SSPARS_Industry_Day_Briefing_4_Oct__16.pptx

Solid State Phased Array Radar System (SSPARS)

FA2517-15-R-8001

Industry Days

Laura McDonough, Program Manager Austin Frindt, Contracting Officer

Air Force Space Command Guardians of the High Frontier

21st Contracting Squadron (21 CONS):

Contracting Officer (CO): Austin Frindt Contracting Specialist (CS): Kristen Weaver

21st Small Business Office:

Director: Reggie Selby

21st Program Management Division (21 SW/PMD):

Program Manager (PM): Laura McDonough Quality Assurance Manager (QAM): Michael Gusta

Government Introductions

Red Font = Not invited yet or not confirmed

Overview Administrative Comments Government Introductions Purpose of Industry Days Ground Rules for Information Exchanges SSPARS Mission Briefing Performance Work Statement (PWS) Requirements Risk Assessment Contract Information Source Selection

Overview Special Considerations Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) CAsPR Matrix PWS Format CLIN Structure Clear AFS Warehouse Procedures Small Business Approach Property Consideration Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) Acquisition Schedule Questions & Answers

Welcome! We’re looking forward to a successful exchange of information and encourage everyone to participate!

If anyone is parked in the Chapel parking lot, we ask that you move your vehicle now to the parking directly in front of the auditorium Restrooms are out the double doors in the lobby Please sign the attendance sheet at the back table if you have not already done so

Administrative Comments

One-on-one sessions Will be held tomorrow and Thursday at Building 350, Room 1205 All sessions require a reservation – if you requested a session, you should have received confirmation from our office Sessions are limited to a strict 30 minutes Arrive early enough to find a parking spot, as the closest lots are often full.

If you arrive late, it will cut into your 30 minutes

Administrative Comments

IAW the "Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 15.201, Exchanges with Industry Before Receipt of Proposals:

Exchanges of information among all interested parties, from the earliest identification of a requirement through receipt of proposals, are encouraged Any exchange of information must be consistent with procurement integrity requirements (see FAR 3.104) Interested parties include potential offerors, end users, Government acquisition and supporting personnel, and others involved in the conduct or outcome of the acquisition We find industry days to be invaluable in communicating requirements, risks and methodology and encourage industry to provide feedback in an open exchange Industry Day is part of market research Purpose of Industry Days

Ground Rules for Information Exchanges Nothing stated in Industry Days or during one-on-one discussions is contractually binding We encourage and appreciate open information exchange The Government may, or may not, incorporate changes to the solicitation or requirements based on feedback received Proprietary information or approaches will not be shared Questions asked will be recorded and answers posted to all interested offerors Any costs incurred by companies prior to receipt of a contract signed by the CO is at your own risk All Government changes or direction will be communicated in writing by the CO

Ground Rules for Information Exchanges (cont.)

Government will post the following on FEDBIZOPPS (FBO):

Attendance roster to facilitate subcontracting opportunities Government briefing charts All questions and answers including those from the one-on-one discussions will be compiled on a non-attribution basis and posted to FBO Proprietary information or confidential business strategies will not be shared

Organizational Chart

21 OG

7 SWS

12 SWS

13 SWS

SSPARS Mission Briefing

21 OG Mission Briefing

SSPARS PWS Requirements General New Performance Work Statement written in a totally new format Requirements have been added, expanded, and clarified; the following lists some of the changes Added:

Top Secret (TS)/Secret Compartmentalized Information (SCI) security classification in support of SCI Facility (SCIF) and communications requirements Advanced Training materials and demonstrations Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Information Assurance Vehicles and heavy equipment needed in performance of contract requirements – contractor approach

TS/SCI Security Classification. Requirements: Maintain SCIF terminals, equipment and cabling/connections to the JWICS node/demarcation point. Coordinate JWICS service interruptions with the appropriate service provider or organization. a) AQL: Contractor Controlled Availability (Acc) of not less than 99.0% each calendar month; b) STD: At least one JWICS available within 2 hours after contacting contractor for repair (precludes power outages or other outside influences not in the contractor’s control)

Advanced Training. Implement, update and maintain site radar and system familiarization material and provide information and equipment demonstrations to Operations personnel. Includes monthly blocks of training covering the following in a 7 month period (one block per month). Topics include: Basic and site-specific Radar hardware and software, power requirements, MWOC interfaces, etc.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Appoint a primary ICS IAM with Information Assurance Technical (IAT) Level II or Information Assurance Management (IAM) Level I certifications (Note: Security+ certification satisfies either IAT Level II or IAM Level I certification.) and alternate ICS IAM (no IT certification required). Maintain ICS certification and manage systems. IAW Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 11-1 - Civil Engineer Industrial Control System Information Assurance Compliance.

Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). A new radar is being built at Clear AFS. It is anticipated that system and facility O&M will be required on this contract in support of the LRDR in approximately the FY20/FY21 timeframe. The type of work required is covered within the existing PWS requirements, but the level of effort cannot be determined at this time and will be separately negotiated sometime after contract award.

