AFMSBridgeRedactedJA_Redacted.pdf

MICC Control No.: 2017-8 Contractor: CALIBRE Systems, Inc.

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FAR Part 6 Justification and Approval for Other than Full and Open Competition

1. Contracting Activity: Mission Installation Contracting Command, Fort Belvoir (MICC‐ FB), 9410 Jackson Loop North, Building 1425, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 22060

2. Description of Action: The US Army Force Management School (AFMS) requests a firm-fixed-price contract with CALIBRE Systems, Incorporated, 6354 Walker Lane, Alexandria, Virginia 22310. The Government projects award in December 2016 and fiscal year 2017 Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds will be used. An acquisition plan is not required because this procurement does not meet the threshold at Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 207.103(d)(i)(B).

3. Description of Supplies/Services: This acquisition will provide necessary Professional and Educational Support Services for AFMS while the Army conducts a competition for the follow-on requirement. These services are non-personal in nature and will be performance based in accordance with FAR Part 37. Under the resultant contract, the contractor will continue to provide the status quo administrative, instructional, logistical and publications support as detailed in the Performance Work Statement (PWS) until the competitive follow-on is awarded in August 2017. The period of performance is as follows:

Base Period 17 December 2016 to 16 August 2017 Value: $7.69M

Option Period 1 17 August 2017 to 16 October 2017 Value: $2.00M Total: $9.69M

The AFMS is identified as the Army’s Training and Education proponent for: (1) Force Management, (2) Force Development, (3) Global Force Management, (4) Force Integration, (5) Force Structure Documentation, and (6) Total Army Analysis (TAA).

Therefore, the AFMS is the Army’s sole credentialing authority for the award of the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 3R, and Functional Area (FA) 50 Force Manager initial qualification training (Proponency School) in order to fill Army authorizations with properly trained and qualified personnel.

The AFMS is a centralized educational institution for preparing senior Army analyst and leaders for assignments within the Force Management (FM) community and provides for Strategic Leadership training and education. AFMS trains General Officers (GO), Senior Executive Service (SES), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians in order to meet both Department of Defense (DoD), and DA FM requirements. In addition, the contract provides support in order to meet both the Training Doctrine Command (TRADOC) accreditation standards, the implementation and execution of the Army Learning Model 2015 (ALM2015) formerly referred to as (ALC 2015), the development and execution of exportable and Distance Learning (DL)

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY curriculum, and provides DA with the means of maintaining currency of specified FM publications, regulations, manuals, pamphlets, circulars, and associated documents.

The high-visibility mission of the AFMS requires continuous support and is critical in nature in order to support both DoD and DA educational requirements in its execution of multiple programs and courses, many of which are scheduled up to one year in advance.

HQDA G3/5/7 provides and supports the following courses through the AFMS:

How The Army Runs Course (HTARC), Proponent HQDA G3/5/7.

Force Integration Course for Senior Leaders (FICSL), Proponent HQDA G3/5/7.

Senior Leader Orientation Course, Proponent HQDA G3/5/7.

Command Sergeant Major How the Army Runs Course, Proponent Sergeant Major of the Army.

FA50 Qualification Course, Proponent Army G-8.

Staff Synchronization Officers Course, Proponent HQDA G-8.

Action Officer Logistics Course, Proponent HQDA G-4.

How AMC Runs Course, Proponent Army Materiel Command.

FA51 Qualification Course, ACC Center of Excellence (Huntsville).

Lastly, as the proponent for Force Management Training and Education, and IAW AR 350-1, page 41, AFMS is responsible for both Instructor certification and to validate force management educational material being presented within other Army educational institutions such as: Army War College, Army Management Staff College, Command and General Staff College, Army National Guard Bureau, and the Sergeants Major Academy.

Additionally, the AFMS supports three (3) other major educational programs: the Army Senior Executive Education Program (ASEEP), the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program (ASLDP), and the US Army Force Management School (USAFMS). The ASEEP requires each service to conduct training for newly selected Flag and General Officers and Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel. The ASLDP provides the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) with a means to comply with AR 350-1 in order to provide training, education and developmental opportunities for the General Officer Corps. The USAFMS program incorporates all other force management courses not included within the ASLDP and ASEEP.

The AFMS Support Contract is critical to ensuring that AFMS can provide the educational services required by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Army G-3/5/7, and the Army G-8.

4. Authority Cited: 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) or 41 U.S.C. 253(c)(1); FAR 6.302-1: Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements IAW FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii)(B), which states that for DOD procurements, services may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of follow-on contracts for the continued provision of highly specialized services when it is likely that award to

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY any other source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.

