Attachment_0007_Stryker_SCG__23_May_2017.pdf

Stryker Family of Vehicles Security Classification Guide 23 May 2017

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Table of Contents

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Purpose

2. Authority

3. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)

4. Classification Challenges

5. Compilation of Information

6. Threat/Intelligence Information

7. Government Furnished Property (GFP)

8. For Official Use Only (FOUO) Caveat

9. Distribution Statements

10. Export Controlled Marking

11. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination

12. Public Release

13. Release of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

14. Release of Classified Information

15. Foreign Disclosure

16. Loss, Compromise, or Suspected Compromise

17. Marking Requirements

18. Foreign Government Information (FGI)

19. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

20. Operations Security (OPSEC)

21. Security Classification Guides for Complementary Programs

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TABLE

1. Programmatic Information

2. Threats

3. Performance and Capabilities

4. Hardware/Software

5. Armor and Survivability Characteristics

6. Test and Evaluations

7. Modeling and Simulations

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8. Training

9. Maintenance

10. Cybersecurity

NOTES

DEFINITIONS

ACRONYMS

REFERENCES

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Purpose

This Security Classification Guide (SCG) provides instructions and guidance on the classification and declassification of information and material pertaining to the Stryker Family of Vehicles (FOV). This guide refers only to information owned by the Program Executive Officer Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS) under the PEO’s Original Classification Authority (OCA). Complementary program SCGs and Department of Defense (DoD) technical SCGs that will be used on the Stryker FOV retain their original classification when integrated into the Stryker FOV. The OCA for these external programs retains OCA (see Section 21). Classification elements will be added to address technical and design details as these areas mature. Contact the Project Manager Stryker Brigade Combat Team (PM SBCT) Security Office to determine the appropriate course of action for elements that are missing or do not fit into the categories defined in this guide.

The Stryker FOV consists of eighteen light armored vehicles that serve as the primary combat and combat support vehicles of the SBCT. There are eleven Flat Bottom Hull variants and seven Double “V” Hull variants. The Stryker FOV equips the SBCT with integral capabilities for the successful conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations as well as the ability to fight as part of a larger formation. It is designed as a full spectrum, early entry combat force.

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2. Authority

This guide is issued under the authority of Executive Order (EO) 13526 Classified National Security Information, DoD Manual 5200.01 Volume 1-4, DoD Information Security Program; and Army Regulation (AR) 380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program. According to Executive Order 13526 there are three classification levels. All three apply to this guide:

1) CONFIDENTIAL (C), the unauthorized disclosure could cause damage to national security.

2) SECRET (S), the unauthorized disclosure could cause serious damage to national security.

3) TOP SECRET (TS), the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

This guide constitutes classification authority and is to be cited as the basis for classification, regrading, or declassification of information involved in the Stryker FOV.

Changes in classification required by application of this guide shall be effective immediately. Information identified as classified in this guide is classified by the PEO GCS. Operational information is classified in accordance with (IAW) the operational unit security guidance or the Theater Commander’s guidance. The unit must ensure only operational information at the Secret level or below is stored or processed on Stryker Family of Vehicles accredited Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

When citing this guide, the appropriate entry is:

Classified by: List name and position title of the Derivative classifier and office of origin Derived from: Stryker FOV SCG, 20170523 Declassify on: YYYYMMDD (Refer to declassification column to determine the date)

Information or material classified using this guide and other security classification guidance shall cite “Multiple Sources” on the “Derived from” line and the list of multiple sources shall be included with or annotated on the derivative document. If the document has a bibliography or reference list, this may be used as the list of sources.

3. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)

This guide is issued by, and all inquiries concerning content and interpretation, as well as recommendations for changes, should be addressed to:

PM SBCT Security Manager Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems

ATTN: SFAE-GCS-S, MS 325

6501 East Eleven Mile Road Warren, MI 48397-5000

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4. Classification Challenges

If at any time, any of the security classification guidance contained herein is challenged, the items of information involved shall continue to be protected at the level prescribed by this guide until such time as a final decision is made on the challenge by appropriate authority. Classification challenges should be addressed to the OPR.

All users of this guide are encouraged to assist in improving its currency and adequacy.

Over classification or incorrect classification should be brought to the attention of the OPR. Changes to this guide will be made by the issuance of a numbered change letter with corrected page.

5. Compilation of Information

In some circumstances, classification may be required when unclassified elements of information are combined to reveal classified information, or when classified elements combine to reveal information at a higher classification level than the individual elements. An explanation for the classification as a result of compilation shall be provided on the “Derived from” line or within the document. The explanation must clearly describe the circumstances under which the individual portions constitute a classified compilation, and when they do not. The classification and marking process is as follows:

a. When a document that comprises individually unclassified items of information is classified by compilation, the overall classification shall be marked conspicuously at the top and bottom of each page and the outside front and back covers (if applicable). An explanation of the basis for classification by compilation shall be placed on the “Derived from:” line or within the document. The explanation must clearly describe the circumstances under which the individual portions constitute a classified compilation, and when they do not. The explanation shall be portion marked as needed, at a minimum as “For Official Use Only.” If portions, standing alone, are unclassified, but the document is classified by compilation or association, those portions shall be marked “U,” and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation.

b. If individual portions are classified at one level and the compilation is a higher classification, each portion shall be marked with its own classification, and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation. An explanation of the classification by compilation is required.

6. Threat/Intelligence Information

Data or information relating to the threat systems or other intelligence derived from material must show the security markings of that threat/intelligence material. The release of threat/intelligence may require the consent of the originator. The servicing Foreign Intelligence Office (FIO) controls all dissemination of threat/intelligence information. Threat/intelligence information will not be reproduced, released to contractors, or disseminated unless approved by the FIO and Senior Intelligence Officer

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(SIO) that supporting the Stryker FOV program in the G2, U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, Attn: AMSTA-CSS-F, 6501 East 11 Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000, commercial 586-282-5891, DSN 786-5891.

7. Government Furnished Property (GFP)

The Project Management Office, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (PMO SBCT) will acquire GFP, such as the 120 mm mortar system, as end items. All GFP (including material and associated publications) are subject to the security classifications and special handling caveat markings of its respective SCGs. SCGs for GFP are identified in Section 21 of this guide. Additional GFP may be provided and incorporated into the Stryker FOV in the future. Future GFP will be protected in accordance with its respective SCG.

8. For Official Use Only (FOUO) Caveat

FOUO is not a security classification. Information that has not been given a security classification pursuant to the criteria in this guide, but which may be withheld from the public for one or more of the reasons cited in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions AR 25-55, Army FOIA, shall be designated FOUO. Information so designated in this guide that warrants FOUO markings will be handled and protected IAW AR 25-55 and DoDM 5200.01, V4. FOUO information may be disseminated within DoD Components and between officials of DoD Components and DoD contractors, consultants, and grantees to conduct official business for the Department of Defense.

Documents will be marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in letters equal to or larger than the rest of the text, at the bottom of the front cover, the title page, or the first page, and on the bottom of the outside of the back cover. (Font size of 14 point or larger in black ink is recommended.) Pages within the document which contain FOUO information will be marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY at the bottom. Apply the following statement to the front cover or title page of the document:

FOIA Exemptions identified or applicable to this guide:

Number 3. Records protected by another law that specifically exempts the information from public release.

Number 4. Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a private source which would cause substantial competitive harm to the source if disclosed.

Number 5. Internal documents that are deliberative in nature and are part of the decision making process and contain opinions, and recommendations. Includes information on planning, programming, and budgetary information.

Number 7(E). Disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of investigative techniques and procedures.

This document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

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Number 7(F). Reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

Note that the listed exemptions are examples and not all inclusive. The user should review AR 25-55 for all exemption guidance.

9. Distribution Statements

Distribution Statements are required to be placed on all technical documents whether they are classified or unclassified. These notices will be placed on the front cover or first page of the document.

Technical documents (or data) is defined as containing information (experimental, developmental, engineering works) that can be used to define an engineering or manufacturing process or to design, procure, produce, support, maintain, operate, repair or overhaul material. The information may be in text, graphic or pictorial form.

The following statements are referenced in the Security Classification Guidance Table for application to technical data. Exceptions for the use of another distribution statement shall be submitted to the PM SBCT Security Office, in writing, with justification. Refer to DoDI 5230.24 for a complete list of Distribution Statements and reasons.