Notable Changes Expanded:

Assessment and Authorization (A&A) Mission System Administrators Clarified:

Communications Requirements (to include NIPRNet/SIPRNet, messaging and user and network enterprise interfaces) All requirements were clarified as the new PWS was written

Please accomplish a thorough and in-depth review of all PWS requirements

Contract Line Items (CLINs) Fixed Price CLINs All Services and parts necessary in performance of PWS requirements that are foreseeable and can be forecasted Requirements shall be covered in the fixed price even if the contractor chooses to subcontract to a certified company to perform the work Consumables (custodial supplies, light bulbs, paper, etc) and parts, supplies and materials needed for normal maintenance and in performance of day-to-day contract requirements are included in the fixed price and will not be reimbursed by the Government

Notable Changes cont.

Contract Line Items Fixed Price CLINs (cont.)

The contractor shall cover any collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or other agreement, employee meal costs and unofficial travel expenses as agreed to between the contractor and the contractor’s employees The Government will not reimburse these costs on a cost reimbursable basis

Cost Reimbursable (CR) CLIN; allowable:

Government-approved equipment, materials, supplies and parts which are not foreseeable and cannot be forecasted Government-approved TDY and non-local travel Parts (if not part of preventive maintenance) Labor hours resulting from Government-approved minor labor surges G&A is allowable on CR CLIN purchases if applicable; however, neither profit nor fee shall be allowed Employee meal costs and unofficial travel expenses are no longer government funded on the CR CLIN

Individual Job Order (IJO) CLIN:

Work which is not specifically identified in the PWS, but which is still within the general scope of this contract . FFP or CR IJOs to be determined by the CO on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the work Contractor shall develop initial technical and cost proposals for Government review and approval at the request of the CO Contractor shall perform planning, development, and distribution of plans and specifications, installation instructions, bills of materials, as-built (red-lined) drawings, specifications, drawings and bills of materials and inspection to complete the job at the work location

Individual Job Order (IJO) CLIN (cont.):

Contractor provides all necessary management for IJOs to include technical management, logistics support and services, administrative support and services, engineering, drafting, and similar requirements as they occur Examples of IJOs include, but are not limited to, generation of threat scenarios for system test and evaluation, generation of exercise simulation media for system tests and exercises, special reports or surveys related to the technical operation or maintenance of the mission equipment or support systems, special civil engineering tasks or projects for renovation and minor construction IJOs shall be negotiated by the CO prior to any action occurring Work shall commence once a bi-lateral modification is completed and signed

(30-49%)

(90-100%)

Likelihood Likelihood Legend:

c = cost s = schedule p = performance Low: 1 Moderate: 9 High: 2

Low: 7 Moderate: 5 High: 0

SSPARS Risk Assessment Overall

An acquisition risk assessment was conducted by the SSPARS multifunctional team (MFT) -- focused on acquisition-specific risks.

Risks were categorized in the areas of cost, schedule, and performance as denoted by the subscript c, s, or p, respectively. Each risk was assessed to determine probability and consequence ratings.

Overall, the team identified twelve (12) acquisition risks. Each risk is assigned a number for tracking purposes and each is plotted based on the identified probability and consequence to determine the risk level.

After all risks were initially identified and plotted, the overall acquisition program risk was determined by the team to be “moderate”.

The team looked in-depth at all risks that were ranked moderate or high and worked with functional experts to determine handling strategies.

After handling, there are 7 “low” risks and 5 “moderate” risks remaining, and the overall program was re-evaluated as low-to-moderate.

The following charts show the 5 “moderate” remaining after handling strategies are employed.

Risk 1 - Loss of Contractor Experience/Knowledge (Performance): If experienced contractor personnel’s knowledge is not captured for Government-unique systems maintenance (Radar, MILSATCOM) prior to contractor personnel turnover, then the mission will be impacted Handling:

Identify risk to industry for awareness Better define “turnover”/transition requirements in PWS and/or performance matrix Include Capture Plan (update as changes occur) in RFP and evaluate in Source Selection Include all site government O&M procedures in the Bidder’s Library

Risk 1 (Moderate)

Low Moderate High

Risk 1, Loss of Contractor Experience/Knowledge (Moderate Performance Risk): If experienced contractor personnel’s knowledge is not captured for Government-unique systems maintenance (Radar, MILSATCOM) prior to contractor personnel turnover, then the mission will be impacted. (Note: Aging contractor maintainer workforce; these skills are not grown in-house by the Government, but knowledge is passed on within contracted activities.)

Initial ID highly likely/serious:

Mitigate by: 1) Identify risk to industry for awareness (also brief current employees have first right of refusal), 2) Better define “turnover”/transition requirements in PWS and/or performance matrix, 3) Include Transition or Capture Plan (update as changes occur) in the Request For Proposal (RFP) and evaluate in Source Selection, 4) Include all site government operations and maintenance procedures in the Bidder’s Library

After handling/mitigation strategies employed: Likely/moderate

SSPARS Risk Assessment Risk 2 (Moderate) Risk 2 - Government Mission System Procedure Gaps (Performance): If the government does not have all maintenance/system administration requirements captured in Technical Orders and site operating procedures, then a gap exists for inexperienced maintenance personnel in troubleshooting system failures and performing restoration actions, causing extended system downtime and impacting mission operations Handling:

Continue efforts to ensure all maintenance procedures are incorporated into TOs and codified in site O&M procedures and local work cards Advanced Training PWS requirement for contractor to train gov’t operators on system functionality and assist in problem identification/communication Require Maintenance Operating Instructions as deliverable in PWS

Risk 2, Government Mission System Procedure Gaps (Moderate Performance Risk): If the government does not have all maintenance/system administration requirements captured in Technical Orders and site operating procedures, then a gap exists for inexperienced maintenance personnel in troubleshooting system failures and performing restoration actions, causing extended system downtime and impacting mission operations.

