Attachment_6.G_-_CA_Regional_Security_Initiative.pdf

Central America Regional Security Initiative:

Background and Policy Issues for Congress

Peter J. Meyer

Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

December 17, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-5700 www.crs.gov

R41731

Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service

Summary Central America faces significant security challenges. Criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems, and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment contribute to widespread insecurity in the region. Consequently, improving security conditions in these countries is a difficult, multifaceted endeavor. Since U.S. drug demand contributes to regional security challenges and the consequences of citizen insecurity in Central America are potentially far-reaching—as demonstrated by the increasing number of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees arriving at the U.S. border—the United States is collaborating with countries in the region to implement and refine security efforts.

Criminal Threats

Well-financed drug trafficking organizations, gangs, smugglers, and other criminal groups are threating citizen security and the rule of law in Central America. The isthmus has become a major transshipment point for illicit drugs as counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have disrupted other trafficking routes to the United States. At the same time, clashes between street gangs have paralyzed cities and intensified violence. Several Central American countries now have homicide rates that are among the highest in the world. The resulting desperation has created opportunities for smugglers and traffickers to prey on Central Americans attempting to travel, or to send their children, to the United States.

Social and Political Factors

Throughout Central America, underlying social conditions and structural weaknesses in governance inhibit efforts to improve security. Persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Given the limited opportunities other than emigration available to the expanding youth populations in Central America, young people are particularly vulnerable. The failure to fully implement post-conflict institutional reforms that were initiated in several countries in the 1990s has left police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption. Recent scandals that have led to the resignations of the president of

Guatemala and senior officials in Honduras demonstrate the extent to which criminality has infiltrated state institutions.

Central American Security Policies

Central American governments have attempted to improve security conditions in a variety of ways. The Honduran government has taken a hardline approach to crime, deploying military forces to carry out policing functions. The Salvadoran government is pursuing similar policies after the truce it brokered between criminal gangs broke down. The Guatemalan government has also embraced a larger role for the military in public security while simultaneously working with the U.N.-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to strengthen its investigative and prosecutorial capacities and root out corruption. Other Central American governments have emphasized modern policing strategies and prevention activities, such as programs that focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth. Recognizing the transnational nature of the threats they face, Central American governments have also sought to improve regional security cooperation.

U.S. Assistance

Since FY2008, the U.S. government has supported security efforts in Central America through the

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The initiative provides the seven nations of the isthmus with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement operations. CARSI is also designed to strengthen the long-term capacities of Central

American governments to address security challenges and the underlying social and political factors that contribute to them. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated nearly $1.2 billion for

Central America through CARSI. As of the end of FY2015, $457 million of the funds allocated to

CARSI had been expended.

The Obama Administration requested $286.5 million for CARSI in FY2016 as part of a broader

$1 billion request to support a new “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America.” Although the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029) would not fully fund the Administration’s request for Central America, it would provide $750 million for the region, including $348.5 million for CARSI. The bill would also place a number of conditions on the assistance, requiring governments in the region to take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, increase revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions.

Contents

Introduction

Background: Central American Security Challenges

Underlying Societal Conditions Structural Weaknesses in Governance Criminal Threats

Drug Trafficking Organizations Gangs Other Criminal Organizations

Central American Policy Approaches

Mano Dura and Militarization Law Enforcement and Institutional Reform Prevention Regional Cooperation

U.S. Policy

Background Central America Regional Security Initiative

Funding Implementation Programs Results

Additional Issues for Congressional Consideration

Strategy and Funding Levels Human Rights Concerns Relation to U.S. Domestic Policies

Drug Demand Illicit Financial Flows Arms Trafficking Deportations

Outlook

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Central America

Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Central America and Mexico: 2014

Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes

Figure 4. CARSI Allocations by Country

Tables

Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico: 2008-2013

Table 2. Central America Social Indicators

Table 3. CARSI Funding: FY2008-FY2016

Appendixes

Appendix. CARSI Appropriations Legislation: FY2008-FY2015

Contacts

Author Contact Information

Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction The security situation in Central America has deteriorated over the past decade. Gangs, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups have expanded their activities, contributing to escalating levels of crime and violence that have alarmed citizens and overwhelmed governments. Violence is particularly intense in the “northern triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and

Honduras, which have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Citizens of those nations now rank crime as the top problem facing their countries, and an increasing number have sought refuge abroad. Crime and violence also take an economic toll on the countries of the region, which is estimated to range from 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in Costa Rica to 10.5% of GDP in Honduras.

