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Annex 3 Relevance of FORSATY results against drivers of extremism based on RUSI summary table of hypotheses
| Hypothesis/Factor |
| Evidence Strength |
| Brief Summary |
| FORSATY Significant Change |
| Hypothesis 1: Ineffective or blocked political participation, widespread corruption of the political process, elite domination, and little hope of change, create frustration which is harnessed by extremist groups |
| Mixed |
| Although the evidence is mixed, on balance the research suggests that blocked participation does create grievances which can be harnessed to promote extremist violence–but it is neither a sufficient nor consistent factor. Econometric analyses show that lack of civil liberties is the most reliable predictor of terrorism identified so far (although such analyses are limited in showing statistical correlations rather than cause and effect). |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 2: Organized civil society (and political society) groups which fail to achieve change despite attempting to engage with the state, are more likely to resort to extremist tactics and to have support from the wider population in doing so |
| Supported |
| Some examples exist of civil or political society turning to violence when faced with political failure or repression. However, civil society canal so be crucial in countering extremism. It is therefore important to encourage inclusive and active engagement with civil society. |
| Participation has been introduced for excluded youth and been significantly amplified for educated youth. |
Excluded neighborhood youth have emerged as civic leaders and engaged in concrete civic actions with broad success. Power holder response has led to policy change and one example of non-response.
Youth Councils at the city level have generated widespread participation welcomed by local governments but not yet leading to substantial change in policy or programs, essentially because of an activity design issue.
| Hypothesis 3: The search for personal and group identities among those who feel this has been undermined by rapid social change can increase the vulnerability of the young to radicalization |
| Strongly Supported |
| Identity-formation–a normal, universal and psychologically attested process –is important in radicalization. Psychological research is beginning to examine how identity-formation can become ‘maladaptive’, and why some individuals are more vulnerable to radicalization than others: one theory suggests that certain cognitive ‘propensities’ can combine to create a ‘mindset’ that presents a higher risk. |
| Thousands of excluded youth have established identity with peers, CBO presidents and coaches, local associations, sports leagues, employers. The new relations have demonstrably kept youth from radicalization and brought back previously radicalized youth. |
Thousands of failing in-school youth at-risk of dropout have strengthened identity with the school and entered college.
Thousands of marginalized youth with no diploma and no information have accessed decent employment, are overwhelmingly satisfied and feel appreciation form their employer. Change in status has strengthened their standing with family and community. Most have kept regular contact with the CSO and some volunteer.
| Hypothesis/Factor |
| Evidence Strength |
| Brief Summary |
| FORSATY Significant Change |
Hypothesis 4: The growth of religious and ethnic identities (particularly if they compete with loyalties to the state) can be exploited by extremist ideologues
| Strongly Supported |
| There is robust evidence that radicalization is a social process and that identity is a key factor in why individuals become involved in violent |
movements. There is substantial evidence for religion and ethnicity being among the most powerful expressions of individual and group identity. The role of charismatic individuals (peers as well as leaders) who can instrumentalize identity is also often widely acknowledged.
n/a
| Hypothesis 5: Ideals of masculinity and honor (including the role of family breadwinner) are increasingly difficult to fulfil in some societies, and the loss of self-esteem can be considerable for young men. Other ways may be sought to achieve status, including extremist activity. |
| Not Supported |
| Although most violent extremists are young men, there is little convincing research to suggest that ideals of masculinity and honor play a significant role in causing violent extremism. |
| n/a |
Hypothesis 6: Women generally play a moderating role against extremism, and if more empowered could do this more effectively
| Not Supported |
| There is little evidence that women have a moderating influence on militancy, but this does not mean they cannot, as active agents, play a significant role in countering violent extremism. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 7: Limited availability of information, low literacy, and a lack of diverse sources, lead to issues being seen in black-and-white terms with little understanding of context, and make people more vulnerable to extremist messages |
| Not Supported |
| There is no clear link between education levels and extremism: some extremists are highly educated, some are not, and countries with low and high provisions of education have experienced violent extremism. Nor is there evidence that certain types of education (e.g. faith-based) increase the risk of radicalization. Although education in some scientific or technical disciplines has been proposed as a contributory factor in the radicalization of Islamist terrorists, |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis/Factor |
| Evidence Strength |
| Brief Summary |
| FORSATY Significant Change |
| Hypothesis 8: People with shared experiences of discrimination and exclusion are more susceptible to a legitimizing ‘single narrative’ which binds together multiple sources of resentment and proposes a simple solution |
| Supported |
| There is a strong relationship between perceived grievances and violent extremism though there is some speculation about whether grievances are causative. Some suggest they are necessary but not sufficient to cause violent extremism – although in general the research seems speculative on this point. In conflicts involving violent extremism (as opposed to terrorism directed against the West), socio-economic discrimination and marginalization do help to explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers. However, while the use of a single narrative to justify, recruit and motivate is near universal among extremist groups, the research into how extremist narratives work is actually limited and we consider this to be an area for productive further research. |
| Thousands of excluded idle youth previously overlooked and not accessing any service engage in paths to personal achievements and formal occupations including employment. |
Thousands of youth in situations of exclusion from school, extracurricular activities, training and employment now access services that: 1) they would unlikely have otherwise accessed; 2) essentially did not exist in the neighborhood/ were not adapted to vulnerable youth. Access to academic success and further education for a majority of failing in-school participants eliminates feelings of exclusion. Access to decent employment for youth previously excluded from training arguably eliminates feelings of exclusion for the overwhelming majority.