Initial ID: highly likely/serious

Mitigate by: 1) Continue efforts to ensure all maintenance procedures are incorporated into TOs and codified in site government operations and maintenance procedures and local work cards, 2) New training program (Advanced Training) added to PWS for contractor to train government operators on system functionality and to assist in problem identification and communication, 3) Require SSPARS Maintenance Operating Instructions as a deliverable in PWS

After handling/mitigation strategies employed: Likely/moderate

SSPARS Risk Assessment Risk 3 (Moderate) Risk 3 - Potential Organizational Conflict of Interest (Performance): If the contractor that wins the Sustainment and Modification of Optical and Radar Sensors (SMORS) contract proposes on the SSPARS contract, then there will be a potential organizational conflict of interest (OCI) with SSPARS. The SMORS contract designs and implements upgrades and the SSPARS contract tests those upgrades, so if the same contractor has both contracts it would be “grading its own tests.”

Handling:

OCI clause in RFP and contract requiring that companies certify their organization and personnel as not having a procurement integrity issue and/or to disclose potential conflicts and provide mitigation strategies Discuss in Industry Day and in Pre-Proposal Conference CO determination whether the OCI can be avoided, neutralized, or mitigated prior to contract award

(FAR 9.5)

Risk 3, Potential Organizational Conflict of Interest (Moderate Performance Risk): If the sustainment contractor (who is awarded the SMORS contract) proposes on the SSPARS contract, then there will be a potential organizational conflict of interest (OCI) for the SSPARS acquisition.

Initial ID: Likely/Serious

Mitigate by: 1) OCI clause in RFP and contract requiring that companies certify their organization and personnel as not having a procurement integrity issue and/or to disclose potential conflicts and provide mitigation strategies, 2) Discuss in Industry Day and in Pre-Proposal Conference, 3) CO Determination whether the OCI can be neutralized, mitigated or waived to ensure that no unfair competitive advantage exists (FAR Subpart 9.5)

After handling/mitigation strategies employed: Likely/Moderate

Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI). The acquisition team believes a potential OCI could exist if the sustainment contractor (SMORS contract) and the O&M contractor (SSPARS) are the same.

For example, it is the sustainment contractor’s responsibility to design and implement system upgrades and it is the O&M contractor’s responsibility to provide testing support for those upgrades. If the same contractor has both contracts, they will be designing, implementing, and testing their own work. Another type of conflict could occur if the O&M contractor deferred level I maintenance until it crossed over into the more expensive level II maintenance. Both of these scenarios create a situation that might bias the contractor’s judgement. At the time of this writing, the solicitation for the SMORS contract was canceled and the requirement is being re-written.

Depending on the exact requirement of that contract, there are two possibilities.

The MFT may determine an OCI exists that cannot be mitigated. If so, all offerors would be notified that the successful offeror on the SMORS contract is ineligible to compete on the SSPARS contract.

The second possibility is 2) an OCI exists, but can be mitigated or eliminated. If so, as a mitigation strategy, in addition to the surveillance described in Section II, Paragraph S, any offeror that is associated with a potential OCI will be required to submit an OCI mitigation plan as part of their proposal and AFFARS clause 5352.209-9000 “Organizational Conflict of Interest” will be included in the contract. The OCI restrictions included the clause will flow to all subcontractor and teaming arrangements.

SSPARS Risk Assessment Risk 4 (Moderate) Risk 4 - Advanced Training (Performance): If new Advanced Training Concept requirement is not incorporated into the new SSPARS PWS, then knowledge/experience cannot be passed onto Government operators; also a lost mitigation opportunity for Risk #2, Government Mission System Procedure Gaps Handling:

Day-to-day-team is working with current contractor to capture knowledge (based upon incumbent’s proposal commitments) Advocate for funding to add contractor training program requirements for Operators to PWS

Risk 4, Advanced Training (Moderate Performance Risk): If new Advanced Training Concept requirement is not incorporated into the new SSPARS PWS, then knowledge/ experience cannot be passed onto government operators; lost mitigation opportunity for Risk #2.

Initial ID: Likely/Moderate

Mitigate by: 1) Day-to day-team is working with current contractor to capture knowledge, 2) Advocate for funding to add contractor training program requirements for Operators to PWS, 3) Explain requirement to industry (Industry Day, Pre-Proposal and Pre-Performance Conference)

After handling/mitigation strategies employed: Likely/Moderate

SSPARS Risk Assessment Risk 5 (Moderate) Risk 5 - Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Support across GSUs (Performance): If COR manpower/skills mix is not available in support of contracted requirements or is disproportional across GSUs, then performance assessment is not optimized and there is potential for contractor performance issues to go unidentified. (Associated risk: If adequate COR oversight is not available, then vigor in the data validation process may be lacking in areas such as the CPARS Matrix, invoicing, GFP, etc.)