5. Reason for Authority Cited: Services are currently being performed under the AFMS Professional Support Services contract W91WAW-12-D-0017, awarded on 17 June 2013. On 2 May 2016, the AFMS was informed that the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a top to bottom review of the General Officer Training Program. The review involved the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program (ASLDP), one of the three major programs within the AFMS curriculum. On 3 August 2016, HQDA issued HQDA EXORD 248-16, titled Army-Wide Implementation of the Army Strategic Education Program, which directed the realignment of the ASLDP Basic, Intermediate, Advanced, and Senior Leader courses to the Army War College, effective 1 October 2016. In order to align with the direction specified within the EXORD, the AFMS would have to make significant revisions to the scope of work. ASDLP was one of the key programs within the AFMS curriculum. Removing the ASLDP Program had approximately a impact on the value of the re-compete. The necessity for these senior leader directed changes required a complete revision of the requirement, leading to a compressed acquisition timeline that made it unfeasible to compete a new contract without incurring a break in service.

As a result, a follow-on contract must be issued on a sole-source basis to complete on-going education and continue the critical services provided to both Army soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians. The services under this bridge will be the same services provided on the current contract. The time required to compete a new contract incorporating the aforementioned revisions to the ASDLP Program would result in unacceptable delays and a break in service, which is not feasible given the importance of the services provided. The eight month follow-on bridge will provide the government with sufficient time to compete a new contract that incorporates the revised requirements.

Alternatives: Four alternatives were considered before proceeding with this J&A, suspension of operations, in-house resourcing, competition, and support from other Government agencies.

1. Suspension of Services: Suspension of services is not a viable option. As noted above, the mission of the AFMS is ongoing and requires continuous support and the execution of multiple programs and courses, many of which have been scheduled for up to a year in advance. Any degradation in support will greatly hinder the Secretary of the Army, CSA, Army G-3, and Army G-8 in their provision of support to both the Army and DoD organizations for a spectrum of activities contained within the Force Management Process and the eight organizational cycles contained within the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM).

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. In‐House Resourcing: USAFMS does not have the ability to use in‐house personnel/expertise to satisfy the complex technical and analytical services.

The lack of in‐house Government expertise to perform these functions is due to the current staffing levels, and the mandate to further reduce staffing in accordance with an April 2014 Department of the Army directive to reduce the Agency in‐line with other HQDA staff elements by 25% beginning in Fiscal Year 2016. The reduction of existing staff translates to no in‐house capability to replace the expert capability provided by the existing USAFMS support contract.

3. Competition: Given the compressed acquisition timeline caused by the CSA directed changes, awarding a competitive contract valued at would not have been feasible. The solicitation process alone would require roughly three months to complete for a requirement of this magnitude; two months to develop and pass all required reviews, and an additional month to post for industry responses. Given that the scope changed in August, there would not have been enough time to solicit and award a competitive contract of this dollar value. Additionally, there are duplicative costs associated with the phase in period that would not occur if awarded to the incumbent. If awarded to a different contractor, the new contract period of performance would need to begin 30 days prior to the date that the current period of performance expires to allow time for the phase in. This additional 30 days equates to approximately in additional costs to the government.

4. Availability of support from other Government agencies: The requiring activity conducted research to determine whether this requirement could be supported by TRADOC or by any other governmental agency. It was determined that in order to provide a standing faculty within the restricted timeline and to instruct and facilitate force management courses within the current manning constrained environment was not feasible and any approach to solve this with a government solution would lead to a turbulent and unsuccessful outcome. This instant capability does not reside within the government.

Additional Competition Discussion

1. The services provided on the current contract represents the minimum requirement that the government needs for the next eight months. The eight month period of performance will be sufficient to maintain the status quo services provided on the current contract and also provides sufficient time for the government to compete a new contract. A two month option period will be included within the bridge contract in the event that a new contract is not awarded within eight months.

2. Since the CSA directed changes were published 03 August 2016, the time required to revise the requirement and meet the requisite threshold reviews would not have been feasible. Additionally, awarding to the incumbent doesn’t

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY require the 30-day phase in that will be included within the re-compete. The government would not have sufficient time to award a new competitive contract and ensure the awardee has 30 days to complete the phase in period. The educational training provided within the requirement is complex and requires instructors with the requisite certifications and senior force management experience, which requires time to recruit and hire.

3. There were changes directed to the requirement by the CSA as explained within paragraph 5, Reason for Authority Cited. The EXORD directing the change is attached to this J&A.

4. A new contractor would be required to find qualified faculty to include instructors with the requisite certifications and the required force management experience. Additionally, the new contractor would be required to become familiar with all on-going school courses, programs, scheduling, over 250 lesson plans, and the use of the Blackboard Learning Content Management System (LCMS), which houses all course content, course shells, testing, and assessments.

Impact: The AFMS educational requirement is CSA directed for all General Officers and members of the Senior Executive Service. The courses taught by AFMS provide Army senior leaders with strategic-level knowledge on critical aspects of running the Army. If the contract is not awarded and the service is disrupted/discontinued, there will be a significant degradation to the strategic-level education provided to Army senior leaders responsible for managing the Army.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition: Two sources sought notices have been posted to FedBizOpps. The first, posted on 02 August 2016, received four responses from industry indicating interest in the requirement. The second Sources Sought was posted on 01 November 2016 with five responses from industry. However, none of the industry responses provided a reasonable explanation of how they can begin performance within the required timeframe.

a. Effective Competition: Effective competition will be achieved through the subsequent re-compete of this requirement.

b. Subcontracting Competition: CALIBRE has been encouraged to provide for competition among its subcontractors under this contract. The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) maintains sufficient surveillance to ensure that CALIBRE is effectively managing their purchasing program which includes fostering competition among subcontractors.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: The 8 month bridge contract will allow the government time to award a competitive contract that will result in the best value to the government. The government is aggressively pursuing the following established milestones for the re-compete:

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Requirement document completed by 3 January 2017 Acquisition Plan approved by 24 February 2017 Solicitation issued by 12 April 2017 Proposals received by 12 May 2017 Contract awarded by 14 July 2017

8. Market Research: An initial Sources Sought was posted to determine if a sufficient number of interested firms were in the marketplace to facilitate competition and 13 responses from industry were received. A second Sources Sought was posted on 01 November 2016 with five responses received from industry. The requiring activity also conducted market research beginning in November 2014 by contacting industry to determine if there are contractors available within the marketplace that can perform the requirement. The sources sought and the market research provided by the requiring activity indicate that there are contractors interested in the requirement. However, it was not clear from the industry responses how they would be able to meet the requirement within the required timeframe.

9. Interested Sources: See paragraph 6.

10. Other Facts:

a. Procurement History:

1. Prior to 2009, the operation of the USAFMS was accomplished under the Force Management Service Support (FMSS) contract. Contract numbers DASW01-94-D-0006 (Military Professional Resources, Inc (MPRI) and DASW01-94-D-0007 (SY Coleman) were the first FMSS multiple award IDIQ contracts awarded in September 1994 under full and open competition.

2. In September 1999, the FMSS contract underwent its second full and open competition which resulted in contract numbers, DASW01-99-D-0026 (MPRI) and DASW01-99-D-0027 (SY Coleman).

3. In September 2004, the FMSS contract underwent its third full and open competition, which resulted in the award of contract numbers W74V8H-04-D- 0080 (MPRI), W74V8H-04-D-0081 (MPRI), W74V8H-04-D0082 (SY Coleman), and W74V8H-04-D-0083 (Cubic). All prior contracts were labor hour contracts.

4. In September 2009, the FMSS contract underwent its fourth full and open competition, and the contracting officer determined that the requirement for the USAFMS should be procured separately from the other FMSS contract requirements as a single award IDIQ contract. A commercial Firm Fixed Price (FFP) IDIQ contract with incidental cost-reimbursement CLINs was awarded under contract number W91WAW-10-D-0035, awarded to MPRI, a division of L-3, on 15 March 2010, and expired on 22 August 2012.

Program/Equipment: Professional and Education Services

Version – MAY 2016 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. The government solicited a non-commercial, single award, hybrid IDIQ contract on 11 June 2012 which will provide the USAFMS with the flexibility needed to order services at the Task Order level using just the FFP CLINs, or a combination of FFP and Cost Reimbursement CLINs, as needed. The contracting officer considered whether a multiple award was appropriate for this acquisition. In accordance with FAR 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(B)(4), the contracting officer determined that the projected orders were so integrally related that only a single contractor could reasonably perform the work. This solicitation resulted in award of contract number W91WAW-12-D-0017, awarded on 22 August 2012, as result of full and open competition. This award was protested and a stop work order was issued on 6 September 2012 for the two task orders that had been issued against W91WAW-12-D-0017.

6. Contract W91WAW-12-C-0062 was awarded on 7 September 2012 as a bridge contract to incumbent MPRI/L3 while the protest was pending and during a period of corrective action.

7. Upon implementing corrective action, performance resumed on 1 July 2013, on task orders issued under W91WAW-12-D-0017.