10. Export Controlled Marking

Information contained in this SCG may be restricted from export to foreign nationals.

For documents containing export controlled information, the following warning shall be placed on the document immediately below the distribution statement and the reason “Export Controlled” will be added to the distribution statement. See Definitions for Export and Deemed Export.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative and Operational Use, date of determination is 23 May 2017. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the attention of the PM SBCT Security Manager at: Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems, ATTN: SFAE-GCS-S, MS 325 (Security Office), 6501 East Eleven Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by PM SBCT, date of determination is 23 May 2017, or higher DoD authority.

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq) as amended.

Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties.

Disseminate IAW provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

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11. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination

Authority for reproduction, extraction, and dissemination of this guide is granted to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors involved with the Stryker FOV program. All other requests for dissemination of this guide shall be referred to the OPR.

12. Public Release

The fact that this guide shows certain details of information to be unclassified, including controlled unclassified information, does not allow automatic public release of this information. The public release of Army information regarding the program will be IAW AR 360-1. Defense contractors shall follow Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7000 (disclosure of information) and fully comply with National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), DoD 5220.22M, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and its supplements, and are responsible to ensure their subcontractors comply with these requirements. All requests for public release of official information pertaining to the program must undergo an OPSEC review and be approved by the PEO GCS Public Affairs Officer (PAO) prior to any release in any form (media, e-mail, websites, video, photographs, etc.). Replies to queries from unofficial sources may be made only after written approval from the PEO GCS PAO is obtained. Information or visit requests received through any Public Affairs Office or public media representatives shall be coordinated with the OPR, prior to release of information or the visit.

Defense contractors and other organizations must ensure all information is unclassified and technically accurate for an OPSEC review submission. Copies of the material may not be released until the OPSEC review process is complete and the final determination is the information is approved for public dissemination.

All requests will be submitted to the PM SBCT Security Manager, Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems, ATTN: SFAE-GCS-S, MS 325 (Security Office), 6501 East 11 Mile Rd, Warren, MI 48397-5000. The program will require 45 working days to process the request and render a decision. Submissions shall be protected as CUI until approved for public release.

Care must be taken to ensure that all Army information that is entered on publicly accessible or unprotected Worldwide Web (WWW) sites has been processed, reviewed and approved for public release. The provisions of AR 25-2, Information Assurance (IA), apply and AR 530-1 Operations Security are applicable.

13. Release of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

CUI includes FOUO and technical data. Releasing CUI information to individuals or organizations that are not supporting the program requires Program Office approval.

Submit a request for dissemination outside of predetermined controls (identified previously in this SCG) and a justification to the OPR. A review shall be conducted within a minimum of 45 working days to adjudicate each request.

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14. Release of Classified Information

Presentations containing information classified under this SCG intended to be released at classified symposiums, seminars, conferences, or similar forums will be submitted for approval. Such requests for release must be submitted through the OPR at least 45 calendar days prior to the proposed date of release. The request will include the name of the individual making the presentations, date of the presentation, title of the forum, and justification for the proposed release. The request will also identify whether the forum will include any foreign attendance or participation.

15. Foreign Disclosure

Disclosure of Stryker FOV program information (classified or unclassified) under the cognizance of this guide to foreign governments or companies shall conform to the policy and procedures in the National Disclosure Policy-1, DoD Directive (DoDD) 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. If a country with which the DoD has entered into a reciprocal procurement Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or offset arrangement expresses an interest in the Stryker FOV program or weapon system, a foreign disclosure review will be conducted prior to issuance of a solicitation. All program contractors must comply with U.S. export laws and be contractually prohibited from executing any third party information releases, without PEO GCS approval. Any requests for information shall be processed as official requests through appropriate foreign disclosure organizations. The supporting TACOM LCMC Foreign Disclosure Officer is the primary point of contact for all foreign disclosure issues. Mailing Address: G2 TACOM LCMC, AMSTA-CSS-C, Mail Stop 105, 6501 East 11 Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

16. Loss, Compromise, or Suspected Compromise

Report the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information or material to the OPR within 24 hours of the incident or IAW the applicable Defense Department (DD) Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification, DoD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, Section 3, reporting requirements, for contractors, and AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, Chapter 10 for Government organizations.

