FORSATY final report.docx

FORSATY

Final Report October 1, 2012, to May 31, 2019

Submission Date: October 30, 2019

[Contract/Agreement] Number: AID-608-13-00001

Submitted to: Idriss Touijer

Tel: +212 (0) 537 65 28 81 Fax: +212 (0) 539 94 92 85 Email: vcarbonneau@iom.int

This document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development, Morocco (USAID/Morocco).

ACTIVITY INFORMATION

Search for Common Ground

Acronyms and Abbreviations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. REPORT OVERVIEW

The FORSATY program came on the heels of the Arab Spring and just ahead of the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State caliphate. It was implemented in northern Morocco in a context of strong localized industrial growth, unequal access to decent employment, high levels of academic failure and dropouts, lack of information and opportunity for large swaths of urban youth including idle youth entirely excluded socially and economically. During the period Morocco exported an estimated 1,500 foreign fighters to Syria and state security services dismantled one extremist cell each month on average.

The Program was implemented from October 2012 to May 2019 with the goal that marginalized youth 10 to 25 in peri-urban neighborhoods will not be open to violent extremist messaging and actors, and purpose that marginalized youth are integrated, productive citizens. FORSATY worked in the cities of Tangier and Tetouan and in FY2017 expanded to the provinces of M’diq-Fnideq and Al Hoceima. The Program reached a total of 33,000 youth for a USAID budget of 12,770,000 and contributions from the UK and the Netherlands.

Three groups were targeted: 1) struggling and failing in-school youth grades five through nine, many with irregular attendance and disciplinary issues; 2) employment-seeking marginalized youth, mostly without a primary or middle-school diploma, idle or living on odd-jobs; 3) excluded youth neither in school, training or seeking employment or services.

A participatory youth assessment (PYA) was conducted in the first project year to identify drivers. PYA results served as the basis for the three-year follow-up of the originally two-year pilot, beginning in FY2014. The Program was further extended for 18 months in FY2017.

The FORSATY Model is based on the theory that, when failing and alienated individuals become bounded with others, acquire a sense of belonging to legitimate local institutions and are engaged in self-realization, they are less likely to radicalize. Resilience to radicalization is achieved through three changes in marginalized and excluded youth: access, assets and identity.

Through widely broadened access to appropriate services, the Program enables youth to develop straight life paths by overcoming personal issues, achieving personal success and gaining rewarding occupations including civics and decent employment. Processes and content involved in the services build personal assets and affirm identity through new and enriched relations with peers, community and institutions.

The Model uses a neighborhood approach in which local civil society organizations (CSOs) become One-Stop-shops (OSS) and develop tailored services effectively reaching youth at-risk and work with community-based organizations (CBOs) to reach out to idle excluded youth. OSSs undergo a revolution in methods and practices, from single on-demand service provider to catalyst between marginalized youth and opportunities.

Excluded youth. Excluded youth are working age youth neither in school, training or employment and many do not actively seek employment or services. Attitudes toward the appearance, language and behavior of many youth on the fringe further repels participation and deepens feelings of rejection.

FORSATY staff designed the Community Model to reach that segment and reintegrate excluded youth into the mainstream. The Community Model is based on collaboration between partner OSS and grassroots CBOs; the latter bring the essential proximity necessary to reach youth under the radar.

The net change brought about by FORSATY is that excluded youth now access activities that foster reintegration into the community. Between May 2015 and May 2019, 7,800 excluded youth not previously reached by any public or CSO service or activity entered a tailored process of re-connection with the community and with their own future Of the 7,800 youth reached, 4,752 attended Open Clubs; 2,321 completed the process in Steady Clubs and More than 450 displayed their talents and capacity on-stage in 36 neighborhood festivals assembling 14,500 participations from their peers, families and neighbors. The others displayed their prowess on the field, in sports tournaments. The Program enabled a growing number of women from conservative families to participate in activities, from 2 percent in 2015 to 24 percent in 2017.

Out of 815 active participants in Community activities in FY2016, 240 (roughly estimated) were able to change their paths and concretely reintegrate the community through formal activities within the same year. It is estimated that roughly 1,000 excluded youth were reintegrated during the Program.

An exit survey of 134 randomly-selected active and past participants showed that 37 percent have been referred to vocational training (19%) or to seasonal (8%) or formal employment (10%) and 37 percent are inactive. This suggests a reintegration rate of between 20 percent (formally integrated) and 57 percent (formally reintegrated + referred). The remaining 20 percent are in school or internships and represent the better-off youth that are included in Community activity groups alongside target excluded youth.

