Attachment 4 - Example of a Combined Fire Strategy - Redacted.pdf

90% FIRE STRATEGY ASSESSMENT

BUILDINGS 1388 & 1389

‘Egress Shop Repairs’

FIRE STRATEGY ASSESSORS DETAILS

Signed:

Name (in Capitals): NEIL GREEN

Position :

Fire Advisor (Cambs Fire S

FIRE STRATEGY ASSESSMENT

FOR

BUILDINGS 1388 & 1389

‘Egress Shop Repairs’

AT

RAF LAKENHEATH

Revision 'C' - 10.03.18

FIRE STRATEGY ASSESSORS DETAILS

Qualification:

Eng Tech, FIFireE

NEIL GREEN

Safe Ltd) Date: 13.03.20

FIRE STRATEGY ASSESSMENT

Eng Tech, FIFireE

Index

Section “A” Overview of the Project Details

Section “B” Fire Strategy Based on the CIBSE Guide E

Section ‘’C’’ Appendix

Appendix A A fire compliance audit for the existing building has been undertaken by WSP on 15.04.14

Appendix B Building Risk Assessment Documentation

Appendix C Memorandum confirming isolation of sprinkler system to areas identified as ‘Apply no water’, in accordance with AFMAN 91.

Appendix D Fire Alarm ‘Cause and Effect’.

Appendix E Previous fire officer comments.

Appendix F DSEAR Risk Assessment

Appendix G Previous responses to the storage of hazardous materials.

Appendix H Fire safety packs dated 2014

Appendix I Fire Strategy Drawings

Appendix J Building Control approval of design Certificate ‘’C1’’ Building Control approval of structural calculations ‘’C2’’

Project Specific Fire Strategy Document

Section “A” Overview of the Project Details

Location; RAF Lakenheath Project Title; Buildings 1388 & 1389 Repairs Project Number; MSET 12-2016 Interserve Project Ref; ESR5017

1. Brief description / scope of the overall project

This Project consists of Internal Alterations and repairs to achieve compliant use of this facility in consideration of the fire safety provisions required to allow the egress and hydraulics shops to be incorporated into these buildings.

Building 1388 is an existing relatively small hardened building, consisting of just two rooms. This building will be used for the storage of full ejector seat assemblies,which do contain the explosive devices.

Building 1389 (located adjacent building 1388), will incorporate the hydraulics and egress shops. This will include office spaces inclusive of ancillary accommodation, as well as workshops; two of which will be used for the building, servicing and maintenance of ejector seats containing explosive devices.

2. Non-compliance issues

In accordance with the requirements of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)Order 2005 (RRO), a current life safety Fire Risk Assessments(FRA) should be in place for these facilities, however no FRA’s had been provided at the time this report was compiled.

The existing fire strategy for these facilities were not available at the time this report was compiled.

The fire compliance audit conducted by WSP on the 15.04.2014 is believed to be extant, therefore the existing deficiencies noted have been included for rectification as far as practically possible by this project. This audit identified a number of observations/findings of items that require further investigation to confirm compliance with the current building use as follows.

(The audit can be found in Appendix A of this report with a list of the existing non-compliance items within Table 2 of section 4.)

Remaining non-compliance issues are:

2.1 Building 1388

NFPA 101 Chapter 7.11: High hazard storage facility should have two means of escape, however at the clients request this non-compliance issue has not been included within the scope of works. Notwithstanding we believe that the condition present do comply with host nation requirements and therefore should achieve certificate ‘A’ approval.

Nonetheless with a view to ensuring that the existing condition has been considered and in order to apply all possible mitigating features possible, we would request the user provide a risk mitigation/management evacuation plan which should be reviewed and accepted via waiver of NFPA Fire Regulations, by the explosives licensing authority, DIO weapons effects and fire departments. The mitigating factors being that:

• This building is occupied for occasional short periods only which are strictly controlled, when either storing or collecting an ejector seat, from within the building

• These doors would be held open at all times when the building is occupied

• The workers employed being able bodied service personnel who have been made aware of the restriction caused by the blast doors

• Fire alarm and detection system installed within the building

• Short travel distances to the single exit

In our opinion if the mitigating factors listed are applied we believe that host nation fire safety regulations have been met and that the building is fire safe.

It must be noted that this waiver is not necessarily required prior to any submission for approval from DSA.

2.2 Building 1388

The existing steel double blast doors in front of the personnel door leading into the facility, create an obvious restriction to the means of escape. At the clients request the removal of these doors have not been included within the project, as they were identified as an additional measure to give protection to/from Hanger 7 (opposite) in the event of an explosion. We therefore believe that this fire deficiency would require the user to provide a risk mitigation/management evacuation plan which can be considered by DSA on application for the certificate A. The mitigating factors being that;

• This building is occupied for occasional short periods only which are strictly controlled, when either storing or collecting an ejector seat, from within the building

• These door would be held open at all times when the building is occupied

• The workers employed being able bodied service personnel who have been made aware of the restriction caused by the blast doors

• Fire alarm and detection system installed within the building

In our opinion if the mitigating factors listed are applied we believe that host nation fire safety regulations have been met as far is practically possible and that the building is fire safe.

2.3 Building 1389

There will be no Automatic fire suppression system within areas classified as ‘apply no water’. (Compliant with the AFMAN requirements). Refer also to waiver in Appendix C.