Handling:

PMD Working Group to assess COR/MCOR support on various contracts, potentially recommending billet reallocation among GSUs Advocate for additional COR resources at Clear AFS due to expanding footprint

Risk 5, Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Support across GSUs (Moderate Performance Risk): If COR manpower/skills mix is not available in support of contracted requirements or is disproportional across GSUs, then performance assessment is not optimized and there is potential for contractor performance issues to go unidentified. (Associated risk: If adequate COR oversight is not available then data in CPARS Matrix may not get validated, vigor in validation processes (invoicing, GFP, etc)).

Initial ID: Likely/Serious

Mitigate by: 1) PMD Working Group to assess COR/MCOR support on various contracts, potentially recommending billet reallocation among GSUs, 2) Advocate for additional COR resources at Clear AFS due to expanding footprint

After handling/mitigation strategies employed: Low likelihood/Serious

Overall Program Risk after Mitigation: Low to Moderate Seven (7) out of twelve (12) risks are rated low Five (5) out of twelve (12) risks are rated moderate Zero (0) out of twelve (12) risks are rated high

Cost Risk: Overall cost risk is Low Four (4) cost risks were identified, all low risk (Risk 7 - IMSC Impacts to Contract Schedule, Risk 8 - Contract CLIN Definitions, Risk 9 - Government-Unique Training, and Risk 10 - GFP for Contractor Use) Schedule Risk: Overall schedule risk is Low Two (2) schedule risks were identified, both low risk (Risk 6 - Changing Requirements, and Risk 12 - Delay in Contract Award) Performance Risk: Overall performance risk is Moderate Six (6) performance risks were identified, five (5) of which were moderate and one (1) was low (Risk 11 - Emergency Management Requirements Definition)

Risk Summary

In conclusion, the acquisition risk assessment, after mitigation, is rated as low-to-moderate, with five moderate performance risks and seven low risks in the areas of cost, schedule and performance.

Cost Risk. Overall cost risk is low. Four cost risks were identified, all low risk: Risk 7- IMSC Impacts to Contract Schedule, Risk 8- Contract CLIN Definitions, Risk 9- Government-Unique Training, and Risk 10- GFP for Contractor Use. These risks are all largely related to the potential for the Air Force to “double pay” for certain services. However, the mitigation techniques described above will keep cost categories clear, segregated, and trackable.

Schedule Risk. Overall schedule risk is low. Two schedule risks were identified, both low risk: Risk 6- Changing Requirements, and Risk 12- Delay in Contract Award. The mitigation strategies employed are proven and the MFT does not expect any impacts to the acquisition schedule.

Performance Risk. Overall performance risk is moderate. Six performance risks were identified, five of which were moderate and one was low. The five moderate risks are: Risk 1- Loss of Contractor Experience/Knowledge, Risk 2- Government Mission System Procedure Gaps, Risk 3- Potential Conflict of Interest, Risk 4- Advanced Training, and Risk 5- COR Support Across GSUs. The low risk is Risk 11- Emergency Management Requirements Definition. The services are well established, the systems maintained under this contract are mature and the maintenance activities well documented. Moderate risk recognizes the associated difficulty of managing this very large, diverse requirement in harsh and isolated environments found at Clear and Thule. The current workforce is aging and many of the employees, who have worked on the system for 20–30 years, are nearing retirement. Many employees may view a contract transition as an appropriate time to retire. In order to mitigate this risk, a technical/price tradeoff source selection strategy will be employed, giving the Government the option of potentially trading up for a better Staffing Plan and a better Knowledge Capture/ Transition Plan.

SSPARS Risk Assessment Risk Handling Summary Implementation Handling via acquisition strategy:

PWS requirements Exchanges with industry Information in bidder’s library (workload data, government procedures, etc) Source selection strategy and evaluation criteria Contract clause (OCI) Program advocacy

Risk assessment conclusion - the team is implementing several different mitigation strategies to reduce program risk in the areas shown here from better PWS requirements definition to exchanges with industry, inclusion of evaluation criteria, etc.

Contract Information PSC: M1BG – Operation of Electronic and Communications Facilities NAICS: 517919 (Small Business size standard $32.5M) Competitive: Full & Open Competition Contract Type: Firm Fixed Price with Cost Reimbursable CLIN and Individual Job Order CLIN Contract Period of Performance: 1 Sep 18 - 30 Apr 26 Estimated Contract Award Date: 28 Feb 18 Transition Period: 1 Jun 18 – 31 Aug 18 Start Date: 1 Sep 18

Source Selection Source Selection will be conducted as a Technical Price Tradeoff (TPT) Technical proposals will be evaluated and assigned combined technical/risk ratings which reflect the extent to which the proposal meets the Government’s specified performance and capability requirements, considering any strengths and weaknesses associated with the proposed approach The Government may award to a higher-priced offeror if it is determined by the SSA that the superior technical approach outweighs the price difference All strengths from the winning offeror’s technical approach, including the Small Business Participation Commitment Document, will be incorporated into the contract as an attachment in Section J

Source Selection - Continued Offeror’s proposals will be rated on two Factors Technical (Factor 1) Consists of 5 subfactors (in descending order of importance):

Mission System Maintenance Plan (acceptable/unacceptable) Program Management Knowledge Capture and Retention Resource Management Small Business Participation Commitment Price (Factor 2) Evaluated for reasonableness, balance, and affordability Technical and Price are approximately equal in importance

The Technical factor will be rated at the subfactor level; an overall rating for Factor 1 will not be given

Each Technical subfactor will be given a rating IAW DoD Source Selection Procedures as follows:

Subfactor 1 Mission Maintenance Plan

Unacceptable Proposal does not meet the requirements of the solicitation.