While some analysts argue that the growth of organized crime in Central America poses challenges to U.S. strategic interests and may present a greater threat to regional security than the civil conflicts of the 1980s, U.S. policymakers have only recently begun to offer increased attention and financial support to the region. During the 1980s, U.S. economic and military assistance to Central America averaged nearly $1.4 billion (inflation-adjusted 2013 dollars) annually to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region.

U.S. attention to the region declined significantly in the early 1990s, however, as the civil wars ended and Cold War concerns faded. The U.S. government continued to provide Central

American nations with some assistance for narcotics interdiction and institutional capacity building, but the funding levels were comparatively low.

U.S. security assistance to the region did not increase substantially until FY2008 with the introduction of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance program that focused primarily on Mexico but also included some funding for Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration re-launched the Central America portion of the Mérida

Initiative as the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Whereas most U.S.

security efforts in Central America since the 1990s have focused on preventing illicit narcotics from reaching the United States, CARSI is designed to address a broader array of security concerns. While it continues to support immediate law enforcement and interdiction operations, it also aims to strengthen the capacities of communities and governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying conditions that contribute to them. Since FY2008, 1 For the purposes of this report, “Central America” includes all seven countries of the isthmus: Belize, Costa Rica, El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

2 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, ed., The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance

Across 10 Years of the Americas Barometer, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), December 2014, p. 13 (hereinafter, Zechmeister, 2014).

3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for

Latin America, Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014, November 2013, p. 6.

4 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Regional Security

Cooperation: An Examination of the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin

Security Initiative (CBSI), prepared statement of Michael Shifter, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 19, 2013, p. 1; Steven S.

Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras, Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute and the University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, May 2010, p. 27 (hereinafter, Dudley, May 2010).

5 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign

Aid, https://explorer.usaid.gov/index.html.

6 For information on the Mérida Initiative in Mexico, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:

The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.

Congressional Research Service 2

Congress has appropriated nearly $1.2 billion for the seven nations of Central America through the Mérida Initiative and CARSI.

Although more than seven years have passed since Congress first appropriated funding for the initiative, Central America continues to face significant security challenges. As Congress evaluates budget priorities and considers additional assistance for the region, it may examine the scope of the security challenges in Central America, the current efforts being undertaken by the governments of Central America to address those challenges, and how the United States has supported Central American efforts. This report provides background information about these topics and raises potential policy issues regarding U.S.-Central America security cooperation that

Congress may opt to consider, such as the strategy and funding levels necessary to achieve U.S.

objectives, how best to promote and protect human rights, and how U.S. domestic policies impact security conditions in the region.

Figure 1. Map of Central America

Source: CRS.

Note: The “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are pictured in orange.

Congressional Research Service 3

Background: Central American Security Challenges As in neighboring Mexico, the countries of Central America—particularly the northern triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—are dealing with escalating homicides and generalized crime committed by drug traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. While drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has captured U.S. policymakers’ attention, the even more dire security situations in many Central American countries have received considerably less focus or financial support from the United States.

In 2013, the homicide rate per 100,000 people in

Mexico stood at 18.9, a rate exceeded by those of El Salvador (39.8), Honduras (84.3), and— according to local sources—Guatemala (39.3) (see Table 1).

Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico: 2008-2013

Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Belize 35.1 32.2 41.8 39.4 45.1 Not available

Costa Rica 11.3 11.4 11.3 10.0 8.4 8.4

El Salvador 51.7 70.9 64.1 70.2 41.5 39.8

Guatemala 46.1 46.5 41.6 38.9 34.6 Not available

Honduras 60.8 70.7 81.8 91.8 91.0 84.3

Nicaragua 13.0 14.0 13.5 12.5 11.3 Not available

Panama 18.4 22.6 20.6 20.3 17.2 17.2

Mexico 12.2 17.0 21.8 22.8 21.5 18.9

Source: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Intentional Homicide, Counts and Rates per 100,000

Population,” April 13, 2015.

Note: 2013 is the most recent year for which data are available from UNODC at this time.

Common crime is also widespread. According to 2014 polling data, nearly a fifth of Salvadorans, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, and Guatemalans had been victims of a crime within the past year (see

Figure 2).

Multiple studies have found that those who have been victims of crime or who perceive that crime is increasing in their countries express less support for the political system and the rule of law than other citizens.