In all, 166 excluded youth emerged as natural community leaders. Young leaders identified and successfully implemented 30 civic initiatives involving roughly 560 volunteers. Leaders also initiated and ran 14 neighborhood forums involving 662 participants, identifying priority neighborhood issues, and advocated on four issues, with success in three cases.

In-School Youth. In partner middle-schools, annual passing rates are below 50 percent and participating students are among the most vulnerable in the class. FORSATY OSS partners provide participating students with four services: 1) tailored pedagogical support; 2) extracurricular activities with a learning content; 3) psychosocial services; 4) parental mobilization. The combination of the four services is what generates change in the individual student.

Success rates (youth passing the year) for middle-school participants reached 65 percent in FY2015, 74 in FY2016, 90 percent in FY2017, 64 percent in FY2018 and 78 percent in FY2019.[footnoteRef:1] Each year on average, 70 percent of participating middle-school students and 74 percent of primary school students improved their grades. [1: The value for FY2018 does not reflect a reduction in performance. In FY2018 application of Ministry policy on passing grades was tightened, generating a reduction in passing rates across the board. In FY2019 strikes in schools and OSS autonomy have impacted negatively on performance. ]

Numerous testimonies illustrate how the services enabled participating students to overcome their difficulties, develop self-confidence and change their relation to learning and to others. Out of 62 randomly-sampled past participants 15 and above in the exit survey, roughly two-thirds state that they are attending high-school. This suggest that services generated significant change in the individuals and that, under favorable circumstances, youth favor furthering their education.

Employment-seeking youth. Most employment-seeking marginalized youth are without a primary or middle-school diploma, are idle or eek by on odd-jobs and seek to access decent employment through vocational training. Key private sector informant interviews in the FORSATY livelihoods assessment (2012) reported that 90 percent of their workforce was not from the region.

The net change brought about by FORSATY was the broadening of access to vocational services for a population of marginalized youth that, for the most part, did not access services. More than 18,144 marginalized youth, most without information or access, have been reached by vocational services.

FORSATY OSS partners placed a total of 6,291 youth (2,137 women) in internships and employment during the Program. This includes 4,030 youth trained by the OSS and placed through partner firms, and 2,287 placed through the WR service, as described further in this section.

During the last three full years of the Program OSS partners inserted 1,400 youth in internships and decent employment annually, on average. By comparison, an estimated average of 4,500 industrial jobs were created annually in the entire region between 2012 and 2014, essentially decent jobs generated by foreign direct investment in the automotive sector.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Ministère du commerce et de l’Industrie et de l’Economie numérique, 2014. ]

Eighty-nine (89) percent of youth surveyed after one and two years of FORSATY were employed. Of those, 65 percent expressed full satisfaction with their situation and 23 percent were “more or less satisfied”. Seventy-five (75) percent said they were appreciated or very appreciated by their employer, while 21 percent had no opinion and 4 percent said they experienced problems.

Sixty-three percent said that they progressed since being hired. Thirty-seven percent indicated that they call/would call the OSS if they needed a service. Sixty percent are in regular contact with the OSS and five percent volunteer. A full 88 percent of respondents indicated that their family’s perception toward them had changed positively, and 77 percent contribute to the family budget.

Access for women. FORSATY provided more than 17,800 young women and girls with opportunities, including at-risk in-school girls, excluded young women and women seeking decent employment. The opportunities provided to women led to positive changes in their status.

CVE Relevance. Community component activities have a clear and direct recorded impact on radicalization and recruitment by VEOs. FORSATY activities enabled more than 30 radicalized youth to move away from VE and VEOs and resume a normal lifestyle. The bonds that are established between participants and between youth and CBO presidents and coaches through Community Model activities are the cement that enables presidents and coaches to intervene effectively with radicalized youth.

To evaluate the relevance of changes in access, assets and identity to the drivers of radicalization, they are compared to a review of CVE literature that verifies hypothetical links between drivers and radicalization. Four of the 17 hypotheses are relevant to FORSATY activities and outcomes. Of the four, one is strongly supported by the literature, two are supported and one is mixed.

Major systemic changes. At the onset of FORSATY, there was a generalized stigma on youth on the fringe. While a trickle of activities for youth existed in some underserved neighborhoods, the YSOs naturally catered to better-off youth: those with the manners, dress, and personal/family/school situation to seek and receive the proposed activities. The following are specific changes brought about by the Program. Others were rejected as bad influences at best and dangerous at worst.

