Attachment 1 - Objectives..pdf

RFI RHPED: ATTACHMENT 1: RHPED OBJECTIVES

Attachment 1- RHPED Objectives

Version 1.0 December 2023

Important Dates

Event Date Submission Requirements Response to RFI 12 January 2024 See Section SAM.gov posting for details

1.1. Agency Name

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 6595 Springfield Center Dr., Springfield, VA 22150

1.2. Program Information

RFI Number: TSA25-04-0398 Program Name: Alarm Resolution (AR) Managing Program Office: RCA Managing Program Division: Requirements, Human Performance, and Engineering Division (RHPED)

2. BACKGROUND

The mission of the TSA is to protect the nation's transportation system to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA's mission is derived from the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, which directs TSA to screen all passengers and property that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft. To achieve its mission, TSA must ensure that its aviation security screening equipment is both effective and efficient. AR, including Advanced Alarm Resolution (AAR), is used to resolve explosive and Non-Explosive Prohibited Items (NEPI) alarms occurring during primary screening. TSA is continuously evaluating and modernizing AR processes to strengthen the agency's ability to detect and respond to emerging and evolving threats and to enable efficient and effective targeting of screening resources.

TSA uses a layered screening countermeasures approach to accomplish its mission. These layers consist of a combination of Transportation Security Equipment (TSE), manual procedures, and human-in-the-loop decisions. When primary screening TSE detect a potential threat, an alarm is generated. These are then referred to secondary screening, where AR is used to determine whether the person or property that alarmed can be allowed into the secure area of the airport. Alarms that cannot be resolved in AR are elevated to AAR, conducted by highly specialized personnel (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Example Alarm Resolution Process for Checkpoint & Checked Baggage Screening

TSA's AR activities are focused on improving, acquiring, and deploying capabilities and technologies to enhance the operational efficiency and security effectiveness of the AR and AAR capabilities. RCA's role in TSA's acquisition of TSE includes identifying needs, defining suitability and specific user requirements, analyzing alternatives, and demonstrating new capabilities/solutions.

Solutions borne from these activities may be procured by the Government or obtained by other aviation stakeholders. TSA is interested in AR capabilities that at a minimum can:

• Resolve all threats (or suspected items) detected by the primary screening device.

o Increase the number or percentage of alarms resolved for Stream of

Commerce (SOC) powders, solids, and oversized Liquids, Aerosols, and Gels (LAG) alarms resolved without the need for AAR.

o Increase the number or percentage of alarms resolved for benign items (i.e., benign items that commonly alarm the primary screening device) without the need for AAR.

• Reduce the average number of decisions, processes, and TSE required for AR.

2.1 Problem Statement

TSA is seeking information on new solutions to strengthen the ability to resolve alarms on potential threats in increasingly complex scenarios and empower Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to resolve more alarms on benign items without elevation to Advanced Alarm Resolution (AAR). TSA is unaware of whether there is a single technology capable of resolving all alarms on the wide variety of objects screened at the checkpoint. TSA is currently developing a Raman-based Bulk Resolution Technology (BRT) solution that will significantly improve the capability to resolve alarms on bulk solids, powders, liquids, aerosols, gels, creams, and pastes within objects that are accessible for direct screening and can be penetrated by an energy source such as a laser beam. Based on the known limitations of screening using Raman technology, the BRT solution will likely be able to screen 80 percent of chain-of-commerce items. However, there is a gap for the remaining 20 percent of items.

TSA is now seeking technologies that go beyond the limitations of light penetration to improve the capability of TSOs to resolve alarms on opaque sealed objects (OSOs). OSOs are objects that completely or partially block the passage of radiant energy while at the same time blocking physical access to the material causing the primary screening alarm. OSO contents can be physically accessed only through destructive means such as an irreversible breaking of a permanent seal or by disassembly. Examples of OSOs include complex electronics and sealed metal and ceramic objects.