| Hypothesis 9: Government failure to provide basic services (health, education, welfare) allows extremist groups to meet these needs and build support as a result |
| Strongly Supported |
| In a number of contexts, extremist groups have proven able to deliver services. The impact is two-fold: extremist groups gain support and legitimacy while the government and state structures lose credibility and support. This increases both the support for extremist groups and the potential for state failure. Some extremist groups want to improve the situation of the people. Other groups’ primary interest is retaining resources and power for themselves. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 10: Failure of the state to provide security and justice, and people’s experience of predatory and oppressive security sector institutions, are influential drivers towards extremism |
| Mixed |
| While the failure of the state to provide security and justice, and people’s experience of predatory and oppressive security sector institutions, are influential factors in violent extremism, these are not necessary factors. Extremist groups also operate in strong and stable states with effective security and justice sectors. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis/Factor |
| Evidence Strength |
| Brief Summary |
| FORSATY Significant Change |
| Hypothesis 11: In the absence of peace and security, populations are often ready to accept any entity that offers stability |
| Strongly Supported |
| Evidence from a wide range of countries shows that in situations of conflict and insecurity, populations often accept any entity that offers stability, at least in the short-term. Anarchy and governance and state failure are breeding grounds for extremist activity. Ensuring that extremist groups do not have the monopoly over security provision can therefore help to reduce the support for extremist groups. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 12: Madrassas should be the primary focus of attention in education as their students are particularly vulnerable to extremist narratives |
| Not Supported |
| Madrassas can play a role in promoting extremist ideologies and in providing facilities for recruitment and training. However, the number of ‘extremist’ madrassas (in Pakistan especially) is small, and the problem of madrassa-based radicalization has been significantly overstated. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 13: (Income) poverty and deprivation are major drivers of radicalisation |
| Mixed |
| Poverty and deprivation have been dismissed as drivers of Western-focused transnational terrorism. However, there is a correlation between poverty and civil war, and hence some broader-based forms of violent extremism. Because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 14: Underemployed young men with frustrated aspirations and a limited stake in society are particularly susceptible to radicalization |
| Mixed |
| The findings on the relationship between education, employment and radicalization are mixed. There is, however, some limited evidence that militant groups recruit from the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed including those that are relatively well-educated. |
| Data from arrests in Morocco for terrorism-related activities indicate persons employed seldom radicalize. Out of 508 arrests for terrorism-related activities, only 4 percent of persons arrested were employees, while 40 percent were jobless or employed informally and/or irregularly.[footnoteRef:1] [1: Bureau des Investigations Judiciaires, 2017. ] |
More than X marginalized youth accessed decent employment under FORSATY.
| Hypothesis/Factor |
| Evidence Strength |
| Brief Summary |
| FORSATY Significant Change |
| Hypothesis 15: Where inequality and institutionalized discrimination coincide with religious or ethnic fault-lines, there is an increased likelihood of radicalization and mobilization |
| Strongly Supported |
Religious and ethnic fault-lines do not always coincide, but the economic, social and political marginalization of ethnic or religious groups is widely believed to increase the risk of violent extremism.
n/a
| Hypothesis 16: Migrants from rural to urban areas are particularly susceptible to radicalization |
| Not Supported |
| There is little evidence to suggest a causal link between urbanization and violent extremism, although mega-cities in the developing world have been identified as permissive environments for some forms of violent extremism. |
| n/a |
| Hypothesis 17: Events in Palestine, Iraq, etc., a perceived global attack on Islam, and a belief that Muslim nations are less prosperous than they should be (as a result of Western policies), give rise to widespread indignation and resentment which encourage support for extremist action |
| Mixed |
| While the perceived victimization of fellow Muslims can be instrumentalized by leaders of violent extremist groups, there is disagreement over whether this is a driver of extremism or merely used as justification to legitimize extremist activities. However, human rights violations and perceived overseas |
| n/a |
