DSL-VSATAttachment11ATInfo.pdf

DeCAD 30-18 March 1, 1997 (Change 5, March 2006)

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(5) Local AT/FP Awareness Training. Store directors and heads of DeCA facilities will participate in host installation AT/FP awareness training.

c. Exercises. AT/FP emergency and related exercises will be conducted annually, or more often as directed by DoD, CoCom, host/servicing installation, HQ DeCA, regional office, to exercise local AT or other emergency plans. Annual exercises must contain a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) component. Results of the exercise will be documented and submitted on a DeCA Interest Report (DIRep), to include a discussion of lessons learned. File a copy in the Security Continuity Book.

d. Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). JPEN is a critical information sharing system and supports essential, reliable, and assured information exchange of Threat and Local Observation Notice (TALON) data, between DoD Elements, enabling decision superiority, situational awareness, knowledge, and information management capabilities. JPEN is for the dissemination of TALON and other related FP incident information from the collecting unit to other possibly threatened locations, units, activities or agencies as well as other organizations including analytical centers, such as the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). JPEN is required for use by HQ DeCA and Field level security specialists with FP responsibilities. There is no requirement to purchase hardware or software due to the web-based architecture via the Internet. JPEN Version 2.0 is accessible via any existing NIPRNet or Internet-capable computer running Internet Explorer 5.5 or higher, and is available at https://www.jpen.mil. Information on establishing JPEN accounts is posted to the NC/J3 FP/MA web portal. (NORTHCOM AT OPORD)

14-6. TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT, THREAT LEVELS AND FPCONS.

a. DoD has developed a methodology to assess the terrorist threat to DoD personnel, facilities, materials, and interests. Six factors are used in shaping the collection and analysis of information to give credibility to a threat:

(1) Existence. A terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale.

(2) Capability. The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of capability for a terrorist group to conduct attacks.

(3) Intentions. Recent demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity.

(4) History. Demonstrated terrorist activity over time.

(5) Targeting. Current credible information on activity indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations.

(6) Security environment. The internal political and security considerations that impact on the capability of terrorist elements to carry out their intentions.

b. Threat Levels. The DoD Terrorism Threat Level classification system is a set of standardized terms used to quantify the level of terrorism threat on a country-by-country basis. The Terrorism Threat Level terms are Low, Moderate, Significant, and High. The system evaluates the threat using a variety of analytical threat factors. Defense Terrorism Warning Reports are used to convey that terrorist groups are operationally active and specifically targeting US interests, and are issued by either the DIA or the CoCom, regardless of a country's assigned threat level. Threat levels are obtained based on

DeCA Note

Start Section 14-6

14-8 the presence of a combination of the factors listed above. Terrorist threat levels do not address when a terrorist threat will occur and do not specify a FPCON status. Issuance of a terrorist threat-level judgment is not a warning notice. Formal terrorism warning notices are issued separately.

(1) HIGH. Factors of existence, capability and targeting must be present. History and intentions may or may not be present. HIGH is differentiated from all other terrorist threat levels because it is the only one in which credible information identifying specific DoD personnel, facilities, assets, or interests as potential targets of attack are present. Although particular action is not specified, a HIGH threat level compels local commanders to take appropriate protective measures.

(2) SIGNIFICANT. Factors of existence, capability, history, and intentions must be present, but analysts lack specific targeting information.

(3) MODERATE. Factors of existence, capability, and history must be present.

Intentions may or may not be present. Threat level MODERATE and threat level HIGH are similar in that data for the factors existence, history, and capability exist.

(4) LOW. Existence and capability must be present. History may or may not be present.

c. Terrorist FPCONs. Whereas the Terrorist Threat Level is an intelligence community assessment about the likelihood of terrorist attacks on DoD personnel and facilities, the FPCON is the principal means a local military commander has to apply an operational decision on how to guard against a threat. Ultimately, it is the local installation commander who must weigh the information and balance increased security measures with the loss of effectiveness during prolonged operations and the accompanying impact on quality-of-life, such as commissary operations. FPCONs are selected by assessing the terrorist threat, the capability to penetrate existing physical security at an installation, the risk of terrorist attack to which DoD facilities and personnel expose themselves, the ability of the installation or units to carry on with missions even if attacked, and the criticality to DoD missions of assets to be protected.

d. Commanders at any level can establish FPCONs, and subordinate commanders can establish a higher FPCON if local conditions warrant doing so. FPCON measures are mandatory when declared and can be supplemented by additional measures. The declaration, reduction, and cancellation of FPCONs remain the exclusive responsibility of the commanders issuing the order. Off installation DeCA facilities will implement FPCONs in place at the nearest military activity or higher level as directed by their region director. In no situation will a FPCON be implemented that is lower than the baseline FPCON for a particular geographic area.

