ATTACHMENT_2_-_IAMatrix.xlsx
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- Solicitation number
- HC1013-14-R-0004
- Issued by
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Defense Information Systems Agency
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Section J Attachment 2 - IA Matrix
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IA Matrix_v4.0
SBS
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
CAM enters TO, MAC and Confidentiality information MAC II Vendor Name:
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor enters Company and Proposal identification information End User: Navy - CBSP William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
CAM enters Customer ("End User") and Purpose ("Deployment") Information Operator(s):
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor enters Satellite(s) employed in the proposed solution Period of Performance: 1-Year Base with Four 1-Year Options William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
CAM enters earliest and latest operational start and end dates Received Date:
William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY
| ddmmmyy | ||||||||
| 5 | Sensitive | Proposal Number: | Deployment: HC1013-14-R-0004 (CSSC) | Satellite(s): | Start: End: | TBD TBD | IA Review Date: | ddmmmyy |
| Vendor Questionaire | Answers | |||||||
| 1) | Is the Tracking, Telemetry, & Control (TT&C) network connected to the Internet? | Yes | ||||||
| 2) | Is the Tracking, Telemetry, & Control (TT&C) network separate from other networks? | No | ||||||
| 3) | Do you have SIPRNet, a STE, or other classified networks in your facility? | Yes | ||||||
| 4) | Does the requirement call for a steerable beam to be repositioned during the term of the lease? | No | ||||||
| 5) | Will utilization of the proposed transponder be limited to only the DoD? | No | ||||||
| Control / Impact |
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Column A - L in Row 2 and Column A - F in Row 3 -175 are for the common cognizance and use of all interested parties but may only be modified by PMO IA and are locked in this spreadsheet Subject / Name Description MAC III MAC II MAC I Status William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor completes Row 3 through 175 in Column G by selection from drop-down menu. Blank entry or entry other than drop-down menu will be treted as a control failure. Notes William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
For Vendor use when needed to clarify "Status" entry (e.g. "While COAS-1 is Not Applied, COAS-2 is Implemented and meets the requirement at the higher level") Finding William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor selects Compliant when the control is fully Implemented or properly Inherited in all segments and components of the proposed solution. In any other circumstance, the vendor selects Non-Compliant and addresses the issue in the corresponding Column J entry. Note that PMO IA may non-concur and correct the finding by moving a Non-Compliant entry to Compliant or a Compliant entry to Non-Compliant after considering status, notes and mitigations Mitigations William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor enters mitigation information which may be considered in reducing the residual risk of non-compliant findings. Note that PMO IA may non-concur, with or without comment, and find the mitagatory effect of the measures described more or less effective than asserted by the Vendor. without comment Residual Risk William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY Comments William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY
COAS-1 / Medium William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
If, “An alternate site is identified that permits the partial restoration of mission or business essential functions.”, then the COAS-1 control is considered implemented and “Implemented” should be selected from the drop-down menu in cell 3G. Cell 3H (Notes) would most likely be left blank as no additional information is presumed to be required in this scenario. The finding for an implemented control, as in this case, would be compliant and “Compliant” should be selected from the drop-down menu in cell 3I. As the finding is “Compliant”, no mitigations are required and cell 3H would be left blank. This would result in a “LOW” residual risk finding for control COAS-1 when the solution is applied to a MAC III requirement as the control is fully compliant (see matrix cell 3D) with the MAC III requirement for this control.
William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY
| Continuity / Alternate Site Designation | An alternate site is identified that permits the partial restoration of mission or business essential functions. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant |
| COAS-2 / High |
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
If, “An alternate site is identified that permits the restoration of all mission or business essential functions.” is not a true statement, because that control is not implemented in the solution or is not inherited from another segment of the solution, then “Not Applied” would be selected from the drop-down menu in cell 4G unless there was inheritance or implementation planned in the future which would allow “Planned” to be selected. Cell 4H would be left blank in the event the control was not applied and not planned but would be used in the event inheritance or implementation was planned (e.g. “COOP site with COAS-2 compliance scheduled to be operational 25 SEP 10”). If the status of the control is either “not-applied” or “planned” then the finding would be non-compliant and “Non-Compliant” would be selected from the drop-down menu in cell 4I. If COAS-1 was in a compliant status, as described in example 1 above, then “COAS-1 is fully compliant and provides partial restoration capability.” Could be entered in cell 4J as a mitigation that could be considered as partial compliance for a MAC II or MAC I requirement (see cells 3E and 3F) and may reduce the residual risk of non-compliance to LOW or MEDIUM depending on the end-user requirement.