An opacity study was conducted to measure the transparency of visible light through a variety of objects. The study concluded that human eyes perceive an object as opaque when its transparency to visible light is less than 5 percent. The measure of an object’s opacity depends on the frequency of the radiant energy directed at the object. For example, an object opaque to light may be penetrable by X-rays. The work aspires to quantify the opacity of laser beams to BRT. While BRT will be able to resolve alarms in a wide set of SOC items, there will be objects that are opaque to both the human eye and the upcoming BRT technologies where light penetration presents a challenge. TSA is looking to investigate technologies that can interrogate alarmed masses in OSOs that are opaque to BRT, such as electronics, flasks, etc., without physically accessing the material or opening objects for screening purposes.

Alarmed objects from primary screening will be removed from the bag for alarm resolution in secondary screening. The proposed solution must be able to screen objects that include a range of sizes such as personal gaming systems, laptops, urns, etc. The solution will perform with a very high Probability of Detection (Pd) and very low Probability of False Alarm (Pfa) within a realistic, operational field environment. TSA needs to have a high confidence in the solution’s output to distinguish threat items from benign materials.

2.2 Solution Approach

The alarm resolution program is being conducted in two “tracks.” Track 1 is developing the Raman-based BRT separately from this RFI; Track 2 is focused on solutions that can improve alarm resolution capability in situations not suited for the BRT. Track 2 research and development will focus on solutions able to penetrate OSOs, interact with their contents, and send the acquired information back to their detectors, where it will be processed and matched with the programmed library of threat materials.

A wide range of new technologies will be considered to meet TSA’s capability improvement objectives. Preliminary market research indicates that potential solutions may use technologies including, but not limited to, X-ray Diffraction, X-ray Differential Phase Contrast, THz Spectroscopy-Far IR, IR, FTIR, Ultrasound, Radio Frequency, Gravimetrics, Microwave Spectroscopy, Neutron Spectroscopy, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance, Raman-FTIR, RF-Ultrasound, RF-IR, RF-Microwave, microsampling for ETDs, Image Recognition, Magnetic Induction, colorimetrics, High-Sensitivity Vapor Detection, Improved ETDs, photoacoustic spectroscopy, and X-ray imaging. Some solutions may use more than one technology to increase the amount of information collected.

Solutions are grouped into one of three overarching groups, based on how they are used to support alarm resolution:

Bulk Resolution Technology (BRT) solutions screen bulk quantities of substances in an accessible container through the container or as a sample taken from the container.

BRT systems are confirmatory solutions and are used when the source of the alarm is accessible for direct analysis. Solutions employ technologies including spectroscopy (Raman, Fourier transform infrared), spectrometry (ion mobility, mass spectrometry), ultrasound, magnetic induction, X-rays, and colorimetrics.

Trace Resolution Technology (TRT) solutions detect potential threats in residual quantities without contact with a bulk quantity of the alarm material. TRTs are non-confirmatory solutions and are used when the source of the alarm is not accessible for direct analysis. Solutions employ technologies including spectrometry (ion mobility, mass spectrometry) and Capillary Zone Electrophoresis.

Imaging Resolution Technology (IRT) solutions screen complex objects and bulk quantities of substances without direct contact with the alarm material. IRTs are non-confirmatory solutions and are used when the source of the alarm is not accessible for direct analysis. IRT solutions are typically X-ray-based.

Respondents must discuss known challenges specific to their technologies that must be overcome to effectively support resolution of alarms when the alarm material is inaccessible for direct analysis. Specific challenges include cross-contamination, thick containments, increasingly complex containments, high-clutter objects, and low signature from certain threat items that present a challenge to identified technology.

3.0 Objectives for Alarm Resolution

As the aviation sector continues to be the target of new and emerging threats, the aviation screening community continues to deliver increasingly more effective security solutions.

In a diverse and rapidly evolving threat environment, TSA's security effectiveness strategies must achieve an adaptable state to respond quickly. To enable this mission objective, TSA is looking to establish the next generation of AR and AAR solutions with a focus on advancing materiel and non-materiel capabilities to accurately identify, analyze, verify, and resolve alarms within the TSA security ecosystem.