Community perceptions. While data on public opinion is lacking, ample testimony from youth and actors highlight the transformation that youth experience through public performance and the change in peer and community sentiment toward them. While difficult to measure, this evolution in perceptions toward excluded youth by community members, brought on by years of regular festivals and youth leader initiatives is palpable and marks a fundamental change in attitude.

OSS commitment to excluded youth. Three of the four older OSS that have been implementing the FORSATY Community Model would seek to mobilize further funding to continue the activity after FORSATY. One of the three has amended its strategic plans; two have repeatedly expressed their resolve to keep working with this group. CBO commitment to excluded youth. While CBO presidents repeated for a while that “they could get better results with better-off youth”. Now, in four of six neighborhoods CBO presidents defend excluded youth. They have understood that excluded youth have talent, can do well and must be included.

The Commune of Tetouan has adopted official policy on the inclusion of excluded youth and runs weekly activities in the Annakata neighborhood, based on the Community Model. The activity is currently being run in partnership between the Commune and CSO ATIL, funded by the Commune, independently of USAID technical and financial support.

Vocational public YSOs lack the basic services that complement technical training and are often determinant to the success of marginalized and vulnerable youth. Now, three Entraide Nationale (EN) centers in Tetouan and M’diq-Fnideq, have emerged and gained city-wide notoriety by delivering counseling, soft skills, work readiness and placement in addition to technical training. Additional services are provided to participants without direct program support.

Through FORSATY, OSS and public services have bridged the gaps between services to open a more effective path from marginal to decently employed. In Tetouan, public YSOs subsequently combine their services to supply the youth with the entire, coordinated, necessary ensemble of services to enable them to reach decent employment and avoid exiting the process in failure. YSOs together provide vocational counseling, training, work readiness and placement services.

OSS partners established sustainable partnerships with the private sector in the textile, automotive and service sectors. The OSS-private sector link has been maintained over several years. The number of maintained partnership relations since FY2017 is 41 and the number of agreement renewals is 60.

Gender equality. Greater access by women, combined with mixed-gender activities and women performing on stage and on the field has generated significant impact on perceptions and opinions. While just over half of surveyed youth agreed that males and females should have equal access to social, economic and political opportunities before participation in FORSATY, more than three quarters now agree, a 38 percent increase.

The most significant lesson of FORSATY is the rate at which youth in situations of failure, idleness and exclusion change their course when they have access to appropriate services. Across different processes including one year in school or three to six months in Vocational and Community services, most participants achieve success (passing grade, employment), strengthen internal assets and forge stronger identities. The average proportion of surveyed participating youth that scored negatively on self-perceptions of internal assets such as self-confidence, dropped from 52 to 16 percent through participation in FORSATY activities. Participants also build demonstrably stronger identity through relations with peers and institutions.

1. CONTEXT AND BASELINES

1. Context Analysis

The Arab uprisings Ignited in Tunisia at the end of 2010, an unprecedented protest movement quickly spread in the spring of 2011 to other countries in the Maghreb and the Middle East. During this "Arab spring", people were protesting both against poverty and unemployment and against the tyranny and corruption of authoritarian governments that have been in power for decades.

In Tunisia, the "jasmine revolution", which forced President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to leave power in January and flee the country, prompted thousands of Egyptians to revolt against the regime. The latter drove President Hosni Mubarak out of power in February. Free elections were held in both countries, won by Islamist parties. In Libya, the rebellion against Colonel Muhammar al-Khadhafi turned into a civil war in which O.T.A.N. forces intervened. The war ended with the death of the Revolutionary Guide in October 2011.

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions encouraged the people of Yemen, Bahrain and Syria to protest their governments from the beginning of 2011. In each of these countries, and more particularly in Syria, where the government of Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed insurgencies despite condemnations by the international community. In other Arab countries including Morocco, the Governments launched reforms in response to the population's demands to contain the movements.

20 February movement On February 20, 2011, while several countries in the region were the scene of protests. More than 100,000 people took to the streets, all over Morocco. Since the early 1990s, Morocco has been undergoing reforms that have led to the emergence of a more open public space. Through mass mobilizations (human rights movement, Islamist movements, feminist movement, or mobilizations on socio-economic issues), Moroccan actors have learned political militancy and participated in defining the terrain of a confrontation with the regime. 20 February demands included: the dissolution of parliament and the dismissal of the government, respect for the principles of the separation of powers, an end to corruption, the recognition of the Amazigh language and culture, the release of political prisoners, the integration of unemployed graduates into the civil service and the improvement of public services.