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor completes Row 3 through 175 in Column G by selection from drop-down menu. Blank entry or entry other than drop-down menu will be treted as a control failure.
William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
For Vendor use when needed to clarify "Status" entry (e.g. "While COAS-1 is Not Applied, COAS-2 is Implemented and meets the requirement at the higher level") William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor selects Compliant when the control is fully Implemented or properly Inherited in all segments and components of the proposed solution. In any other circumstance, the vendor selects Non-Compliant and addresses the issue in the corresponding Column J entry. Note that PMO IA may non-concur and correct the finding by moving a Non-Compliant entry to Compliant or a Compliant entry to Non-Compliant after considering status, notes and mitigations William Janosky: COMSATCOM Center:
Vendor enters mitigation information which may be considered in reducing the residual risk of non-compliant findings. Note that PMO IA may non-concur, with or without comment, and find the mitagatory effect of the measures described more or less effective than asserted by the Vendor. without comment William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY
William Janosky: PMO IA USE ONLY
| Continuity / Alternate Site Designation | An alternate site is identified that permits the restoration of all mission or business essential functions. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | ||
| COBR-1 / High | Continuity / Protection of Backup and Restoration Assets | Procedures are in place assure the appropriate physical and technical protection of the backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software, such as router tables, compilers, and other security-related system software. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODB-1 / Low | Continuity / Data Backup Procedures | Data backup is performed at least weekly. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODB-2 / Medium | Continuity / Data Backup Procedures | Data backup is performed daily, and recovery media are stored off-site at a location that affords protection of the data in accordance with its mission assurance category and confidentiality level. | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODB-3 / Medium | Continuity / Data Backup Procedures | Data backup is accomplished by maintaining a redundant secondary system, not co-located, that can be activated without loss of data or disruption to the operation. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODP-1 / Low | Continuity / Disaster and Recovery Planning | A disaster plan exists that provides for the partial resumption of mission or business essential functions within 5 days of activation. (Disaster recovery procedures include business recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODP-2 / Medium | Continuity / Disaster and Recovery Planning | A disaster plan exists that provides for the resumption of mission or business essential functions within 24 hours of activation. (Disaster recovery procedures include business recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| CODP-3 / Medium | Continuity / Disaster and Recovery Planning | A disaster plan exists that provides for the smooth transfer of all mission or business essential functions to an alternate site for the duration of an event with little or no loss of operational continuity. (Disaster recovery procedures include business recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COEB-1 / Medium | Continuity / Enclave Boundary Defense | Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site provides security measures equivalent to the primary site. | Full | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COEB-2 / High | Continuity / Enclave Boundary Defense | Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site must be configured identically to that of the primary site. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COED-1 / Low | Continuity / Scheduled Exercises and Drills | The continuity of operations or disaster recovery plans are exercised annually. | Full | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COED-2 / Medium | Continuity / Scheduled Exercises and Drills | The continuity of operations or disaster recovery plans or significant portions are exercised semi-annually. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COEF-1 / Low | Continuity / Identification of Essential Functions | Mission and business essential functions are identified for priority restoration planning. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COEF-2 / Medium | Continuity / Identification of Essential Functions | Mission and business-essential functions are identified for priority restoration planning along with all assets supporting mission or business-essential functions (e.g., computer-based services, data and applications, communications, physical infrastructure). | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COMS-1 / Low | Continuity / Maintenance Support | Maintenance support for key IT assets is available to respond within 24 hours of failure. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COMS-2 / Medium | Continuity / Maintenance Support | Maintenance support for key IT assets is available to respond 24 X 7 immediately upon failure. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COPS-1 / Low | Continuity / Power Supply | Electrical power is restored to key IT assets by manually activated power generators upon loss of electrical power from the primary source. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COPS-2 / Medium | Continuity / Power Supply | Electrical systems are configured to allow continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT assets. This may include an uninterrupted power supply coupled with emergency generators. | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COPS-3 / Medium | Continuity / Power Supply | Electrical systems are configured to allow continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT assets and all users accessing the key IT assets to perform mission or business-essential functions. This may include an uninterrupted power supply coupled with emergency generators or other alternate power source. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COSP-1 / Low | Continuity / Spares and Parts | Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT assets can be obtained within 24 hours of failure. | Full | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COSP-2 / Medium | Continuity / Spares and Parts | Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT assets are available 24 X 7 immediately upon failure. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COSW-1 / High | Continuity / Backup Copies of Critical SW | Back-up copies of the operating system and other critical software are stored in a fire rated container or otherwise not collocated with the operational software. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| COTR-1 / High | Continuity / Trusted Recovery | Recovery procedures and technical system features exist to ensure that recovery is done in a secure and verifiable manner. Circumstances that can inhibit a trusted recovery are documented and appropriate mitigating procedures have been put in place. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCAR-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Procedural Review | An annual IA review is conducted that comprehensively evaluates existing policies and processes to ensure procedural consistency and to ensure that they fully support the goal of uninterrupted operations. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCAS-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Acquisition Standards | The acquisition of all IA- and IA-enabled GOTS IT products is limited to products that have been evaluated by the NSA or in accordance with NSA-approved processes. The acquisition of all IA- and IA-enabled COTS IT products is limited to products that have been evaluated or validated through one of the following sources - the International Common Criteria (CC) for Information Security Technology Evaluation Mutual Recognition Arrangement, the NIAP Evaluation and Validation Program, or the FIPS validation program. Robustness requirements, the mission, and customer needs will enable an experienced information systems security engineer to recommend a Protection Profile, a particular evaluated product or a security target with the appropriate assurance requirements for a product to be submitted for evaluation (See also DCSR-1). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCBP-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Best Practices | The information system security design incorporates best security practices such as single sign-on, PKE, smart card, and biometrics. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCCB-1 / Low | Security Design and Configuration / Control Board | All information systems are under the control of a chartered configuration control board that meets regularly according to DCPR-1. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCCB-2 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Control Board | All information systems are under the control of a chartered Configuration Control Board that meets regularly according to DCPR-1. The IAM is a voting member of the CCB. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCCS-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Configuration Specifications | A reference document, such as a security technical implementation guide or security recommendation guide constitutes the primary source for security configuration or implementation guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IA- and IA-enabled IT products that require use of the product's IA capabilities. If a DoD reference document is not available, the following are acceptable in descending order as available: (1) Commercially accepted practices (e.g., SANS); (2) Independent testing results (e.g., ICSA); or (3) Vendor literature. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCCS-2 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Configuration Specifications | A reference document such as a security technical implementation guide or security recommendation guide constitutes the primary source for security configuration or implementation guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IA- and IA-enabled IT products that require use of the product's IA capabilities. If a reference document is not available, the system owner works with DISA or NSA to draft configuration guidance for inclusion in a Departmental reference guide. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCCT-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Compliance Testing | A comprehensive set of procedures is implemented that tests all patches, upgrades, and new AIS applications prior to deployment. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCDS-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Dedicated IA Services | Acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated IA services such as incident monitoring, analysis and response; operation of IA devices such as firewalls; or key management services are supported by a formal risk analysis and approved by the CIO. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCFA-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Functional Architecture for AIS Applications | For AIS applications, a functional architecture that identifies the following has been developed and is maintained: - all external interfaces, the information being exchanged, and the protection mechanisms associated with each interface - user roles required for access control and the access privileges assigned to each role (See ECAN) - unique security requirements (e.g., encryption of key data elements at rest) - categories of sensitive information processed or stored by the AIS application, and their specific protection plans (e.g., Privacy Act, HIPAA) - restoration priority of subsystems, processes, or information (See COEF). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCHW-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / HW Baseline | A current and comprehensive baseline inventory of all hardware (HW) (to include manufacturer, type, model, physical location and network topology or architecture) required to support enclave operations is maintained by the Configuration Control Board (CCB) and as part of the SSAA. A backup copy of the inventory is stored in a fire-rated container or otherwise not collocated with the original. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCID-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Interconnection Documentation | For AIS applications, a list of all (potential) hosting enclaves is developed and maintained along with evidence of deployment planning and coordination and the exchange of connection rules and requirements. For enclaves, a list of all hosted AIS applications, interconnected outsourced IT-based processes, and interconnected IT platforms is developed and maintained along with evidence of deployment planning and coordination and the exchange of connection rules and requirements. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCII-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / IA Impact Assessment | Changes to the information system are assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to implementation. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCIT-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / IA for IT Services | Acquisition or outsourcing of IT services explicitly addresses Government, contractor, service provider, and end user IA roles and responsibilities. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCMC-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Mobile Code | The acquisition, development, and/or use of mobile code to be deployed in systems meets the following requirements: |
1. Emerging mobile code technologies that have not undergone a risk assessment by NSA and been assigned to a Risk Category by the DoD CIO is not used.
2. Category 1 mobile code is signed with a ECA PKI code signing certificate; use of unsigned Category 1 mobile code is prohibited; use of Category 1 mobile code technologies that cannot block or disable unsigned mobile code (e.g., Windows Scripting Host) is prohibited.
3. Category 2 mobile code, which executes in a constrained environment without access to system resources (e.g., Windows registry, file system, system parameters, network connections to other than the originating host) may be used.
4. Category 2 mobile code that does not execute in a constrained environment may be used when obtained from a trusted source over an assured channel (e.g., SIPRNET, SSL connection, S/MIME, code is signed with a ECA code signing certificate).
5. Category 3 mobile code may be used.
6. All workstation and host software are configured, to the extent possible, to prevent the download and execution of mobile code that is prohibited.
| 7. The automatic execution of all mobile code in email is prohibited; email software is configured to prompt the user prior to executing mobile code in attachments. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |||
| DCNR-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Non-repudiation | NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography (e.g., ECA PKI Medium Assurance token) is used to implement encryption (e.g., AES, 3DES, DES, Skipjack), key exchange (e.g., FIPS 171), digital signature (e.g., DSA, RSA, ECDSA), and hash (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512). Newer standards should be applied as they become available. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCPA-1 / Low | Security Design and Configuration / Partitioning the Application | User interface services (e.g., web services) are physically or logically separated from data storage and management services (e.g., database management systems). Separation may be accomplished through the use of different computers, different CPUs, different instances of the operating system, different network addresses, combinations of these methods, or other methods, as appropriate. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCPB-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / IA Program and Budget | A discrete line item for Information Assurance is established in programming and budget documentation. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCPD-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Public Domain Software Controls | Binary or machine executable public domain software products and other software products with limited or no warranty such as those commonly known as freeware or shareware are not used in information systems unless they are necessary for mission accomplishment and there are no alternative IT solutions available. Such products are assessed for information assurance impacts, and approved for use by the DAA. The assessment addresses the fact that such software products are difficult or impossible to review, repair, or extend, given that the purchaser does not have access to the original source code and there is no owner who could make such repairs on behalf of the purchaser. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCPP-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Ports, Protocols, and Services | Information systems comply with DoD ports, protocols, and services guidance. AIS applications, outsourced IT-based processes and platform IT identify the network ports, protocols, and services they plan to use as early in the life cycle as possible and notify hosting enclaves. Enclaves register all active ports, protocols, and services in accordance with DoD and DoD Component guidance. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCPR-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / CM Process | A configuration management (CM) process is implemented that includes requirements for: |
1. Formally documented CM roles, responsibilities, and procedures to include the management of IA information and documentation;
2. A configuration control board that implements procedures to ensure a security review and approval of all proposed information system changes, to include interconnections to other information systems;
3. A testing process to verify proposed configuration changes prior to implementation in the operational environment; and