In extreme cases, some people—including on- and off-duty police—have carried out vigilante killings of those suspected of committing crimes. Recent

7 For information on drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel.

8 From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress appropriated more than $2.5 billion in counterdrug and anti-crime assistance to

Mexico under the Mérida Initiative and nearly $1.2 million to Central America through Mérida and CARSI.

9 This figure is from Guatemala’s National Forensics Institute.

10 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Intentional Homicide, Counts and Rates per 100,000 Population,”

April 13, 2015.

11 Zechmeister, 2014, op. cit., p. 17.

12 See, for example, Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga, Crime Corruption and Societal Support for Vigilante Justice: Ten Years of Evidence in Review, Vanderbilt University, Latin America Public Opinion Project, 2015.

Congressional Research Service 4 killings of suspected gang members in El Salvador appear to be one recent manifestation of that phenomenon.

Figure 2. Crime Victimization Rates in Central America and Mexico: 2014

Percentage of people reporting they were victims of a crime in the past year

Source: CRS presentation of data from Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, ed., The Political Culture of Democracy in the

Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance Across 10 Years of the Americas Barometer, Vanderbilt University, Latin

American Public Opinion Project, December 2014, p. 17.

Underlying Societal Conditions

The social fabric in many Central American countries has been tattered by persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities available for growing youth populations.

With the exceptions of Costa Rica and Panama, the countries of Central America are generally low-income countries with high levels of poverty (see Table 2). They are also highly unequal societies with income disparities exacerbated by the social exclusion of ethnic minorities and gender discrimination. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has found that countries with large income disparities have homicide rates that are four times higher than those of more equal societies.

Poverty and inequality have been reinforced by the lack of social mobility and persistent unemployment and underemployment in many Central American countries. With

13 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2014, June 2015.

14 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data, 2011, p. 30.

Congressional Research Service 5 limited opportunities at home, many Central Americans have emigrated abroad.

The resulting family disintegration has further weakened the social fabric in the region.

With the exceptions of Belize and Costa Rica, Central American countries have also had long histories of armed conflicts and/or dictatorships. A legacy of conflict and authoritarian rule has inhibited the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law in many countries. Protracted armed conflicts also resulted in the widespread proliferation of illicit firearms in the region, as well as a cultural tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling disputes.

Some former combatants have put the skills they acquired during their countries’ armed conflicts to use in the service of criminal groups. In El Salvador, for example, illicit networks that smuggled arms and other supplies to both sides involved in the armed conflict have been converted into transnational criminal networks that smuggle drugs, people, illicit proceeds, weapons, and other stolen goods.

Table 2. Central America Social Indicators

Country Population Life

Expectancy at Birth

Adult

Literacy

Rate

Per Capita

Gross

Domestic

Product

Population

Living in

Extreme

Poverty

Gini

Coefficient

Belize 359,000 70.5 years 82.7% $4,815 Not available Not available

Costa Rica 4,978,000 79.6 years 97.8% $10,072 7.2% 0.512

El Salvador 6,405,000 73.2 years 88.4% $3,954 12.5% 0.453

Guatemala 16,158,000 72.3 years 79.3% $3,719 29.1% 0.585

Honduras 8,378,000 73.8 years 88.5% $2,378 45.6% 0.573

Nicaragua 6,236,000 73.6 years 82.8% $1,919 29.5% 0.478

Panama 3,989,000 78.1 years 95.0% $11,845 12.2% 0.527

Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Note: The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of income concentration: a value of 0.0 represents absolute equality; a value of 1.0 represents absolute inequality.

Structural Weaknesses in Governance

In recent years, much has been written about the governance problems that have made many

Central American countries susceptible to the influence of drug traffickers and other criminal elements and unable to guarantee citizen security. Many governments do not have operational

15 While emigration from Mexico has decreased in recent years, emigration from Central America has accelerated, including migration by family units and unaccompanied minors. Since FY2012, the majority of unaccompanied minors apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border have been from the northern triangle of Central America rather than Mexico. In

FY2014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended an unprecedented 51,700 minors from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied minors decreased by 42% in FY2015, largely due to

Mexico dramatically increasing its enforcement efforts, but still exceeded the FY2013 level. CBP, “Southwest Border

Unaccompanied Alien Children,” http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-

2015.

16 Tani Marilena Adams, Chronic Violence and its Reproduction: Perverse Trends in Social Relations, Citizenship, and

Democracy in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2012.