Subfactors 2-4 Program Management, Knowledge Capture and Retention, and Resource Management:

Subfactor 5 Small Business Participation Commitment:

What about Past Performance?

Past performance will not be included as part of the evaluation criteria

Past performance will be included as part of the responsibility determination

A lack of demonstrated history of past performance will be a basis for a determination of non-responsibility

Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) CAsPR Matrix PWS Format CLIN Structure Clear AFS Warehouse Procedures Small Business Approach Property Consideration Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI)

Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) The Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is currently being constructed at Clear AFS The SSPARS PWS contains a placeholder only; will be separately negotiated sometime after contract award As facilities for LRDR are completed, the O&M of those facilities will be added to the SSPARS contract As facilities are brought online, they will be funded by MDA for two years. After two years, the Air Force will assume funding responsibility.

Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). A new radar is being built at Clear AFS. It is anticipated that system and facility O&M will be required on this contract in support of the LRDR in approximately the FY20/FY21 timeframe. The type of work required is covered within the existing PWS requirements, but the level of effort cannot be determined at this time and will be separately negotiated sometime after contract award.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LRDR - Continued

Entry Control Facility Maintenance Facility Fuel Storage LRDR Power Plant Facility Electrical Substation Fuel Unloading LRDR MILCON Program FY17 Project / FY19 Project LRDR Equipment Shelter (LES) Mission Control Facility (MCF) Project One Scope FY 17 Mission Control Facility LES Foundation Partial Site Infrastructure ECF, ESS and SSL-A Fencing Project Two Scope FY 19 Power Plant Facility Fuel Unloading Maintenance Facility Additional Site Infrastructure Roads Primary Site Infrastructure Additional Site Infrastructure Interim Construction Free-zone Fence FY17 Project FY19 Project

CAsPR Matrix

Contractor Assessment and Performance Reporting (CAsPR) Matrix

PWS Format PWS no longer uses directive paragraphs within AFIs or AFMANs within the requirement

Example: PWS used to say, “Ensure all cannibalization actions are approved and documented IAW AFSPCI 21-108 paras. 5.6.1, 6.1.5, and 6.1.5.2.”

PWS Format - Continued PWS now writes actual requirement into PWS, without directive paragraph references, where possible

Example: PWS now says, “Verify the part that is not available prior to recommending cannibalization action to the Installation/Site Commander. Submit cannibal-ization action to the 21 OSS COM for approval. Document approved cannibalization actions in IMDS ensuring a demand is placed on the supply system. Coordinate with the Depot Management Activity, order replacement parts and repair cannibalized equipment.”

2.2.8.9. Space Systems Corrosion Prevention and Control. Implement and maintain the corrosion prevention and control program for all assigned equipment to minimize the effects of corrosion on communications-electronic equipment.

Performance Standards:

a) STD: IAW TO 1-1-689 - Cleaning and Corrosion Control, Corrosion Program and Corrosion Theory (Vol 1)

b) STD: IAW system specific TOs Reference: AFSPCI 21-108 Site Applicability: Beale AFB, Cape Cod AFS, Clear AFS, RAF Fylingdales and Thule AB

In the previous example, the contractor had to look up AFSPCI paragraphs to find the requirement; requirement is now written into the PWS paragraph TO 1-1-689 is the standard with applicable sections identified to which the requirement is to be performed and/or measured AFSPCI will still be listed, but as reference only, so contractor knows source of the requirement Goal is to reduce administrative modifications whose sole purpose was to update Directive (for example, AFI, AFSPCI, etc) paragraph references

CLIN Structure

Parent CLINs numbered according to SWS designation

Cape Cod AFS – XX06 (6 SWS) Beale AFB – XX07 (7 SWS) Thule AB – XX12 (12 SWS) Clear AFS – XX13 (13 SWS) RAF Fylingdales – XX18 (not SWS)

CLIN Structure - Continued

Phase-in designated “00XX”, Base period “01XX”, Option Years 1-7 “10XX” – “70XX”

Example: Phase-in at Cape Cod AFS is 0006 Example: Base Period at Thule AB is 0112 Example: Option Year 2 at Clear AFS is 2013

SubCLINs will be numbered according to function

O&M - XXXX10

MILSATCOM- XXXX20

Environmental- XXXX30

Example:

O&M funding for Beale AFB in the Base Period is 010710 Where: 01 07 10

O&M Funding Beale AFB Base Period

Example:

MILSATCOM funding for RAF Fylingdales in Option Year 2 Where: 20 18 20

MILSATCOM Funding RAF Fylingdales Option Year 2

This allows functions to be organized and “grouped” together

All “O&M” subCLINs will be in the “10s” All MILSATCOM subCLINs will be in the “20s” All Environmental subCLINs will be in the “30s”

Example: If another subCLIN is needed to fund MILSATCOM, it can “slot” in at 201821

Some functions apply across the entire contract, rather than to individual sites (1 parent CLIN covering all sites). These CLINs are numbered as follows:

X200 – CR CLIN

Example: The CR CLIN for Option Year 2 is 2200

X300 – IJO CLIN

Each job order will be its own subCLIN and will be negotiated separately.