| 4. A verification process to provide additional assurance that the CM process is working effectively and that changes outside the CM process are technically or procedurally not permitted. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |||
| DCSD-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / IA Documentation | All appointments to required IA roles (e.g., DAA and IAM/IAO) are established in writing, to include assigned duties and appointment criteria such as training, security clearance, and IT-designation. A System Security Plan is established that describes the technical, administrative, and procedural IA program and policies that govern the information system, and identifies all IA personnel and specific IA requirements and objectives (e.g., requirements for data handling or dissemination, system redundancy and backup, or emergency response). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSL-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / System Library Management Controls | System libraries are managed and maintained to protect privileged programs and to prevent or minimize the introduction of unauthorized code. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSP-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Security Support Structure Partitioning | The security support structure is isolated by means of partitions, domains, etc., including control of access to, and integrity of, hardware, software, and firmware that perform security functions. The security support structure maintains separate execution domains (e.g., address spaces) for each executing process. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSQ-1 / Medium | Security Design and Configuration / Software Quality | Software quality requirements and validation methods that are focused on the minimization of flawed or malformed software that can negatively impact integrity or availability (e.g., buffer overruns) are specified for all software development initiatives. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSR-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Specified Robustness - Basic | At a minimum, basic-robustness COTS IA and IA-enabled products are used to protect publicly released information from malicious tampering or destruction and ensure its availability. The basic-robustness requirements for products are defined in the Protection Profile Consistency Guidance for Basic Robustness published under the IATF. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSR-2 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Specified Robustness - Medium | At a minimum, medium-robustness COTS IA and IA-enabled products are used to protect sensitive information when the information transits public networks or the system handling the information is accessible by individuals who are not authorized to access the information on the system. The medium-robustness requirements for products are defined in the Protection Profile Consistency Guidance for Medium Robustness published under the IATF. COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products used for access control, data separation, or privacy on sensitive systems already protected by approved medium-robustness products, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements for basic robustness. If these COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products are used to protect National Security Information by cryptographic means, NSA-approved key management may be required. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSR-3 / High | Security Design and Configuration / Specified Robustness – High | Only high-robustness GOTS or COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products are used to protect classified information when the information transits networks that are at a Lower classification level than the information being transported. High-robustness products have been evaluated by NSA or in accordance with NSA-approved processes. COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products used for access control, data separation or privacy on classified systems already protected by approved high-robustness products at a minimum, satisfy the requirements for basic robustness. If these COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products are used to protect National Security Information by cryptographic means, NSA-approved key management may be required. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSS-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / System State Changes | System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are configured to ensure that the system remains in a secure state. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSS-2 / High | Security Design and Configuration / System State Changes | System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are configured to ensure that the system remains in a secure state. Tests are provided and periodically run to ensure the integrity of the system state. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| DCSW-1 / High | Security Design and Configuration / SW Baseline | A current and comprehensive baseline inventory of all software (SW) (to include manufacturer, type, and version and installation manuals and procedures) required to support information system operations is maintained by the CCB and as part of the C&A documentation. A backup copy of the inventory is stored in a fire-rated container or otherwise not collocated with the original. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBBD-1 / Low | Enclave Boundary Defense / Boundary Defense | Boundary defense mechanisms to include firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the wide area network, and Internet access is permitted from a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that meets the DoD requirement that such contacts are isolated from other systems by physical or technical means. All Internet access points are under the management and control of the enclave. Internet access is permitted from a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that meets the DoD requirement that such contacts are isolated from other systems by physical or technical means. All Internet access points are under the management and control of the enclave. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBBD-2 / Medium | Enclave Boundary Defense / Boundary Defense | Boundary defense mechanisms, to include firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the wide area network, at layered or internal enclave boundaries, or at key points in the network, as required. All Internet access is proxied through Internet access points that are under the management and control of the enclave and are isolated from other information systems by physical or technical means. | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBBD-3 / High | Enclave Boundary Defense / Boundary Defense | Boundary defense mechanisms to include firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the wide area network, and at layered or internal enclave boundaries and key points in the network as required. All Internet access is prohibited. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBCR-1 / Medium | Enclave Boundary Defense / Connection Rules | The information system is compliant with established DoD connection rules and approval processes. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBPW-1 / High | Enclave Boundary Defense / Public WAN Connection | Connections between enclaves and the Internet or other public or commercial wide area networks require a demilitarized zone (DMZ). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBRP-1 / High | Enclave Boundary Defense / Remote Access for Privileged Functions | Remote access for privileged functions is discouraged, is permitted only for compelling operational needs, and is strictly controlled. In addition to EBRU-1, sessions employ security measures such as a VPN with blocking mode enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the log for every remote session. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBRU-1 / High | Enclave Boundary Defense / Remote Access for User Functions | All remote access to information systems, to include telework access, is mediated through a managed access control point, such as a remote access server in a DMZ. Remote access always uses encryption to protect the confidentiality of the session. The session-level encryption equals or exceeds the robustness established in ECCT. Authenticators are restricted to those that offer strong protection against spoofing. Information regarding remote access mechanisms (e.g., Internet address, dial-up connection telephone number) is protected. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| EBVC-1 / Medium | Enclave Boundary Defense / VPN Controls | All VPN traffic is visible to network intrusion detection systems (IDS). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECAD-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Affiliation Display | To help prevent inadvertent disclosure of controlled information, all contractors are identified by the inclusion of the abbreviation "ctr" and all foreign nationals are identified by the inclusion of their two character country code in: - user e-mail addresses (e.g., john.smith.ctr@army.mil orjohn.smith.uk@army.mil); - user e-mail display names (e.g., John Smith, Contractor <john.smith.ctr@army.mil> or John Smith, United Kingdom <john.smith.uk@army.mil>); and - automated signature blocks (e.g., John Smith, Contractor, J-6K, Joint Staff or John Doe, Australia, LNO, Combatant Command). Contractors who are also foreign nationals are identified as both (e.g.,john.smith.ctr.uk@army.mil). Country codes and guidance regarding their use are in FIPS 10-4. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECAN-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Access for Need-to-Know | Access to all information (classified, sensitive, and public) is determined by both its classification and user need-to-know. Need-to-know is established by the Information Owner and enforced by discretionary or role-based access controls. Access controls are established and enforced for all shared or networked file systems and internal websites, whether classified, sensitive, or unclassified. All internal classified, sensitive, and unclassified websites are organized to provide at least three distinct levels of access: |
1. Open access to general information that is made available to all authorized users with network access. Access does not require an audit transaction.
| 2. Controlled access to information that is made available to all authorized users upon the presentation of an individual authenticator. Access is recorded in an audit transaction. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant |
| ECAR-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Record Content – Public Systems | Audit records include: |
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
| · Type of event. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant |
| ECAR-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Record Content – Sensitive Systems | Audit records include: |
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
· Type of event.
· Success or failure of event.
· Successful and unsuccessful logons.
· Denial of access resulting from excessive number of logon attempts.
· Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or access port and the reason for the action.
| · Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate safeguards controlled by the system. | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant |
| ECAR-3 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Record Content – Classified Systems | Audit records include: |
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
· Type of event.
· Success or failure of event.
· Successful and unsuccessful logons.
· Denial of access resulting from excessive number of logon attempts.
· Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or access port, and the reason for the action.
· Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate safeguards controlled by the system.
· Data required auditing the possible use of covert channel mechanisms.
· Privileged activities and other system-level access.
· Starting and ending time for access to the system.
| · Security relevant actions associated with periods processing or the changing of security labels or categories of information. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |||
| ECAT-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Trail, Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting | Audit trail records from all available sources are regularly reviewed for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity. Suspected violations of IA policies are analyzed and reported in accordance with information system IA procedures. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECAT-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Trail, Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting | An automated, continuous on-line monitoring and audit trail creation capability is deployed with the capability to immediately alert personnel of any unusual or inappropriate activity with potential IA implications, and with a user configurable capability to automatically disable the system if serious IA violations are detected. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCD-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Changes to Data | Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that data is accessed and changed only by authorized personnel. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCD-2 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Changes to Data | Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that data is accessed and changed only by authorized personnel. Access and changes to the data are recorded in transaction logs that are reviewed periodically or immediately upon system security events. Users are notified of time and date of the last change in data content. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCM-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / COMSEC | COMSEC activities comply with DoD Directive C-5200.5. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCR-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Rest) | If required by the information owner, NIST-certified cryptography is used to encrypt stored sensitive information. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCR-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Rest) | If required by the information owner, NIST-certified cryptography is used to encrypt stored classified non-SAMI information. | N/A | Full | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCR-3 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Rest) | If a classified enclave contains SAMI and is accessed by individuals lacking an appropriate clearance for SAMI, then NSA-approved cryptography is used to encrypt all SAMI stored within the enclave. | N/A | N/A | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCT-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Transmit) | Unclassified, sensitive data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network are encrypted using NIST-certified cryptography (See also DCSR-2). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECCT-2 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Transmit) | Classified data transmitted through a network that is cleared to a Lower level than the data being transmitted are separately encrypted using NSA-approved cryptography (See also DCSR-3). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECDC-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Data Change Controls | Transaction-based systems (e.g., database management systems, transaction processing systems) implement transaction roll-back and transaction journaling, or technical equivalents. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECIC-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Interconnections among DoD Systems and Enclaves | Discretionary access controls are a sufficient IA mechanism for connecting information systems operating at the same classification, but with different need-to-know access rules. A controlled interface is required for interconnections among information systems operating at different classifications levels or between DoD and non-DoD systems or networks. Controlled interfaces are addressed in separate guidance. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECID-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Host Based IDS | Host-based intrusion detection systems are deployed for major applications and for network management assets, such as routers, switches, and domain name servers (DNS). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECIM-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Instant Messaging | Instant messaging traffic to and from instant messaging clients that are independently configured by end users and that interact with a public service provider is prohibited within information systems. Both inbound and outbound public service instant messaging traffic is blocked at the enclave boundary. Note: This does not include IM services that are configured by a AIS application or enclave to perform an authorized and official function. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECLC-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit of Security Label Changes | The system automatically records the creation, deletion, or modification of confidentiality or integrity labels, if required by the information owner. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECLO-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Logon | Successive logon attempts are controlled using one or more of the folLowing: |
· Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful logon attempts.
· The number of access attempts in a given period is limited.
| · A time-delay control system is employed. If the system alLows for multiple logon sessions for each user ID, the system provides a capability to control the number of logon sessions. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant |
| ECLO-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Logon | Successive logon attempts are controlled using one or more of the folLowing: |
· Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful logon attempts.
· The number of access attempts in a given period is limited.