17 Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: The Homegrown and Transnational Dimensions, Woodrow Wilson

Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, February 2011.

Congressional Research Service 6 control over their territories. As an example, the Mexico-Guatemala border is 600 miles long and has only eight formal ports of entry, but as many as 350 informal crossings.

This lack of territorial control is partially a result of regional security forces being undermanned and/or ill-equipped to establish an effective presence in remote regions or to challenge well-armed criminal groups.

Resource constraints have persisted over time as governments have often been unwilling to increase tax collection. Tax revenue in Central America averaged 17.8% of GDP in

2013, ranging from a low of 13% of GDP in Guatemala to a high of 22% of GDP in Costa Rica.

Resource constraints aside, there have also been serious concerns about corruption at all levels of the police, prisons, judicial, and political systems in Central America. This is partially a result of several countries’ failures to fully implement post-conflict institutional reforms in the 1990s.

Criminal groups’ efforts to influence public officials and elections, particularly at the local level, have also contributed to corruption. According to Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption

Perceptions Index, citizens in nearly every Central American country perceive high levels of public sector corruption.

In 2015, Guatemala’s Attorney General, with support from the U.N.

Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), uncovered massive corruption in the customs and social security systems. Those revelations ultimately led to the resignation of

Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina as well as other top-level officials.

Large-scale corruption scandals have also emerged in Honduras, where several prominent officials have been arrested on corruption charges and President Juan Orlando Hernández is accused of financing his

2013 election campaign with funds embezzled from the country’s social security institute.

Weak state presence, corruption, and criminal infiltration have contributed to widespread impunity, which has further eroded public confidence in Central American governments. Of all the homicides committed in Honduras between 2010 and 2013, for example, only 4% resulted in convictions.

With crime victimization rates on the rise and conviction rates remaining stubbornly low, Central Americans express little confidence in law enforcement and other governmental institutions. Many businesses and wealthy individuals in the region have turned to private security firms to ensure their safety. One study found that the number of authorized private security personnel in Central America exceeds 160,000, with private security agents

18 CRS correspondence with Mexican embassy official in Washington, DC, May 1, 2014. Since mid-2014, Mexico has increased government surveillance and immigration enforcement along its southern border. Those efforts have included increased operations against alien smugglers and other criminal groups. See CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Recent

Immigration Enforcement Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

19 The U.S. Department of Defense has sought to help Guatemala stand up an inter-agency unit along part of its border with Mexico. For an assessment of that effort, see Gillian S. Oak, Building the Guatemalan Interagency Task Force

Tecún Umán: Lessons Identified, RAND Corporation, 2015.

20 Belize is not included in this calculation. Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrations, Inter-American

Development Bank, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Revenue Statistics in Latin America: 1990-2013, March 10, 2015.

21 On police reform, see Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Protect and Serve? The Status of Police

Reform in Central America, June 2009. On the judicial sector, see Due Process of Law Foundation, Evaluation of

Judicial Corruption in Central America and Panama and Mechanisms to Combat It, 2007.

22 According to Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, citizens in nearly every Central

American country perceive high levels of public sector corruption. On a scale of 0-100 (highly corrupt-very clean), the countries scored as follows: Honduras (29), Nicaragua (28), Guatemala (32), Panama (37), El Salvador (39), and Costa

Rica (54). Belize is not included in the index.

23 For more information, see CRS Insight IN10354, Guatemala: President Pérez Resigns; Runoff Presidential Election on October 25, by Maureen Taft-Morales.

24 For more information, see CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer.

25 “Homicidios en Honduras Impunes en un 96%,” El Heraldo (Honduras), November 24, 2014.

Congressional Research Service 7 outnumbering police in every country in the region.

Perhaps more alarmingly, non-state actors such as drug trafficking organizations and gangs are increasingly exercising governance in areas where national governments have failed to establish effective state presence.

Criminal Threats

Many different types of criminal actors are taking advantage of the instability and institutional weakness in Central America, as well as the large informal economies in the region, to conduct a wide range of illicit activities. Those activities include, but are not limited to, crimes that impact people’s daily lives, such as extortion, robbery, rape, and small-scale drug distribution. They also include transnational criminal activities, such as money laundering, weapons smuggling, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking. Criminal organizations tend to generate violence when rivals or government security forces challenge their control of territories and illicit markets.

