Zim_Ag_Eval_Final_Report_-_6.12.14_DH_Format.pdf

FEBRUARY 2014

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Development & Training Services, Inc. (dTS) for the USAID/Zimbabwe Economic Growth Office under Contract

No. RAN-I-00-09-00015, Task Order No. 613-TO-13-00001. Authors: Janet Kerley, Lighton Dube, Felix Tete, and

Surendra Bhatta.

ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURAL

PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

Prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, USAID Contract Number AID-RAN-

I-00-09-00015, Task Order Number AID-613-TO-13-00001, Zimbabwe Agricultural Portfolio Evaluation.

Implemented by:

Development & Training Services, Inc. (dTS)

4600 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 402

Arlington, VA 22203

Phone: +1 703-465-9388

Fax: +1 703-465-9344 www.onlinedts.com http://www.onlinedts.com/

ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURAL

PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

FEBRURARY 2014

DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United

States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Page intentionally left blank.

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT i

CONTENTS

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... v

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ i

Chapter One: Introduction, Evaluation Purpose, Background and Country Context

Purpose of The Evaluation

Evaluation Questions

Methodology

Zimbabwe Development Context

Economic Context of Smallholder Agriculture

USAID Strategy and Activities in Response to Agriculture and Livelihoods Problems

USAID Involvement in Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Sector

USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy, Development Hypothesis and Development Objective 2

Chapter Two: Findings and Conclusions

Introduction

I. Effectiveness of the Management of the Transition Between the Recovery Phase and the Development Phase

II. Appropriateness of Portfolio Design

Initial Response

Phase I Program Design Solutions

Phase II Program Design Solutions

Beneficiaries’ Satisfaction with Support

Types of Support Beneficiaries Received

Conclusions on Appropriateness of Designs

III. Critical Program Assumptions

IV. Achievement of Intended Objectives: Did Household Food Security, Incomes, Production and Productivity, and Employment Increase in Targeted Areas?

Achievement of Intended Objectives

Household Food Security

Productivity

Production

Employment

Income

V. Degree to which Activities Incorporated and Provided Real Benefits to Women

VI.Were Agricultural Production Systems, Market Linkages, Credit Financing Systems and an Effective Policy and Regulatory Environment Established?

Agricultural Production Systems and Market Linkages

Credit Financing System

Effective Policy and Regulatory Environment

Achievements

Inter-project Coordination Among Livelihood and Agricultural Portfolio Projects ii USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

Sustainability

Chapter Three: Conclusions and Recommendations

Overall Performance

Appropriateness of Portfolio Design

Achievement of Intended Objectives

Recommendations

Appropriate Portfolio Design

Achievement of Intended Objectives

Policy Reform

Access to Financing

Coordination

Policy and Enabling Environment

Zim-ACP

Success Stories

Annexes

Annex A. Scope of Work

Annex B. Evaluation Methodology

Annex C. Evaluation Tools

Annex D. Descriptions of Phase One and Phase Two Projects

Annex E. List of Meetings, Interviews, and Focus Group Discussions

Annex F. Quantitative Data Tables

Annex G. Qualitative Responses from Household Survey Questions

Annex H. Performance Monitoring Tables for Zim-AIED, Zim-ACP, and HWA

Annex I. Bibliography of Documents Reviewed

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Beneficiaries’ Satisfaction with Appropriateness of Support Received

Figure 2: Beneficiaries’ Degree of Satisfaction with the Appropriateness of Activities, by Project

Figure 3: Types of Support Received by Beneficiaries, Self-reported

Figure 4: Support Received by Beneficiaries from the USAID Projects

Figure 5: Beneficiaries’ Statement of Changes Seen As a Result of the Projects

Figure 6: Impact of Activities in Six Key Areas

Figure 7: Achievement of Intended Objectives: Food Security

Figure 8: Households Reporting at Each Level of HHS Score

Figure 9: Achievement of Intended Objectives: Productivity

Figure 10: Achievement of Intended Objectives. Production by Project

Figure 11: Achievement of Intended Objectives: Employment

Figure 12: Achievement of Intended Objectives: Income

Figure 13: Use of Extra Income

Figure 14: Word Cloud, Project Contributions to Development of Women Leaders

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number and Type of Respondents file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597337 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597338 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597339 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597343 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597344 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597345 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597346 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597347 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597348 file://SERVER/RedirectedFolders/jkerley/My%20Documents/Zimbabwe/Final%20Report/Draft%20Report%20and%20sections/FINAL%20REPORT/FINAL%20VERSION%20MAY%202014/Zim%20Ag%20Eval%20Final%20Report%202014%20June%202014.docx%23_Toc389597349

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT iii

Table 2: Phase I and Phase II Activities by Project, Value Chain, and Adoption by Zim-AIED