| · A time-delay control system is employed. If the system alLows for multiple logon sessions for each user ID, the system provides a capability to control the number of logon sessions. Upon successful logon, the user is notified of the date and time of the user's last logon, the location of the user at last logon, and the number of unsuccessful logon attempts using this user ID since the last successful logon. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |||
| ECLP-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / B93Least Privilege | Access procedures enforce the principles of separation of duties and "least privilege." Access to privileged accounts is limited to privileged users. Use of privileged accounts is limited to privileged functions; that is, privileged users use non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged functions. This control is in addition to an appropriate security clearance and need-to-know authorization. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECML-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Marking and Labeling | Information and information systems that store, process, transit, or display data in any form or format that is not approved for public release comply with all requirements for marking and labeling contained in policy and guidance documents such as DoD 5200.1R. Markings and labels clearly reflect the classification or sensitivity level, if applicable, and any special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECMT-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Conformance Monitoring and Testing | Conformance testing that includes periodic, unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for specific penetration testing to ensure compliance with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as the IAVA or other IA practices is planned, scheduled, and conducted. Testing is intended to ensure that the system's IA capabilities continue to provide adequate assurance against constantly evolving threats and vulnerabilities. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECMT-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Conformance Monitoring and Testing | Conformance testing that includes periodic, unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for specific penetration testing to ensure compliance with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as the IAVA or other IA practices is planned, scheduled, conducted, and independently validated. Testing is intended to ensure that the system's IA capabilities continue to provide adequate assurance against constantly evolving threats and vulnerabilities. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECND-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / B97Network Device Controls | An effective network device control program (e.g., routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and includes: instructions for restart and recovery procedures; restrictions on source code access, system utility access, and system documentation; protection from deletion of system and application files, and a structured process for implementation of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA). | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECND-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Network Device Controls | An effective network device control program (e.g., routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and includes: instructions for restart and recovery procedures; restrictions on source code access, system utility access, and system documentation; protection from deletion of system and application files, and a structured process for implementation of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA). Audit or other technical measures are in place to ensure that the network device controls are not compromised. Change controls are periodically tested. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECNK-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Need-To-Know | Information in transit through a network at the same classification level, but which must be separated for need-to-know reasons, is encrypted, at a minimum, with NIST-certified cryptography. This is in addition to ECCT (encryption for confidentiality – data in transit). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECNK-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Encryption for Need-To-Know | SAMI information in transit through a network at the same classification level is encrypted using NSA-approved cryptography. This is to separate it for need-to-know reasons. This is in addition to ECCT (encryption for confidentiality – data in transit). | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECPA-1 | Enclave Computing Environment / Privileged Account Control | All privileged user accounts are established and administered in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes all system and network privileges into roles (e.g., key management, network, system administration, database administration, web-administration). The IAM tracks privileged role assignments. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECPC-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Production Code Change Controls | Application programmer privileges to change production code and data are limited and are periodically reviewed. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECPC-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Production Code Change Controls | Application programmer privileges to change production code and data are limited and reviewed every 3 months. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECRC-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Resource Control | All authorizations to the information contained within an object are revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject from the system's pool of unused objects. No information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released back to the system. There is absolutely no residual data from the former object. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECRG-1 / Low | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Reduction and Report Generation | Tools are available for the review of audit records and for report generation from audit records. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECRR-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Record Retention | If the information system contains sources and methods intelligence (SAMI), then audit records are retained for 5 years. Otherwise, audit records are retained for at least 1 year. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECSC-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Security Configuration Compliance | For Enclaves and AIS applications, all DoD security configuration or implementation guides have been applied. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECSD-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Software Development Change Controls | Change controls for software development are in place to prevent unauthorized programs or modifications to programs from being implemented. | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECSD-2 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Software Development Change Controls | Change controls for software development are in place to prevent unauthorized programs or modifications to programs from being implemented. Change controls include review and approval of application change requests and technical system features to assure that changes are executed by authorized personnel and are properly implemented. | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECTB-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Trail Backup | The audit records are backed up not less than weekly onto a different system or media than the system being audited. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECTC-1 / High | Enclave Computing Environment / Tempest Controls | Measures to protect against compromising emanations have been implemented according to DoD Directive S-5200.19. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECTM-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Transmission Integrity Controls | Good engineering practices with regards to the integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS and custom developed solutions are implemented for incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks and cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs). | Full | Partial | Partial | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECTM-2 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Transmission Integrity Controls | Good engineering practices with regards to the integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS, and custom developed solutions are implemented for incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks and cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs). Mechanisms are in place to assure the integrity of all transmitted information (including labels and security parameters) and to detect or prevent the hijacking of a communication session (e.g., encrypted or covert communication channels). | N/A | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant | |
| ECTP-1 / Medium | Enclave Computing Environment / Audit Trail Protection | The contents of audit trails are protected against unauthorized access, modification or deletion. | Full | Full | Full | Implemented | Compliant |
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