X400 – Termination Liability CLIN Each site will have its own subCLIN designation (i.e. 140013 for Clear, AFS is Option Year 1)

Clear AFS Warehouse Procedures Operate the Clear AFS Supply Warehouse in support of contract performance 13/213 SWS organizations and third-party customers are responsible to purchase their own supply items, but the warehouse may be used for receipt and storage of supplies and materials on a space available basis, as determined by the on-site COR Maintain documentation of all warehouse transactions Account for all Government-furnished supplies and materials provided at contract start through the end of the contract Do not comingle Government and contractor supplies

Small Business Approach Section L: (Subfactor 5) para D.1.e.

Offerors must submit a “Small Business Participation Commitment Document” (SBPCD)

The SBPCD is different than a Small Business Subcontracting Plan!

Whereas a subcontracting plan has “goals,” a SBPCD has a “Minimum Quantitative Requirement” (MQR) Note: The MQR is a requirement, NOT a goal

SBPCD will be incorporated into apparent successful offeror’s Small Business Subcontracting Plan prior to award

Small Business Approach - Continued Section L: (Subfactor 5), Para D.1.e.1)

Offerors on SSPARS must include a minimum of 20% of total contract cost in small business subcontracting

“Total Contract Cost” is defined as the cumulative total cost of all exercised options

Examples:

The MQR in the base year is 20% of the base year (because no options have yet been exercised)

The MQR in option year 1 is 20% of the combined total of the base year and option year 1

Small Business Approach - Continued While an MQR of 20% is required, an MQR exceeding 20% could be rated as a strength and be subject to trade

Section L: (Subfactor 5), Para D.1.e.1)(ii) and (iii) - Other areas subject to potential trade:

The complexity and variety of work small businesses are to perform The extent to which small businesses are specifically identified by name, including formal commitment agreements

Bottom Line: The more meaningful the small business subcontracting commitment, the greater potential for a higher rating

Property Consideration We request industry feedback on the following considerations:

Use of Government property in contract performance is subject to the following regulations and guidance Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) “Although the Department of Defense may not have physical custody, in order to maintain effective property accountability and for financial reporting purposes, DoD Components shall establish and maintain records and accountability for property (of any value) furnished to contractors as Government furnished property (GFP)”

Property Consideration - Continued Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 45.102 (a) and (b)

(a) Contractors are ordinarily required to furnish all property necessary to perform Government contracts

(b) Contracting officers shall provide property to contractors only when it is clearly demonstrated—

(1) To be in the Government’s best interest;

(2) That the overall benefit to the acquisition significantly outweighs the increased cost of administration, including ultimate property disposal;

(3) That providing the property does not substantially increase the Government’s assumption of risk; and

(4) That Government requirements cannot otherwise be met

Currently, the SSPARS sites possess two types of Government property:

1) That which properly qualifies as “GFP” as defined at FAR 45.102(b) and DFARS PGI 245.103-70(2)

Property that will be issued as GFP includes that which is on Custodial Authorization/Custody Receipt Listings (CA/CRLs), bench stock issued through the Government Enterprise Solution-Supply (ES-S) system, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE)

2) “Other” Government-owned property that is used in the performance of the contract, but does not properly qualify as GFP per FAR 45.102(b) and DFARS PGI 245.103-70(2)

This “other” property includes “supplemental” items such as ground-handling equipment, hand tools and tool chests, small appliances, extension cords, coils of copper and other piping, and “shop stock” (nuts, bolts, screws, fuses, components, etc.). These items are not on any official Government property listing

Therefore, in light of FIAR and FAR guidance, the Government must somehow account for this “other” property, since it is used in the performance of the contract

FIAR says it must be issued as GFP

FAR says it should not be issued as GFP

So in an attempt to be in compliance with both FIAR and the FAR, the Government requests industry feedback on the following consideration:

The proposed solution is to have the contractor bid “consideration” into their proposal in order to take title to this “other” property

The Request for Proposal (RFP) will include a “consideration” CLIN. Offerors will propose the dollar amount of consideration they will give the Government in exchange for taking title to the property

This consideration amount will then be deducted from the overall price of the contract

By using this approach, only that property which properly counts as “GFP” will be issued as such; the contractor will have title to, and bear responsibility for, all other property

This will meet the letter and intent of the FAR, and allow for a clean and accurate audit that meets the letter and intent of FIAR

NOTE: This is not a settled course of action! As part of Market Research, the Government is interested in Industry feedback on the viability and practicability of this approach If you have ideas for alternative approaches, let us know!

Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) A potential organizational conflict of interest exists between the SSPARS contract and the SENSOR contract (and its follow-on, SMORS)

The SSPARS contractor will be responsible for testing or providing technical evaluations of products delivered from the SENSOR/SMORS program

OCI - Continued Restrictions are needed to ensure that the Contractor is not testing or providing technical evaluations on its own products delivered to the SSPARS program

As a part of the proposal, the offeror shall provide the Contracting Officer with complete information of previous or ongoing work that is in any way associated with the contemplated acquisition

Prime or subcontract work related to the SENSOR contract may disqualify an offeror from proposing on SSPARS

OCI - Continued If award is made to the offeror, the resulting contract may include an organizational conflict of interest limitation applicable to subsequent Government work, at either a prime contract level, at any subcontract tier, or both During evaluation of proposals, the Government may, after discussions with the offeror and consideration of ways to avoid the conflict of interest, insert a special provision in the resulting contract which shall disqualify the offeror from further consideration for award of future contracts, including SMORS or its equivalent

Acquisition Schedule RFP Release:

1 March 2017 Preproposal Conference/Site Visit:

Week of 20 March 2017 Receipt of Proposals from Industry:

18 April 2017 Contract Award:

28 February 2018 Contract Transition Period:

1 June – 31 August 2018 Contract Performance Start:

1 September 2018

Questions and Answers Any additional questions that result from this Industry Day and the One-on-one sessions are due in writing to the Contracting Officer, Austin Frindt, at austin.frindt@us.af.mil NLT 1400, 13 October 2016.

Questions?

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Welcome to the

21st Operations Group Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado

Colonel Troy L. Endicott Commander

21st Operations Group Mission and Vision

Mission Execute combat-relevant indications and warning (I&W), Space Situational

Awareness (SSA), and Space Control Operations to secure space for our nation and Allies.

Vision Disciplined Operations today; postured with Allies for decisive, innovative warfighting in a CDO environment, while reinforcing our nation’s trust.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

We lead 17 operational units located around the world to execute the missile warning, missile defense, space surveillance, and counterspace missions.

FOREIGN

PARTNERS

21ST OPERATIONS GROUP

GROUP COMMANDER (CC)

DEPUTY COMMANDER (CD) x2

TECH DIRECTOR (TD)

FINANCIAL MGMT (FM)

EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CCE)

SECRETARY (CCS)

STAN/EVAL (OGV)

6TH SPACE

WARNING

SQUADRON

CAPE COD AFS MA

7TH SPACE

BEALE AFB CA

10TH SPACE

CAVALIER AFS ND

12TH SPACE

THULE AB GL

13TH SPACE

CLEAR AFS AK

21ST OPERATIONS

SUPPORT

PETERSON AFB CO

4TH SPACE

CONTROL

16TH SPACE

20TH SPACE

EGLIN AFB FL

13 SWS OPERATION

LOCATION - CD

COBRA DANE

EARECKSON AS AK

GROUP ORGANIZATION

1st EXPEDITIONARY

SPACE CONTROL

DEPLOYED

21 OG OPERATING

LOCATION-A

RAF FYLINGDALES

UK

DEPLOYMENT MANAGER (UDM)

20 SPCS

DETACHMENT 1

SOCORRO NM

DETACHMENT 3

MAUI HI

21 OSS

BEALE CA

DETACHMENT 2

DIEGO GARCIA

BIOT

21 OG OPERATING

LOCATION-B

EDINBURGH,

AUSTRALIA

18TH SPACE

VANDENBERG AFB CA

18TH SPCS

DAHLGREN VA

21 OG By The Numbers

• 1,790-member Total and Combined Force Team

– 180 Regular Air Force Officers

– 506 Regular Air Force Enlisted

– 165 Air Force Civilians

– 37 Associated Air Force Reserve/Air National Guard Officers

– 161 Associated Air Force Reserve/Air National Guard Enlisted

– 393 Associated Foreign Military Partners

– 455 Defense Contractors

• 21 subordinate and 5 associated/partner units

• Employ 15 different weapon systems

• Operate the second busiest DV aerial port in DoD

• Manage 3 Air Force installations

– Clear AFS AK, Cavalier AFS ND, & Cape Cod AFS MA

• Serve at 19 locations in 8 countries spanning 13 time zones

Missile Warning Mission

• Detect

• Assess

• Disseminate

To accomplish our missile warning mission, we employ six large, ground-based radars to continuously monitor the skies for signs of a submarine launched or intercontinental ballistic missile attack. If they detect a missile, crews have just 60 seconds to assess if the radar system is functioning normally or if there is some sort of anomaly, pass a site report to the Missile Warning Center, and disseminate launch and predicted impact data to the National Military Command Center and other forward users.

Missile Warning Locations

Thule

Clear

Beale Cavalier

Cape Cod

RAF Fylingdales

7 SWS

Beale AFB CA

Thule AB Greenland

United Kingdom

13 SWS

Clear AFS AK

10 SWS

Cavalier AFS ND

6SWS

Cape Cod AFB MA

These radar systems are located around the periphery of North America at Clear AFS in the heart of Alaska; Beale AFB, CA; Cavalier AFS on the North Dakota/Canadian border; Thule AB, Greenland, 700 miles north of the Arctic Circle; and at RAF Fylingdales in the United Kingdom. They are capable of surveilling the skies out to roughly 3,000 nautical miles into space and can track hundreds of objects simultaneously.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/Clear_Air_Force_Station_Alaska.jpg http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/Clear_Air_Force_Station_Alaska.jpg http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/7d/Spliced.fylingdales.jpg