17. Marking Requirements

Documents and other products, including information technology material and briefing slides containing classified material will be marked IAW DoD 5220.22-M, DoDM 5200.01, and the booklet labeled, “Marking Classified National Security Information,” as required by EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 December 2009, and 32 C.F.R. Part 2001, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Implementing Directive, effective 25 June 2010 (Revision 2, January 2014). Documents will be derivatively classified with this SCG used as a source.

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18. Foreign Government Information (FGI)

If a foreign country expresses an interest in sharing its information with the Stryker FOV program, either with DoD agency or to a defense contractor, the OPR shall be notified immediately. Use of or reference to foreign government data or information furnished under the Stryker FOV program shall be classified not less than the classification assigned by the original foreign government. Safeguarding of FGI must be IAW DoD Manual 5220.22-M and DoDM 5200.01. Third party disclosure and dissemination is prohibited.

19. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

If a foreign country expresses an interest to enter into a FMS, the OPR shall be notified without delay. The provisions of AR 12-1, Security Assistance, Training and Export Policy apply. The disclosure or transfer of U.S. or Allied country information to a third part is prohibited without the written consent of the originating county.

20. Operations Security (OPSEC)

PM SBCT has an approved OPSEC Plan. This plan identifies the information deemed critical to the program and has documented various OPSEC measures to protect the OPSEC sensitive or critical information (classified or unclassified). Contact the OPR to request a copy of the OPSEC Plan.

21. Security Classification Guides for Complementary Programs

The following SCGs also provide security classification guidance for complementary programs. The list is provided for reference purposes only and may not be all inclusive.

Stryker FOV Security Classification Guides for Program Components Proponent Date

120 mm Battalion Mortar System (120 mm BMS) ARDEC 8 Jan 2007 AN/PED-1, AN/PED-1A, AN/PED-1B Range Finder-Target Designator, Laser (aka) Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) PEO Soldier 16 May 2013

Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE) PEO IEW&S 20 Aug 2014 Fire Cell Systems applies to Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), and Forward Entry Device System (FEDS)

CECOM 15 Jun 2012

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P) PM FBCB2 31 Mar 2010

Global Positioning System (GPS) PEO IEW&S 21 Dec 2011

Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) JPEO CBD 13 Jul 2009

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) CECOM 23 Oct 2009

Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) PEO IEW&S 21 May 2014

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Stryker FOV Security Classification Guides for Program Components Proponent Date

Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS) M95/M96 (Mounted) and XM150/XM151 (Dismounted)

PM Mortar Systems May 2008

Reactive, Electromagnetic, and Fuze Disruption Armor Technologies ARL 2 Jan 2013

Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) PEO IEW&S 6 Apr 2012

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) PEO C3T 27 Mar 2015 TOW Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS)/Modified ITAS (MITAS) and Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem (IBAS) PEO MS 28 Aug 2007

Note: SCGs listed are current as of the signing of this SCG.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TABLE

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

1. Programmatic Information

1.a. Administrative Data:

1.a.1. Program name as written Stryker Brigade Combat Team or SBCT

U

1.a.2. Identification of Program Executive Office (PEO) and Project / Product Management Offices

U

1.a.3. Stryker FOV mission U See Note 1.

1.a.4. Stryker FOV program purpose, goals and objectives U See Note 1.

1.a.5. Stryker FOV nomenclature U 1.a.6. Federal or national stock number U 1.a.7. Armor designation used for Stryker programmatic documents, manuals, and/or presentations that do not reveal force protection capabilities, limitations or vulnerabilities

U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

(e.g., Technical manuals referencing 14.5 armor modules)

1.b. Budget:

1.b.1. Planning, programming, and budgetary information U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

1.b.2. Funding level for the program U

FOUO prior to White House/OMB release to Congress.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

1.b.3. Overall budget for the year U

FOUO prior to White House/OMB release to Congress.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

1.b.4. Cost, pricing, or funding for individual systems, subsystems, or components U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

1.c. Schedules:

1.c.1. Program schedule at summary level (does not list specific date, time or location of meeting or event)

U

1.c.2. Program schedule below summary level U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.c.3. Test dates and test locations U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.c.4. Test dates and test locations for classified tests

See Remarks

Completion of test

CLASSIFY at the same level of the item being tested.