Table 3: Number of Farmers Trained Through SAT Demonstration Plots

Table 4: New Ideas and Technologies Adopted By Farmers as a Result of USAID Support

Table 5: Trends in Tea Production

Table 6: New Employment Creation Observed by Beneficiaries

Table 7: Women’s Involvement in Project Activities

Table 8: Involvement of Women in Community Associations Managing the Project. Percent of Total

Mentions

Table 9: Influence of Project on Status of Women. Percentage of Total Mentions, Multiple Answers Possible

Table 10: Number and Percent of Cumulative Disbursements by Gender (Zim-AIED Table 21)

Table 11: Recommendations for Continued/Future Support

LIST OF ANNEX TABLES

Annex Table 1: Survey Respondents by Marital Status

Annex Table 2: Survey Respondents by Sex

Annex Table 3: Survey Respondents by District

Annex Table 4: Tentative Distribution of Selected Evaluation Wards

Annex Table 5: Distribution of Actual Evaluation Wards Visited

Annex Table 6: Ward Sampling Intensity by IP

Annex Table 7: Percentage of Respondents by Project

Annex Table 8: List of Phase One Projects by Implementing Organization

Annex Table 9: List of Meetings, Interviews, and Focus Group Discussions

Annex Table 10: Zim-AIED Performance Indicator Summary Table. Source: Annual Report. FY 2013.

October 2013

Annex Table 11: Summary of Indicators

Annex Table 12: HWA Performance Indicator Summary Table. Source: USAID/Zimbabwe Results

Reporting FY 2013 (Q4 Revised)

LIST OF ANNEX FIGURES

Annex Figure 1: The dTS Evaluation Team at Work

Annex Figure 2: Theory of Change for Zim AIED Interventions. Adapted from Zim-AIED Q11Report July

Annex Figure 3: Support Received, FINTRAC

Annex Figure 4: Support Received, Land O’ Lakes

Annex Figure 5: Support Received, HWA

Annex Figure 6: Changes Observed, FINTRAC

Annex Figure 7: Changes Observed, Land O’ Lakes

Annex Figure 8: Changes Observed, HWA

Annex Figure 9: Number of Months during Which Food Aid Received Annually Before/After Project

Annex Figure 10: Number of Meals Consumed Daily Before/After Project

Annex Figure 11: Number of Months Self-sufficient From Own Harvest Before/After Project iv USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT v

ACRONYMS

ACDI/VOCA Agricultural Cooperative Development/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance

AEW Agricultural Extension Worker

AMA Agriculture Marketing Authority

AOR Agreement Officer’s Representative

APS Annual Program Statement

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

BIZ Bio-innovation Zimbabwe

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy

CIBER Competitiveness Impacts of Business Environment Reform

CLUSA Cooperative League of the United States of America

CNFA Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs

COR Contract Officer’s Representative

CRS Catholic Relief Services

CSO Civil Society Organization

DAEO District Agricultural Extension Officer

DAI Development Alternatives, Inc.

DCA Development Credit Authority

DFID Department for International Development

DO Development Objective dTS Development and Training Services, Inc.

EG Economic Growth

ESF Economic Support Fund

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FTF Feed the Future [Initiative]

FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Program

FY Fiscal Year

GDA Global Development Alliance

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [(German) Agency for International Cooperation]

GNDR Global Network for Disaster Reduction

GNU Government of National Unity

GOZ Government of Zimbabwe

HH Household

HHS Household Survey

HWA Hilfswerk Austria International

IO Implementing Organization

IP Implementing Partner

IR Intermediate Result

IRD International Relief and Development, Inc.

KII Key Informant Interview vi USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

LOL Land O’ Lakes

LPD Livestock Production and Development [Department, GOZ]

LSC Large-scale Commercial [Farmer]

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MABC Matabeleland Agri Business Chamber

MAMID Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development

MLRP Mashonaland Livelihoods Restoration Project

MNWLA Matabeleland North Women Livestock Association (MNWLA)

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPPA Manicaland Poultry Producers Association

MYAP Multi-year Assistance Program

NGO Non-governmental Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PAEO Provincial Agricultural Extension Officer

PMP Performance Management Plan

PRIZE Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe [Project]

R2DT Relief to Development Transition

RAIN Revitalizing Agricultural Incomes & New Markets (RAIN)

REALIZ Restoring Economic Agricultural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe [Project]

RLR Revitalization of Smallholder Agricultural Production in Zimbabwe [Project]

SAT Sustainable Agricultural Technology

SBU Sensitive but Unclassified

SOW Scope/Statement of Work

SSC Small-scale Commercial [Farmer]

STAMP Smallholder Technology and Access to Markets Program

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD U.S. Dollar[s]

