Call_0004-_SOO_B-_Rapid_VBIED_Assessment_and_Inspection.pdf

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SOO B- Rapid Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Assessment and Inspection

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Rapid Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Assessment and Inspection Statement of Objectives BAA 13-012/Call 0004/ SOO B

October 13, 2015 Science and Technology Directorate Department of Homeland Security

DISTRIBUTION NOTICE: Further dissemination only as directed by DHS Office of Policy DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Rapid VBIED Assessment and Inspection Statement of Objectives

September 14, 2015 i

Table of Contents

1.0 Purpose

2.0 Scope (Capability Gap)

3.0 Period and Place of Performance

4.0 Background

5.0 Functional Requirements

5.1 Overall Concept of Operations

5.2 Threat

5.3 Operating Constraints (Current Technology Shortfalls)

5.4 Specific Required Capabilities

5.4.1 Operation

5.4.2 Functionality

5.4.3 System Characteristics

5.5 System Performance

5.5.1 Mission Scenarios

5.5.2 Compatibility and Interoperability

5.5.3 Human Interface Requirements

5.5.4 Logistics and Readiness

5.5.5 Durability

5.6 System Support

5.6.1 Maintenance

5.6.2 Capabilities and Limitations

5.6.3 Supply

5.7 Training

5.8 Storage

5.9 System Affordability

5.10 Certification Requirements for Product Conformity

1.0 Purpose

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are a significant threat that is difficult to defeat in certain conditions. This solution will rapidly assess if a stationary, suspicious vehicle or container represents a VBIED threat, by recommending a pass/fail assessment in as close to real-time as possible. The solution must be able to assess vehicles at a confidence level of 90% or greater using non-intrusive techniques. The goal of this project is the development of much faster VBIED threat assessment solution.

2.0 Scope (Capability Gap)

This tool shall provide a rapid identification ability used to mark or clear a vehicle as quickly as possible for the components of a VBIED. Based on all the components of an explosive device and its location, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician will be able to select the best tool available for the identified threat to render the situation safe. It is important that this rapid identification technology operates at an industry standard confidence level of 90%. With a confidence level of 90%, this technology provides the requisite assurance to make actionable decisions to evacuate or render a potential threat safe.

3.0 Period and Place of Performance

The period of performance for this award shall be between 12 – 18 months, and shall not exceed the latter. All developmental activities will be performed at the contractor-designated site(s). DHS may require the contractor to perform critical design reviews and/or product presentations at DHS-specified locations. First Responders believe a complete field-testable, functional prototype that demonstrates at least 90% of all requisite capabilities within 24 months of award is required.

4.0 Background

Currently, technology that provides adequate rapid explosive ordnance screening time for larger vehicles or containers is unavailable. A solution is needed that will allow law enforcement EOD personnel to rapidly assess a large number of vehicles for a VBIED threat. Current technology does not allow for complete assessments of vehicles as they pass through borders and secure facility entrances, unless those vehicles are pulled aside for additional evaluation.

Current solutions require a vehicle-mounted X-ray system to be driven up to the target threat for assessment, rendering it incapable of being used in physically restricted situations. Other solutions require an extensive amount of funding and time to create expensive drive-through portals or extensive time using multi-panel X-Rays. A non-invasive technology will be extremely portable with a very fast resolution, and must operate with a 90% confidence level to quickly clear vehicles of potential threat.

5.0 Functional Requirements

5.1 Overall Concept of Operations

The proposed solution to this gap functions generally as a single uniform device, manually or robotically placed near or on the suspect vehicle or container prior to assessment. The solution will then provide a clear 2-D image of the contents contained therein without triggering any potential threat. The technology will quickly assess the existence of a potential threat in a stationary vehicle or container.

5.2 Threat

The main threat avoidance from using this technology comes from avoiding intrusive techniques to assess the potential threats, increasing public and first responder safety, and decreasing civic impact of a negative outcome. Without this technology, there is a risk of triggering a potential threat via intrusive assessment methods and reducing first responder and public safety. There are also dangers of not being able to assess the threat in a timely manner, potentially delaying the ability to mitigate the threat or evacuate the public in time. Conversely, there is a risk in creating undue public panic and injury if a non-viable threat is determined to be hazardous with a false-positive reading.

5.3 Operating Constraints (Current Technology Shortfalls)

There are several technological shortfalls currently related to this capability challenge. There is an existing need to provide a more robust clear-or-confirm technology for emerging threats. A solution is needed to reduce the response time required for first responders when in hazardous situations to assess threats. Additionally, there is a need to rapidly determine the need for wide-scale evacuations in order to minimize civic impact.

Current technologies in use are much more intrusive and are less safe for human operators, more costly to use, and time consuming. Additionally, the current solutions involve potential damage to the EOD robots as well, especially when using common orthogonal techniques.

