STSS Class JA - JA-2023-04-0910 BW Redacted.pdf

Justification and Approval FAR Part 6 authority

Desko Gottlieb-Keim-Straße 56, BAYREUTH GERMANY 95448

CEIA 9155 DUTTON DR, TWINSBURG OH 44087-1981 USA

Solicitation Numbers: The solicitation numbers for the IDIQs are TBD.

Background Information About the Requirement: Historically, TSA has awarded separate contracts for TSE production and support services, including STSS. The TSA awarded sole source STSS IDIQ contracts to Rapiscan in 2017 and to CEIA in 2018. Desko was awarded a competitive IDIQ contract for production of Boarding Pass Scanner (BPS) systems, system management support, engineering support, and maintenance. These contracts expire in 2023.

3. Description of Supplies/Services.

APM implements advanced security solutions to protect the nation’s transportation systems, ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce. Critical to APM’s mission is the ability to adapt its processes and capabilities to address dynamic, evolving threats posed to the nation’s transportation network. This includes the procurement of TSE for deployment at airports nationwide, in addition to performing upgrades or enhancements to currently deployed TSE to support TSA’s constantly evolving security posture. APM often requires technical support to enhance and sustain TSA’s security capabilities in the field in support of checkpoint screening operations. For example, TSA may require technical and engineering support services to support test activities related to Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) and other configuration management changes that result in system enhancements. These IDIQ contrac ts will include four primary requirements vital to support security technology in the field:

(a) System Management Support Support services to adhere to reporting, security, and safety requirements Support for preparation and facilitation of Program Management Reviews (PMR) and

Technical Interchange Meetings (TIM) Developing and maintaining TSE documentation (e.g., configuration management, technical/operational/maintenance manual updates) Conduct annual TSE refresher training for TSA Academy

(b) Engineering Support

Software or hardware improvements or upgrades Services to support test activities related to configuration management changes Other activities that require knowledge of TSE engineering data/support to meet TSA requirements, such as system enhancements and assessments.

(c) Information Technology (IT) Support Support services to comply with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) IT Security

Requirements for all fielded TSE such as security patching and anti-virus updates.

(d) Maintenance for BPS Units The Desko STSS contract will include maintenance for fielded BPS units. TSA does not have any other contracts that provide maintenance for BPS units. CEIA and Rapiscan STSS contracts will not contain maintenance as it is covered under a separate checkpoint maintenance contract.

The scope of the proposed contracts is for life cycle support services only and do not include procurement of the systems, nor installation and integration of the systems upon initial deployment. The purpose of the resulting contracts is to provide all other support services required throughout a deployed system’s life cycle.

4. Identification of Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition.

The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 41 U.S.C. 3304(a)(1), implemented by the FAR Subpart 6.302-1 entitled “Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.”

5. Demonstration that the Nature of the Acquisition Require Use of the Authority Cited.

The threat to transportation security evolves constantly while the systems and solutions TSA deploys to counter terrorist and other security threats may remain in service for many years. In order to maintain effectiveness while maximizing return on fielded security technology, TSA requires flexible technology systems that can adapt to maintain a high level of effectiveness as threats and adversaries change. If this Class Justification were not approved, and consequently, if contracts are not available to provide the needed engineering, IT, and maintenance services, the TSE covered by the STSS contracts would not continue to meet updated security and safety requirements, fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence or cyber vulnerability, will not be able to address unknown deficiencies experienced after deployment, or will no longer be able to be upgraded to meet new evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.

The OEMs of TSE have proprietary rights in the technology. This consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may include networking configurations for applic able TSE. TSA does not own the intellectual property or all data rights for TSE. As a result, only the OEM is capable of fulfilling specialized technical and engineering support requirements at the level of expertise required to ensure that the work is completed to the TSA specifications and other (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) guidance. System engineering services are especially critical to improving the detection capabilities and cybersecurity of TSE in the field and necessary to meet TSA security technology mission and objectives. As such, the OEMs are the only responsible sourc e c apable of satisfying TSA’s requirements at the level of expertise needed.

Further, some checkpoint security technology requires customized electrical, mechanical, and networking component configurations in order to conduct high volume automated screening and movement of passengers and their carry-on items. Because of these unique configurations, the costs involved to substitute presently available TSE are prohibitive. Factors such as system redesign, reprogramming, removal of existing systems and mechanical components, disposal, equipment movement, additional electrical requirements and operational testing all must be considered when evaluating the potential cost of switching or substitution. TSA also would suffer the loss of operational capability while redes ign and technology substitution is ongoing, thus, decreasing the TSA’s ability to screen passengers and their carry-on items accurately and efficiently. These factors represent substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.

As TSA does not own technology data or data rights in this TSE, the OEM is the only source respons ible to meet TSA’s configuration management requirements. This includes management of all configurable and adjustable parameters and adaptation data used to tailor the system, as well as their settings and values and inventory of hardware Configuration Items (CIs), software CIs, and firmware CIs with configuration identification data. Configuration management is also integral to implementing TSA’s changing security posture. As security technology systems are relocated, the OEM performs site acceptance tests (SAT) (that is witnessed by independent third parties) to verify that the system has been properly installed and integrated in the operational environment and verify the configuration baseline is consistent. Due to proprietary restrictions, the OEM is the only source that can install the changes to the fielded systems. Such services are critical in order to ensure that there will not be a negative impact on airport operations due to inoperable or malfunctioning security technology or ancillary equipment.