Missile Defense Mission

• Detect & Categorize Incoming Ballistic Objects

• Provide Real-Time Track Data

• Automatically Disseminate

Data to Decision-Makers and Missile Defense Interceptors

Of course, providing early warning of a missile attack only gets us so far. Ideally, we need to be able to do something about those incoming missiles. We didn’t always have the capability to do so, but our nation now has a limited ballistic missile defense system and three of our missile warning radars have been upgraded to be an integral part of that system. In addition to providing early warning, these three upgraded radars also provide real-time tracking data to the Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense. If the command is given, this real-time tracking data is relayed to ground-based interceptor units at Vandenberg AFB, California and Fort Greely, Alaska who can then launch interceptors to shoot down the incoming warheads.

Missile Defense

7 SWS

Beale AFB CA

Thule AB, Greenland

United Kingdom

Thule

Beale

RAF FylingdalesEareckson

13 SWS, OL-CD

Eareckson AFS AK

The three radars that have been upgraded are at Beale AFB, CA; Thule AB, Greenland; and RAF Fylingdales, UK. Our radars at Clear AFS, AK and Cape Cod AFS, MA are currently scheduled to receive upgrades in the FY16-18 timeframe.

Space Situational Awareness

“Routine” Spacetrack

• Detect

• Track

• Catalog

• Identify

Space Object Identification (SOI)

• Mission Payload Assessment

• Damage Assessment

• Routine Space Intel

• Anomaly Resolution

Event Processing

• New Domestic Launch

• New Foreign Launch

• Maneuvers

• Reentry Assessment

Orbital Safety

• On-Orbit Conjunction Assessment

• Launch Conjunction Assessment

• Human Spaceflight Support

We also have a space situational awareness mission which has several sub-sets. First is what we call “routine” spacetrack. That is, we have to maintain constant surveillance on the over 23,000* objects currently orbiting the Earth; everything from nuts and bolts to spent rocket bodies to active satellites. We continuously collect observations on these objects and pass the data back to the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB, CA where orbital analysts maintain what we call a satellite catalog so that we know where any particular object should be at any given time. However, objects aren’t always where they should be…

As a result, we also perform a space object identification role in which we collect optical and radar data and provide it to analysts at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center so they can assess what particular satellites of interest might be doing.

Another aspect of that role is on-orbit event processing. If a foreign nation launches a new satellite, we need to be able to track that launch, determine where the satellite is going, and what it’s mission is. Once on orbit, many satellites have the capability to maneuver. We need to be able to detect when a satellite maneuvers, determine where it went, and why it moved. And finally, whatever goes up must eventually come down. We provide data to the orbital analysts at the Joint Space Operations Center so that we can determine if and when an object is going to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, if it will burn up or survive re-entry, and where on the surface of the Earth it might impact.

Last but not least is orbital safety. With 20,000 objects flying around the Earth at different altitudes at speeds of 17,000 mile per hour, it is imperative that we prevent any on-orbit collisions, especially for our manned spaceflight operations.

*Recent growth from the Briz-M breakup (http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/10/25/russian-rocket-explosion-created-space-junk-that-could-threaten-station/) has #s right now at: (a/o 1 Nov 12) Space Catalog (objects with a known origin): 16,000 Analysis Satellites (objects with an unknown origin): 7,000 Near Earth: 17,500 Deep Space: 5,500 (GEO: 1,750; Non-GEO: 3,750))

Space Situational Awareness

We have a multitude of systems to accomplish the space situational awareness mission. While our missile warning radars are scanning the skies for incoming missiles, they are also tracking satellites within their field of view. However, they are focused on what we call low Earth orbit; ranges out to around 3,000 nautical miles.

We also have a series of dedicated optical and radar sensors whose sole purpose is space surveillance. These systems are capable of tracking objects the size of a basketball out to distances of 22,000 nautical miles.

Note: The slide this image was pulled from is in the 2016 State of the Wing slide deck.

Space Control Mission

• Protect US and friendly space systems and our ability to exploit space

• Prevent an adversary from using space systems for hostile purposes and exploiting space to their advantage

Space Control

4 SPCS & 16 SPCS

Peterson AFB CO

4 SPCS &

16 SPCS

*And Singapore

SPIRIT*

Operation SILENT SENTRY

Now, knowing where everything is in space and what it’s doing is only part of the problem. We also need to defend our space assets and prevent our adversaries from using their space assets against us. This is where our defensive and offensive space control units come into play. We have three space control units located here at Peterson AFB and at Holloman AFB, NM as well as expeditionary space control units supporting the current fight.

22 Jan – updated verbiage from Counterspace to Space Control. Awaiting 21 OG documentation. 30 Jan – got verbiage (AFDD 3-14, june 12) For non-operators, see space control information below:

The third mission area of space operations is space control (SC). Air Force space forces execute space control operations to protect US military and friendly space capabilities while denying space capabilities to the adversary, as situations require. The NSP governs our conduct with regard to military operations in, through, or from space. The NSP charges the DOD to maintain the capability to execute the mission of space control. It further specifies: ―The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.

SC includes defensive and offensive operations. Both defensive and offensive operations are dependent on robust SSA.