On March 9, 2011, King Mohammed VI delivered a speech that launched a constitutional reform process. The February 20 movement campaigned for a boycott of the referendum, criticizing the undemocratic methodology behind the drafting the new constitution and noted some irregularities during the referendum campaign. The "yes" vote won with 98% of the votes. On 25 November 2011, early parliamentary elections brought the Justice and Development Party (PJD) to power. Following the constitutional referendum and the parliamentary elections, the protest dynamic has been losing momentum and the movement's membership has gradually decreased.

The rise of ISIS In June 2014, a Jihadist group proclaimed, through its leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the establishment of a caliphate on territory straddling Syria and Iraq and proclaimed itself an Islamic State. This proto-State established Sharia law as the law to be followed. It has been based on the alliance of former generals of Saddam Hussein's army and former Al Qaeda figures, and joined by thousands of people from several countries including Morocco.

The Islamist group established an obscurantist and violent regime, between 2014 and 2019, until it was defeated by the coalition formed against it. The group was also active in Afghanistan and Yemen, where it has been taking advantage of war or/and uncertain political contexts. The organization claimed many deadly attacks in Paris, Catalonia, Brussels, London, Sousse, Orlando and the Thalys high-speed train attack in France.

Morocco faced threats from groups linked to Al Qaeda and continues to identify and disrupt ISIS-affiliated cells. According to Bureau central d’investigations judiciaires (BCIJ), 49 terrorist cells have been dismantled, including 44 directly linked to the Islamic State, and 772 people have been arrested since the creation of BCIJ in 2015[footnoteRef:3]. [3: Chiffre tiré d’un article publié en 2018 : https://www.medi1.com/fr/article/le-bcij-a-d%C3%A9mantel%C3%A9-49-cellules-terroristes-depuis-sa-cr%C3%A9ation-en-2015--165872]

Morocco has experienced two major terrorist attacks. In May 2003, the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) and its subgroup, Salafia Jihadia, killed 45 people and harmed more than 100 others in a suicide bombing in Casablanca. In April 2011, militants set off remote-controlled bombs in Café Argana, Marrakesh, killing 17 people and wounding 20[footnoteRef:4]. On December 17, 2018, decapitated bodies of two Scandinavian female were discovered by Moroccan authorities near Mount Toubkal. Four suspects in the murder, pledging allegiance to ISIS, were arrested by the Moroccan police. [4: Les chiffres sont tirés d’un article du journal Jeune Afrique : https://www.jeuneafrique.com/559935/politique/ce-jour-la-16-mai-2003-les-attentats-de-casablanca/]

Morocco is one of main the foreign fighter exporters. It was revealed that many of the attack’s perpetrators in Paris in 2015, Spain and Brussels in 2016 were of Moroccan descent. According to a BCIJ document[footnoteRef:5], 1,664 Moroccans travelled to Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2017. It includes 285 women and 378 children. If Europeans of Moroccan nationality are added, this figure increases to more than 2,000. According to a government spokesperson, 80 percent of Moroccan foreign fighters were recruited via social networks, namely Facebook and Twitter. An total of 377 Facebook and Twitter accounts linked to ISIS were shut down in the first months of 2017[footnoteRef:6]. [5: Chiffres tirés de l’article de Morocco world news : https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/04/271476/study-moroccan-counter-terrorism-more-successful-than-egypt-tunisia/] [6: ‘80% of Moroccan youth recruited through social media’, Moroccan World News, 26 May 2017, https:// www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/05/217773/80-of-moroccan-youth-in-isis-recruited-through-socialmedia-minister/]

Morocco’s major investment programs Morocco enjoys a strategic position for its proximity to the major international financial centers. In terms of business climate, Morocco has been ranked first in North Africa, second in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) and third in Africa in the 2019 Doing Business ranking. Morocco is first in Africa in terms of infrastructure quality according to the Global Competitiveness Index 2016-2017. Morocco boasts the Tangier-Med port, with a total capacity of 9 million containers, a 5,000 hectare industrial platform, the first high-speed train on the African continent, linking Tangier to Casablanca, and a highway network linking major Moroccan cities, which should stretch for 3000 km by 2030.

Morocco also has several ambitious sectoral strategies launched to ensure strong, sustainable economic growth. Among these strategies the Plan d’accélération industrielle (PAI) which is based on the development of high-performance ecosystems in key industrial sectors. Plans include the development of the automotive and aeronautics industries and public-private partnerships that have enabled the construction of the Noor-Ouarzazate solar energy complex.