5.4 Specific Required Capabilities

5.4.1 Operation

From an operational standpoint, the system will be deployable and require operators. Scanning tools must be able to be placed quickly around a vehicle or container and the results of the scan must be as close to real time as possible, with a data terminal or computer or tablet interface to read the results in the field.

5.4.2 Functionality

The proposed solution must meet the following minimum requirements:

• Produce near real-time imagery;

• Remotely deployed and operated;

• Able to be deployed by a bomb technician while wearing a standard EOD bomb suit or existing robotic systems;

• System must be vehicle, man, and robot portable (robotic being the preferred method), weighing less than 50 pounds, and able to operate under own power for two (2) hours;

• Able to scan multiple vehicle types ranging from a passenger car to a tractor-trailer;

• The diagnostic imagery system shall be able to resolve 22 gauge insulated wire, and 25 grain detonation cord (resolution must be able to resolve interior contents of widths of 1/4” or better);

• Able to operate in terrain up to a 30 degree incline;

• The system must be durable, (i.e., able to operate after a 10 foot drop);

• Able to withstand and operate in adverse weather (wet, dry, hot, cold) conditions, including, but not limited to: 5-100% humidity, -20 degrees to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and winds up to 20 mph.

• Self-enclosed, autonomous functionality: once placed into position, the unit should be able to complete all other functions (pierce, image, etc.) without operator involvement. System should be controlled manually;

• “Human-in-the-loop” control (the system shall use a feedback loop that will provide an alert if it is not working properly);

• Compatible with the most common bomb squad robot used (i.e., the Andros F6);

• Compatible with multiple available commercial off the shelf (COTS) computer operation systems and computers (e.g., Apple, Microsoft, and Android products);

• Be Intrinsically Safe;

• Require less than three (3) business days for operator and maintenance training;

• Intuitively obvious user interface: once imagery has been obtained, targeting and measuring methods should be as simple as point and click; and,

• Must be able to operate in ambient or no light conditions (e.g., daylight to dark settings) typical of the interior of a closed tractor-trailer. If illumination is required, it shall be self-contained within the equipment.

Ideally, the technology shall also endeavor to meet these additional requirements, if possible:

• The system should be able to rapidly clear-and-confirm up to a 20-foot box truck within five

(5) minutes and a 53-foot trailer within 15 minutes;

• Have passive scanning ability (i.e., the ability to capture alternative data without interrupting the VBIED focal point [atmosphere, temperature, pressures, and possibly scanning for secondary devices or hazards] using ambient light, heat signatures, etc. to take images without introducing a supplemental light, sound, radio wave, source, etc.);

• The system should be able to transmit scanned images from the target vehicle to the Command Post at a minimum separation distance of 1000 feet, non-line of sight;

• Require approximately four (4) hours of training to be qualified to operate the equipment, depending on the solution;

• System should be self-contained (lighting, imaging, power, etc.);

• Able to operate within 15 minutes with as few parts as possible to assemble; and,

• Able to produce an image through a light-weight tarp (i.e., penetrable - able to scan through layers or concealment/covering items).

5.4.3 System Characteristics

Once placed next to the suspect vehicle, the tool’s operation should be autonomous. The technician shall only have to start and stop the operation. If multiple operations are required to obtain the imagery, then the tool shall stow itself to a position where the unit can be moved robotically to another point and the system activated again.

Software to provide imagery, distance measurements, aiming solutions etc., shall operate on current COTS operating systems and devices. Input from the system into the laptop should be accomplished while the tool is deployed, and without the need to return the system to the safe area (if feasible).

The system must not be robot dependent or dependent on any other platform. The system also needs the ability to operate with various flat-surfaced or corrugated materials, as well as layers of various materials used commonly in transportation vehicles, including but not limited to: carbon fiber, fiber glass, plastic, aluminum, steel, and polymer lining.

The resolution of rendered images should provide for a 90% confidence level for object identification within the scanned object.

5.5 System Performance

5.5.1 Mission Scenarios

Rapid and accurate assessment of a perceived VBIED is essential to a favorable outcome. Having a “Live-Scan” capability shall provide responders with the most definitive assessment tool available.

As such, operators would be able to surgically attack components of the bomb, reducing the possibility of unintended detonation; which in turn, saves lives and property.

Current VBIED missions rely on two (2) mechanisms (large scale X-ray and piercing the container skin for insertion of a camera system) to help assess the threat. Neither result is a means of conducting a fast or precise disruption of a target within the vehicle. As a result, bomb technicians have to either render the device safe manually (at great risk to the technician) or use a broad targeting method (which can result in initiating the explosives). The goal of this project is to have a means of conducting a rapid assessment of the suspected vehicle. In so doing, technicians can perform more accurate render safe procedures with less risk to themselves and to the public.