This AR RFI is focused on gathering responses for the following Technical Task Areas (TTAs):

• Enhanced Threat Analysis & Resolution

• Interoperability with TSA TSE in an Open Architecture Environment

• System of Systems Threat Analysis & Resolution

• Detection and Scanning Operations

• Physical Considerations

• Operational Cycle Time

• Detection Capability

• Cybersecurity Considerations

• Safety

3.1 Enhanced/System of Systems Threat Analysis and Resolution There is a need within the TSA to resolve all alarms at the Opportunities of Encounter (OOE), from primary screening countermeasures. In collaboration with DHS S&T and other DHS partners, TSA has supported the addition of orthogonal technologies to be integrated within aviation screening checkpoints to obtain additional material discrimination data and to meet the required level of detection. The stated goal is to increase the ability to confirm and resolve primary screening alarms, reduce the need for re-calibration during duty hours, increase threat libraries (for systems that use these), improve throughput and TSO utilization, and reduce manual searches and confiscation of benign items that cannot be cleared. TSA is considering enhancing secondary screening performance through the development of a single or multi-signature (orthogonal) platforms using proven material characterization methods.

3.2 Interoperability with TSA TSE in an Open Architecture Environment TSA expects to also improve security capabilities by establishing common and accessible data and interface standards between TSE. TSA is interested in AR concepts that can achieve the following:

• Interoperability with TSA Enterprise Architecture,

• Interoperability and interconnectivity to existing TSE to improve alarm characterization and to inform more effective screening,

• Utilization and/or supporting establishment of applicable common data formats and interface standards such as the Digital Imaging and Communications in Security (DICOS) and Open Platform Software Library (OPSL), and

• Ability to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to improve detection and false alarm performance over time (future-state).

3.3 System of Systems Threat Analysis and Resolution

TSA is interested in a Systems of Systems concept that incorporates workflow logic based on TSA Open Architecture approach of common and accessible data and interfaces. Data fusion and integration is integral to achieve distributed screening and dynamic switching of algorithms based on individual risk level. A key priority in the AR mission is to address the capability gaps for checkpoint screening due to the higher number of alarm types requiring resolution and linkage. To that end, AR feedback loops that incorporate data from primary screening algorithms may prove useful (future-state).

3.4 Detection and Scanning Operations

The solution must able to function in the airport environment.

The system must be operable in the following environments:

• Commercial United States Airports

• Tropical, Dry, Temperate, and Continental climates

The system must be usable by TSOs in the checkpoint.

3.5 Physical Considerations

The system should be primarily designed for operation in airport checkpoints. Considerations include size, weight, and system integration within checkpoint operations as described in the Checkpoint Requirements and Planning Guide. However, the system may be used in other environments that have fewer logistical constraints, such as in the Checked Baggage area.

3.6 Operational Cycle Time

The system’s analysis time must support checkpoint throughput.

Once the system is ready for scanning, it will ideally be able to support performing a scan approximately every 2 minutes with a maximum of 10 minutes.

Respondents must specify the analysis time of their system and the operational cycle time. Cycle time is defined as the time between the start of a scan and when the system is ready to perform the next scan, excluding delays for alarm resolution activities.

3.7 Detection Capability

Respondents must describe current detection experience and capability for commercial, military-grade, and homemade explosives through challenging OSOs. If experience is not with explosives, respondent should describe the types of items that are the target of the system. What limits the ability to undertake development in the explosives domain?

3.8 Cybersecurity Considerations

The system must apply appropriate cybersecurity controls and be capable of connecting to the TSA secure network leveraging the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF) and TSA implementation of the RMF. TSE operating within TSA’s environment must comply with federal cybersecurity policy including the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) and apply the appropriate cybersecurity controls outlined in NIST 800-53 and 800-82 based on system Categorization.

Additionally, the use of Defense Information Systems Agency(DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) are recommended. The solution developer should anticipate meeting these cybersecurity requirements in order to operate in a connected environment.

The system must fully comply with the requirements set forth in Security Technology Integrate Program (STIP) Transportation Security Equipment (TSE) Interface Requirements Document

(IRD).

The system must consider zero trust principles aligned with agency zero trust Architecture goals.

Reference the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) zero Trust Maturity Model version 2.

