JnA_16-R-4006 _FedBizOps_Redacted.pdf

J&A No. N32205-16-R-4006

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR USE OFOTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity: Department of the Navy, MilitarySealift Command (MSC)

2. Description of the Action Being Approved: This is a brand name justification for work to be provided f or the MTA of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189) under RFP N32205-16-R-4006. This Justification is covering onlythe portion of the acquisition which an OEM authorized facility/Manufacturer/Representative is required and theapproval level requirements will then onlyapply to that portion.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: MSC requires Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) authorized technical field service representatives and OEM parts to accomplish the requirements of Work Items WI 201, 202, 203, 302, 401, 402, 403,404, 405, 414, 501,503, 507, 509, 511, 515, 604, 606, 607, 608, for 43 day MTA repair availability, the estimated dollar value of the twenty (20) Work Items is estimated at $ which will be funded utilizing FY 16 Operations & Maintenance funds.

4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition: 10 U.S.C 2304 (c)(1), Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements, as implemented byFAR6.302-1(a).

5. Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Authority:

a. WI 201 PME And SME Connecting Rod Studs Replacement

There are only two licensed U.S. authorized distributors and service centers, Fairbanks Morse Engines (FME) under licensing agreement, and Motor Services Hugo Stamp (MSHS) as a MAN Diesel SA authorized distributor and service center. Only FME and MSHS are capable of meeting the stringent Quality Assurance requirements and are certified by the OEM for same. The engineering construction, drawing and technical characteristics for the manufacturer of parts for these propulsion engines are proprietaryto MAN diesel SAS-SEMT Pielstick.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the main engines as critical equipment. Failure of one main engine will force the ship to reduce speed. The loss of two main engines puts the ship in a C-4 status, thus becoming unable to perform it primary mission of providing underway replenishment services to the fleet. The reduction in speed can also pose a hazard to the crew, due to limited ship maneuverability. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the main engines are critical to the safe operations of the John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

b. WI 202, Main Engine Fuel Injection Pump Overhaul

There are only two licensed U.S. authorized distributors and service centers, Fairbanks Morse Engines (FME) under licensing agreement, and Motor Services Hugo Stamp (MSHS) as a MAN Diesel SA authorized distributor and service center. Only FME and MSHS are capable of meeting the stringent Quality Assurance requirements and are certified by the OEM for same. The engineering construction, drawing and technical characteristics for the manufacturer of parts for these propulsion engines are proprietaryto MAN diesel SAS-SEMT Pielstick.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the main engines as critical equipment. Failure of one main engine will force the ship to reduce speed. The loss of two main engines puts the ship in a C-4 status, thus becoming unable to perform it primary mission of providing underway replenishment services to the fleet. The reduction in speed can also pose a hazard to the crew, due to limited ship maneuverability. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the main engines are critical to the safe operations of the John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

c. WI 203 Port Main Clutch and coupling Overhaul

The Original Equipment Manufacture of the Clutch, Coupling, and Geislinger Flexible Link (GFL) is Eaton and Geislinger. There are two(2) known approved sources Nolnacs and Geislinger in the United States. The Clutch and coupling is complex in design and requires OEM technical representation to dissemble and refurbish. If anypart of the Clutch system fails, it could be catastrophic and cause injury to personnel and damage to ship's equipment. If the clutch becomes inoperable, it would cause the ship to onlyhave one (1) propeller which limits the ship's ability to maneuver in and out of port and next to ships during UNREPS. The clutch and components are classed by Safety Management System (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL as critical equipment.

d. WI 302, Main Circuit BreakerMaintenance

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s main air circuit breakers in the main, auxiliary and emergencyswitchboards was Westinghouse and is now Eaton Cutler Hammer. Eaton Cutler Hammer now owns Westinghouse. The use of an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) authorized or otherwise qualified technical field service representative is required by this work item.

Canam Circuit Breaker Services Inc., CR Electrical Distribution Services and Eaton are some of the companies that have proven to provide the services of a qualified service technician, experienced in the inspection, repair and overhaul of Eaton Cutler Hammer SPB Circuit Breakers. Canam Circuit Breaker Services Inc., CR Electrical Distribution Services and Eaton also have access to OEM repair parts required by this work item. The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) authorized or otherwise qualified technical field service representative must have access to and the ability to provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors.