5.5.2 Compatibility and Interoperability

The software system shall be able to operate on COTS computers, and use standard operating procedures. The system should complete the required objectives in concert with the current operating limitations and communication protocols of the robotic platforms for the public safety bomb squad community (i.e. the Andros F6A robot which is widely used). In order to be usable by this community, the imaging/targeting system shall be deployable by the F6, although other robotic platforms are also used. This shall be accomplished by being carried, pushed or pulled into position. Due to unknown construction of cargo containers or possible interior obstructions, the tool must be capable of being repositioned. Operation of this tool shall not interfere with audio/video capabilities of the robot nor interfere with wireless or fiber optic operation of the robot (or any other robotic platform that may be in operation in the vicinity). Additionally, the system shall be able to be deployed by a bomb technician while wearing a standard EOD bomb suit.

Optimally, the tool will be able to function within an Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) environment.

5.5.3 Human Interface Requirements

The proposed device shall include an intuitive user interface to be operated by vetted U.S.

Department of Defense (DoD) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-certified bomb technicians. The system shall be capable of operation from a standard laptop computer and footprint. The intent of this project is to aid in the rapid determination of whether a vehicle has an explosive device. Most bomb responses involve two (2) technicians and therefore this project must be able to be assembled and operated by no more than two (2) individuals (which includes the robot operator). It should also be of a reasonable weight to be managed by the technicians.

5.5.4 Logistics and Readiness

This system shall be available for each DoD and FBI accredited public safety bomb technician.

This will provide options for a VBIED response that are currently not available. This system shall enable the bomb technicians to train and prepare to rapidly address VBIED incident, while increasing the probability of completing a surgical disruption.

The amount of room required for storing equipment is always a concern; therefore the system shall be able to fit within two (2) Pelican storage cases weighting 50 pounds or less each. The cases shall protect the equipment from normal transportation related bumps and vibrations and temperature variations.

5.5.5 Durability

The proposed system/software shall:

• Must operate on COTS computers;

• It shall withstand wide temperature fluctuations in storage and while in use;

• Must operate in full sunlight, dark, mist, fog, rain, and snow;

• The system shall be ruggedized for outdoor use (not including the COTS computer); and

• It should also be capable of withstanding repetitive use during training, operations, and transportation by bomb squad vehicles.

5.6 System Support

5.6.1 Maintenance

All maintenance for the item(s) and related equipment shall be defined by the contractor, including:

the required maintenance schedule, identification of the specific components of the ensemble that requires the maintenance, the type of maintenance required, and whether the maintenance can be performed in the field by operational personnel or if it will be required to be returned to the manufacturer for the required maintenance.

5.6.2 Capabilities and Limitations

As with any equipment, the capabilities and limitations of the equipment shall be made clear to all users. This should include any special cleaning procedures or storage conditions that are required to preserve the protective properties of the equipment.

5.6.3 Supply

Supply shall be determined by the individual departments based upon cost, quantity needed, and effectiveness of the solution.

5.7 Training

Training information as required shall be provided on any specialized equipment, and shall include instruction for proper storage, cleaning, deployment, and maintenance. Any specialty requirements of personnel conducting maintenance, storage, extraction, or delivery will be identified including certification requirements. Training material shall be available initially in hard-copy, and subsequently in soft-copy format.

5.8 Storage

The manufacturer shall identify all storage requirements that is developed under this SOO.

5.9 System Affordability

First responders’ budgets are limited and should be taken into consideration when developing and determining a price per unit cost model. According to the First Responders Resource Group (FRRG), a national subject matter expert group that has representation from all major first responder disciplines, it is believed that the solution should be made available for under $10,000.

5.10 Certification Requirements for Product Conformity

The device must meet all relevant Human Factor Safety standards. If wireless communications are required for either operation or visual imagery, the equipment will be Federal Communications Commission compliant.

1.0 Purpose
2.0 Scope (Capability Gap)
3.0 Period and Place of Performance
4.0 Background
5.0 Functional Requirements
5.1 Overall Concept of Operations
5.2 Threat
5.3 Operating Constraints (Current Technology Shortfalls)
5.4 Specific Required Capabilities
5.4.1 Operation
5.4.2 Functionality
5.4.3 System Characteristics
5.5 System Performance
5.5.1 Mission Scenarios
5.5.2 Compatibility and Interoperability
5.5.3 Human Interface Requirements
5.5.4 Logistics and Readiness
5.5.5 Durability
5.6 System Support
5.6.1 Maintenance
5.6.2 Capabilities and Limitations
5.6.3 Supply
5.7 Training
5.8 Storage
5.9 System Affordability
5.10 Certification Requirements for Product Conformity

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