Morocco's commitment to the economic growth of the African continent has been very strong thanks to a decisive Royal involvement in boosting South-South cooperation. Morocco's commitment was strengthened following the Kingdom's reintegration into the African Union in January 2017, after more than 33 years of absence.

The Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region has experienced an economic boom since 2000s, marked by the establishment of a large automotive industry and the opening of the Tangier-Med port. Thanks to this boom, Tangier rose to 5th place among cities that attract the most foreign investment in the world in 2012[footnoteRef:7]. [7: Voir article sur le rapport de la banque mondiale sur les villes les plus compétitives https://www.medias24.com/ECONOMIE/160359-Villes-competitives-Tanger-classee-5e-au-niveau-international.html]

Social development has not kept pace with this growth. The region's poverty rate (9.5%) remains higher than the national average (8.2%)[footnoteRef:8]. This creates widespread vulnerability especially in Tangier’s peripheral neighborhoods. In addition to the various forms of migration, the situation of these neighborhoods is becoming increasingly complex, which has led to the unhealthy development of several phenomenon such as poverty, crime, extremism, drug use and an extremely violent environment. [8: Principaux résultats de la cartographie régionale de la pauvreté multidimensionnelle au Maroc – HCP- file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Principaux%20r%C3%A9sultats%20de%20la%20cartographie%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20multidimensionnelle%202004%20-%202014%20_%20Paysage%20territorial%20et%20dynamique.pdf]

Morocco’s social issues Morocco is facing several social issues. Structural deficits continue to weigh on the education and vocational training sectors. Thus, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council has revealed several dysfunctions, those related to the recruitment of teachers who are trained on outdated curricula as well as the overcrowding of classrooms. School dropout is very costly for Morocco, both financially and socially. The INE (Instance Nationale de l’Évaluation) estimated the cost of dropout to be 2,1 billion MAD (200 M USD) annually.

Inequality in access to quality services in education is reflected in Morocco’s development indicators. The UNDP 2016 report states that Morocco suffers from a huge loss in potential because of inequalities in education, with an average loss rate of 45,8% in 2015. This rate is higher than that of other human development indicators: life expectancy in health (16%) and income (23%). (Source: Ibid). Dropout is most common among youth in vulnerable family contexts, in which parental educational levels are weak. According to the High Council on Education, « …Poverty and vulnerability are not an external factor to the school. They impact students’ learning and the school climate. (Social Justice, CSE, May 2018).

The vocational training sector is experiencing a significant increase in enrolment, while, the incidence of unemployment among graduates remains high and exceeds that of students from general education. This situation points to the need to strengthen referral mechanisms and to place more emphasis on quality than on reception capacity. Regarding youth, according to le Conseil économique social et environmental (CESE), two thirds of youth aged 15-34 have dropped out of school, 20% are unemployed, 50% earn below the minimum wage, 82% do not partake in any physical activity, 75% have no social security coverage and 1 in 5 suffer from psychological disorders.

In the public health sector, despite progress in the generalization of basic medical coverage, dysfunctions related to the financing and the governance of the sector have been noted. About gender equality and parity, it is to be deplored that poverty, unemployment and low participation rates among women are prevalent. Indicators concerning violence against women, the improvement of their living conditions and their economic autonomy remain at worrying levels despite the institutional and social progress achieved. Child labor continues to exist in Morocco, dangerous work by minors between the ages of 7 and 17 concerned 162,000 children in 2017.

A permanent increase in prison population raises the issue of overcrowding and the cost of the prison system to society. As for the social climate, 154 strikes in the private sector, carried out in 121 companies, took place in 2017, generating 178,289 strike days. The main cause of strikes remains non-compliance with the labor code by employers.

1. Participatory Youth Assessment Major Findings

FORSATY conducted a Participatory Youth Assessment (PYA) from January to July 2013 to identify the major factors of marginalization and exclusion of youth in Tangier and Tetouan.

A team of young respondents (YRs) were selected from the target population. They were trained and coached to conduct their own assessment with their peers. The assessment targeted youth at-risk of dropping out of school, those who already dropped out, and those who have never gone to school.

Over the course of 4 weeks 209 valid (out of 300) questionnaires were collected, providing a sound quantitative overview of the targeted beneficiaries and their situations. The PYA included 35 gender-balanced focus groups comprising all profiles of the targeted youth.

The PYA enables the FORSATY team to gain insight into factors that generate frustration, grievance, a sense of injustice, legitimacy, and exclusion among youth from institutions and opportunities. The principal results are summarized below.