As some of the materials present may react violently with water and the water may damage essential equipment.

Inadequate provision of fire extinguishers (These are not required as part of the brief, although the user would need to arrange for these to be provided).

It has been advised that there is an inadequate fire hydrant water supply in this area of the base. This existing deficiency does not form part of this project and should be addressed under an additional scheme which addresses base-wide fire safety deficiencies.

3. UFC Project Classification

The works to these buildings are classified as repairs.

4. Building Classification

The following classifications have been adopted in accordance with NFPA 101 Chapter

Building 1388 Building 1388 is classified as high hazard storage due to the installation of explosives within ejector seats stored within the building.

Building 1389 The facility is made up of multiple occupancy classifications consisting of Industrial High Hazard, Industrial Ordinary Hazard & ancillary existing Business Occupancy. For the purpose of this fire strategy, the areas where operations around explosives are undertaken, (ejector seat operations bays, spray booth and room 6), the areas are Industrial High Hazard, Other maintenance areas including rooms 1, 2 and 3 are defined as Industrial Ordinary Hazard and all remaining areas have been classified as business occupancy.

5. Purpose Group

In accordance with ‘Approved Document B Volume 2 Appendix D Table D1 Purpose Group 7(a) the purpose group of this building is ‘’Storage’’.

Building 1389 In accordance with Approved Document B Volume 2 Appendix D Table D1 Purpose Group 6,the main purpose group of this building is‘Industrial’, the ancillary accommodation being purpose group 3 ‘Office’.

6. Occupation of the Facility

We have been advised that the total occupant load of Building 1389 shall be 45 persons.

Building 1388 will be classified as an unoccupied building, as it is a stand-alone storage building. There could be circa 4 persons within the building at a time when moving products from or to the building.

It is currently believed that the buildings are proposed to be occupied during construction. (CONTRACTOR TO BE AWARE OF EXPLOSIVES PRESENCE &

CONDUCT OWN FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO WORKS BEING CARRIED

OUT).

7. Mission Essential Facilities

It has been confirmed that these buildings are deemed to be mission essential.

8. Size of Facility

The overall ground floor area of Building 1388 is 118m².

The overall ground floor area of building 1389 (to area considered by this project and the egress/hydraulics shops) is 640m². The total first floor area, excluding the roof void (identified as an area of maintenance access only) is 93m².

It should be noted that the area described within the scope of works of this project is linked by a fire compartment wall & door to another wing of the building used for other purposes by a different user. This other element of the building is not considered within this fire strategy, and are considered to be separate. This fire strategy only refers to the area covered by this project.

9. Number of Floors and Height of Facility

Building 1388 is single storey facility, the height to eaves level being 4.9m.

Building 1389 Building 1389 is predominantly a single storey building, with a large roof void area that is accessible for maintenance only. It has a small second storey element that is proposed to be used for offices and a conference room. The ground floor areas have a floor to underside of woodwool slab height of approx. 3.2m, with some areas containing a suspended ceiling below.

The first floor level floor to underside of suspended ceiling height is 2.4m.

The total ridge height of the main portal frame element of the building is approximately 8.6m from G/F level.

There are some single storey elements attached to the building, forming the w/c & break-room areas, hydraulics shop areas (rooms 1-3) and existing office areas 9 & 10.

10. Type of Construction

Building 1388 is a hardened reinforced concrete structure, with a concrete roof. Walls are generally circa 650mm thick, with 2 heavy steel doors to the front.

Building 1389 Building 1389is a steel framed structure with an element of insulation to the wall and roof cladding. The office areas generally have a masonry internal skin to the walls.

The existing internal ground floor walls are of masonry construction, at first floor the internal walls are studwork.

11. Existing Fire Deficiencies (Form 1487)

A fire safety pack containing form 1487 was provided dated February 2014. This refers to fire extinguisher testing, fire sealing of holes and gaps through fire rated walls & a smoke detector head issue. These points will be picked up by the general design proposals. (Refer to Appendix H of doc for pack). An updated fire pack is required to ascertain if there are any additional deficiencies since the issue of the original fire pack, by the on base fire department.

12. Previous Fire Review Comments

Fire review comments were received on 20.04.2016, and are attached in Appendix E of this document. The comments from DSA were considered and addressed within the amended strategy.

Section “B” Fire Strategy Based on the CIBSE Guide E

The guidance laid down within CIBSE Guide E have been employed in the development of this project, this fire strategy does not rely on a fire engineered solution. Content has been considered as indicated below:

a) Introduction.

Building 1388is a single storey concrete hardened building, it is to be used for the storage of ejector seats which contain explosives, and it is therefore considered an explosive storage facility.

Building 1389is a slightly more complex building, the majority of which being single storey principally for industrial use. This facility is employed as an aircraft ejector seat assembly and maintenance workshop. Part of the area will be designated asan explosives operations bays where the seats are maintained. Other industrial purpose areas are for hydraulics assemblies. The remainder of the building is for office use, including the small two storey area to the North West.

Note that this fire strategy only refers to the element of the building covered by this project, the link to another wing of the building is separated by a fire compartment wall that is outside of the scope of this project and therefore not covered by this fire strategy.