Drug Trafficking Organizations

Since the mid-1990s, the primary pathway for illegal drugs, including Andean cocaine, entering the United States has been through Mexico. Nevertheless, as recently as 2007, only a small amount of the cocaine that passed through Mexico first transited through Central America. This has changed in recent years, as stepped-up enforcement efforts in Mexico and instability in certain Central American countries have provided incentives for traffickers to use the region as a transshipment point. Traffickers now use overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and short-distance aerial trafficking through Central America instead of directly transporting cocaine from South America to Mexico (see Figure 3). According to the U.S. State Department, about

84% of cocaine trafficked to the United States passes through Central America and Mexico.

A large but unknown proportion of opiates, as well as foreign-produced marijuana and methamphetamine, also flow through the same pathways. In September 2015, President Obama identified all seven Central American nations as “major drug transit” countries for the fifth consecutive year.

In the past, Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) tended to contract local drug trafficking groups in Central America, sometimes referred to as transportistas, to transport drugs through that region. More recently, drug transshipment activities have increasingly been taken over, often after violent struggles, by Mexican drug traffickers, such as the Sinaloa DTO and the Zetas, and their affiliates. Mexican DTOs have been most active in

Guatemala, where they are battling each other and family-based Guatemalan DTOs for control over lucrative drug smuggling routes. Mexican DTOs have paid transportistas and gangs—who sometimes serve as enforcers (or hit men)—in product, which has increased drug consumption in many countries and sparked disputes between local groups over control of domestic drug

26 RESDAL, Public Security Index, Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and

Panama, Buenos Aires, October 17, 2013.

27 Douglas Farah and Carl Meacham, Alternative Governance in the Northern Triangle and Implications for U.S.

Foreign Policy, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), September 2015.

28 U.S. Department of State, 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2015, p. 10

(hereinafter, INCSR, March 2015).

29 President Barack Obama, “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing

Countries for Fiscal Year 2015,” September 15, 2015.

Congressional Research Service 8 markets.

The DTOs, particularly the Zetas, have also taken control of many migrant smuggling routes originating in Central America, enacting harsh penalties on those who fail to work for them or pay them quotas.

Figure 3. Central American Drug Trafficking Routes

Source: Douglas Farah and Carl Meacham, Alternative Governance in the Northern Triangle and Implications for U.S.

Foreign Policy, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), September 2015, p. 7, http://csis.org/files/ publication/150911_Farah_AlternativeGovernance_Web.pdf.

Gangs32

In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and analysts have attributed, sometimes erroneously, a significant proportion of violent crime in the region to transnational youth gangs, or maras, many of which have ties to the United States. The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18 th Street” gang (also known as M-18) and its main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

The 18 th Street gang was formed in the 1960s by Mexican youth in Los Angeles who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later expanded their operations to Central America. This process accelerated after the United States began deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back

30 Dudley, May 2010, op. cit.

31 Tim Johnson, “Violent Mexican Drug Gang, Zetas, Taking Control of Migrant Smuggling,” McClatchy Newspapers, August 12, 2011.

32 For background, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

33 For the history and evolution of these gangs, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and

American Law Enforcement (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

Congressional Research Service 9 to the region after the passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(IIRIRA) of 1996.

Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely. A top State

Department official estimated that there were 85,000 MS-13 and 18 th Street gang members in the northern triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) in 2012.

UNODC has estimated total MS-13 and M-18 membership in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras at a more modest 54,000. According to UNODC, in 2012 there were roughly 20,000 gang members in El

Salvador, 22,000 in Guatemala, and 12,000 in Honduras. El Salvador has the highest concentration of gang members, with 323 for every 100,000 citizens, double the level of

Guatemala and Honduras.

Nicaragua has a significant number of gang members, but does not have large numbers of MS-13 or M-18 members, perhaps due to the fact that Nicaragua has had a much lower deportation rate from the United States than the “northern triangle” countries.

Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama also have local gangs.

Central American officials have blamed gangs for a large percentage of homicides committed in recent years, particularly in El Salvador and Honduras. The actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central America remains controversial, but analysts agree that the gangs have increasingly become involved in extortion; kidnapping; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling.

Gangs have extorted millions of dollars from residents, bus drivers, and businesses in cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or violence.

There is some evidence that the MS-13 and M-18 have expanded their geographic presence and the scope of their illicit activities. Certain gang cliques (clicas) in El Salvador have established ties with gangs in Los Angeles and Washington, DC.