Relations with the teacher and school Youth agreed that teachers do not treat students well. The treatment is characterized by various types of violence (physical, verbal, and psychological). Youth focused on verbal violence: insults, even using inappropriate language and explicitly ridiculing, scorning and publicly mocking students. The youth stressed the importance of a more humane and interactive relationship between teachers and students. Teachers are more considerate with students with better exam results.

The learning and achievement factor enhance their negative perception as they sense they are not given equal attention and care in the classroom. For them, this intensifies deprivation from opportunities to learn and affects their willingness to continue their schooling. For them, the teachers show that they are inconsiderate of the youth needs, problems, concerns or even their potential. For youth, relations at all levels in the school are a source of frustration and thus do not lead to a positive climate.

Academic support Tutoring is often conducted by the same teacher who has taught the subject in class and usually needs to be remunerated. Imposing paid extra hours by teachers on students is one of the key concerns of youth. All agree that it is a bad practice. Tutoring does not achieve the necessary results. It shows the school is failing its mission of free public education services. They see it furthermore as a practice that gives the teacher incentive not to do his/her job in the classroom, i.e. to make sure that the students have understood the lesson well. This parallel system is pointed to as a major flaw of the education system; they see it as something imposed and thus do not accept it; it intensifies their negative perception of the school and thus, indirectly reinforces the propensity to drop out.

Tutoring is particularly negatively perceived by the youth who have financial difficulties; which increases their unwillingness to invest efforts. Moreover, the money paid for extra hours is seen as a form of corruption.

Relations with family If they have problems in their families, no one listens to them. Many youths emphasized this dimension of coming to school with the burden of family difficulties as they are from poor and fragile areas, but they feel that there is no one in the school to care about them. Ninety-one percent of respondents agreed with the statement “I do not get along with my family”. This information should be considered along with contrasting results from the FORSATY baseline. While sample youth in the baseline were in a relatively better situation than those in the PYA, more than 80 percent of the latter stated that relations with family were positive. The proportion of target FORSATY youth with problematic relations with family is certainly lower than the PYA results convey.

Respondents state that family involvement in children’s education is a crucial precondition to their success and integration in school. This implies that for those who dropped out, this precondition was not met. Half of respondents list family support and monitoring as the first motivation for students to continue studying. They further agree on the family's responsibility in student retention or drop out.

Out of 155 youth (42% women), 74 percent agreed or somewhat agreed (69% of women and 78% of men) that they experienced violence in their family.

Violence Youth believe the school environment is not free from aggression. Violence is a major hindrance to learning, at home and inside the school and/or in the classroom or in its immediate surroundings and in the neighborhood. Aggression – verbal, physical, symbolic, occurs everywhere and by all actors: the teacher, the school principal, the administrator, the administrative staff and peers in the school. Violence also affects girls and takes the form of sexual abuse, even rape. This is compounded by drug use in the school as well as by the presence of weapons. Forty-four percent of surveyed youth said that they do not feel safe inside their neighborhood because of the spread of physical and psychological violence.

Idleness Out of 78 youth (53 men and 25 women) discussing their obstacles to finding a job, 16 women (64%) and 14 men (27%) stated that they were not looking for work. Of those that were looking for employment, lack of diploma, experience, knowledge or capacity to write a C.V. were stated as obstacles. The high proportion of women not seeking employment roughly reflects current national statistics on activity rates of working-age women (17% for urban areas).

Vocational Youth in focus groups were not confident in finding a job after training. They think that corruption and discrimination hinder their possibilities of finding a decent job.

For those who found a job after dropping out, perception of “exploitation” from business owners is present. Others reported bad treatment by the employer, being underpaid and working long hours.

The data from questionnaires shows that 72% of participating youth confirmed having to help with household expenditures. This rate is significantly higher among boys (84%) than girls (45%).

Civic Participation Findings from the 5 neighborhoods also reveal that although most of the youth are aware of the importance of participation, only few of them participated in political activities. Findings also show that there is clearly a huge lack of trust in political parties as well as in elected representatives, and that there is an absence of structures that facilitate social and political inclusions of youth.

THE FORSATY MODEL

1. FORSATY purpose and expect outcomes FORSATY can look back to a six years and six months history. Field experience and program developments have enriched the original goals and objectives. This section briefly describes the major evolutions in the Program definitions. Adaptive management and associated changes are reported further below.

FORSATY FY2012 to FY2014 In 2012 FORSATY was a two-year program with a possibility to extend for an additional three years. The initial program goal was “Prevent delinquency and reduce recidivism among targeted youth in selected areas of Tangier and Tétouan”.