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REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

1.c.5. General fielding status U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.c.6. Production shortfalls U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.c.7. Data on parts, accessories, and long lead items required for the development of Stryker vehicles

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.d. Contracting Information:

1.d.1. Contractor bid and proposal information. Information prepared by or on behalf of an offeror and submitted to the Government

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.d.2. Source selection information prepared for use by the Government in connection with the selection for contract award. Includes bid, prices, proposed costs or prices, source selection plans, technical or cost evaluation plans, competitive range determinations, ranking of competitors, reports or evaluations and proposal evaluation results

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.d.3. Source selection data evaluation board rating criteria derived from classified specification

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D

1.d.4. Contract award date U 1.d.5. A listing of offerors or subcontractors participating in the program prior to contract award

U See Note 1.

1.d.6. A listing of offerors, contractors or subcontractors working on the program after contract award

U

1.e. General Vehicle/System Characteristics:

1.e.1. Physical dimensions U

1.e.2. Vehicle weight (empty or full) U

1.e.3. Vehicle crew quantity & dismounted soldier quantity U

1.e.4. Total vehicle fleet U

1.e.5. Overall operational readiness of the vehicle fleet when specific locations or units are not identified

U

1.e.6. Total quantity of each mission role vehicle type U

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REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

1.e.7. Quantity of vehicles authorized to a unit U

1.e.8. Quantity of vehicles on hand in a unit U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.e.9. Operational readiness of specific units U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.e.10. Quantities of specific radios in theater U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.e.11. Operational readiness of vehicles assigned to organization at the regimental level or above, to include units and major headquarters, or when the information reflects more than one battalion or five or more separate company/detachment size units

U Apply Distribution Statement F.

1.e.12. Information about the program related to production details (e.g., capacity, volume, etc.)

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.f. Program Protection:

1.f.1. Identification of organic Critical Program Information (CPI), organic Critical Components (CC) or Critical Function (CF).

Inherited CPI or CC retain classification from owning program

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.f.2. Identification of traditional security protection measures U

Traditional security measures are Industrial Security, Information Security, Operations Security, Physical Security, etc.

1.g. Transportation & Shipping:

1.g.1. Methods of shipping armor, armor kits, or vehicles with armor (e.g., rail, air, ship overland truck cargo, etc.)

U See Notes 2 and 3.

1.g.2. Information on armor shipments or vehicles with armor upgrades which includes mode of shipment, quantities, and delivery dates, but does not include the unit receiving the shipment or the unit delivery location(s)

U See Notes 2 and 3 Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

1.g.3. Information on armor shipments or vehicles with armor upgrades which includes all the following: mode of shipment, quantities, delivery date, and unit of assignment and unit delivery location

U See Notes 2 and 3.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.g.4. Shipment of vehicles for demonstration, display or public view purposes that include model of shipment, quantity, delivery date and location

U See Notes 2 and 3.

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REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

1.g.5. Total vehicle distribution (e.g.

numbers, variants, destination, delivery schedule or unit allocation)

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

1.g.6. General information related to movement of PM Stryker personnel and equipment

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(F) applies.

1.h. Requirements:

1.h.1. General information regarding the requirements excluding armor, NBC, or EW for any Stryker FOV

U Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.h.2. Identification of key performance threshold/objective parameters excluding armor, NBC or EW for any Stryker FOV

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.h.3. Identification of key performance threshold/objective parameters regarding armor, NBC, or EW for any Stryker FOV

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.h.4. Stryker vehicle Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) U

See Note 4.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.h.5. Specific information relating to movement and location of PM Stryker related personnel and equipment linked to a unit's mission capability or vulnerability, to a specific operational plan or geographic location

S 25 years from date of document

Personnel to include civilians/contractors on the battlefield (COB).