6. Description of Efforts Made to Ensure that Offers are Solicited from as Many Potential Sources as is Practicable.

On November 10, 2022, TSA issued Notice of Intent (NOI) TSA25-04-03771 for Rapiscan, and on January 3, 2023, issued NOI TSA25-04-03778 for Desko and CEIA on the sam.gov website. These notices indicated TSA’s intent to contract using other than full and open competition with the OEMs for engineering and technical services. In the NOIs, the TSA offered interested parties the opportunity to identify their interest and capability to respond to the requirement by November 25, 2022 and January 17, 2023. TSA did not receive any information to contradict the findings in this Justification. Further information regarding the market research that was conducted is described in Section 8.

7. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the Anticipated Cost to the Government will be

Fair and Reasonable.

The Contracting Officer will ensure that the anticipated cost to the Government is fair and reasonable through price analysis techniques in accordance with FAR 15.404-1 prior to award. In order to determine fair and reasonable pricing, the Contracting Officer anticipates using the IGCE, historical contract pricing, and actual cost data for comparison purposes.

8. Description of Market Research.

Market research has shown that while other commercial providers of similar services exist, the OEMs of TSE have proprietary rights in the technology which preclude these services from being provided by a third party. These proprietary rights consist of software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may also include proprietary networking configurations for applicable TSE.

Without this support, TSE deployed by TSA may not continue to meet updated security and safety requirements, could fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence, may not be able to address known deficiencies experienced after deployment, or may not be able to be upgraded to meet new and evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.

9. Any Other Facts Supporting the Use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.

The intended IDIQ contracts will be awarded on a sole source basis to each OEM as they are the only source able to upgrade, test, and change their systems due to proprietary restrictions. TSE are sophisticated electronic screening devices, and all of TSA’s deployed TSE for which TSA requires engineering services has proprietary information that is specific to the OEM. The proprietary information of the security technology consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated w ith the security technology and networking configuration. TSA does not own the intellectual property or data rights for the security technology to support a third party providing engineering services. Therefore, the OEM is the only source capable of providing services for the system it manufacturers. Efficiencies will be gained as one single contract for security technology support services will be in place for each OEM vendor, rather than separate contracts by technology.

10. A Listing of the Sources, if Any That Expressed, in Writing, an Interest in the Acquisition.

None.

11. A Statement of the Actions, if Any, the Agency May Take to Remove or Overcome Any Barriers to Competition Before Any Subsequent Acquisition for Supplies or Services Required.

APM is actively seeking out opportunities that will improve the interoperability of TSE through standardized interfaces for security system components and establishing standard image and data formats for certain technology systems. The standardization of component interfaces will allow accelerated independent development of critical component technologies as well as the establishment of modular security system platforms. Standardized image and data formats will reduce barriers to integration that exist because of the technical differences between vendor proprietary systems. It will also provide flexibility to acquire capabilities that have the potential to be integrated with independently developed detection algorithms, imaging programs, and operating platforms. Efforts such as development of common graphical user interfaces (CGUI) are ongoing to support common system platforms as well.

Once common system architecture is developed, APM intends to engage in new partnerships to inc rease the number of vendors to support TSA security technology.

Until system architecture allows for more competition of security technology systems and engineering support services, TSA will continue to need the expertise supplied by TSE OEMs to assure that its fleet of TSE is able to evolve and meet new challenges that may not have been present when the TSE initially was procured and deployed.

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12. Contracting Officer’s Certification.

I certify that the data supporting the recommended use of other than full and open competition is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Jessica Seay Security Technology Acquisition Division Contracting and Procurement

13. Technical/Requirements Personnel Certification.

I certify this requirement meets the Government’s minimum need and that the supporting data, which forms a basis for this justification, is complete and accurate.

Geoffrey Kirby Technical Representative Acquisition Program Management

14. CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL

Concurrence:

Jessica Seay Contracting Officer Security Technology Acquisition Division Contracting and Procurement

Marvin Grubbs Competition Advocate

JESSICA L

SEAY

Digitally signed by

JESSICA L SEAY

Date: 2023.02.07 12:35:38 -05'00'

GEOFFREY N

KIRBY

Digitally signed by

GEOFFREY N KIRBY

Date: 2023.02.07 13:40:55 -05'00'

JESSICA L

SEAY

Digitally signed by

JESSICA L SEAY

Date: 2023.02.07 13:54:04 -05'00'

CHARLES

M GRUBBS

Digitally signed by

CHARLES M GRUBBS

Date: 2023.02.23 16:09:45 -05'00'

Approval:

J. William Weinberg Head of the Contracting Activity

Transportation Security Administration

JOSEPH W

WEINBERG

Digitally signed by

JOSEPH W WEINBERG

Date: 2023.02.28 15:54:45 -05'00'