USG United States Government

WVI World Vision International

ZAPAD Zimbabwe Agricultural Production & Agribusiness Development Project (ZAPAD)

ZCFU Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union

ZFU Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union

Zim-ACP Zimbabwe Agricultural Competitiveness Program

Zim-AIED Zimbabwe Agricultural Income and Employment Development [Program]

ZimVAC Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

ZRLP Zimbabwe Restoring Livelihoods Project

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the Agricultural Portfolio for USAID/Zimbabwe’s

Economic Growth Office (EG). The purpose of the evaluation was to review the entire portfolio of agricultural activities, rather than conduct project evaluations of implementing partners. Farmers referred to in this report are smallholder farmers1 unless mentioned otherwise. USAID will use the results of the evaluation to make design changes (as appropriate) and mid-course corrections to its current strategy, and to share lessons learned with key stakeholders. Lessons learned will inform follow-on activities. The evaluation was conducted from September to December 2013 by Development Training Services, Inc. (dTS).

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team examined USAID's current strategy and DO2 activities in terms of their relevance to meeting its economic growth objectives and FTF initiative objectives, taking into consideration the country context, past experience of USAID projects, and lessons learned from the projects.

The portfolio evaluation was organized by these topics: (1) Appropriateness of the portfolio design; (2)

Achievement of intended objectives under each phase; and (3) Transition Management between the recovery phase and the development phase. The evaluation paid particular attention to women’s incorporation into portfolio activities and the benefits they derived from that participation (Annex A. Scope of Work).

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team conducted a desk review of project documents and did fieldwork, including Focus

Group (FG) discussions (27); Key Informant Interviews (KII) (113); a mini household survey (94); positive deviance inquiry; and observations, to capture the attitudes and perceptions of beneficiaries.

Limitations to the data stem from the difficulty in locating participants of closed projects, potentially introducing a positive bias to the findings. Current political sensitivities in certain regions limited access to some individuals. Farmers were occasionally reluctant to speak about government programs, limiting the teams’ ability to determine the full picture of a program. Finally, data collection took place close to planting season.2 The full evaluation methodology is found in Annex B. Individuals interviewed are listed in Annex C.

COUNTRY CONTEXT AND USAID’S PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSE

During the 2009 recovery from hyperinflation, the smallholder agriculture sub-sector experienced a number of challenges that seriously affected its recovery and ability of the country to address food security. Chief among them were: depleted productive assets for smallholder farmers and limited access to inputs; loss of financial savings; insufficient agro-finance; high indebtedness; dilapidated rural infrastructure and services;

low production due to inadequate agronomic knowledge, poor agronomic practices and technologies and insufficient use of improved technologies; weak access to markets; an inadequate enabling environment and weak institutions; and political instability and land tenure insecurity.

1 A smallholder farmer is defined by FTF as “a beneficiary with five hectares or less of arable land or equivalent units of livestock, which are Cattle: 10 beef cows, Dairy: two milking cows, Sheep and Goats: five adult ewes/does, Camel Meat and Milk: five camel cows, Pigs: two adult sows, Chickens: 20 layers and 50 broilers.

2 Additional information on data limitations is found in Annex B. Evaluation Methodology.

ii USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

USAID began emergency and recovery programs in agriculture and economic growth in that same year. The activities addressed the need for under-skilled smallholder farmers to learn farming practices and gain access to tools to increase productivity. USAID funded 11 Economic Support Fund (ESF) agriculture sector development activities in Phase 1. The EG office also contributed $2M to a Title II program to improve resiliency and initiate the transition from emergency response to development.

Two contracts were awarded in Phase 2: The Zimbabwe Agricultural Income and Employment Development

Project (Zim-AIED) and the Zimbabwe Agricultural Competitiveness Program (Zim-ACP). Hilfswerk

Austria (HWA), a Global Development Alliance partnership, was incorporated into the portfolio in 2011.

Elements of the Land O’ Lakes (LOL) program were folded into Zim-AIED in November 2013.

EVALUATION FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The portfolio is innovative because it is introducing changes in systems and individuals’ mindsets about the agricultural sector at multiple levels: farmers, bankers, association leaders, government and private players in the sector, and policy makers. The lessons learned can be useful for the projects and beyond when the sector normalizes.

APPROPRIATENESS OF PORTFOLIO DESIGN

The Mission-level agricultural strategy and program design were well aligned to meet agriculture growth and food security objectives. The strategy and approaches used in Phases I and II remain appropriate. The

Transitional CDCS and DO2 PAD used past experiences and lessons learned and are well aligned with the

Agency’s FTF Initiative strategies and goals of reducing hunger and improving nutrition. All key issues of agriculture and food security are being addressed in these documents.

USAID effectively identified areas of intervention for the portfolio considering the country context at the time. Project designs are appropriate to achieve DO2 objectives. Phase I activities were appropriate for country conditions in 2009-2011; Phase II carried successful programs forward. The mix of portfolio activities was appropriate to address the two major challenges the agriculture sector faced—creating an enabling environment and improving productivity. Beneficiaries said they were very satisfied with the appropriateness of the design.

The question “Did critical program assumptions hold?” was addressed for three assumptions and the answers follow. (1) The national elections would result in a change of leadership and allow for changes in the project design. Given the results of the elections, short term national planning in agriculture is expected to continue on the same course. (2) The inability to work directly with the GOZ would introduce constraints.

The tense political environment and lack of trust among key stakeholders caused project start-up delays. As implementation progressed, stakeholder engagement increased and has contributed significantly to achieving results. (3) Funding for the EG Programs would remain constant or increase. Funding was reduced by 45% in

FY 2013. Therefore, programs are not likely to be fully funded which has implications for focusing activities.

ACHIEVEMENT OF INTENDED OBJECTIVES

The expected outcomes of DO2 programs were achieved: improved ability of households to meet food needs, and increased staple food and cash crop production, incomes, rural employment, and access to markets and credit.

Improved Household Food Security

This overarching goal of the project was achieved. Participants selected were “vulnerable [poor] but viable” farmers with an annual household income on average between $400 and $500. Project participants are

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT iii considerably less vulnerable to food insecurity due to the project. Eighty-three percent of the families surveyed had “little to no hunger” after participating and 79% said their food security situation improved due to USAID-supported programs. Eighty-six percent of the households reported that household nutrition also improved.

Increased Productivity and Production

Significant increases were achieved in productivity and the volume and value of marketed surplus. Project stakeholders and beneficiaries corroborated project findings. Two factors played a decisive role in increasing productivity and production: (1) the training/capacity building provided by all implementing partners for stakeholders at all levels of the value chain; and (2) adoption of new ideas and technologies by farmers.

Impact of Capacity Building and Training

Capacity building and training was one of the most successful achievements of the portfolio in both Phase I and Phase II. Training was provided at all levels, to individual farmers, association members, and stakeholders at the national level. The performance of the trained farmers showed remarkable improvement and farmers exhibited a paradigm shift towards commercial production. The training provided by Sustainable Agricultural

Technology (SAT) in the Zim-AIED program was practical and used hands-on methods.

“Farming as a Business” was a fundamental concept taught in all projects and is beginning to overcome the donor dependency attitude that had arisen among the farmers.

A cascading training approach enabled IPs to reach a large number of people.

A majority of the training was provided by implementing partners. Ensuring training programs are sustained when the project ends by facilitating moving the training to local institutions will increase sustainability.

Impact on Women Beneficiaries

Women have been adequately incorporated into and are deriving real benefits from portfolio activities. All partners introduced activities to address gender issues and established monitoring and evaluation systems which tracked results disaggregated by men and women.

Women have participated nearly equally in training and have increased their incomes and access to assets.

Social relationships are changing as women gain economic power. Women’s access to leadership positions in.

community and industry organizations has increased. Women continue to face barriers in accessing credit however. The loan disbursement rate for Zim-AIED’s AgriTrade facility shows that women are still relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to credit financing; 31 percent of beneficiaries were women. The respondents to the survey and in the focus groups expressed the same concern.

During the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, women were often the principal farmers and may have been able to avail themselves of opportunities provided by the projects in ways not possible previously. USAID mainstreamed the agency’s gender policy resulting in women making significant gains.

Effective Enabling Environment and Policy Reform

Zim-ACP is meeting its objectives of improving the enabling environment through its capacity building support to national and regional associations to become skilled in advocating for policy reforms. The agribusiness associations and farmers’ unions have successfully analysed and prepared draft legislation.

Five new laws have been passed/approved and implementation has begun. The impact of the new legislation should begin to appear this year.

iv USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

Twenty draft legislation/decrees were presented for consideration and 35 were presented for public/stakeholder consultation.

Zim-ACP also built the capacity of farmers’ unions and commodity associations to dialogue with government ministries and the government is increasingly interested in what these associations are discussing. GoZ representatives participated in the ‘Competitiveness Impacts of Business Environment Reform’ (CIBER) assessment, stakeholder meetings facilitated by Zim-ACP, and various government units are increasingly participating at the regional level with farmers associations. The project still does not directly work with GoZ.

Two components did not meet their initially established targets: increasing efficiencies in agricultural markets

(Component 2) and enhancing business service providers’ capacity to deliver training to firms and farmers

(Component 3). The project is meeting targets for one of four indicators for these components. Most of the market infrastructure and institutions are in the public domain and the current U.S. policy does not allow

Zim-ACP to work directly with them. Component 3 was integrated into Components 1 and 2 and is no longer a separate component. The work plan modified the indicators and targets to correspond to the greater emphasis on Component 1.