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2. Threats

2.1 A list of threat munitions likely to be used

in an attack against the armor U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

2.2 Generic threats (e.g. small arms, heavy

machine gun, rocket propelled grenade (RPG), mine, top attack weapons or IED) against which the vehicles armor provides protection without the specific velocity of the round at impact, the angle of the round, the type of projectile, or net explosive material

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.3 Specific threat (e.g. small arms, top

attack, underbody threat(s), medium and larger caliber (e.g., RPG, IED, tank fired KE and CE)) against which the vehicle provides protection and details of the specific threat are given (including any one: velocity of the round at impact, the angle the round struck the target, range, explosive weight (underbelly) or specific projectile identification)

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

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REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

2.5 Specific identification and characteristic

of electromagnetic threats and their effects that threaten Stryker

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.6 Identification of any threat for which no

countermeasures have been implemented S

25 years from date of document Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a. Vulnerabilities and Limitations

2.a.1. Non-specific information regarding vulnerabilities and limitation of Stryker FOV U

Information found via open sources related to common and well known armored vehicle vulnerabilities. An example is a statement that indicates that the Stryker vehicle is vulnerable to Road-side bombs.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.2. Details of specific operational limitations and vulnerabilities of the Stryker FOV GFE involving armor, NBC or EW

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.3. Details of specific operational limitations and vulnerabilities of Stryker FOV GFE not involving armor, NBC or EW

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.4. Identification of system susceptibilities in the presence of a validated threat relative to the specific Stryker vehicle

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.5. Specific vulnerability to kinetic energy round penetration S

25 years from date of document Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.6. Specific vulnerability to shaped charge munitions S

25 years from date of document Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.7. Specific vulnerabilities to ballistic threats, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and mines

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3. Performance and Capabilities 3.a. General:

3.a.1. General information regarding the capabilities of any Stryker vehicle U Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.a.2. Operational capabilities excluding armor, NBC or EW U Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.a.3. Operational shortfalls excluding armor, NBC or EW U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(F) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.a.4. Operational capabilities, limitations or vulnerabilities of armor, NBC or EW S

25 years from date of

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REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

3.a.5. MGS hit probabilities S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4. Hardware/Software 4.a. Design Details:

4.a.1. General information regarding design of any Stryker variant excluding armor, NBC or EW

U Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.a.2. Specific technical details that reveal specific operational limitations or vulnerabilities regarding armor, NBC or EW of any Stryker variant

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.b. Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)/Mission Equipment Package (MEP):

Also see Section 1 Paragraph 7 of this SCG for further explanation

4.b.1. Fact that Stryker program is integrating GFE U

4.b.2. Details on specific GFE systems, subsystems, and components or fielding schedules

See Remarks

25 years from date of document

Classify in accordance with the GFE security classification guide, if applicable.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.b.3. Special systems or applications See Remarks

25 years from date of document

Classify in accordance with the GFE security classification guide, if applicable.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.b.4. Application of GFE onto a Stryker that would lead to loss of technical or operational information or tactical disadvantage; or would reveal a system vulnerability

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.c. Software:

4.c.1. Stryker vehicle integration software (software that integrates various GFE systems into Stryker vehicle to provide a mission-ready vehicle)

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d. Views:

4.d.1. Drawings, sketches, photographs, or charts that highlight specific ballistic, NBC or EW vulnerabilities of the current vehicle armor system

S 25 years from date of document

See Note 5.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.2. Detailed media items under this section showing length, width and thickness and weight of the Stryker vehicle’s armor system

U

See Notes 1 and 5.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 16

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

4.d.3. Combat damaged vehicles and photos of combat damaged vehicles without amplifying information or cause of damage

U See Notes 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.4. Compilations of media items when combined show a composition or configurations of installed armor system (weakness, susceptibility or vulnerability revealed)

S 25 years from date of document

See Note 5.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.5. Photos, videos, or sketches of damaged Stryker vehicle components that reveal enough information, e.g. threat projectile or velocity that identifies vulnerability. (Annotated photo with information showing protective characteristics and performance)

S 25 years from date of document

See Notes 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.6. Drawings of final products revealing dimensions of length, width and/or thickness and weight of installed armor (Does not disclose armor performance objectives or vulnerabilities

U

See Notes 1 and 5.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.7. Drawings or sketches showing a proposed ballistic test pattern with threat direct or implied or surrogate munitions that identify any of the following: The velocity of the round at impact, the type of projectile, or explosive characteristics for Stryker vehicle

S 25 years from date of document

See Note 5.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

4.d.8. Photos, videos or sketches showing the inside of a Stryker with no operational or classified information displayed

U See Notes 1 and 5.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5. Armor and Survivability Characteristics

5.a.1. A standard armor sample or plate of metal alloy used as part of the armor configuration, but not yet tested

U Apply Distribution Statement D.