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/checkpoint-requirements-and-planning-guide.pdf

3.9 Safety

The system must operate without presenting a safety hazard as indicated in the TSA Occupational Safety and Health Manual. At a minimum, such safety hazards would include electrical hazards, tripping hazards, bodily injury hazards due to sharp corners or edges, radiological sources, and an adverse impact on electronic medical devices such as pacemakers.

The system must be able to screen sensitive explosive materials without causing hazardous reactions.

Respondents should provide operating procedures to help TSA understand proper use of the device.

4.0 General Parameters

This section contains examples of the requirements a solution must meet to be acquired by TSA.

These are provided for informational purposes only to illustrate parameters of the operational environment.

4.1 Operational

4.1.1 Startup Time

The system’s startup time from cold should not exceed 30 minutes, and from standby should not exceed 30 seconds.

4.1.2 Power Down

The system’s power down should not take longer than five minutes.

4.1.3 Power Requirement

Systems should operate from a single-phase electrical power source on commercially available 120 volts alternating current (VAC) with a +/- 10% voltage tolerance, at 60 hertz (Hz) with a +/- 3% variance in frequency

4.1.4 Power Supply Stability

The system shall not introduce transients into the power supply generation system above the limits specified in 47 CFR 15, Federal Communications Commission (FCC): Radio Frequency Devices, Subpart B for Class A equipment.

The performance characteristics of the system with respect to power include(s):

• Draw no more than six (6) amperes (amp) during operation.

• Plug into a single standard National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) 5 15R (non-locking receptacle).

4.1.5 Operating Personnel Requirement

The system shall be operable by TSOs meeting personnel requirements specified in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 1544.403 and 1544.405 in terms of auditory and visual acuity, dexterity, English proficiency, and educational level (high school diploma, General Educational Development (GED), or a combination of education and experience).

The system should, at minimum, be operable by the general user population from the 5th percentile female (to set reach envelopes) to the 95th percentile male (to set clearances) of human physical characteristics as defined in ISO/TR 7250-2.

4.2 Environmental Requirement

4.2.1 Resistance to Airport Low Frequency Vibrations

The system function should demonstrate no degradation resulting from low-frequency vibration typically stemming from airport terminal sources (e.g., aircraft departures/landings, heavy foot traffic, electric carts, large heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, subfloor bag conveyors, and outdoor truck traffic) and should be in compliance with IEC 60068-2-64, Environmental Testing. Part 2: Test Methods – Test: Vibration, Broad-band Random (Digital Control) and Guidance, or equivalent commercial practice or analysis.

4.2.2 Operational Temperature, Humidity, and Altitude

The system should be capable of operating within the temperature, humidity and altitude ranges defined in Table 1 and still meet the detection, processing time and Ai requirements.

Low High

Temperature 32oF (0oC) 104oF (40oC)

Altitude 300 ft (91.4 m) Below Sea Level

1.92 miles (3090 m) Above Sea Level

Humidity 10% Noncondensing 90% Noncondensing

Table 1: Operational Environment Requirements

4.2.3 Storage Temperature, Humidity, and Altitude

The system should be capable of being stored within the temperature, humidity and altitude ranges defined in Table 2 and still meet the detection, processing time and Ai requirements.

Low High

Temperature 19.4oF (-7oC) 120.2oF (49oC)

Altitude 300 ft (91.4 m) Below Sea Level

1.92 miles(3090 m) Above Sea Level

Humidity 10% Noncondensing 90% Noncondensing

Table 2: Storage Environment Requirements

4.2.4 Standards for Testing Temperature, Humidity, and Altitude Parameters

Each of the following environmental specifications detailed in Tables 1 and 2 should be tested in accordance with MIL-STD 810G, Department of Defense Test Method Standard, Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests.

4.2.5 Emissions Requirements

The system should comply with the Class A (i.e., industrial) equipment emissions requirements of IEC 61326-1, IEC 61000-6-4, or equivalent.

4.2.6 Immunity Requirement

The system should comply with the industrial location immunity requirements of IEC 61326- 1, IEC 61000-6-2, or equivalent.