Credit Financing System

CNFA (Phase 1) provided loan guarantees to input suppliers to provide inputs on loan to agro dealers

(primarily rural business people trading in agricultural inputs and buyers of agricultural produce). The agro dealers then could provide inputs and services to smallholder farmers. CNFA linked trained agro dealers to the Agritrade facility. Zim-AIED built on this approach (Phase 2), established a $5 million revolving credit facility with AgriTrade. AgriTrade disbursed $12.70 million in 1,453 loans as of July 2013.3

The agro dealer loan recipients view the program favorably; interest rates were lower than other finance institutions and the collateral required was reasonable. While substantial progress was made on improving access to credit, two structural challenges continue to confront AgriTrade: the limited supply of appropriately structured credit for smallholder agriculture from Zimbabwe’s financial and commercial banking institutions and incomplete information for banks to assess creditworthiness of nontraditional borrowers.

Financing has reached a relatively small number of beneficiaries, but represents progress compared with the lack of available credit to smallholder farmers at the outset of the project. Some commercial banks have started lending to the agriculture sector and borrowers and lenders are building their experience, transactions and relationships. The elements of cost sharing, training, and technical assistance were particularly important for Zimbabwe since there was no longer a connection between the farmers and commercial enterprises.

Implementation Gaps

Gaps in implementation were identified, such as delayed delivery of inputs in both phases, uneven performance of sub-partners and relatively inexperienced support service personnel.

Integration and Coordination among Interventions

USAID’s existing portfolio interventions cover all elements needed to impact positively on the DO2 goal to increase food security for the targeted populations. Given the complex nature of the portfolio and achievements of the entire portfolio to date, it is evident that the quality of technical planning and implementation is very high. Partially because of this, each project works primarily on its own specific set of

3 AgriTrade Monthly Report to USAID. 31 July 2013. p. 1.

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT v activities with good intra-project coordination and less coordination with other projects, even in areas where both projects’ activities are addressing a similar issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

APPROPRIATENESS OF PORTFOLIO DESIGN

Given reduced funding, USAID will need to reconsider the focus of the current portfolio to determine which innovations can be moved forward.

The programs were designed before the CDCS and DO2 PAD were finalized and prior to FTF. Hence gaps exist between the operations of the portfolio and the mission strategy which is aligned with FTF guidance. The Mission can either realign or add components to the existing projects if applicable, or design new projects to minimize the operational gaps.

ACHIEVEMENT OF INTENDED OBJECTIVES

Farmers will need support from outside for sustaining the farming practices, with the exception of the contract farmers who may receive updates from the buyers. Few institutions being trained have shown the capacity to provide this support to farmers after the project ends.

Sustainability of the training is critical to continuing to upgrade the systems and the farmers, but depends upon identifying institutions to continuously provide the training, be they government extension services, or other committed institutions to carry on the work. Catalog the training courses conducted by the partners.

Begin to build institutional support outside the projects and coordinate with Zimbabwean organizations to continue the training. While the national agricultural extension system would be the best institutional base, given the USG policy restrictions, commodity associations, farmers’ unions, and extension worker training institutions can play a role in continuing the training. Farmers’ organizations should be encouraged to provide extension services to their members.

Consider including other players to support these training activities, such as Agricultural Finance Houses that can build some of the courses into their support package for farmers. Make it a requirement for first time borrowers to go through the training modules.

All the recommendations on training require an overhaul of the extension system - move it away from extension for subsistence needs towards extension for commercial goals. ZIM-ACP can facilitate this paradigm shift.

Encourage more collaboration among projects on technically proven approaches to engage households, such as tools developed in home gardening, food fortification, farming as a business training, and commodity selection, creating a core set of approaches that are appropriate for all programs and identifying specialized techniques.

Assess the selection process to identify sub-partners and tighten the selection of sub-partners to avoid short changing the farmers. Some local partners or actors supported by projects to provide inputs and services have not met the expectation.

Continue to improve the capacity of local organizations. While institutional training was provided, some institutions continue to be fragile and need additional support. They ultimately determine the long-term sustainability of interventions. Include farmers in development and design of activities at the local level, not only in farming practices, but also in seeking their advice on service providers. This increases trust among the parties and increases sustainability by sharing ownership.

vi USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

Potential activities that could be scaled up are Zim-AIED’s model of value chain approach and the market linkage approach in high value cash crops, such as banana and paprika and Land O’ Lakes dairy model.

POLICY REFORM

To increase effectiveness, seek maximum cooperation with GoZ under the constraints. Successful advocacy work remains dependent upon continued willingness of GoZ to participate fully in the dialogue.