This ensures equipment reliability and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a products and services manufactured and provided by other companies. Proper refurbishment and scheduled maintenance of the circuit breakers are critical to the safe operation of the electrical systems and equipment onboard.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Main and Emergency Switchboards as critical equipment. Failure of the Main and Emergency Switchboards will severely impede the ships ability to generate electrical power and degrade mission capabilities. Proper refurbishment and scheduled maintenance of the circuit breakers contained in these switchboards are critical to the safe operations of the United States.

e. WI 401, Radar and Electronic Chart Display System Maintenance Annual (USCG & ABS Requirements)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Radar is FURUNO and the ECDIS is TRANSAS. FURUNO and TRANSAS have numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with a certificate of approved training for the FURUNO Radars and TRANSAS units that are installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company. Furuno Representatives have access to privydata such drawings, software, and Parts, due to constant changing International Maritime Organization rules, these items are needed to keep the Radars and ECDIS Systems in compliance with Class and regulatory bodies.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the radar as critical equipment. Loss of RADAR would essentially leave the vessel blinded during any condition that impairs the human visual or over the horizon detection of obstacles / threats. Without the RADAR systems fully operational, the vessel is in a no sail situation. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the radar ECDIS is critical to the safe operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189)

f. WI 402, NAVIGAT X Gyro Systems Preventative Maintenance

The OEM for the Gyro Compass equipment is Sperry Marine. A Sperry qualified rep for servicing, parts and repairs is required to certify and ensure proper operation and bearing (heading accuracy).

This is the primary electronic means available for determining ships heading and supplies this information to multiple e qu i pm en t on the bridge and must be certified accurate and available for t h e vessel during navigation for safe passage. This is a Coast Guard requirement. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Gyro Compass is critical to the safe operation of the USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189) Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties, en s u r e s equipment reliabilityand crewsafety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by or services from another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment.

g. WI 403, GMDSS Recertification Annual l (USCG & ABS Requirement)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is FURUNO. FURUNO has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training for the FURUNO FS-5000 GMDSS Console unit that is installed. Factoryauthorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings onlyavailable from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment, and the Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is required by ABS and USCG.

Service of the GMDSS must be accomplished by USCG/ABS Approved and OEM trained vendors. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the GMDSS is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

h. WI 404, SVDR Rectification Annual (USCG & ABS Requirement)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Simplified Voice Data Recorded (SVDR) is NETWAVE formerlyRUTTER. Vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training for the SVDR unit that is installed. Factoryauthorized suppliers provide partsand proprietarytechnical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintainsall OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safetytherefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment, and the SVDR is part of the vessel’s Safety Radio Certificate, as required by ABS.

The SVDR (Black Box) is a USCG and ABS required system that is integrated into the Radar and ECDIS systems to records ship movements. Service of the SVDR must be accomplished by USCG/ABS Approved and OEM Trained vendors. If inoperable, the ship cannot sail without proper authorization or waivers. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the SVDR is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

i. WI 405, Magnetic Compass Annual (USCG Requirement)

The OEM for the magnetic compass equipment is Baker Lyman & Company. The use of an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) authorized or otherwise qualified and licensed compass technician/adjuster is required by this work item to ensure proper certification is performed in accordance with the manufacturer recommendations and procedures. This is the onlynon-electronic means available for determining ships heading and must be certified accurate and available for the vessel during navigation for safe passage.

Safety Management Systems number 10.6-002-ALL lists the magnetic compass as critical equipment and the Compass is a USCG and ABS required piece of navigation equipment to determine the ship’s heading. Failure of the magnetic compass will severely impede the ships ability to navigate and maneuver the vessel. The reduction of the ability to navigate and maneuver

j. WI 414, Automatic Identification System (AIS) Replacement T-ALT

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) is SAAB. SAABhas numerous authorized vendors to provide parts and service to their equipment.

Vendor is required to provide documentation of a Certificate of Approved training for the SAAB R5 Automatic Identification System (AIS) unit that is to be installed. Factoryauthorized suppliers provide parts/ services and technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintainsall OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crewsafetytherefore precluding consideration ofa product manufactured byanother company.