(1) FPCON NORMAL exists when there is no known threat.

(2) FPCON ALPHA exists when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel. The exact nature and extent are unpredictable and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement selected FPCON BRAVO measures as a result of intelligence or as a deterrent. FPCON ALPHA must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(3) FPCON BRAVO exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

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(4) FPCON CHARLIE exists when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. Implementation of this measure for longer than a short period of time will probably create hardship and affect peacetime activities of a DeCA activity and its personnel.

(5) FPCON DELTA exists when a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence indicates that a terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized warning.

e. FPCON Measures. Once an FPCON is declared, DoD requires the implementation of the following security measures as mandatory and to be implemented immediately IAW DoD Instruction 2000.16, Standard 13 (reference an) and DoD O-2000.12-H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook (reference ak.). Commissaries and other DeCA activities located off military installations will conform to the FPCON of the nearest military installation or as directed. Heads of DeCA activities are authorized and encouraged to supplement these measures. FPCON measures, when localized for a specific DeCA facility, are to be marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.” These measures were prepared by DoD in a format that applies to most levels of organizational activities, and some will not require action by most DeCA activities; however, an understanding of all the measures is necessary to realize and predict the impact on local DeCA operations. Measures that would require action on the part of DeCA activities are highlighted in bold. Specific DeCA additions are added in bullet format.

Table 14-1

FPCON DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES:

FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture. (DeCA added) Comply with routine security policies contained in DeCAD 30-18, DeCA Security Programs.

Normal 01 Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(DeCA added)

• Secure all machine rooms and access to heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) and refrigeration.

• Review procedures for shutting down HVAC system.

• Place locks or seals on all unused lockers.

• Implement additional host installation requirements as appropriate.

Normal 02

Conduct random security spot-checks of vehicles and persons entering facilities under the jurisdiction of the US.

(DeCA added)

• Conduct random ID checks of all personnel entering DeCA facilities.

Normal 03 Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

(DeCA added)

• Reduce the number of entrances/exits to DeCA facilities commensurate with operations.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/i200016_061401/i200016p.pdf http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/i200016_061401/i200016p.pdf

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Normal 04 and above

(DeCA added) Reserved for local installation or specific DeCA location requirements not otherwise addressed.

FPCON ALPHA: This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONS resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

Alpha 01 Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON.

(DeCA added)

Alpha 02 At regular intervals, inform personnel and family members of the general situation. Ensure personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels, and possible surveillance attempts.

(DeCA added)

• Require Vendor Representatives and other visitors to have their names placed on any personal luggage, cases, or other packages brought into the DeCA facility to assist in identifying the owner during bomb threats, etc.

• Increase employee management over produce and prepared foods.

• Do not place returned items back into stock without appropriate inspection.

• Conduct daily check of DeCA government vehicle license plates.

Alpha 03 The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on call and readily available.

(DeCA added)

• Senior managers on-duty must review emergency evacuation procedures.

Alpha 04 Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the US.

(DeCA added)

• Initiate 100% ID check of all personnel entering DeCA facilities located OFF of military installations.

• Implement additional host installation requirements as appropriate.

Alpha 05 Initiate food and water Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures, and report any unusual activities.

Alpha 06 Test mass notification system.

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• Ensure public address (PA) or other system used within the DeCA facility for emergency notification is tested and operational.

Alpha 07 Review all plans, orders, personnel details and logistic requirements related to the introduction of higher FPCONs.

Alpha 08 Review and, if necessary, implement security measures for high-risk personnel.

Alpha 09 As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual AT measures.

• Notify the supporting installation and DeCA chain-of-command concerning higher FPCON measures that, if implemented, could adversely impact on their operations.

Alpha 10 Review intelligence, CI, and operations dissemination procedures.

• HQ DeCA will review and analyze incoming threat messages for applicability to DeCA and ensure appropriate Command Group personnel are apprised of pertinent information.

• DeCA security personnel will contact their local US Army Military Office (as the CI executive agent for DeCA) to ensure threat information is received in a timely manner.

• Heads of DeCA facilities or their designees will attend local Threat Working Group (TWG) meetings as appropriate.

Alpha 11 and above

FPCON BRAVO: This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

Bravo 01

Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCONs.

Bravo 02 Enforce control of entry onto US infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment, lucrative targets, and high profile locations; randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED (cargo vans, delivery vehicles) sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life.