Reference Section 6 of this SCG for supporting documentation.

5.a.2. A standard armor sample, module or plate used as part of the armor configuration with a ballistic hole or dent

U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

Reference Section 6 of this SCG for supporting documentation.

5.a.3. A standard armor sample, module or plate used as part of the armor configuration with a ballistic hole or dent for which the specific munition is identified

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.4. A system specific sample of Stryker vehicle armor with a ballistic hole or dent from specific munitions that show the threat (direct or implied), disclose the performance level, and associated shot damage

S 25 years from date of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 17

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

5.a.5. Ballistic lessons learned that disclose specific system capabilities, limitations or vulnerabilities

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.6. Ballistic performance data where specific ballistic, performance or vulnerabilities are revealed for a specific armor solution

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.7. Testing performed by contractors or other organizations using unclassified qualification testing procedures (AEP-55, NATO STANAG 4569) or non-classified criteria, when no vulnerabilities are revealed

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.8. Testing data that quantifies the level of protection of armor under this SCG S

25 years from date of document Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.9. Testing conducted by US and foreign contractors on armor designed in accordance with the classified specifications

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.10. Any test results which reveal deficiencies, susceptibilities and threats (direct or implied)

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.11. Test results which show production designs or flaws which reveal a readily exploitable vulnerability

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.12. Ballistic protection, against a class of threats (small arms, machine gun, RPG, mines); no performance or vulnerability data divulged

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) and 7(F) apply.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.13. Ballistic protection against a specific threat and performance or vulnerabilities revealed

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.14. Add-On armor against a class of threats (small arms, RPG, mines); no performance or vulnerability data divulged

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.15. Add-On armor against a specific threat performance and/or vulnerabilities revealed

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.16. Overhead protection against a class of threats (top attack, grenades or airburst);

no performance or vulnerability data divulged

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.17. Overhead protection against a specific threat and performance or vulnerabilities revealed

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.a.18. Mine protection; against a class of threats (anti-tank, anti-personnel, etc); no performance or vulnerability data divulged

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 18

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

5.a.19. Mine protection against a specific threat; specific performance level and/or vulnerabilities revealed

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

6. Test and Evaluations 6.a. Testing:

6.a.1. Details of Stryker FOV test plans not involving armor, NBC or EW U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

6.a.2. Details of Stryker FOV test plans involving specific armor, NBC or EW solutions and test results

S 25 years from date of document

Testing is to be handled at the same level of classification as the item being tested – classify in accordance with information revealed If GFE/MEP system specific classification guidance exists, then classify information pertaining to that system in accordance with that guidance Specific information not covered in a GFE/MEP classification guide is treated as derivative from other sections of this SCG.

Classification of test plans is dependent on the security classification of the information involved.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

6.a.3. Details of Stryker FOV non- ballistic test plans involving specific armor U

Lot acceptance testing excluding threat details, as well as non-ballistic testing of armor modules Apply Distribution Statement D.

6.a.4. Identification of specific test locations associated Stryker FOV testing U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies 6.b. Test Data/Results:

6.b.1. Ballistic performance data where specific threats, performance or vulnerabilities are revealed

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

6.b.2. Unvalidated test data performed by contractors or other organizations that don’t reveal a Stryker vulnerability

U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) and/or 4 apply.

Unvalidated – not confirmed by

PM SBCT

6.b.3. Unvalidated test data performed by contractors or other organizations using Stryker assets that reveal a vulnerabilities

S 25 years from date of document

Unvalidated – not confirmed by

PM SBCT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 19

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

6.b.4. Ballistic lessons learned that disclose specific system performance capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

7. Modeling and Simulations

7.a.1. Any modeling and simulation data, which identifies or characterizes the threshold or objective level of the Stryker FOV force protection

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

7.a.2. Modeling and simulation data revealing vulnerabilities of the Stryker platform to ballistic and blast effects

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

7.a.3. Modeling simulation software and source codes U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

7.a.4. Model inputs and outputs of Stryker FOV force protection when test or intelligence data is contained

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

7.a.5. Modeling or simulation methods and techniques U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

8. Training 8.a.1. Identification and/or location of training specific to the Stryker FOV program U Mark and handle as FOUO, if

FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

8.a.2. Training that reveals specific vehicle force protection capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

8.a.3. Training that reveals specific vehicle lethality capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

9. Maintenance 9.a.1. Tool, parts or stock numbers of equipment used in the course of this program U Apply Distribution Statement D.