4.3 Safety Requirements

4.3.1 No Sharp Corner or Edges

The system should not possess sharp corners or edges that can puncture, cut, or tear the skin or clothing during operational and maintenance activities.

4.3.2 No Hot Surfaces

The system should not expose users or maintenance personnel to hot surfaces over 43.89°C (111°F).

4.3.3 Control/Interlocking of Energy Sources

The system should have all system energy sources (e.g., electrical, mechanical, pressurized) controlled or interlocked to prevent inadvertent or unexpected activation, energization, or release of stored energy that could cause injury to employees during machine calibration and maintenance activities.

4.3.4 Machine Guarding

The system should be provided with one or more methods of machine guarding in accordance with 29 CRF 1910.212, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): Machine Guarding, to protect the user and other employees in the area from point of operation, nip points, and rotating parts.

4.3.5 Ergonomics

The system should not expose users to physical ergonomic risk factors from awkward postures, stresses, and forces during system operation, calibration, and maintenance, as measured by the Body Part Discomfort Survey (IAPA Survey, 2007).

4.3.6 ACGIH

The system should comply with 2010 American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLV®) and Biological Exposure Indices (BEI®), Sub-Radiofrequency (30kHz and below) Static Electric and Magnetic Fields.

4.3.7 Frequencies of Electric and Magnetic Fields

The system power frequency electric and magnetic fields should be maintained at or below 1 kilovolt/meter (kV/m) and 0.1 millitesla (mT), respectively, to protect workers and members of the public who have cardiac pacemakers or internal or external medical electronic devices.

4.3.8 Safety Interlocking for Hazardous Energy Sources

Safety interlock switches should be used wherever any potentially hazardous energy source is in use (e.g., ionizing or electromagnetic sources).

4.3.9 Laser (if any) is ON during Sampling Only

The system’s sampling functionality should demonstrate laser emission time limitations for sampling.

4.3.10 OSHA

The system should comply with OSHA, Title 29 CFR 1910.303(a) – Electrical Equipment Approval.

The system should comply with OSHA, Title 29 CFR 1910.303(b) (1) (i) – Electrical Equipment Examination. These standards are applicable to electrical equipment used in the workplace and require approval or certification by a Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) as defined by OSHA in 29 CFR 1910.7, General – Definitions and Requirements for a Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory.

4.3.11 Underwriters Laboratories (UL)

The system should be Underwriters Laboratories (UL) certified by a NRTL, in accordance with UL 61010-1, Safety Requirements for Electrical Equipment for Measurement, Control, and Laboratory Use, Part 1: General Requirements.

4.3.12 NRTL

The system should use connectors for power that are approved or have certification by a NRTL listed in OSHA, Title 29 CFR 1910.7 – National Recognized Test Laboratory (NRTL), January 1, 2007.

4.3.13 Radioactivity

If the system contains a radioactive source, the source activity should not require users to wear personal dosimetry to monitor radiation exposure.

If the system contains a radioactive source, the source activity should not require the TSA to obtain and operate the device under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license.

Any use of a radioactive source in the system should meet the requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as defined in 10 CFR 20 – Standards for Protection Against Radiation, January 1, 2007.

The system should comply with OSHA, Title 29 CFR 1910.1096 – Ionizing Radiation, as applicable.

The system should comply with OSHA, Title 29 CFR 1910.97(a) (2) (i) and (3) – Nonionizing Radiation, as applicable

4.3.14 Emission of Ultraviolet, Visible or Infrared Radiation

The system should not emit ultraviolet, visible, or infrared radiation in excess of the Ultraviolet Radiation and Light and Near-Infrared Radiation TLVs identified in the 2010 ACGIH TLVs and BEIs.

4.3.15 Laser Emissions

If the system contains a laser, the system should comply with 10 CFR 1040.10, Performance Standard for Light-Emitting Products, Laser Products.

4.3.16 Use of Hazardous Chemicals

The use and production of hazardous chemicals should be minimized. If hazardous chemicals must be used, a complete material safety data sheet should be developed and provided to meet the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200, OSHA Hazard Communication.