SafetyManagement Systems (SMS)number 10.6-002-01-AOlists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is required byABS and USCG.

Service of the AIS must be accomplished byUSCG/ABS Approved and OEM Trained vendors.

Proper installation, refurbishment and maintenance of the AIS is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

k. WI 501 No. 4 SSDG Overhaul

Fair Banks Morse Engine is the sole source provider of parts and services for the Ship Service Diesel Generator (SSDG). The MFR: ALCO Power INC. / Fairbanks Morse Engine Owns all rights and documentation for the Model 251 F V-18 Cylinder 4 Cycle Diesel Engine.

Per the SafetyManagement System (SMS) Number 10.6-002-ALL the SSDG Equipment is considered critical equipment and all parts and service shall be performed by the original equipment Manufacturer or an approved representative. There is onlyone representative identified for procurement ofparts and services for these engines and that is Fairbanks Morse.

l. WI 503 STBD PTO Clutch and Coupling Overhaul

The Original Equipment Manufacture of the Power Take Off (PTO) Clutch and Coupling is Eaton with the approval from Geislinger to Manufacture. There are two (2) known approved sources: Eaton and Nolnacs which both have proprietaryrights to all technical documentation and parts. The Clutch and coupling is complex in design and require OEM technical representation to dissemble andrefurbish. If anypart of the Clutch system was to fail, it could be catastrophic and could cause injury to personnel and damage to ship’s equipment. If the clutch was to be inoperable it would cause the ship to onlyhave one (1) backup generator which limits the ship's available power for operating machinery to maneuver in and out of port and next to ships during UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENTS. The clutch and components are classed bySafetyManagement System (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL as critical equipment.

m. WI 507 Boiler Replacement (USCG & ABS Requirement)

The OEM for the ship’s AuxiliaryBoilers is Clayton Industries. Proper maintenance and refurbishment is required annually for ABS /USG inspections and is critical to the safe operation of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189). Clayton Industries provides authorized service, parts and technical data and drawings as required byUSCG and ABS regulations. This ensures equipment reliability, crew safety and proper operation of the Systems, precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

The Boilers per SafetyManagement System (SMS) Number 10.6-002-ALL are classified as Critical equipment under propulsion, because theyprovide steam to heat up the main engine oil. The steam also allows for purification of the lube oil and fuel-oil. The steam also helps to make water using the Distillers.

n. WI 509, Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor (USCG & ABS Requirement)

The OEM for the equipment is Bristol Babcock. USCG/ABS Annual regulatory recertification requires that an authorized Tech Rep must perform annual calibration & recertification of the Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Technical representatives This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration ofa product manufactured or services provided byanother company.

The Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor per Safety Management System (SMS) 10.6-002-ALL is considered critical equipment under Auxiliaries. The Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor is required by USCG and ABS per the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution.

o. WI 511 Engine Room Oily Water Separator (USCG & ABS Requirement)

The oily water separator is required per ABS and USCG to be installed and operated in accordance with MARPOL Annex I MEP 107. It is the requirement of MSC to maintain this equipment in accordance with regulatory requirements so that the ship will get an International Organization for the Prevention of Pollution (IOPP) Statement of Fact. It is the requirement of the Class and Regulatory that we have onlyan OEM Representative install, maintain, and calibrate thisEquipment. The Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor per Safety Management System (SMS) 10.6-002-ALL is considered Critical equipment under Auxiliaries. The Argo Control Oil Content Monitor is required by USCG and ABS per the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution.

The Engine Room Oily Water Separator per Safety Management System (SMS) 10.6-002-ALL is considered critical equipment under Auxiliaries. The Engine Room Oily Water Separator is required by USCG and ABS per the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution.

p. WI 515, Annual Incinerator Service

The OEM for the ship’s incinerator is Scandinavian Boiler Service. Scandinavian Boiler Service provides authorized service, parts and technical data/drawings as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This ensures equipment reliability, crew safety and proper operation of the Systems, precluding consideration of a product manufactured or services provided by another company.

q. WI-604, Annual, Lifeboats Inspections & Service (ABS Requirement)

Schat Hardening is the OEM for the Four (4) Life Boats; Schat Hardening owns all rights to design documentation, engineering documentation, technical documentation, and Parts. If one (1) Life Boat is inoperable the ship is issued an 835 no sail from USCG and a C-4 CASREP would be issued to the ship. The S hi p would not be allowed to sail; this in turn impacts the mission.