9.a.2. Association of maintenance equipment or tools that may reveal specific system information of Stryker program

U

See Note 1.

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 7(E) applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

9.a.3. Routine maintenance for wear and tear U

10. Cybersecurity 10.a.1. Test methodologies used for Cybersecurity Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES/REMARKS

10.a.2. Test methodologies and objectives used for Cybersecurity Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments when specific details of objectives indicate a specific vulnerability is suspected

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

10.a.3. Cybersecurity Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments raw data (i.e. raw outputs of vulnerability scan tools, or code scanning tools with no analysis conducted) resulting from Stryker weapon system

U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system

10.a.4. Analyzed results of the Cybersecurity vulnerability or penetration assessments identifying the ability to exploit a vulnerability to weapon system Stryker to defeat the system and cause mission degradation or mission failure

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

“Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system

10.a.5. Identification of Cybersecurity mitigation or remediation U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

10.a.6. Timeline to fix Cybersecurity vulnerability(ies) absent of vulnerability, mitigation and remediation

U Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

10.a.7. State-of-the-art technologies, tactics, or techniques that do not require physical connections to Stryker weapon system to defeat the system and cause mission degradation or mission failure

TS

25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system

10.a.8. Information on Cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the Stryker weapon system which include risk analysis on the mission impact of an attack

S 25 years from date of document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system

10.a.9. Cryptographic Keys used for Public/Private Key mechanisms to hash and digitally sign final released software

U

Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 5 applies.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

NOTE: These are FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant cryptographic keys not generated by NSA.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 21

NOTES

1. Although Unclassified, this information is not approved for automatic public dissemination. This information will be considered OPSEC sensitive. This requires a formal review prior to public release.

2. When Stryker vehicles that have all sensitive and classified equipment, and classified armor removed then shipped on foreign carriers, the vehicles can be transported via any means necessary to expedite transportation of vehicles into theatre.

3. When vehicles with classified equipment or classified armor are shipped on foreign carriers, a cleared Department of Defense service member or cleared contractor with a minimum SECRET clearance will escort the Stryker vehicle or armor from Continental U.S. to a U.S. controlled installation/facility. When vehicles with classified equipment or classified armor are shipped on U.S.

carriers, a registered, Defense Security Service certified carrier will be used.

4. At this time all Stryker FOV base armor Technical Data Packages (TDP) are U//FOUO. Armor TDPs could be classified when unique placement or unique armor materials are identified and the PMO SBCT has stated it is SECRET or is classified by another SCG.

5. To include, but not limited to, blueprints, viewgraphs, photographs, videotapes, motion pictures, documents, hardware, computer software, modeling and simulation, and documentation, magnetic tapes, letters, reports, working papers, notes, radar cross sections, all sensor outputs, technical specifications, technical date packages, computer-aided design (CAD)/computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) models, etc.

6. When classified Stryker FOV add-on armor (unique placement or unique materials) is damaged due to enemy activity or vehicle mishap, the exposed portion of add-on armor will be covered with a tarp to deny visual access. The vehicle will be secured or controlled by friendly fire until vehicle is recovered or, destroyed.

7. If all of the armor and classified sensitive items are removed from the damaged vehicle, the vehicle is UNCLASSIFIED.

8. If the damage sustained by the vehicle prevents the removal of classified equipment, then the vehicle must be treated as SECRET until the equipment can be removed and secured. Once the classified or sensitive equipment is removed, the vehicle in UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 22

DEFINITIONS

Armor - A sheathing or protective covering which includes metal plates, ceramic or other materials used on armored vehicles. Covering includes both opaque as well as transparent armor.

Compilation – Items of information,…