Alternate financing will be needed to support a secretariat or umbrella organization to carry on the work of Zim-ACP. The farmer associations are expected to carry on training and other services provided by

Zim-ACP. Few have the revenue base to continue activities on their own or support such a secretariat.

Broaden the type of services the associations can provide on a fee basis to make them sustainable.

Zim-ACP should continue to strengthen associations so they have the skills to do at least the basic minimum analysis.

ACCESS TO FINANCING

Continue work to increase access to financing for women. Agritrade can consider a special loan facility for women beneficiaries to increase the uptake of loans by women.

Consider an insurance component for farmers’ investments, to ensure that when farmers pay for insurance coverage, the companies honor the contracts. A local company has introduced Ecofarmer, with an insurance component for maize production. USAID could consider engaging this and other players to identify suitable products tailor-made to suit the farmers and value chains they are supporting.

COORDINATION

The program should consider strategies to increase the overall impact of the portfolio through increased efficiencies to be gained from coordination among USAID offices, given diminishing resources.

Achieving DO2 would be easier if there were closer programming integration between the Humanitarian

Assistance Office and Economic Growth Office.

The discussions already underway to discuss how best to develop synergies and complementarities between the two programs should continue between the two offices. A common thread clearly exists between the approach of targeting HA resources and the market-led, value chain-based approach of EG agricultural growth activities. Complement and supplement the activities by sharing best practices, technical knowledge, relationships and build on success. Consider increased geographic targeting to continue the type of collaboration undertaken in the PRIZE program. Both programs could work in the same geographic location where EG programs involve the vulnerable yet viable households and HA programs engage the most vulnerable ones.

The Economic Growth Office should also consider increasing coordination among the major EG partners, Zim-ACP and Zim-AIED, and potentially HWA and HA partners. The programs are complementary to each other and should work together.

Offices should discuss the value of focusing on fewer partners and in fewer value chains in order to work more deeply, as opposed to working broadly. Narrowing the geographic and commodity focus will allow the Mission to provide more FTF-related interventions and also provide more needed support to actors in a commodity value chain that will better strengthen the selected value chain.

USAID should initiate and lead the partner coordination by creating a stronger forum/platform for implementing partners to share experiences and integrate programs. A successful strategy is to have periodic food security implementing partner meetings to share progress, and identify and plan activities to realize synergies needed to integrate projects in a geographic region.

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT vii

POLICY AND ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

Ensure smallholder issues are considered in the policy process. Policy issues are being advocated by the associations at the national level, with input from provincial offices for some associations. This is a caution to maintain attention on including small holders’ issues. Most of the association office holders are larger farmers and smallholder issues may get neglected in the process if they are not made part of it.

viii USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION,

EVALUATION PURPOSE,

BACKGROUND AND COUNTRY

CONTEXT

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the Agricultural Portfolio for USAID/Zimbabwe’s

Economic Growth Office (EG). USAID/Zimbabwe undertook this performance evaluation to review the entire portfolio of agricultural activities and determine (i) whether the design of the agricultural portfolio was appropriate, given the country context at the time, and (ii) whether its projects have and are achieving desired results. The evaluation is not intended to serve as project performance evaluations.

USAID will use the results of the evaluation to make design changes (as appropriate) and mid-course corrections to its current strategy, and to share lessons learned with key stakeholders. The implementing partners will learn about their strengths and weaknesses and adjust their projects accordingly. Finally, lessons learned from this evaluation will inform follow-on portfolio activities to be designed in FY 2014/2015. The evaluation was conducted from September to December, 2013 by Development Training Services, Inc. (dTS).

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team was tasked to examine USAID's current strategy and DO2 activities in terms of their relevance to meeting its economic growth objectives and FTF initiative objectives, taking into consideration the country context, past experience of USAID projects, and lessons learned from the projects. Farmers referred to in this report are smallholder farmers unless mentioned otherwise.

The evaluation examined interventions of the portfolio organized under three main topics: (1)

Appropriateness of the portfolio design; (2) Achievement of intended objectives under each phase and in household food security, household agricultural incomes, and agricultural productivity in the targeted geographic zones; and (3) Transition Management between the recovery phase and the development phase.

The evaluation gave focused attention to the degree to which women were incorporated into and derived benefits from the interventions.

Each topic has a related set of sub-questions which are listed below.

Appropriateness of Portfolio Design

1. Were Phase I and Phase II portfolio designs appropriate, given the political and economic conditions that existed in 2008/2009 and 2010?

2. Given varying levels of coordination and collaboration between USAID development and humanitarian assistance programming, as well as other donor programs, were/are the mix of Economic Growth activities sufficient and appropriate to meet USAID's objectives?