Any hazardous chemicals necessary for the system operation should be packaged or configured so as to not require the use of personal protective equipment (e.g., respiratory protection, eye or face protection, hand protection, or protective clothing).

4.3.17 Noise Exposure

The system, excluding audible indicators, should not emit a sound pressure level that exceeds 90 decibels A (dBA) above the reference sound pressure (20 micro-Pascal’s), when measured one meter (3.28 ft.) away from the system, averaged over an 8-hour period with a standard sound level meter set on slow response, as defined by OSHA 29 CFR 1910.95, Occupational Noise Exposure. All continuous, intermittent and impulsive sound levels from 80 decibels to 130 decibels should be integrated into the noise measurements.

4.3.18 Personal Protective Equipment

The operation of the system should not require the use of safety equipment (gloves, eye or face protection, respirator, etc.).

4.3.19 Improved Sampling

The system should possess highly visible tamper-evident seals to secure assemblies that contain sensitive components, sensitive data and sensitive components with sensitive data.

TSA plans to eliminate the need for TSOs to open containers for sampling purposes by or under the supervision of a Transportation Security Specialist-Explosives (TSS-E) in the future. The AR Concept of Operations (CONOPS) dictates that TSA is pursuing advances in the sampling performance characteristics of AR solutions. Sampling techniques should be able to reduce or eliminate the need for a TSS-E.

Improved sampling capabilities may also increase the TSO's ability to implement social distancing and decrease contact with the traveling public and their associated property.

Capabilities may include, but are not limited to:

• Ability to clear all threats detected by primary screening algorithms

• Enhanced ability to analyze materials in OSOs

• Enhanced ability to analyze electronics (large and small) for the presence of threats with a low false alarm rate

• Enhanced ability to analyze printed materials (e.g., books, paper, magazines, etc.) for the presence of threats with a low false alarm rate

• Non-contact sampling of ≥10 cm from container/sample surface (~4 inches)

• Portable or non-portable solutions (e.g., handheld systems, desktop systems, etc.)

• Other enhancements and potential retrofit options (e.g., hardware/software enhancements to existing systems, improved collection and transport techniques, improved ionization and/or sample preparation techniques, etc.)

5.0 Review of Responses

The Government will review vendor responses for market research purposes only. The Government does not intend to provide a response to submissions for this RFI, but the Government reserves the right to hold a technical information exchange meeting after the RFI review at the agency’s discretion. These meetings will be scheduled at the discretion of the Government and may not be scheduled with all vendors that respond to the RFI.

In addition to Government review, the TSA intends to have employees of the firm identified below provide advisory services pertaining to the responses to this RFI. Therefore, it will be necessary to allow for the aforementioned company to have access to all responses received from this RFI. As such, companies that intend to submit proprietary information to TSA and require a non-disclosure agreement to be executed between the TSA contractor and your company, please notify [Toyia Lewis] via email at [Toyia.Lewis@tsa.dhs.gov]. A copy of the agreement shall be submitted with their response.

Global Systems Technologies 109 Floral Vale Boulevard Yardley PA 19067 215-579-8200

6.0 List of Acronyms

Acronym/Abbreviation Definition AAR Advanced Alarm Resolution AI Artificial Intelligence Ai Inherent Availability APS Accessible Property Screening AR Alarm Resolution ATO Authority to Operate BAA Broad Agency Announcement COI Critical Operational Issue CONOPS Concept of Operations DHS Department of Homeland Security ETD Explosives Trace Detection FSS Federal Supply Schedule GSA General Services Administration HME Homemade Explosives IT Information Technology LAG Liquids, Aerosols, and Gels NEPI Non-Explosive Prohibited Items OOE Opportunities of Encounter Pd Probability of Detection Pfa Probability of False Alarm QPL Qualified Products List RCA Requirements and Capability Analysis RFI Request for Information RFP Request for Proposal RHPED Requirements, Human Performance, and Engineering Division RMA Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability SOC Stream of Commerce STIP Security Technology Integration Program TRL Technology Readiness Level TSA Transportation Security Administration TSE Transportation Security Equipment