The project motivations, as stated in the program document were responding to two major elements. The first was the political and social situation in Morocco, influenced by recent developments in countries in the Middle East and North-Africa, namely the Arab Spring. The second was the problem of social marginality, which results in idle young people who are vulnerable to involvement in petty crime, often a characteristic of the newer generation of jihadists.[footnoteRef:9] [9: The USAID Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism (February 2009)]

The program registered under USAID’s Country Assistance Strategy Goal to Mitigate Drivers of Youth Disaffection and Marginalization, stated that “a large youth bulge creates the potential for internal instability, especially when compounding factors such as high unemployment and lack of political participation are present. According to the strategy goal, “by engaging at-risk populations and providing economic, political, and educational opportunities for both in-and out-of-school youth, the USG provides positive alternatives to Moroccan youth and helps to mitigate causes of youth disaffection”, the program had three expected results:

Result 1, to successfully integrate marginalized and disaffected youth into society. The project targeted 2000 at-risk youth (including school youth at-risk of dropping out, those who already dropped out of school and those who have never gone to school) will receive direct assistance through subgrantees Result 2, to reintegrate young offenders into society. The project targeted 300 young offenders: minors detained in the CSE in Tangier, youth on probation and irregular migrant youth (who are considered law offenders under Moroccan law), will receive direct reintegration assistance through subgrantees.

Result 3, to ensure that youth-serving organizations better serve the needs of at-risk youth.

The Program aimed at enhancing prevention efforts to tackle the broader issues of social marginalization, with an emphasis on the role of the community in reducing marginalization. As such, Program activities were to “encourage communities to improve social services for marginalized youth.” For each selected neighborhood, the Program was to identify a local NGO to serve as a single point of contact for beneficiaries to deliver a standard package of holistic youth-friendly services: the One-stop-Shop.

FY2015 to FY2017 The rise of violent extremism in the period 2012-2013 led the designers to adopt “Marginalized youth in peri-urban neighborhoods are not open to violent extremist messaging/actors” as the program goal. The original goal became the Project Purpose and was redefined as Moroccan youth are integrated, productive citizens. This reflected the change in target group from young offenders to marginalized youth more broadly.

The second phase of FORSATY was based essentially on the results of the extended Youth Participatory Assessment (PYA) conducted in 2012 and 2013. The PYA findings that drove the design of the second phase include:

· An enormous gap in youth coaching, counseling and preparation for active life on a professional and civic level;

· A lack of access to information regarding the options available to them after school completion, after dropping-out or while searching for a professional opportunity;

· The identification of the existing services in their neighborhoods, their points of strength, their weakness, the missing facilities in addition to possibilities for improvement.

The original results were modified as follows:

· The result ‘Young offenders are re-integrated into society’- which initially focused on young offenders as a separate group, was now integrated into one single result to also cover at risk out of school youth,

· A new cross cutting result has been added to address issues related to adolescent/youth health, security, violence in the neighborhoods, drug abuse, civic participation for youth, etc.

The second phase was grounded in the USAID 2013-2017 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Morocco: “a five-year plan designed to support Morocco’s efforts to enhance the employability of its youth, increase its citizens’ participation in governance and improve the quality of primary education[footnoteRef:10]”. [10: http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/nov-21-2013-usaid-and-morocco-announce-new-development-cooperation-strategy]

Three areas were clearly identified: FORSATY II will address issues affecting youth through targeted sectorial interventions in the areas of education, livelihoods and youth participation (community involvement) through the creation of youth councils (in partnership with Search-Morocco). The three areas of FORSATY were aligned with the CDCS.

Diagram 1: The FORSATY log frame in FY2014

In FY2015, the FORSATY team realized that legions of youth most at-risk of recruitment by fundamentalists were not reached by the Program. The Program identified those youth as “excluded”, a new sub-group in the “marginalized youth” target group. Excluded youth are neither in school, training or employment and do not actively seek employment or services (NEETs). They constitute an underclass in poor neighborhoods, are rejected or ignored because of their status, appearance or behavior, and are most exposed to violence, crime, drug abuse and most vulnerable to the sirens of extremist ideology.

Accordingly, the Program redefined Cross-Cutting Output 4.2 and created the Community Component. The Component targets excluded youth specifically, with the objective of transforming excluded youth through tailored activities and personal development content and reintegrating them into productive life. The redefinition led the Program to reorder the initial inputs and outputs to achieve greater clarity.