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• Implement barrier plan as coordinated with local authorities.

• Remove garbage cans away from commissary entrance and sales floor.

Bravo 03 Identify critical and high occupancy buildings. Keep cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) away from buildings to reduce vulnerability to bomb attacks.

Apply this criterion to all inhabited structures to the greatest extent possible.

Standoff distance should be determined by the following factors: asset criticality;

the protection level provided by structure, IED/Vehicle Borne IED threat; and available security measures. Consider centralized parking.

(DeCA added)

• Implement barrier plan as coordinated with local authorities.

• Remove garbage cans away from commissary entrance and sales floor.

• Immediately notify host law enforcement of any vehicle encroaching within the designated standoff area.

Bravo 04 Secure and inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

• Only those persons with a specific need are permitted in backup storage and processing areas.

• Conduct periodic rounds/inspections of building exterior, backroom areas including checks of sprinkler system, HVAC, emergency generator, electrical, and telephone rooms, etc.

Bravo 05 At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at random intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

(DeCA added)

• Only those persons with a specific need are permitted in backup storage and processing areas.

• Conduct periodic rounds/inspections of building exterior, backroom areas including checks of sprinkler system, HVAC, emergency generator, electrical, and telephone rooms, etc.

Bravo 06 Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels.

• Only trained individuals to open mail and packages received via postal/courier services.

• Wear nitrile gloves when opening mail and courier/mail packages.

Bravo 07 Randomly inspect commercial deliveries. Advise family members to check home deliveries.

(DeCA added)

• Have delivery drivers and other personnel remain in the in-checking area or with their vehicles.

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Bravo 08 Randomly inspect food and water for evidence of tampering/contamination before use by DoD personnel. Inspections should include delivery vehicles and storage area/containers.

(DeCA added)

• Request medical authorities increase their inspection and surveillance activities for evidence of tampering/adulteration of facilities, consumable products in the facilities, and products being delivered to the facilities.

• Implement additional host installation requirements as appropriate

Bravo 09 Increase security/guard presence or patrol/surveillance of DoD housing areas, schools, messes, on-base clubs, and similar high-occupancy targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and family members.

(DeCA added)

• Request additional patrol/coverage from servicing police/security activity.

Bravo 10 Implement plans to enhance off-installation security of DoD facilities. In areas with threat levels of Moderate, Significant, or High, coverage includes facilities (e.g., DoD schools and daycare centers) and transportation services and routes (e.g., bus routes) used by DoD employees and family members.

(DeCA added)

• Off-installation DeCA facilities shall use this measure to request supporting installation security coverage if not already provided.

• Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or driving.

Bravo 11 Inform local security committees of actions being taken.

Bravo 12 Verify identity of visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

(DeCA added)

• Initiate 100% ID check for entry to all DeCA Facilities. NOTE: ON

INSTALLATION DeCA facilities may risk manage placing ID checking in abeyance providing the following conditions must are met:

o The commissary must be on a controlled access installation where personnel accessing the installation are identified.

o The store director must be confident the level of security provided by the host installation is sufficient to preclude unauthorized persons from gaining access to the commissary.

o Store personnel must be continuously vigilant and reminded to report suspicious activity.

o There is no objection or conflicting guidance from the host installation’s command infrastructure.

o Commissary will conduct a minimum of three random 100% ID checks per week. Each random check will last a minimum of 1 hour.

• These facilities will implement 100% ID checks should the installation’s FPCON change to CHARLIE or higher, or as directed by higher authority.

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Bravo 13 Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

• THIS MEASURE IS NOT IMPLEMENTED BY DECA.

Bravo 14 As necessary, implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel.

Bravo 15 Place personnel required for implementing AT plans on call; commanders should exercise discretion in approving absences.

(DeCA added)

• Keep personnel involved in continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) on-call.

Bravo 16 Identify and brief personnel who may augment guard forces. Review specific rules of engagement including the use of deadly force.

• THIS MEASURE IS NOT IMPLEMENTED BY DECA.

Bravo 17 As deemed appropriate, verify identity of personnel entering buildings.

Bravo 18 Review status and adjust as appropriate OPSEC, COMSEC, and INFOSEC procedures.

Bravo 19-20 Does not apply to DeCA. Applies to airfields and flight line support activities.

Bravo 21-

FPCON CHARLIE: This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent.

Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

Charlie 01 Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCONs.

Charlie 02 Duty personnel must be cognizant of actions required to implement AT plans.

Recall required personnel. Be prepared to react to requests for assistance, from both local authorities and other installations in the regional office.