Sources of Information

All new works will be carried out in accordance with the Building Regulations, Approved Document B and shall incorporate the requirements of the following Fire Engineering reference documents:-

Reference Title A. BS7671: 2008 -Institution of Electrical Engineers Wiring

Regulations-17th Edition – plus Amendment No3: 2015.

B. United States National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 810.21.

C. NFPA 70: 2017 – National Electrical Code.

D. BS 7430: 2011 +A1:2015- Code of practice for protective earthing of electrical installations.

E. MIL-STD 188-124B: 1992 – Grounding, Bonding and Shielding, Military Standard.

F. HD637 S1: 1999 – Section 9 – Standard Earthing Practice.

G. Approved Document Part B Vol 2 2006 + 2010 & 2013 amendments.

H. Electrical Safety Rules and Procedures (JSP375).

I. Unified Facilities Criteria – UFC 3-600-01 Fire Protection

Engineering for Facilities J. Crown Fire Standards (CFS) Issue 1 – Rev 2: 1999.

K BS 5839: Part 1: 2017 – Fire Detection and Alarm Systems for

Buildings.

L NFPA 72: 2016 – National Fire Alarm & Signalling Code.

M. NFPA 101: 2018 – Life Safety Code.

N. Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) –

Guide E – Fire Engineering.

O. NFPA 10-2018: Standard for Potable Fire Extinguishers

P. BS476: Part 22: 1987 – Fire tests on Building materials and structures. Methods for determination of the fire resistance of non-load bearing elements of construction.

Q. BS EN 50200:2015 – Method of test for resistance of Fire of unprotected small cables for use in Emergency circuits.

R. BS 8434: Part 2: 2003+A2:2009 - Methods of test for assessment of the Fire Integrity of Electrical cables. Test for unprotected small cables for use in Emergency circuits. BS EN 50200 with 930oC flame and with water spray.

S. BS 5266, Part 1: 2016 – British Standard Code of Practice for Emergency Lighting.

T. BS ISO 3864:2011– Specification for Exit Signs U. Health and Safety – Safety Signs and Signals Regulations: 1996.

V. BS 8300: 2009+a1:2010 – Design of Buildings and their approaches to meet the needs of Disabled People.

W BS 9999: Jan 2017 – Code of Practice for the fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings.

X BS7974: 2001 – Application of Fire Safety Engineering Principles to the design of buildings Y RAF Lakenheath Base Standards Feb 2018 Z NFPA 13:2016 Standard for installation of sprinkler systems AA BS EN 12845:2004 + A2:2009 Fixed Fire Fighting Systems.

Automatic Sprinkler Systems Design, Installation and maintenance.

AB NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code 2015 AC NFPA 1221 Installation, Maintenance and Use of Emergency

Services Communication Systems 2016 AD BSEN 62305-1:2011 - Protection against Lightning General

Principles AE Defence Estates United States Forces Fire safety Signs Report

Nov 2006.

AF NFPA 495: 2013 Explosive Materials Code AG The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005

Fire Strategy Drawings

The following Fire Strategy Drawings are provided for the DIO Fire Adviser to evaluate the Fire Engineering/Fire Strategy, in conjunction with the accompanying Fire Strategy Report. Drawings attached in Appendix 'I'.

The information contained within the Fire Strategy Drawings is further provided on the Design Submission Drawings which are submitted to the contractor(s) for cost evaluation and tender bid purposes.

Drawing No. Title

FS100 Fire Strategy – Building 1389 g/f sheet 1

FS101 Fire Strategy – Building 1389 g/f sheet 2

FS102 Fire Strategy – Building 1389 f/f

FS103 Fire Strategy – Building 1388 FS104 Fire Strategy - Bldg1389 Egress paths

b) Means of Escape

Travel Distance:

Maximum travel distances in accordance with ADB Vol 2 table 2& NFPA 101 Chapter 7 for:

Building 1388 In accordance with ADB Table 2, high hazard storage facility should have a maximum escape distance of 12m under and 23m for NFPA 101. The maximum travel distance within this building have been confirmed at 12m and are therefore considered compliant.

In accordance with ADB Table 2, high hazard storage facility should have a maximum escape distance of 12m in one direction and 25m if two directionsof escape are provided. NFPA 101 Chapter 7 requires a maximum of 23m.

As demonstrated on the Fire Strategy drawings, these maximum distances are not exceeded in any normally occupied areas. The First floor roof void does have an existing extended travel distance from the far end of the building, as this void is only accessed in order to service the beam detectors it is not considered as a normally occupied area and therefore the travel distance is considered adequate. However it is recommended that this roof void should be designated as an area of control/restricted access and should be included within the facility emergency evacuation plan.

In accordance with ADB the remaining ‘Ordinary Hazard Industrial Areas’ require a maximum travel distance of 25m in one direction and 45m if two directionsare provided. NFPA 101 Chapter 40 requires 30m in one direction for sprinkler protected areas.As can be seen on the Fire Strategy drawings, these maximum distances are not exceeded and are therefore considered adequate.

Escape from the First Floor:

The escape from the First Floor will be via the existing internal fire protected staircaseor alternatively onto the external metal staircase.

The internal stair will provide a 60 minute fire protected enclosure with escape leading directly to open air. The head of the stair is also separated from the First Floor accommodation by a 60minute fire protectedcorridor, and is therefore considered adequate.

Number of Exits:

Building 1388 In accordance with ADB Vol 2: one number fire exit is required from each storey for up to 60 people subject to maximum travel distance, as the maximum number of persons has been confirmed as 4 the number of exits are considered adequate.

In accordance with, NFPA 101 Chapter 7.11: High hazard storage facility should have two means of exit. (Note - refer to Section A item 2 for clarification on our advised requirements) Although this is considered a fire deficiency in regard to NFPA regulation, compliance has been met under host nation requirements.

In accordance with ADB Vol 2: 1 number fire exit is required from each storey for up to 60 people subject to maximum travel distance. As we have been advised that the total occupant load of the building shall be 45 persons compliance has been achieved in all areas.

NFPA 101: High hazard Industrial areas should have at least two means of escape in accordance with Chapter 7.11 subject to maximum travel distance. Ordinary hazard Industrial areas shall not have less than 2 means of egress from each story or area, subject to maximum travel distance. As we have been advised that the total occupant load of the building shall be 45 persons we consider compliance has been achieved in all areas.

Access Control Measures:

Building 1388 The existing entrance into the building will remain unchanged with large heavy duty metal doors that are padlocked shut generally unless entry is required. Note, these doors will be open at all times that the facility is in operation/occupied and be provided with suitable signage. In the unlikely event that the external steel doors are closed whilst the building is occupied, egress can be achieved by operating the panic alarm which has been installed and interfaced through the new ‘Monaco’ transceiver unit fixed to the building which forms part of the fire alarm system, this will report directly to the Base Fire Department. We strongly advise this point is added to the buildings fire evacuation plan.

Building 1389 The existing main entrance into the building will remain unchanged with a keypad lock and a ‘Push Bar’ easy opening device.

Inner Rooms:

Inner room conditions do exist within the facility at; Rooms 1, 2 & 21a. The means of escape from these rooms is in one direction and does not exceed the requirements of ADB Vol 2 table 2 and paragraph 3.10 or NFPA 101. Once out of the room the escape distances are in accordance with the requirements of escape in more than one direction' as shown on fire strategy drawings. Each access room is fitted with smoke/fire detection and all doors have vision panels. The fire alarm decibel levels in all inner rooms are considered adequate.All inner room conditions are therefore considered adequate.

Widths of Escape Routes& Exits:

In accordance with ADB Vol 2 Table 4 the minimumescape route width and exits for up to 60 people shall be 750mm. The proposed corridor widths exceed this minimum requirement as follows; the minimum corridor width being 1150mm, and the minimum exit door being 850mm.

NFPA 101 requires a min exit width on escape routes of 710mm for new works within existing buildings. New external escape doors will provide a minimum of 850mm clear width and minimum corridor width being 1150mm, and the minimum exit door being 850mm.

External Escape Routes:

1388- External escape routes remain as existing and are made no worse by these works in terms of compliance with the building regulations,and are therefore considered adequate.

1389 - External escape routes remain as existing and are made no worse by these works in terms of compliance with the regulations, and are therefore considered adequate.

c) Fire Spread Control

Exit Corridors:

In accordance with ADB Vol 2 Table A1, all exit enclosures shall be separated from other parts of the building by a minimum fire resistance of 30 minutes. This shall be achieved in all areas (see fire strategy drawings).

NFPA 101 Chapter 7: All exits corridors shall be separated from other parts of the building by a minimum fire resistance of 60 minutes. This shall be achieved as part of the project upgrade works.(See fire strategy drawings)

Where corridors run adjacent to the high hazard industrial areas, they are required to be provide 2 hours of fire resistance in order to achieve the required level of compartmentation. All associated walls/ceilings are to be upgraded to achieve this requirement. (Refer to drawing showing compartmentation.)

Fire Exit Stairway:

In accordance with ADB Vol 2 Table A1, all exit stairway enclosures shall be separated from other parts of the building by a minimum fire resistance of 30 minutes, these standards are believed to have been achieved. The internal fire escape stairway within this facility remains as is existing and does not form part of this project. Conditions in this area are made no worse in terms of compliance with the standards as a result of works being undertaken, and are therefore considered adequate.

The new window being installed adjacent to the escape stair will be fire rated and is therefore considered compliant.

There are no material changes proposed to the exterior escape stairway and therefore conditions remains as existing. However minor works do include; the stair nosing's being decorated yellow and the risers to become closed in, in order to achieve compliance against NFPA regulations.

Compartmentation of Floors:

The 1st floor (office area) within this facility is existing and is made no worse in terms of compliance with the standards as a result of works being undertaken by this project. However it could not be confirmed what fire rating the floor provides.

ADB Vol 2 Table A2: states floors including compartment floors up to 5m high should have a fire resistance of 30 minutes.

CFS E4: All floors separating storeys shall be constructed as compartment floors and stairs passing through shall be constructed as protected shafts. The stair enclosure becomes a protected shaft (60mins) however we cannot confirm the floor construction meets 60mins compartmentation, but believe it does from our visual survey.

AFMAN 91: The high risk explosives storage areas shall be separated by a construction that has a minimum fire resistance of 2hours (relative to the corridor roof). Explosive operations separation should be minimum 1 hour. As there is no first floor accommodation above the high risk areas compliance is believed to have been achieved.

NFPA 101: Table 6.1.14.4.1 identifies the required separation between occupancies. High Risk Industrial to all other areas requires 2 hours of fire separation, we therefore propose to enhance the separation to meet this regulation.

General Purpose Industrial requires 2 hours separation between the business occupancy areas however as these areas are covered by sprinkler protection the separation may be reduced down to 1 hour, this has been achieved.

All penetrations and openings within fire walls / barriers / compartmentation lines shall meet the fire rating of the wall/floor they are within.

With the exception of the compartmentation of the high risk areas containing the explosives operations areas, no additional works for compartment floors are anticipated in relation to this and it is expected that the existing construction exceeds the minimum requirements expected of new construction.

Compartmentation of Walls:

CFS E4: Office ancillary areas shall be separated by a construction that has a minimum fire resistance of 1hr.

AFMAN 91: The high hazard explosives storage area shall be separated by a construction that has a minimum fire resistance of 2hours. Compartmentation between the high hazard area continues up into the roof void to separate the roof void over the explosive operations from the adjacent office space (refer to fire strategy drawings).

NFPA 101: Table 6.1.14.4.1 identifies the required separation between occupancies. High risk Industrial to all other areas requires 2 hours, therefore we have enhanced the separation to meet this. General Purpose Industrial requires 2 hours separation between the business occupancy areas however these areas are sprinkler protected allowing the separation to be reduced down to 1 hour, which is achieved.

All penetrations and openings within fire walls / barriers / compartmentation lines shall meet the fire rating of the wall/floor they are within.

With the exception of the compartmentation of the high hazard areas, no additional works for compartment walls are anticipated in relation to this and it is understood that the existing construction exceeds the minimum requirements expected of new construction. We therefore believe compliance has been achieved.(See fire strategy drawings)

Surface Spread of Flame:

All proposed interior surfaces will have a class ‘0’ surface spread of flame on escape routes and class ‘1’ elsewhere.

Separation Distances/Notional Boundaries:

This project does not affect any Separation Distances/Notional Boundaries which may be required under Crown Fire Standards (CFS).

The new external GRP plantrooms are proposed to be protected as follows:

Building 1388 Plantroom:

This plantroom is located adjacent to the existing building and is 100% fire separation by means of the existing reinforced concrete wall offering minimum of one hour fire protection, therefore no space separation limitations apply.

Building 1389 Plantroom:

Plantroom 4, is provided with one hour fire resistant construction, therefore no space separation limitations apply.

d) Design Fires

As the fire strategy relies on compliance with prescriptive standards and not a fire engineered solution, design fires are not relevant.

e) Facilities for the Fire Brigade

The existing buildings are well served by a network of roads and wide footpaths whereby a fire tender can gain access to within 10m of the building.

f) Fire Systems

i. Smoke Control

There are currently no known smoke control measures within the existing building.

This project does not make these conditions any worse than previously accepted.

Smoke Clearance following a fire would be dealt with by means of existing natural means [door openings] and portable smoke control equipment i.e. positive fans.

ii. Sprinkler Systems

This building will have no sprinkler system as the areas are classified as

‘apply no water’. No existing sprinkler is present within building 1388, therefore the existing condition remains unchanged.

The existing sprinkler system within this building shall be modified by a specialist contractor (appointed for design & modifications by the contractor) to areas receiving layout changes only. No works will be undertaken to the existing sprinkler system in any other areas. Any existing deficiency will not be rectified within the scope of this project. Any deficiencies that are encountered during the works will be notified to the PM for further instructions. Modification certificates will accompany all design proposals.

Based on the BSEN12845 and the system requirements to supply ‘Ordinary

Hazard Group 3’ coverage, the requirements are 1100 l/min to 1350 l/min. As we are advised there is 1700 gallons/minute available at the nearby hydrant whichwould equate to 6435 l/min.Based on this information we believe that the capacity ofthe hydrant system is at an acceptable level in order to provide the amount of water required. This point should be confirm prior to acceptance of the design by a specialist contractor.

The sprinkler system will be removed from all rooms where operations involve working with and storage of explosives (rooms 4 & 5), and from the roof void over (as water would penetrate the woodwool floor construction and access the rooms below should they be activated or damaged). These rooms/areas are classified as ‘apply no water’ in accordance with the AFMAN document -refer also to waiver in Appendix C). The sprinkler system will remain in the spray room.

Reference to memorandum from 48 CES/CEF dated 30 Jan 2015 confirm acceptance to isolate the sprinklers in these areas (Copy attached to the back of this fire strategy in Appendix C).

iii. Fire Alarm System

Refer to Appendix D for the fire alarm ‘cause and effect’ sheet.

Building 1388 This building is currently not provided with any fire alarm or automatic fire detection system. It is therefore proposed that anew addressable fire alarm and detection system be provided. The new fire alarm system shall be linked to the base fire department via a new Monaco transceiver unit. It is proposed that the fire alarm panel and Monaco transceiver shall be located within a GRP enclosure located adjacent to the building.

The client has not confirmed the category of the fire alarm system required for this facility under the requirements of B.S 5839: Part 1:2013 – Fire Detection and Alarm Systems for Non-domestic Buildings. As a result and in the interests of moving the project forward, we have made our reasonable assumptions as to these requirements and advise as follows.

The area of repair has been designated as requiring a category L4 system of automatic fire detection (Partial Coverage under NFPA101), for the work area which is also deemed as an escape route.

All incidents and alarms shall be stored on the alarm panel to enable interrogation at a later date. Should a fault occur on a circuit similar information shall also be displayed within the main panel.

Upon activation of the buildings fire alarm system and correct interconnection, the buildings ventilation systems will shut down.

Fire alarm sounders and beacons are to be installed throughout the building as shown on the Electrical services design drawings.

The wiring shall be carried out utilising FP200 fire rated flexible cable with red LSF over sheath for the whole of the fire alarm system including all connections to interface units.

It should be noted that the fire alarm system in building 1388 is totally independent to the system within building 1389 and will not report to each other.

The existing addressable fire detection system control panel shall remain as installed complete with the existing Monaco transceiver unit. The existing fire alarm detection and alarm system circuit wiring shall be stripped out of the work area completely with all devices.

The client has not confirmed the category of the fire alarm system required for this facility under the requirements of B.S 5839:Part 1:2013 – Fire Detection and Alarm Systems for Buildings. As a result and in the interests of moving the project forward, we have made our reasonable assumptions as to these requirements and advise as follows.

The area of repair has been designated as requiring a category L4 system of automatic fire detection within all escape routes, ceiling voids, plant areas, explosive workshops and the roof void. This will be a Partial Coverage system under NFPA101.

The building does have a sprinkler system installed throughout, with the exception to the explosive workshops and roof void over.

The fire detection installation within the adjoining new extension shall be retained and adapted to be served from the new wiring configuration for the existing alarm panel, new electronic sounders and visual beacons shall be provided within the new extension area, these shall be served from the existing fire alarm panel.

All incidents and alarms shall be stored on the alarm panel to enable interrogation at a later date. Should a fault occur on a circuit similar information shall also be displayed within the main panel. The existing panel is located at the entrance of the portion of the building covered by this project.

The fire alarm panel is linked to a comparable fire alarm panel within the adjoining half of the building which is linked to the Monaco transceiver unit.

Upon activation of the buildings fire alarm system and correct interconnection, the buildings ventilation systems will shut down.

Fire alarm sounders and beacons are to be installed throughout the building as shown on the Electrical services design drawings.

The wiring shall be carried out utilising MICC with red LSF over sheath for the whole of the fire alarm system including all connections to interface units.

It should be noted that the fire alarm system in building 1389 is totally independent to the system within building 1388 and will not report to each other.

iv. First-Aid Fire Fighting

Fire extinguishers and cabinets should be located adjacent all storey and final exits. These are however outside of the project brief and should be provided and positioned by the user).

v. Emergency& Egress Lighting

Emergency Lighting:

Emergency Lighting is to be provided throughout the building to comply with the required room luminance outlined within the base standard, BS5266 and NFPA 101.

The egress access routes have been established and denoted on drawing FS104. The emergency lighting modification certificate will be delivered at the 100% design stage in order to achieve compliance and Cert ‘A’ Approval.

Within the high hazard industrial areas are the two rooms that are named the explosive operations bays, as explosives are present in these two areas we have designated all areas as means of access/egress due to the higher risks and changeable layouts with mobile equipment etc.

Emergency illumination devices have been provided to give an initial illumination which is not less than an average of 10.8 lux measured along the path of egress at floor level and 1.0 lux measured along the centre line of an escape route up to 2m in width.

Emergency illumination durations:

- NFPA 101 - 90 minutes autonomy as section 7.9.2.

- ADB - Refers to BS 5266-1:2011.

- BS 5266-1:2011 based on a building use (industrial premises) Clause

9.3.7 states a minimum duration of 1 Hour.

- CFS- Item 4.1.a.1 refers you to ADB.

- RAF Lakenheath Base Standards - 3 hours

Emergency illumination is provided for a minimum of 3 hours duration in the event of failure of normal lighting and shall be linked to a key switch system for testing.

External lighting is to be provided in accordance with the 'siting of emergency escape lighting luminaires' as indicated in B.S 5266-1:2011, clause 6.6.1 which includes the requirement for providing an emergency luminaire above each escape exit door from the building.

Illuminated exit signage shall be located as indicated on the fire strategy drawings and shall be LED type complete with 3hour integral battery and be linked to key switch system for testing. The symbols and sizing shall be in accordance with the “Defence Estates United States Forces Fire safety Signs Report Nov 2006”.

Illumination for Means of Egress:

NFPA 101 Chapter 7:

All floors and other walking surfaces along the designated exit access (as identified in the fire escape routes as above), shall be illuminated at all times the occupancy requires the means of egress to be available for use to the following levels:

- minimum illumination for stairs, 10.8 lux, measured at the walking surface),

- minimum illumination for floors and walking surfaces other than stairs,

10.8 lux, measured at the walking surface).

g) Role of Management

The building management shall incorporate/consider building layout changes and revise their management system/fire strategy as necessary. It should be noted that no fire risk assessment for the building has been made available for this project.

We have been provided with a risk assessment for the facility in relation to its explosive category, however this is not a Fire Risk Assessment in accordance with Article 9 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The RA is attached in appendix B.

h) Cooking Equipment

There are no cooking facilities within building 1388 or 1389. The break room area in 1389 may contain a user supplied microwave but that is out of the designer’s control.

i) Fire Hydrants

We have been provided with base hydrant information including hydrant locations, references and flow rates etc. It appears that not all hydrants are shown on these records as a site walk established a particular hydrant that wasn’t shown on the records. However, using this record information, it appears that all parts of the exterior of buildings 1388 & 1389 are within 106m of a hydrant, therefore compliant with UFC 3-600-01 9.3.5.8.2. We therefore believe that adequate fire hydrant provision has been provided to the building.

It should be noted that the hydrant flow test information provided indicates no one hydrant on the base provides 'the required flow rate for this facility' of 2250GPM (the flow that we have been advised as being required here), however this flow may well be the combined requirement from 2 hydrants, as UFC 3-600-01 9.3.5.8.1 states that hydrants should be provided so that fire flow can be met without taking more than 1250GPM from a single hydrant.

We have been advised that the water supply requirement from hydrants for this facility should be 2250GPM. It has been confirmed that the water available is 1700GPM, and a test carried out in July2016 indicates 1800GPM. It has been advised that the fire department has raised this as a base wide fire deficiency that will be addressed outside of the scope of this project.

j) Heating &Ventilation System

There will be a new supply and extract ventilation system with an Air Handling Unit.

The supply and extract system will shut down automatically in the event of a fire via a fire alarm interface or by the fireman’s switch.

The ventilation also heats the building via wet heater coils in the AHU and ductwork supplementing the radiator system. No electric heating will be present.

This ventilation is not for the purpose of smoke control or extract.

k) Fire Dampers and Fire Stopping

In accordance with Approved Document B and Crown Fire Standards Fire/Smoke dampers shall be installed on all ductwork penetrating a compartment, floor or exit way. These dampers will close on activation of the Fire Alarm system. (Refer to mechanical drawings M200-M202

All services penetrating fire rated walls/floors shall be properly fire stopped with materials that will provide the equal amount of fire resistance as the fire barrier or compartmentation breached.

l) Roof & Ceiling Voids

The extensive roof void over the high hazard and explosive operations areas, will be incorporated within the two hour fire enclosure, as the separating ceiling layer (woodwool slab) cannot be proven to achieve two hour fire resistance.

Access to the roof void should only be permitted to gain access to the far end beam detectors to carry out any future maintenance when required, (this would be very rare access). The building users would need to prepare a method statement for such a time if anyone did need to carry out maintenance to the beam detector.

As the rear corridor also shares the same woodwool slab ceiling covering as rooms 4, 5 & 6, we propose to install a two hour fire compartment ceiling within the corridor adjacent to these rooms.

All other voids are generally above suspended ceilings from ground floor and the first floor office area. These will be protected throughout by relevant fire detection and sprinkler systems.

In accordance with ADB Vol 2: No voids are being created by this project in excess of 20m therefore no additional cavity barriers are required. The existing roof void measuring approximately 20m diagonally, is therefore deemed adequate without the need for additional cavity barriers.

In accordance with NFPA 101 Chapter 8: All attic spaces in excess of 280m2 and ceiling voids in excess of 93m2 shall be draught stopped in accordance with

8.6.11.1. however8.6.11.2(3) states draught stopping is not required where the existing installation is an existing installation. As there are no new installations that exceed the above limits, the proposal is believed to be adequate.

The structural integrity of the existing floor slab in the roof void could not be established, therefore in order to gain safe access to fire detection devices in this area we propose the construction of a new walkway. In this way servicing and maintenance can be safely carried out. This walkway will be provided with lighting/emergency lighting, fire escape directional signage, sounder beacons and a break glass call point adjacent to the exit door from the roof void.

m) Testing and Commissioning

All systems shall be adequately set, tested, commissioned or decommissioned and demonstrated to the complete satisfaction of the PM in line with the manufacturer’s recommendations and industry National Standard Codes of Practice, CIBSE Commissioning Codes and US Base Standards.

n) Other Issues

As the client has not provided a fire risk assessment for the existing building which is required in accordance with 'The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005', this strategy has been produced to the best of our knowledge, based on the following:

• Survey evidence

• Use of reference documents

• Fire Safety Audit carried out by WSP

• Base Fire Department fire deficiency document

o) Explosives

Within both buildings, there are areas that 'store' explosives. These areas are:

• Building 1388 (wholly)

• Building 1389 – Within a 2hr fire resistant cabinet to be located within rooms 4 or 5 (to be supplied & installed by client)

We have been advised that the category of explosives present within this facility belong to groups HD1.3 and HD1.4. As these explosives will be handled/stored throughout the above areas, we believe that an explosive certificate should have been issued for these building. We have been advised by the client that although we are upgrading doors within these areas, the existing internal and/or external walls may not achieve equivalent specification criteria, however it has been confirmed by the client that walls within Building 1389 do not need to be altered in order to comply with the storage and handling of explosives materials regulations.

As we are unable to confirm these requirements we would recommend that a subject matter expert (SME) within explosives authority provide written confirmation that no further more stringent integrity/protection to the structure in question are required.

It should be noted that the AFMAN91 requires that a risk assessments be undertaken on the explosive facility and the operations carried out. This strategy has progressed on the basis of the design brief and on the understanding that a risk assessment has been prepared and approved prior to the brief being issued. It should be further noted that any subsequent risk assessments carried out may affect the design strategy if further deficiencies are found.

p) Hazardous Material storage

It has been identified that there may be hazardous materials (other than explosives) stored within the premises, however we have been advised that they are a user requirement and are not to be considered as part of this design (Refer to TQFA02 in Appendix G of this document). We therefore advise that the storage locations of the hazardous materials should be discussed with DSA and agreed prior to any installation.

Highly flammable materials risk assessments were requested during the design process, but we have been advised that they are a user requirement and are not to be considered as part of this design (Refer to TQFA03 – in Appendix G of this document). It should be noted that if any additional requirement driven by these regulations are raised in the future that it could have an effect on the design provided.

q) Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR) Requirements

As elements of the facility have been identified as requiring a DSEAR Risk Assessment to be undertaking, as identified during the design. The requirements of the DSEAR assessment provided have been considered within this design. This DSEAR assessment is included within Appendix F of this document, and was completed by Haztech Consultants.

The only room identified by that report which is required to be ATEX rated being the spray booth. It has been confirmed that the rooms containing explosives in 1389 are not required to be ATEX rated. As building 1388 is currently ATEX rated it will remain so.

Appendix A

A fire compliance audit for the existing building has been undertaken by WSP on 15.04.14

Appendix B

Building Risk Assessment Documentation

RAF Liaison Officer (Arm)

USAFE-UK

Bldg 562 Royal Air Force Mildenhall Bury St Edmunds Suffolk

IP28 8NF

Military Network: 92052382550 Telephone: 01638 542550 Facsimile: 01638 543680 Email: duncan.arnold.gb@us.af.mil

Our Reference:

Exp Licence App Dated 07 Mar 13 Colonel Kyle Robinson 48th FW Commander Unit 5210 Box 135

APO AE 09461

RAF Lakenheath Suffolk Date: 14 Jun 13

EXPLOSIVE SAFETY CASE – USE OF BLDG 1388 AS A POTENTIAL EXPLOSION SITE

References:

A. JSP 482 – MOD Explosive Regulations.

B. Email 20120918-LAK 1389 Bldg Requirement – Plans for future Aircraft Assisted Escape System (AAES) Maintenance at RAF Lakenheath.

C. Email 20121212-Lakenheath-Use of old ASM Refueller Vehicle Shelter as an Ejector Seat Store / Egress Facility - Technical Assessment.

D. Email 20130312-LAK EJS PES 1388 TA-FS ES-U.

INTRODUCTION

1. Due to the Egress storage and maintenance facility at Bldg 1275 failing both UK and US regulations, RAF Lakenheath has relocated the Egress maintenance facility to Bldg 1389. An Egress storage facility is required adjacent to the maintenance shop in order to facilitate the Egress maintenance operation. Bldg 1388 was chosen as it is close to the maintenance shop and complies fully with Air Force regulations. The new Potential Explosion Site (PES) fails to comply with the MOD regulations at Reference A. In these circumstances IE(RAF) may still issue a licence in accordance with Reference A Chapter 9 Para 13, as long as the Head of Establishment accepts the risk. This Explosives Safety Case (ESC) outlines the risks associated with storing F15 Aircraft Assisted Escape Systems, including catapults, within Bldg 1388. Recommendations are made to mitigate the risk to assets and personnel to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

BACKGROUND

2. The Secretary of State for Defence, through Health and Safety (H&S) legislation is accountable for ensuring MOD activities are carried out within legal and departmental standards. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 requires employers to exercise an absolute duty of care to provide the best safety practices within the law and reasonable practicality. For all operations where full compliance with the regulations is not possible, Reference A requires an ESC to be compiled. This is to ensure the explosive risk carried is identified and is ALARP. The risk is to be accepted at a level determined by the degree of risk iaw Reference A. The signatory is to confirm that operational imperatives prevent compliance with the UK explosive regulations, and that the resultant risk to operational capability, and general H&S, are acceptable under the circumstances.

SITUATION

3. The USVF at RAF Lakenheath have undergone rationalisation under a Value Stream Analysis (VSA). This has identified the need to relocate Egress storage and Maintenance Section in accordance with Reference B. Bldgs 1388 and 1389 were identified as suitable PES and complied with all relevant DoD regulations; however, Bldg 1388 does not fully comply with Reference A – specifically the Authorised Quantity regulations in Reference A, Chapter 10, Section 8, Annex C, Para 1.4.

4. Following a visit by Explosive Safety staff, a Technical Assessment (TA) was requested through the Defence Ordnance Safety Group. The TA report at Reference C, quantified the hazards and recommended structural changes to the front doors, and the provision of a blast wall. This work is planned to be completed NLT Dec 14.

5. In the interim a licence is required with an Acceptance of Risk by the RAF Lakenheath Base Commander iaw Reference A Chapter 9 Para 13. This would allow the USVF at RAF Lakenheath to operate under a standard explosive licence until the Bldg work is completed.

NON-COMPLIANCES

6. The following conditions prevent full compliance with Reference A:

a. Bldg 1388 does not have the required blow out panels.

b. The…