The redefined Output 4.2 was combined with Sub-Purpose 2 into a new Sub-Purpose 1: Youth are full-fledged citizens in their neighborhoods and cities. This combined work with young educated leaders at the city level with civic leadership that is part of the Community Component. Cross-cutting Output 4.2 was made into a stand-alone Sub-Purpose, 2, to fully capture the expected change in CSOs as the centerpiece of the FORSATY program. The realigned results framework is below.

Diagram 2: The FORSATY log frame in FY2015

The Program also explained the linkages between expected outcomes and VE. A theory of change was drafted as follows:

FORSATY Theory of Change: When failing and alienated individuals become bounded with others, acquire a sense of belonging to legitimate local institutions and are engaged in self-realization, they are less likely to radicalize The expected change was further defined as a systemic change in the community, as per the original 2012 orientation: “The Program aims at enhancing prevention efforts to tackle the broader issues of social marginalization, with an emphasis on the role of the community in reducing marginalization” Expected Change: Communities and institutions implement methods and practices that change current target youth trajectories – target youth are no longer alienated and excluded from the system, they acquire personal assets, gain access, build identity and become resilient to extremist messaging.

Access, Assets, Identity.

Three basic linkages were identified between FORSATY activities and expected outcomes and the Program goal that youth be “not open” to violent messaging and actors. FORSATY approaches resilience with a holistic approach that combines the individual’s personal path, personal assets and identity. When the individual improves in all three dimensions, the supposition is that he or she will be significantly more resilient to VEO recruitment and messaging.

Access Obstructed life paths, feelings of exclusion and injustice, personal grievances, violence and humiliation undermine the self and generate psychological vulnerability to VE messaging. The VE narrative soothes and proposes simple and heroic paths forward as a cure to states of personal failure.

FORSATY’s central contributions are: 1) to enable marginalized youth to access services they did not access previously; 2) to ensure proposed services enable marginalized youth to overcome blockages and access self-realization through participation and exchange, addressing conflict and grievance, creative expression, sports, and decent employment.

Assets Personal assets are basic personal qualities and capacities of youth. Assets constitute a base of strength, a stepping stone that enables youth to gain direction, work toward an end, and manage relations and upsets along the way. Basic assets such as self-worth and self-confidence lead to self-control, goal setting, planning and improving relations with peers. Assets reduce vulnerabilities and facilitate the acquisition of successful life paths.

Identity Adolescence is a period during which the identity of the future adult is formed through questioning, reassessment and exploration of alternatives. When identity with one’s community, state, authority and value system is weakened during this period, vulnerability to powerful group identities is increased. Uncertainty in one-self and confusion in competing values are expertly exploited by VEOs wielding the certainty of fundamental truths, sacred values and glorified actions.

FY2017 to FY2019 In FY 2017 the FORSATY program was extended by 18 months, to March 2019. The scope was extended to cover the commune of Fnideq and the province of Al-Hoceima. The extension was an opportunity to replicate methods and tools developed with longstanding partners, in new environments and with new partners. The model was adjusted to the specifics of the new target areas.

Changes to program elements are presented under the adaptive management section, further below.

Contributions by the UK and the Netherlands Two donors, the UK and the Netherlands, developed an interest in the program and provided contributions in FY2017 and 2018. The contributions had a major impact on FORSATY’s scope and budget. In FY2018, the Program’s budget increased by 280 percent from these other donor contributions. The increases generated initially a challenge for the Program team and ultimately demonstrated the ability of the Program and its OSS partners to absorb and manage additional funding. The detailed scopes of work and impact on Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (ME&L) performance targets are in annex 5 of this report In FY2016 the British Embassy in Rabat expressed interest in the Program. A tripartite agreement was signed between USAID, the Embassy and IOM for a 529,000 USD contribution to the Program for FY2017. The fund enabled IOM to increase the scope of the Program as follows:

· Increase the number of target youth accessing educational services by 19 percent

· Increase the number of youths benefiting from vocational counseling, training and work readiness services by 24, 30 and 56 percent respectively

· Increase the number of excluded youths participating in Community activities by 148 percent.

· Training of additional teachers running in-school Life skills Clubs The following year, the UK increase its contribution to 823,000 USD. The fund enabled IOM to increase the scope of the Program as follows:

· Add one One-Stop-Shop in Tangier

· Enrich Community component programming

· Enable young leaders to benefit from training camps and fund initiatives

· Enable Tangier OSS to establish and train youth clubs on the prevention of drug abuse

· Replicating the OSS model in Tetouan (lead to sustained replication)

· Double the number of in-school beneficiaries in two pilot OSS, leading to a 42 percent increase

· Diversify vocational training to automotive sector leading to an increase of 37 percent in the number of youths accessing…