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Charlie 03 Limit access points to a minimum and strictly enforce entry. Randomly search vehicles.

(DeCA added)

• Verify the identity of ALL personnel entering DeCA facilities and activities.

• Inspect ID cards, building passes, or other forms of personal ID.

Charlie 04 Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on threat.

• No vehicle allowed to park within 25-meter standoff for deliveries without first being inspected by a member of the DeCA staff.

Charlie 05 IAW Status of Forces Agreements, issue weapons and appropriate communication equipment to guards. Include specific orders on issue of ammunition.

(DeCA added) THIS MEASURE IS NOT IMPLEMENTED BY DECA.

Charlie 06 Increase patrolling of the installation to include waterside perimeters, if appropriate. Be prepared to assist local authorities in searching for threatening actions/persons outside the installation perimeter. For airfields, maintain continuous observation of approach and departure flight corridors.

Charlie 07 Implement barrier plan to prevent vehicle borne attack.

• Implement Barrier Plan as required for FPCON Charlie.

Charlie 08 Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to vulnerable points outside the military establishment.

(DeCA added)

• This measure should be use to ensure off-installation DeCA facilities receive additional protective coverage from their supporting installation or local police agency.

Charlie 09 To reduce vulnerability to attack, consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities and coordinate any other precautionary measures taken outside the installation perimeter.

Charlie 10 Consider searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., being brought onto the installation through access control points and consider randomly searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., leaving.

(DeCA added)

• Visually inspect the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, and other containers.

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Charlie 11 Review personnel policy procedures to determine course of action for family members.

Charlie 12 Review access procedures for all non-US personnel and adjust as appropriate. For airfields, consider terminating visitor access to the flightline and support facilities.

Charlie 13 Consider escorting children to and from DoD schools.

Charlie 14 Does not apply to DeCA. Applies to airfields and flight line support activities.

Charlie 15 (DeCA added) Risk managed decision will be made by HQ DeCA, regional offices, and/or appropriate local officials to permit special events and gatherings such as hosting outdoor events (case lot sales, picnics, etc), based on local threat.

Charlie 16

FPCON DELTA: This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

Delta 01 Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCONs.

Implement additional host installation requirements as appropriate.

Delta 02 Augment guards as necessary.

Delta 03 Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas.

• Verify all vehicles located at loading docks, receiving areas, etc.

Delta 04 Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation.

Delta 05 Control access and implement positive ID of all personnel—NO EXCEPTIONS!

Delta 06 Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the installation.

• Conduct a visual inspection of all briefcases, vendor bags, etc., brought into

DeCA facilities.

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• Ensure all vendor bags, suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., identify the owner.

• Post signs prohibiting patrons from bringing packages, backpacks, large parcels, etc. into the commissary.

Delta 07 Escort children to and from DoD schools or close the schools.

Delta 08 Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.

Delta 09 Restrict all non-essential movement.

Delta 10-11 Does not apply to DeCA. Applies to airfields and flight line support activities only.

Delta 12 If permitted, close public and military roads and facilities. If applicable, close military roads allowing access to the airfield.

(DeCA added)

• Off-Installation DeCA facilities will close and employees will be sent home except as otherwise directed by competent authority.

Delta 13

f. Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs): Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) delay, complicate, and, if completely effective, confound operational surveillance and planning by presenting a constantly changing defensive strategy for which no distinguishable pattern is establish.

Terrorists or other criminal elements attempts to establish a discernable pattern are confused and frustrated. Random antiterrorism measures can complicate and disrupt the detailed planning inherent in such frequent reconnaissance. RAMs also provide the opportunity for DeCA personnel to practice measures from higher FPCONs for training and to avoid complacency. DeCA store directors and facility heads will conduct RAMs at least quarterly or more frequently as directed by their host installation.

14-7. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS.

a. Local Vulnerability Assessments. Store directors and persons responsible for other DeCA activities (HQ, regional offices, CDCs, etc.) shall conduct a local vulnerability assessment for facilities within their AOR. The local vulnerability assessment shall address the broad range of physical threats to the security of personnel and assets and shall be completed at least annually. The completion of a checklist provided by HQ DeCA/HS or the regional office’s SPM and utilizing the Joint Service Installation Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA) methodology for this purpose, by an individual knowledgeable in security procedures and practices, satisfies this requirement. A copy of the local vulnerability assessment with a list of corrective actions being taken will be forwarded to the appropriate regional office or HQ security office. Higher HQ vulnerability assessments satisfy the annual requirement for a local vulnerability assessment.

DeCA Note

End of Section 14-6