3. Which critical assumptions held for each phase and which did not? If some critical assumptions did not hold, which did not, why, and what effect did that have on achieving project objectives?

2 USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

Achievement of Intended Objectives under Each Phase

4. To what extent did household food security, household agricultural incomes, and agricultural productivity increase in the targeted geographic zones?

5. To what extent were women beneficiaries adequately incorporated into and deriving real benefit from interventions?

6. How well has USAID programming established sustainable agricultural production systems, market linkages between input suppliers, farmers, and buyers, credit financing systems, and an effective policy and regulatory enabling environment? For Phase II development activities that are still underway, how well are they creating the right conditions for long-term sustainability?

7. How and how well did USAID programming adapt to changing conditions on the ground, addressing challenges and taking advantage of opportunities presented?

8. What modifications to the design of Phase II portfolio activities (Zim-AIED, HWA and Zim-ACP) are needed to more effectively achieve the stated FTF and long-term sector development objectives?

Transition Management

9. Was the transition between the recovery and development phases managed effectively by USAID and its implementing partners?

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation used several data collection methods

(mixed-methods): a desk review of project documents and fieldwork using focus group discussions (FG) (27); key informant interviews (KII) (113); a mini household survey

(94); positive deviance inquiry/success stories (7), and observations (Table 1). The team reviewed each project’s design and implementation in the field to identify how it aligns with USAID/Zimbabwe’s CDCS strategy and DO2 objectives. Some projects may have been referenced more frequently than others as they have more components. The importance of all programs contributing to the portfolio was appreciated.

Based on the Rao size software (www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html), the mini survey’s (household survey) target was ninety four households. This number is based on the goal of a target population of one hundred and fifty thousand4 (which was the highest achieved target by implementing partner for Zim AIED).

Three major limitations to data collection arose during the implementation of the evaluation. First, the team had difficulty locating participants of closed projects, potentially introducing a positive bias to the findings.

The second limitation came as a result of the current political sensitivities in some geographic regions.

Farmers were sometimes reluctant to speak about government programs, thus limiting the teams’ ability to determine the full picture of what had happened. A third limitation was the timing of the data collection which took place close to planting season thereby restricting access to some of the farmers.5 The full

4 Participation in Zim-AIED in October 2013 was 122,823 households, “Zim-AIED Annual Report FY2013.” p. 2.

5 Additional information on the data limitations is found in Annex B. Evaluation Methodology.

Table 1: Number and Type of Respondents

Method Number/Percent

Focus Groups 27

FG Participants 200

Mini Household Survey 94

Women 55%

Men 45%

Key Informant Interviews 113 http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 3

evaluation methodology is described in Annex A, Scope of Work; Annex B, Evaluation Methodology; and

Annex C, Evaluation Tools. The list of individuals interviewed is found in Annex D.

ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Since 2000, Zimbabwe has experienced a series of economic, political and social challenges resulting in loss of livelihoods, widespread poverty and human displacement, high unemployment, and reduced food security.

Inflation spiraled out of control and because of the economic turmoil; Zimbabwe lost its major driving forces for economic growth, agriculture and industry. In 2008, Zimbabwe faced 231 million percent peak hyperinflation and a high unemployment rate; nearly 80 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. Between 2000 and 2008, the national economy contracted by as much as 50 percent; GDP per capita dropped by 40 percent, agricultural output dropped by 79 percent, and industrial production dropped by 47 percent. The agricultural sector has struggled, more than most, to cope with the combined effects of the Fast

Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP), hyper-inflation, capital constraints and government controls on markets. The 2013 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee’s (ZimVAC) rural livelihoods report, which estimates food insecurity levels, predicts that ‘2.2 million Zimbabweans will be unable to access sufficient food during the peak hunger period, January – March 2014. This is the highest level of food insecurity since 2009.’6

Agriculture has traditionally been the backbone of Zimbabwe’s economy. The sector accounts for 16 to 207 percent of the country’s GDP8 and provides a livelihood for three-quarters of the country’s population, including farmers, traders and agro-processors. Agriculture is the primary livelihood for most of the 60 percent of the population residing in rural areas.9 The agricultural sector contributes over 60 percent of manufacturing value-added, i.e. the value addition from industry comes from agro-industries and also input manufacturing. The agricultural sector accounts for one-third of Zimbabwe’s export earnings.10

However, as noted in USAID/Zimbabwe’s Transitional Country Development Cooperation Strategy

(CDCS), “the economic collapse severely disrupted commercial supply chain and retail marketing systems, causing chronic food and agricultural commodity shortages. Poorly designed policies, a structural shift in the agriculture sector to smaller farms, declining agricultural extension capabilities, significant deterioration in the agricultural inputs supply chain, and loss of livestock for tillage and household savings inhibited food production, resulting in significant food deficits at both the national and household levels.”11

ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE

During the 2009/10 recovery from hyperinflation, the smallholder agriculture sub-sector experienced a number of challenges that seriously affected its recovery, growth and ability of the country to address food security. Chief among them were:

6 Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac). “ZimVac Interim Rural Food Security Assessment National Report.”