Likewise, regional and U.S. authorities have reported increasing gang involvement in drug trafficking. In Honduras, the 18 th Street gang still generates most of its income from extortion, whereas the MS-13 is now generating more income from local drug dealing.

A transactional relationship between DTOs and gangs appears to be present in El Salvador, where the MS-13 works with transportista groups who in turn collaborate with transnational DTOs.

Some MS-13 members are reportedly being contracted on an ad hoc basis by Mexican DTOs to carry out revenge killings. Still, UNODC maintains that the term transnational gangs is misleading when used to describe the maras, as their primary focus

34 IIRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants to get relief from removal.

35 U.S. Department of State, “Gangs, Youth, and Drugs – Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” remarks by William R.

Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at the Institute of the

Americas, press release, October 1, 2012.

36 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, September

2012, p. 29 (hereinafter, UNODC, 2012).

37 Dennis Rodgers et al., “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions,” Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper 23, May 2009.

38 Arron Daugherty and Elyssa Pacheco, “El Salvador Gangs Involved in Arms Trafficking Network,” Insight Crime, June 19, 2015.

39 Matthew D. LaPlante, “Gang Leaders in El Salvador Testing Limits of Their Power in L.A., Rest of U.S.,” Los

Angeles Daily News, September 12, 2015; Hector Silva Avalos, “The Ties Between the MS13 in the US and El

Salvador,” Insight Crime, July 13, 2015.

40 Insight Crime and Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa, Gangs in Honduras, November 20, 2015.

41 Douglas Farah and Pamela Phillips Lum, Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal Organizations: The

Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil, International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2013.

Congressional Research Service 10 continues to be on local issues, such as dominating a particular extortion racket or local drug distribution area.

Other Criminal Organizations

Much less information is publicly available about what analysts have termed “other criminal organizations” than about DTOs or gangs operating in the region. Criminal organizations included in this catchall category may be involved in a wide variety of illicit activities, including, but not limited to, arms trafficking, alien smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering.

Some organizations specialize in one type of crime, such as human trafficking, while other enterprises engage in a range of criminal activities. Although most of the income-generating activities of these criminal organizations are illicit, some groups receive revenue through ties to legitimate businesses as well.

Some criminal enterprises active in Central America focus only on a certain neighborhood, city, or perhaps region in one country, while others, often referred to as “organized crime,” possess the capital, manpower, and networks required to run sophisticated enterprises and to penetrate state institutions at high levels. The more organized criminal groups in Central America include both domestically-based and transnational groups.

In Guatemala, for example, much has been written on the ongoing influence and illicit activities of domestic criminal organizations, often referred to as “hidden powers,” whose membership includes members of the country’s political and economic elite, including current and former politicians and military officials.

While the dominant transnational criminal organizations may vary from country to country, some transnational criminal groups appear to be active throughout the region.

Central American Policy Approaches46 Confronting the increasing threats posed by both domestic and transnational organizations has become a central concern of governments throughout Central America. Governments in the northern triangle countries have tended to adopt more aggressive approaches than those in the rest of the region, enacting tough anti-gang laws and deploying military forces to help police perform public security functions. In general, such policies have been put in place in reaction to rising violence rather than formulated as part of proactive, forward-looking strategies to strengthen citizen security. They have failed to stave off rising crime rates and have had several negative unintended consequences. Experts have urged Central American governments to adopt more

42 UNODC, 2012, op. cit., p. 28.

43 The definition of what constitutes “organized criminal organizations” varies significantly from country to country.

For example, the Mexican government refers to DTOs as organized crime, whereas the U.S. government has historically considered drug trafficking and organized crime as distinct for programmatic purposes. Similarly, the

Salvadoran government considers gangs as transnational organized crime, while the Nicaraguan government seems to view gangs as a local problem to be addressed primarily by youth crime prevention programs.

44 UNODC, 2012, op. cit.

45 See, for example, Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltrán, Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala, WOLA, September 2003; and Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the

State, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2010.

46 For more on individual nations’ public security strategies, see CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and

U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic

Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Maureen Taft-Morales; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S.

Relations, by Peter J. Meyer.

Congressional Research Service 11 holistic approaches, leading some countries to experiment with alternative policies, such as gang truces, and to place more emphasis on modern policing techniques and crime and violence prevention programs. While national strategies have diverged, Central American governments have continued to pursue closer regional coordination.

Mano Dura and Militarization

In the early 2000s, governments in the northern triangle countries adopted mano dura (strong-handed) anti-gang policies in response to popular demands and media pressure for them to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime. Mano dura approaches typically involve incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those with visible tattoos) for illicit association and increasing sentences for gang membership and gang-related crimes. While early public reactions to the tough anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely positive, the long-term effects of the policies have been largely disappointing. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions were subsequently released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime.

Some youth who were wrongly arrested were recruited into the gang life while in prison.

Moreover, studies have shown that, as happened in the United States, gang leaders in Central

America have used prisons to increase discipline and cohesion among their ranks.

Given the failure of mano dura policies to produce sustainable reductions in violence, some governments have experimented with alternative policies. In Belize and El Salvador, governments supported efforts to broker truces between warring gangs. Those efforts were short-lived, however, as the truce launched in Belize in 2011 broke down in 2012, and the truce negotiated in

El Salvador in 2012 unraveled in 2014. (See the text box, “The Salvadoran Gang Truce and

Dissolution,” below).

The Salvadoran Gang Truce and Dissolution

With support from El Salvador’s Minister of Justice and Public Security David Munguía Payés, a Catholic bishop and a former legislator (who was the minister’s aid in the defense ministry) brokered a truce between the MS-13 and 18th

Street gangs. In March 2012, Munguía Payés agreed to transfer high-ranking gang leaders serving time in maximum security prison to less secure prisons in order to facilitate intra-gang negotiations. Munguía Payés denied his role in facilitating the truce until September 2012.49

Between the time the prison transfers took place and May 2013 (when Munguía Payés was removed from his post), the Salvadoran government reported that homicide rates dramatically declined (from an average of roughly 14 murders per day to 5.5 per day). Gang leaders pledged not to forcibly recruit children into their ranks or perpetrate violence against women, turned in small amounts of weapons, and offered to engage in broader negotiations.

However, they never agreed to give up control over their territories or to stop extortions. While some praised the truce, many others expressed skepticism, maintaining that disappearances increased after it took effect.

The truce began to unravel after the administration of President Mauricio Funes withdrew its support for the truce mediators and reduced communication between imprisoned gang leaders and gang members in the streets in mid-

2013. By April 2014, average daily murder rates had risen to some nine murders a day; gang attacks on police also occurred with increasing frequency. These trends have worsened considerably in 2015. Church leaders have voiced support for renewed dialogue with gang members; however, the current Sánchez Cerén administration opposes negotiating with the gangs—directly or indirectly—and has classified them as “terrorist organizations.”50

47 Holistic approaches to addressing gang-related violence may include prevention programs for at-risk youth, interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against crime and violence.

48 Carlos Garcia, “Tracing the History of Failed Gang Policies in US, Northern Triangle,” Insight Crime, December 3, 2015.

49 Carlos Martínez and Jose Luis Sanz, “The New Truth About the Gang Truce,” Insight Crime, September 14, 2012.

50 For more information, see CRS Insight IN10382, Escalating Violence in El Salvador, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

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In recent years, Central American governments have increasingly turned to their militaries to provide public security. While most Central American countries have made significant progress in subordinating military forces to civilian control since the end of dictatorships and armed conflicts in the 1990s, they have made much less progress in defining proper military-police roles and relationships.

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have deployed thousands of troops to help their often underpaid and poorly equipped police forces carry out public security functions, without clearly defining when those deployments might end. In Guatemala, 21,000 troops are deployed to “maintain security” throughout the country.

In El Salvador, the government created three new “rapid reaction” military battalions in May 2015; some 7,000 troops were already involved in public security.

In Honduras, the government has heavily relied on a 3,000-member military police force, as well as regular military units, to perform law enforcement tasks. This trend has led many observers to raise concerns about the “re-militarization” of Central American societies and to predict an increase in human rights abuses since military personnel are ill-trained to perform police work. Evidence also indicates that military involvement in public security functions has not reduced crime rates significantly.

Law Enforcement and Institutional Reform

The U.S. government has advised Central American nations to employ “intelligence-led policing” and has called on legislatures in the region to give police and prosecutors new law enforcement tools. The governments of Costa Rica and Panama, for example, are adopting comparative statistics (COMPSTAT) systems, which allow for real-time mapping and analysis of criminal activity.

Every country in the region has enacted wiretapping legislation, which assists police and prosecutors in gathering evidence and building successful cases. Central American nations are also in the process of implementing laws that enable governments to fund law enforcement entities with assets seized from criminal organizations.

Many security analysts maintain that governments in the region still need to carry out far-reaching institutional reforms to improve the investigative capacity of police and the conviction rates secured by public prosecutors’ offices. Improving trust, information-sharing, and coordination between police and prosecutors is an important component of the reform process.

Building that trust will require proper recruiting, vetting, and training of police and prosecutors, as well as robust systems of internal and external controls in both institutions to detect and punish corruption. Such reforms have generally not been undertaken, however, because of limited resources and political will to do so. Recognizing the challenging nature of institutional reform, some governments have sought outside assistance. (See the text box, “The International

Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: A Regional Model?” below.)

51 Richard L. Millett and Orlando J. Pérez, “New Threats and Old Dilemmas: Central America’s Armed Forces in the

21st Century,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2005).

52 Just the Facts, “Militarization of Law Enforcement in Guatemala,” July 24, 2013.

53 Hector Silva, “Violence and Risky Responses in El Salvador,” AULA Blog, April 23, 2015.

54 Orlando J. Pérez, “Militarizing the Police Undermines Democratic Governance,” Latin America Goes Global, August 3, 2015.

55 INCSR, March 2015, op. cit.

Congressional Research Service 13

Prevention

In the past few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, toward more comprehensive approaches to dealing with gangs and crime. Every country in the region has created institutional bodies to design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and has units within their national police forces engaged in prevention efforts. Some governments, with support from the U.N.

Development Program (UNDP) and other donors, have also begun to encourage municipalities to develop crime prevention plans. However, government-sponsored prevention programs have tended, with some exceptions (such as Nicaragua’s national youth crime prevention strategy), to

56 CICIG, Informe de la Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala Con Ocasión de su Octavo Año de

Labores, November 13, 2015.

57 WOLA, The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for

Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law, June 2015.

58 “El Salvador: Mild Alternative to the CICIG Model,” Latin American Security and Strategy Review, November

2015; and Hector Silva, “Elección de Fiscal Salvadoreño Llega a Washington,” La Prensa Gráfica, December 8, 2015.

59 OAS “What Is the MACCIH?,” press release, November 9, 2015.

60 Alliance for Peace and Justice, APJ Position on MACCIH, Proposed by the OAS, October 15, 2015.

The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala: A Regional Model?

In August 2007, the Guatemalan Congress ratified an agreement with the United Nations to establish an independent investigative entity to support Guatemalan institutions in the identification, investigation, and prosecution of illegal security groups and clandestine criminal organizations that are tied, directly or indirectly, to the Guatemalan state.

The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a unique hybrid body that operates completely within the Guatemalan legal system, includes 148 local and international staff, and is funded entirely through international donations. CICIG’s mandate, which was originally for two years, has been extended four times and is now scheduled to end in September 2017.56

CICIG has produced notable results in its eight years of operations. Together with the Guatemalan Public

Prosecutor’s Office, CICIG has launched over 200 investigations involving 33 criminal structures and 161 government officials. Those investigations have produced convictions of cabinet-level officials, high-ranking members of the police and military, drug traffickers, businessmen, and politicians, including a former president. As noted previously, a 2015 investigation into corruption in Guatemala’s customs and social security systems ultimately led to the resignation of

President Otto Pérez Molina and other top-level officials. CICIG has also helped prevent a number of individuals with significant ties to corruption and/or organized crime from being appointed to senior positions in the Guatemalan government and has recommended numerous legislative reforms, several of which have been adopted. Some proponents of CICIG argue that perhaps its greatest achievement has been to demonstrate to the public that

Guatemala’s high impunity rates are not inevitable, and the criminal justice system can be made to work, even against powerful individuals who have long been considered “untouchable.”57

Given the success of CICIG, civil society groups in El Salvador and Honduras have called upon their governments to establish similar entities. Salvadoran and Honduran officials, some of whom are likely concerned that they could become targets of independent investigators, have been less supportive. The Salvadoran government has ruled out establishing an international commission, and observers are concerned that the Salvadoran Congress may reelect an attorney general who has failed to advance several major investigations and who has been accused of corruption.58

The Honduran government is working with the Organization of American States (OAS) to establish what appears to be a more limited Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). The

MACCIH would reportedly include a group of international judges and prosecutors to “supervise, advise, and provide support” to Honduran institutions charged with investigating and prosecuting acts of corruption.59 It remains unclear, however, whether or not they would be able to act independently of the Honduran government.