Marionette_Industry_Day_QA.docx

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MARIONETTE (A MULTI-DOMAIN C2 DECISION CALCULUS FOR COMPLEXITY IMPOSITION)
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FA875021S7005
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This document provides details on an upcoming Broad Agency Announcement and Industry Day event for the Marionette program. The Air Force Research Laboratory's Information Directorate will conduct a virtual Industry Day on February 23, 2021 to provide information on BAA FA8750-21-S-7005, which seeks proposals for developing a framework to analyze how complexity imposition can optimally shape adversary decision-making across multiple domains. Interested parties must register by February 19 for the prerecorded presentation and Q&A document. Questions may be submitted through February 26 regarding the program's goal of quantifying complexity properties against multi-domain courses of action. The Q&A responses will be posted on March 3. The BAA will consider approaches from all disciplines, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, to address analyzing the imposition of complexity on adversaries.

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Marionette: A Multi-Domain C2 Decision Calculus for Complexity Imposition Industry Day Q&A

FA8750-21-S-7005

Technical Questions

1. Does the term of “Decision Calculus” mean, for example:

An adversary’s deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements:

· The benefits of a course of action

· The costs of a course of action

· The consequences of restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter)

· A model of an Adversary’s decision calculus represents the base state of adversarial decision making, and Blue operations, both traditional and complexity focused, that attempt to shape the outcome of this decision flow to achieve a desired set of operational effects. In some cases, the outcome might be more robust deterrence as Red sees that the likelihood of arriving at a desired end state is diminished. In other cases, the outcome might be an inability of Red to act quickly as necessary information is denied and risk reward tradeoffs are more complex.

2. Since government will provide COAs, our focus should be on the decision calculus analysis, not to create COAs, is that correct?

· Yes.

3. What type of adversary model will the government provide?

· A robust Red System of Systems (SoS) simulatable model that represents an adversary spatially and temporally. It will be coded in MatLAB.

4. Will the concept of deception be applicable or acceptable?

· Yes.

5. Will the program focus on effects chain (not kill chain)?

· Yes.

6. Will the project be classified?

· The project will use unclassified data.

7. Though the problem description looks complicated, some might argue that the way of thinking is still “conventional” with respect to doctrine, etc. Will artificial intelligent/machine learning approaches be acceptable?

· Yes. We are accepting approaches from all disciplines. We will consider any approach that effectively answers how to quantify and analyze the imposition of complexity.

Programmatic Questions:

8. Will this BAA include the Battle Damage Assessment Seedling?

· No.

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File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .