, Over-reliance on Metrics, Techno-Centric, Impatient, and of course Bad

Attitude.

2. Not understanding your HNP culture, history, or retrospect.

MP3: Advisor Role/Guidelines/METLs

a. Advisor and advisor team are defined as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise

HNP in order to develop their professional skills. Additionally, teaching, coaching, advising, training, and educating are defined as follows:

1. Teaching means to provide instruction and/or education to HNP to develop skills or knowledge necessary to do a particular job.

2. Coaching is to assist a counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The distinctive feature is that the recipient assumes more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required.

3. Advising means to provide the advisor‗s counterparts with expert opinions, advice, or counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge and through a mutually developed bond of trust. The distinctive feature is that the recipient is responsible for making the decision while the advisor provides only advice.

4. Training is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks or the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.

5. Educating consists of teaching concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad range of applications. The advisor has to be ready to teach and coach concepts and knowledge as necessary.

b. Top Twenty Advisor Guidelines from the Multi-Service TTPs for Advisors;

1. Learn enough of the language for simple conversation. Know the basics and use them from your first meeting: ―hello‖, ―please‖, ―thank you‖, ―yes‖, ―no‖, and ―goodbye‖.

Language demonstrates a willingness to understand and be competent in the host nation culture. Cultural awareness yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for you and your team.

2. Be patient and subtle. Explain the benefits of an action.