Life Boats are categorized on the SMS Form 10.6-002-01-A) T-AO Critical Equipment List as critical equipment.

r. WI 606 Port RHIB Davit Annual Servicing (ABS Requirement)

Allied Marine Services is the OEM for the Port RHIB Davit. All rights to design, engineering, technical, and drawings are owned by the OEM. All parts and Service s a r e only available through the OEM. If the RHIB boat which is a lifesaving piece of equipment could not be launched and recovered, this would be a C-4 CASREP and USCG would issue an 835 no sail impacting the ship's mission.

The RHIB Boat and support equipment are categorized p er the SMS Form 10.6-002-01-A) T-AO Critical Equipment List as critical equipment.

s. WI 607, Annual SCBA Compressor Servicing

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s SCBA Compressor and Refill Station is MAKO. MAKO has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training for the MAKO Model No.

9400E3 Compressor and Model No. M3100 Refill Station unit, installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured or services provided by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment. The vessel’s SCBA Compressor and Refill Station is required to refill expended SCBA bottles used when fighting a shipboard fire or addressing a HAZMAT situation. Failure of the SCBA Compressor and Refill Station will severely reduce the Ship’s Force capability to control and or extinguish a fireand save the vessel from further damage.

t. WI 608 Annual, SCBA Equipment, Inspections (ABS Requirement)

Interspiro is the OEM for the SCBA Mask and Bottles. Interspiro owns all Technical, engineering, design documentation and parts. Interspiro owns all SOLAS Approval documentation, and testing perimeters per ABS and USCG. Only an approved OEM technical representative that has been trained and approved bythem mayinspect, test and repair the SCBA Mask and Bottles.

The Interspiro per Safe Management Systems (SMS) Procedure NR. 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment. SCBA Mask and Bottles are considered Damage Control Equipment.

6. Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable: The Government intends to post a synopsis and a Request for Proposal (RFP) at the Government Point of Entry, FedBizOpps website, with the intent of awarding a firm-fixed-price contract to the lowest price offeror. Any prospective contractor will be required to use the OEM or OEM authorized vendor(s) as a subcontractor to perform the work in the related WIs.

7. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost: The Contracting Officer will determine the anticipated cost to the Government of the supplies/services covered by this J&A will be fair and reasonable in accordance with FAR Part 15.

8. Actions to Removed Barriers to Future Competition. For reasons set forth in Paragraph 5, MSC has no plans at this time to allow prime contractors to solicit these requirements competitively, other than synopsizing the requirements. If another potential source emerges, MSC will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible.

Services identified in paragraphs 5.a thru 5.x are specifically intended to be accomplished by OEM, authorized or former OEM tech reps to comply with US Coast Guard / ABS Regulatory requirements, manufacturer warranty and/or the MSC Safety Management System (SMS) Procedure 10.6-002-AO - Identification of Critical Equipment for addressing and identifying Ships Critical Equipment Risk Levels.

For all other work items there are no restrictions limiting use of OEM or authorized service reps or technicians.

CERTIFICATION AND APPROVALS

Technical/Requirements Cognizance:

I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance which are included in this Justification and its supporting acquisition planning documents, except as noted herein are complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dig i t all y s i g ne d by C OLE M AN. R AY . E . 1 2 2 9 6 6 1 2 4 4

2 0 1 6. 0 3 . 1 4 1 6:5 5 :0 0 - 0 4' 0 0 ' 16 February 2016 Signature Name (Printed) Phone No. Date

Legal Sufficiency Review:

I have reviewed this justification and it is deemed to be legallysufficient.

Signature Name (Printed) Phone No. Date

Contracting Officer Certification:

I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature Name (Printed) Phone No. Date

Competition Advocate Approval:

Upon the basis of the above justification, I hereby approve as Competition Advocate, the solicitation of the proposed procurement(s) described herein using other than full and open competition.

Signature Name (Printed) Phone No. Date

16 Mar 16