August 30, 2013. p. 124.

7 World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe. “Zimbabwe Agricultural Assessment Study. Final Report.” December 2010.

Harare: PricewaterhouseCoopers.

8 Global Finance: “Zimbabwe Country Report.” Accessed January 2014. http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/143-zimbabwe-gdp-country-report.html 9 The World Bank, World Development Indicators. “Rural Population (% of total population).” Accessed January 2014.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS.

10 World Bank and Government of Zimbabwe. “Zimbabwe Agricultural Assessment Study. Final Report.” December 2010.

Harare: PricewaterhouseCoopers.

11 USAID/Zimbabwe. “Transitional Country Development Cooperation Strategy.” p. 6.

4 USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

Depleted productive assets for a majority of smallholder farmers and limited access to inputs. In an effort to survive the economic meltdown, most smallholder farmers had to sell most of their productive assets, such as livestock and farming equipment.12 This strategy was a short-term measure that then left most farmers vulnerable in the long term, as they lost their capacity to produce. Farmers were in serious need of access to inputs: improved seed, fertilizer, crop protection pesticide, and water.

Loss of financial savings due to hyper-inflation, currency reforms and dollarization of the economy.

During this period, Zimbabwe went through a series of currency reforms in an attempt to cope with the hyperinflation the country was experiencing. The hyperinflation drastically reduced the total worth of farmers’ past savings, as most had been in the local currency. As a result of hyperinflation and subsequent dollarization of local currency, farmers became bankrupt overnight, losing their savings and ability to finance farming activities from their own resources.

Conversion of utility bills (electricity, telecommunications and water) from the Zimbabwean dollar to US dollars left most farmers highly indebted; the loss of past Zimbabwean dollar savings made it virtually impossible for most smallholder farmers to honor these bills. As a result, many lost their electric, water and telecommunication services. This move left a number of irrigation schemes and most milk processing centers inoperable.

Insufficient agro-finance. The liquidity challenges that were facing the country made it difficult for banks to lend to the agricultural sector. Seasonal lending was seriously affected, as banks preferred to provide short-term consumer loans over a six-month repayment period to productively employed citizens. In addition, few farmers had (have) access to credit to finance the purchase of seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and supplemental labor due to insufficient collateral and lack of relationships with financial institutions. Access to credit was not only limited to farmers but also to the off-farm actors in the value chain. The banking sector had no experience in dealing with smallholder farmers and viewed them as non-bankable. Further, difficulties experienced by the population with the banking and financial system resulted in a majority of people losing confidence in the formal finance sector.

Dilapidated productive agriculture, rural infrastructure and services. Due to years of poor maintenance and declining public expenditure on social infrastructure, most productive agriculture and rural infrastructure was dilapidated. This included irrigation infrastructure, rural banking infrastructure, input supply infrastructure and services, produce marketing infrastructure and services, and transport and telecommunication infrastructure. Institutions to service farmers were weakened, as most of the highly skilled and experienced extension and research experts left public service in search of better opportunities in neighboring countries and internationally. The decayed infrastructure made it unprofitable for service providers to work with rural smallholder farmers.

Low agriculture production and productivity due to inadequate agronomic knowledge, poor agronomic practices, poor technologies and insufficient use of improved technologies. Smallholder farmers were characterized by a low capacity to farm efficiently due to lack of training and low access to technological tools. As noted in the CDCS,13 “the reform process redistributed land to subsistence and small-scale commercial farmers who are climate dependent, …do not fully utilize good agricultural practices, …and to recipients with no farming experience …but the greatest capacity reduction has been in the technical and managerial labor needed to work the land, due to large scale displacement of commercial farmers and their former employees.” Farmers needed new information about techniques and training in skills to apply knowledge about improved inputs, management practices, farming techniques for improved farming, 12This happened primarily before the 2009 multi-currency period.

13 USAID/Zimbabwe. “Transitional Country Development Cooperation Strategy.” p. 7.

USAID/ZIMBABWE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 5

processing technologies such as grading, sorting, packaging, and changes in government policy to suit market preferences. Further, due to the economic hardships, a significant portion of the male population left rural areas to seek work outside the country, leaving women and children to conduct most farm operations in communal areas.

Weak linkages and access to markets. Very few smallholder farmers had experience producing in quantity and at quality levels demanded by commercial buyers. Most buyers did not have relationships with smallholder farmers, nor were their logistical systems designed to work with hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers.