Appendix_E_-_Spill_Prevention-Response_Plan.pdf

SPILL PREVENTION & RESPONSE PLAN

CDRL CEV‐15C

Thule Air Base

Final FY‐12

OPR: GREENLAND CONTRACTORS

Chief of Environmental Engineering DSN 629‐3840 ext. 2698 Supersedes CDRL CEV‐15C 1 July 2010, signed 24 May 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1.1 Security and Administrative Instructions

2 INFORMATION AND EMERGENCY CONTACTS

3 GENERAL

3.1 Purpose

3.2 Scope

3.3 Regulatory Overview

3.4 Thule AB’s Worst Case Spill Scenarios

4 PREVENTION SECTION

4.1 Incident Commander (IC)

4.2 General Information

4.3 Potential Spill Locations

4.4 Arrangements for Emergency Services

4.5 Telephone number to emergency services

4.6 Prevention, Control and Countermeasures

4.7 Emergency Equipment

4.8 Evacuation Plans

4.9 Required Procedures

4.10 Site-specific procedures

4.11 Deficiencies in Spill Prevention and Control Measures

5 SPILL CONTROL SECTION

5.1 Responsibilities, duties, procedures and resources

5.2 Immediate response actions

5.3 Emergency Response Team

5.3.2 Spill Response Team

5.4 Procedures for ERT alert and response

5.5 Notification of Spills

5.6 Notification of IC, Installation Commander and local authorities

5.7 Assignment of responsibilities for making notifications

5.8 Surveillance procedures for early detection of spills

5.9 Surveillance and logging of historical spills

5.10 Critical Water and Natural resources

5.11 Additional Emergency Assistance Organizations

5.12 Cleanup procedure

CDRL CEV-15C Spill Prevention and Response Plan

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5.13 Reuse and disposal of recovered substances and absorbent materials

5.14 General health, safety and fire prevention precautions

5.15 Public Affairs and releasing information

6 REPORTING SECTION

6.1 Recordkeeping

6.2 Non-Reportable Spills

6.3 Reportable Spills

6.4 Notification of Host Country Authorities

6.5 Spill Response Training and Drills

6.6 Follow-up actions

APPENDIX 1: POTENTIAL SPILL LOCATIONS, HAZMAT STORAGE

APPENDIX 2: POTENTIAL SPILL LOCATIONS, TANKS AND TRANSFORMERS

APPENDIX 3: SPILL ROUTE MAPS

APPENDIX 4: DRAINAGE PATTERNS

APPENDIX 5: EVACUATION PLANS

APPENDIX 6: WATER PROTECTION AREAS

APPENDIX 7: SPILL MIGRATION PATHWAYS

APPENDIX 8: INVENTORY OF SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

APPENDIX 9: FUEL DISTRIBUTION PIPELINE MAP

APPENDIX 10: DOCUMENTATION FOR CLEAN-UP ACTIONS

APPENDIX 11: SPILL ROUTE MAP, FLIGHTLINE

APPENDIX 12: CONTINGENCY PLANS

APPENDIX 13: HQ AFSPC/A4/7 GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, CLEANUP LEVELS

APPENDIX 14 : PROCEDURES

APPENDIX 15: DISTRIBUTION LIST

APPENDIX 16: 2011 REVIEW COMMENTS

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1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1.1 Security and Administrative Instructions

Title: The long title of this plan is “Spill Prevention and Response Plan”. The short title is SPRP, and this title will be used as reference throughout the entire document.

Classification: The document is unclassified.

Responsibilities: Greenland Contractors, Environmental Engineering (GC/EE) is the office of primary responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan. The instructions given in this plan are applicable to all organizations and tenant units on Thule AB. Organizations are authorized to extract and reproduce those portions of the plan that are essential in the accomplishment of necessary planning and in the preparation of supporting documents and reports.

References: References referred to in the SPRP do not appear in the plan, but they may be accessed through GC Environmental Engineering or the Air Force Electronic Publication Library (AFEPL).

Reviews/changes: The SPRP is reviewed and updated annually IAW the CDRL and distributed accordingly.

A draft is submitted to the requiring office, 21CES/CEANN, by 1 Nov for review. Review comments, if any, will be provided by 21CES/CEANN within 60 days. Review comments received will be incorporated in the final version of the plan within 30 days; thereafter the document will be submitted to 821ABG/CC for signature. The signed plan will then be submitted as the Final edition.

Further, the plan is subject to change if any of the applicable laws, regulations, or requirements is altered.

Distribution: The plan will be distributed to the organizations shown on the distribution list in Appendix 15.

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2 INFORMATION AND EMERGENCY CONTACTS

As Thule AB is a remote site, no immediate support from outside installation agencies may be expected in case of emergencies. If an emergency occurs and Thule AB is not capable of responding, 21st Space Wing must be contacted.

Emergency Phone Numbers

List of persons to be contacted in case of an emergency situation and their phone numbers:

Department Extension

Main Base Fire Department or Ambulance 911

BMEWS Site I Fire Department or Ambulance 911

DET-1 Fire Department or Ambulance 911

821 SFS Security Forces 911

Storm Operations Center 2763/2764

Civil Engineering Service Call 2111

GC Environmental Responder on Call (Service Call) 2111

GC Chief of Environmental Engineering 2698

GC Safety Engineer 3250

M-plant Control Room (Spill Response Team) 3215

821 SPTS/SG Medical Liaison Officer 2696

821 ABG Safety Officer 2709

821 SPTS/CE Civil Engineering 3274

Danish Liaison Officer 2276/2206

Danish Police Inspector 2406/2280

21 CES/CEANN DSN 834-7727

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3 GENERAL

3.1 Purpose

The purpose of the plan is to assure that documented guidance regarding spill prevention and response is available to all installation personnel. The plan will describe the procedures, methods, and equipment being used to prevent spills at Thule AB, as well as procedures to be followed in case of releases, accidents, and spills. The goal is to achieve a full state of awareness throughout the installation and in this way enable personnel to:

- Be familiar with spill prevention and response procedures including related regulatory requirements.

- Develop related planning documents (e.g. action plans) that will bring the installation into full compliance with regulatory requirements.

- Quickly and appropriately respond to spills in a manner that will greatly reduce or eliminate contamination, which is the overall purpose.

- Maintain a safe working environment at the installation.

3.2 Scope

The provisions of the SPRP apply throughout the whole installation and to all personnel.

Certain responsibilities are specifically assigned to selected individuals identified in the plan.

The SPRP limits its contents to spill prevention and response issues. Related plans have been developed to cover other functions and may need to be consulted. TABI 10-105 controls the Thule Response Group. This TABI is the overall response instruction for major spills and natural disasters.

3.3 Regulatory Overview

In accordance with USAF policy, Thule AB is required to comply with the following public laws and their respective regulations:

US State Laws: Not applicable

USAF: AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations

Final Governing Standards for Environmental Protection by United States

Forces in Greenland

Thule AB: EPC Decisions

Host Country: The Greenland Government (GG) Authority has the primary role for environmental protection in Greenland.

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3.4 Thule AB’s Worst Case Spill Scenarios

In July 2011 a spill expert visited Thule AB. The Spill expert were tasked, under US Navy

Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV), to assist US Air Force 21 AFSPC with site assessment and report on the status and capability of the Base and GC to respond to a

Worst Case Discharge (WCD) of fuel.

The Spill expert addressed the spill risk and associated spill prevention and response to an accidental oil spill. Special focus were paid on how to respond to large fuel oil spills that would or could enter the marine environment directly or indirectly and potentially cause harm to marine life and ecosystems.

3.4.1 Possible Worst Case Scenarios

The worst case discharge for Thule AB is 2.5 million gallons IAW FGS Appendix AP2. Thule

AB does not have the capability to respond to a spill of that magnitude. The procedures below are a reflection on what could be done with the resources available and should not be interpreted as final or even satisfactory responses.

3.4.2 Tank ship operation

A disaster scenario at Thule AB would be if the tanker that delivers POL to Thule AB during the summer experienced a significant spill. The 2011 Tanker “The Afrodite” has a cargo capacity of approximately 15.2 million gallons The total transfer in the summer 2011 were approximately 10.9 million gallons of JP-8 jet fuel. This amount is considered as the Worst

Case Discharge (WCD) for a vessel spill near Thule AB.

Pumps are available to recover fuel from the ocean surface. The pumps can only be deployed from the pier and have a capacity of 154 gallons per minute. The collected water and fuel would be disposed in an empty BST (which will be available during the tanker operation).

Thule AB is capable of deploying a spill boom. The boom is long enough to reach the

Dundas Mountain and there is a tethering point there to contain spills from tankers or spills entering the North Star River. However, experiences from the annual exercises indicate that the engine power of the available push boat is insufficient to deploy more than 400 meters of boom due to the heavy current. The boom would be deployed in a loop around the tanker.

In case a weather warning calling for high speed winds is issued the fuel transfer will be aborted temporarily. This minimizes the risk of a spill under conditions where the POL will enter open water fast and thus prevent outside assistance to arrive in time to avoid an environmental disaster.

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3.4.3 Tankfarm

The Thule AB tank farm consists of twelve Bulk Storage Tanks, each with a capacity of 2.1 million gallons. The tank farm is located on a hill side above the North River with the first tank being approximately a mile from the bay. A critical failure of a Bulk Storage Tank (BST) could potentially release more than 2 million gallons fuel. The procedure for containing such an event would be to pump the spill from the secondary containment to an empty bulk storage tank.

The BST all have secondary containment in the form of berms that incorporate double liners, drainage, and all Tanks are alarm equipped. The secondary containment berms are sized for 110% of the tank capacity. No BST is designated for this purpose and if all BSTs contain product the spill would remain in the secondary containment basin until a BST could be emptied. There are currently no level alarms installed at the Bulk Storage Tanks at Thule AB.

The probability for such a failure is very low.

Tank 34 contains appr. 350,000 gallons waste fuel. If a spill occurs at Tank 34, Thule does not have any other means than pumping the spilled fuel into available tank capacities. Tank

34 does not have adequate secondary containment. This risk is unacceptable and the basis for programmed projects to empty and demolish tank 34.

In order to provide Thule AB with a designated contingency BST and fix the containment at tank 34, the project WWCX 10-0111 “Upgrade Secondary Containment at BST34, Fac.

#30034” was programmed in 2009. However, WWCX 10-0111 has since been cancelled.

3.4.4 North Star River

The fuel transfer lines between Tank Farm North and buildings and tanks pass over the

North Star River. During high river flows or flooding these lines are potentially at risk. Even if the fuel transfer is aborted immediately following the detection of a leak, the volume of fuel in the pipelines is thousands of gallons. The Spill Boom cannot currently be deployed to contain the mouth of the North Star River due to the lack of engine power on the push boat.

Spills entering the North Star River may origin from several different sources including, incl by river crossings at the drive bridges. It is expected, that if Spills reaches the North River

(steep slopes of the surrounding area), the spill quickly will flow out into the bay. Therefore most spill response actions in relation to spill in the North Star River will involve a Spill Boom deployment in the bay instead of a river operation.

The tide in the Bay may give cause to problems during the Spill response actions as there is up to 8 meters in water level differences. The Spill Boom can only used during high tide and it can only be placed into the wide area in front of the river delta and then only next to the shore at a steep angle in order to try and capture some of the spill as the current velocity in this river is too great to collect oil in main stream with boom.

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3.4.5 J-site (BMEWS powerplant)

J-site is located on a hill approximately 1200 feet above sea level which slopes down to pristine glacial fjord on its north side. This site has two 126,000-gallon tanks with secondary steel berms. It also has exposed steel operational piping that is used both when filling the storage tanks (on one set of piping) and for providing fuel to the ‘Day Tanks’ of the facility.

These pipes are thus charged all the time and open to the storage tank.

It would be recommendable that for any new pipe installations and especially any long piping runs that double wall pipe or pipe with outer protective coatings are considered.

A failure of one or both of the bulk storage tanks at BMEWS would endanger the

Wolstenholme Fjord. The tanks are protected by secondary containment IAW the FGS and the risk of such a failure is very low. However, the fuel transfer pipes between the BSTs and the day tanks inside the BMEWS power point do not have secondary containment or shut-off valves. Although unlikely, a vehicle could crash into these pipes with disastrous consequences. A project has been identified to address this deficiency. If such a spill were to happen, Thule does not have the capability to respond, especially in extreme weather.

Emergency measures would be to extend the broken pipe back into the containment area and establish earth or sandbag dikes to limit the release to the fiord. This applies to failures on the fuel pipelines at the main base as well.

3.4.6 Thule AB’s ability to respond to a WCD

During the July 2011 spill expert site visit to Thule AB a review of the existing oil spill response equipment were performed. The initial conclusion to this is that Thule Air Base is not prepared to respond to a large oil spill, and is especially unprepared to respond to a

Worst Case Discharge from either a vessel or the above ground storage tanks. The primary reasons for this are that Thule AB does not have enough response equipment and does not have adequate personnel trained in Oil Spill Response and the following crisis management.

3.4.7 Recommendations on spill training and equipment

Following the July 2011 spill expert visit to Thule AB the following recommendations were given to the HQ AFSPC and 21 CES/CEANN, in order to upgrade the capability of the Base and GC to respond to a Worst Case Discharge (WCD) of fuel. It is recommended to review budgets and timelines in order to commence a time phased plan to accomplish the following items as soon as possible:

1. Training of personnel:

Basic Spill Response (Send personnel to a licensed or established school)

More Advanced response (‘hands on’ and ‘class room’ at established school)

Arctic Spill Response (Specific Training – possibly in GC, but maybe in

Scandinavia, Alaska, or Canada)

Emergency Management (EM) for Oil Spills (This can be done anywhere. Locate only experienced companies with long background of training and EM history)

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2. Procure “arctic grade” spill response equipment designed for use with light oil – and two work boats

3. Develop detailed spill response plans for each of the potential WCD spill Locations

4. Develop Training Plans- Some of which should include entities from outside GC and should include training scenarios for various times of year e.g. winter / summer / spring.

5. Identify additional resources such as the Canadian Coast Guard (Arctic response-see Section 5.2) and conduct spill response exercises with either or both of them.

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4 PREVENTION SECTION

4.1 Incident Commander (IC)

The IC at Thule AB is the Fire Chief. The following table list up the IC and alternates, IAW FGS C18.3.2.1

TABLE 4.1

Roster listing the IC and alternates, IAW FGS C18.3.2.1

Name

Title Responsibility

Duties

Telephone

DP / HP

Aage Johansen Fire Chief Incident

Commander

First Responder

Evaluate spill situation

Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

3249 / 3149

Henrik Simonsen Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate IC

First Responder

Evaluate spill situation

Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

2589 / 2501

Peter Brinch

Finnedal

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate IC

First Responder

Evaluate spill situation

Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

2589 / 3527

Karl Frederik

Mortensen

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate IC

First Responder

Evaluate spill situation

Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

2589 / 2073

4.2 General Information

4.2.1 Facility Description

Thule AB is located 695 miles North of the Arctic Circle (76 32' North latitude, 68 50' West longitude), and 947 miles south of the North Pole on the northwest side of the island of

Greenland. It is approximately 550 miles east of the North Magnetic Pole.

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The Thule Defense Area is a large land area that includes various base functions outside the

Main Base area (Appendix 6). Thule AB contains three distinct areas; the Main Base, BMEWS, and Det-1. The areas of the base are divided into building areas designated as 100 through 900 areas. The Group Headquarters and other support functions are located in the

400 area of the base. The area identified as the goal for consolidation efforts is within the

100 and 200 areas (See Figure 1) together with flight line facilities in the 600 area. Also, some large facilities in the 500, 700, 800 and 900 areas, primarily with stand-alone heating systems, will remain.

Figure 1: Thule AB Main Base Area

Thule AB is located in the valley of a glacially fed stream called North River. This area is designated by the Danish government as the Thule Defense Area. The Main Base is located on a relatively flat plain near the mouth of the stream. The active landfill at Thule is located southeast of the main base (Figure 2, taken from Final Landfill Assessment and Operations

Management Plan, 821st ABG, December 2005). DET-1 is located 3 miles east of the Main

Base (Figure 3) and BMEWS located 12 miles northeast and 1,250 feet higher on a hill overlooking Wolstenholme Fjord (Figure 4). Lake Crescent is used for potable water production and is located 5 miles east of the main base (Figure 5).

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The base mission consists of BMEWS 12th Space Warning Squadron (12 SWS) and 23nd

Space Operations Squadron (DET-1, 23 SOPS) satellite tracking and control operation.

Figure 2: Thule AB Landfill area

Figure 3: Thule AB DET-1 area

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Figure 4: Thule AB BMEWS area

Figure 5: Thule AB Lake Crescent area

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4.2.2 Water protection Areas

There are 3 main water protection areas. It is the North Star River, North Star Bay, and Lake

Crescent. Maps of these three locations are shown in Appendix 6 Water Protection Areas

4.2.3 Maps of Locations

Figure 1 to Figure 5 above show maps of the locations covered by this plan. The locations are the Thule AB Main Base Area, Thule AB Landfill area, Thule AB DET-1 area, Thule AB

BMEWS area, and the Thule AB Lake Crescent area.

4.2.4 Critical water resources

Lake Crescent is a critical water resource to Thule Air Base functioning as water supply of potable water to Thule Air Base (See map of Lake Crescent, Figure 5).

Lake Crescent is the only potable water supply for all facilities at Thule AB. There is no direct protection of the water source in Lake Crescent and runoff from the watershed is directly into the lake. The pump and water treatment facility is no longer in use and the fuel custodial tanks associated with the buildings has been removed as has any chemicals associated with the water treatment. Handling of chemicals and other water pollutants are not to take place in the proximity of the lake without special precautions taken.

4.2.5 Land Uses

The locations indentified in section 4.2.3 are all support functions to Thule Air Base. In CDRL

CEV 13 Conservation Management Plan and in CDRL CEE-2 CE General Plan the Land

Uses / Land management at Thule Airbase are described.

4.2.6 Possible Migration pathways

The possible migration pathways are shown in Appendix 7 Spill Migration Pathways. The red arrows indicate the flow direction.

4.2.7 Drainage Patterns

Drainage patterns are shown in Appendix 4

4.3 Potential Spill Locations

A significant spill is defined as an uncontained release to the land or water in excess of any of the following quantities:

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For hazardous waste or hazardous substance identified as a result of inclusion in Table AP1.T4 of the Final Governing Standards, any quantity in excess of the reportable quantity listed in the table;

For POL or liquid or semi-liquid hazardous material, hazardous waste or hazardous substance, in excess of 400 liters (110 gallons);

For other solid hazardous material, in excess of 225 Kg (500 pounds); or

For combinations of POL and liquid, semi-liquid and solid hazardous materials, hazardous waste or hazardous substance, in excess of 340 Kg (750 pounds).

If a spill is contained inside an impervious berm, or on a nonporous surface, or inside a building and is not volatilized and is cleaned up, the spill is considered a contained release and is not considered a significant spill.

All HazMat storage locations where there can be a significant spill are listed in Appendix 1.

Bulk Storage sites for JP-8 are 12 Bulk Storage Tanks (BST) at Tank Farm North, Tank 98 at the pier and two BSTs at J-plant (bldg. 4016). Further, there are a large number of smaller organizational tanks at Thule AB. Appendix 2 lists the tanks that can produce a significant spill.

Bulk Storage, Handling and Transfer sites are listed in Appendix 10, with rate and total quantity of spill.

4.4 Arrangements for Emergency Services

Emergency services are provided by Greenland Contractors. Security is provided by 821

Security Forces Squadron. Sections 5.1.3 - 5.1.6 and 5.1.11 describe the role of each emergency response team.

4.5 Telephone number to emergency services

The telephone number to emergency services on a 24 hour basis is 911.

TEL: 911

4.6 Prevention, Control and Countermeasures

The potential sites where a significant spill can occur are listed in Appendix 1, 2 and 10.

The slope of the terrain will cause all spills in the main base area to ultimately flow west, eventually reaching the North Star Bay (possibly via the North Star River).

Further, the Wolsteinholme Fjord could be threatened by a major spill incident at BMEWS.

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Most indoor spills will be contained to the building in which the tanks or hazardous material are located. A spill will be contained using compound absorbent material and spill kits. The primary concern will be the safety of personnel and entry into the sewage system. All indoor potential spill locations must have appropriate spill kits available.

Site specific spill route maps for outdoor locations are provided in Appendix 3 and indicate the potential direction of flow.

Appendix 1 lists the areas where large amounts of hazardous materials and/or waste are stored. The table is listed according to building number, functional area, amount and type of material or waste. The hazardous material inventories from the individual shops are provided to GC/OHS and the Fire Department by GC Supply, who keeps a database over the purchase and stock of hazardous materials.

In all cases spills will be collected in trucks to be temporarily disposed of in POL/water tanks designated for POL spills or stored at Bldg 604 for later shipment as hazardous waste. In case the storage capacity of Thule AB is not sufficient, outside emergency assistance will be required and can be obtained from the list of organizations in section 10.3. Contact to these organizations will occur through 821 ABG/CC.

4.7 Emergency Equipment

Appendix 8 contains an inventory of emergency equipment used by the Emergency

Response Team. Appendix 1 and 2 list emergency equipment present at potential spill locations. When looking for new spill response equipment to Thule AB one should be lokking for equipment which is of Arctic Grade and rated for use in ice conditions.

4.7.1 Spill Boom

The Spill boom present at Thule AB is adequate for the task at hand and acceptable for any possible WCDs. However, the Spill Boom is relatively large for the push-boat present at

Thule AB and should only be deployed in short sections of no greater than 500 to 750 feet.

The Spill Boom is in need of an Anchor systems, as well as some smaller harbor booms to supplement the main Spill Boom

The concept of booming off the entire harbor from the pier to Dundas Mountain is not a possible spill response option as the boom apex will not hold oil at any water velocity over

0.75 knots, and the working tensile strength of the boom will be to large to launch at Mount

Dundas.

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4.7.2 Boats

Thule AB has a push boat and a Boston Whaler on site. But Thule AB has, at the present, not enough work and support boats to be able to work with the containment boom and skimmers recommended by the Spill Expert during the July 2011 Site visit.

4.7.3 Spill Response Equipment

The weir type skimmer and the rope mop skimmer located at Thule AB are good spill response assets. However these two devices are inadequate to respond to a major oil spill due to their small size, light recovery rate and in the case of the weir skimmer it can’t be used in any water condition.

4.7.4 Temporary Storage

It will be an imperative step to install or have access to temporary storage devices that can be utilized on the boats, on the pier or water front areas and also possibly towed in the water behind the skimmer boats.

4.7.5 Communication systems

At Thule Air Base there are the following communication systems, which can be used under a spill incident:

Telephone system

Land Mobile Radio (LMR) system o Channels :

POL net

CE net

Crash net

In the initial phase of a spill incident, the alarm will go via the telephone system using 911.

4.8 Evacuation Plans

Evacuation plans for potential spill sites, where there is a possibility that evacuation would be necessary are provided in Appendix 5. The signal for evacuations at Thule AB is fire alarms.

4.9 Required Procedures

Written procedures to preclude spills, inspections and recordkeeping requirements can be found in Appendix 14

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4.10 Site-specific procedures

In Appendix 12 contingency plans for each potential spill location can be found. At locations, these plans are posted with appropriate spill flow route maps or evacuation plans from

Appendix 3 and 5, respectively.

4.11 Deficiencies in Spill Prevention and Control Measures.

TABLE 4.11

Deficiencies in TAB’s Spill Prevention and Control Measures.

Potential Spill Location Deficiencies Tank Farm North, BST 34 Inadequate Secondary Containment Tank Farm North No storage capacity for worst case spill

Inability to deploy boom at North Star River mouth Fuel Distribution System Inability to deploy boom at North Star River mouth Tanker at DeLong Pier Inability to anchor boom at Dundas Mountain

Inability to recover POL from ocean surface BMEWS BSTs Inability to deploy boom in Wolstenholme Fjord

Interim measures are described in section 3.4

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5 SPILL CONTROL SECTION

The spill control section may be considered a contingency plan and is also often referred to as the spill response section. The scope of this section is to identify resources for cleaning up spills at installations and activities located in the Thule Defense Area, and to provide assistance to other agencies when requested.

5.1 Responsibilities, duties, procedures and resources

It is the responsibility of the personnel mentioned below to maintain the procedures necessary for implementing this plan. Such procedures shall ensure adequate training of personnel and implementation of environmental protection and pollution abatement procedures in their areas of responsibility. The personnel will designate additional project officers and monitors as required ensuring an effective program. These designated individuals will continuously inspect the work areas under their individual areas of responsibility. The names and telephone numbers of the project officers and monitors will be posted in prominent locations at potential spill sites.

The Emergency Response Team (ERT) consists of personnel from the GC Fire Department

(HAZMAT personnel) and designated individuals from GC Operations (the Spill Response

Team).

The personnel involved in the process of containing and cleaning up spills at Thule AB

(including drills) are identified below. Other offices can be involved in follow-up actions.

5.1.1 Installation Commander (821 ABG/CC)

The Installation Commander exercises the overall responsibility for the management of spill prevention and response planning at Thule AB. The 821 ABG/CC is the chairperson of the

Environmental Protection Committee (EPC).

Public affairs including all notifications to the DLO and/or external offices must be accomplished by or coordinated with the Installation Commander prior to execution. The

Installation Commander designates the Incident Commander (IC).

5.1.2 Danish Liaison Officer (DLO)

The Danish Liaison Officer serves as the official representative of Denmark, and Greenland

Home Rule at Thule AB.

5.1.3 Consolidated Communication Center (GC/LGCM)

The Consolidated Communication Center (CCC) receives emergency calls (911) and activates responders. The CCC is also known as Hilltop.

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5.1.4 Security Forces Squadron (821 SFS)

During a spill situation, Security Forces will:

Evacuate personnel from the scene, if needed, based on the decisions of the Incident

Commander or the Fire Chief.

Secure the area as “Off Limits” to unauthorized personnel.

Coordinate the movement of specific personnel to assist at the incident scene.

Direct traffic.

5.1.5 HAZMAT Personnel and Incident Commander (GC Fire Department)

The Fire Department at Thule AB is the first responder to all incidents. Its responsibilities include responding, containing and assessing all incidents to ensure that the scene is a safe and controlled incident site. It is the Fire Chief’s responsibility to designate an entry control point based on the incident situation. The Fire Chief or Assistant Fire Chief on duty is the designated Incident Commander (IC) by the installation commander.

The IC is responsible for directing and coordinating all spill response actions within Thule AB.

The IC will have the authority to utilize the expertise and resources of the Emergency

Response Team (ERT), or any other office of expertise in determining and performing response actions.

5.1.6 Spill Response Team (GC/OMUFM)

The Spill Response Team (SRT) consists of designated members mainly from the Fuels

Operation section, but personnel from the Transportation and Vehicle Maintenance shops can also be appointed. Members must have received training in HAZMAT communication training and have a technical background. The task of the SRT is to respond to spills when requested by the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief in order to perform spill containment, recovery, disposal, and restoration activities.

The SRT will be notified by the IC and requested to initiate cleanup actions when the incident scene is considered under control and safe to enter. The SRT at TAB is limited in equipment and training, and is therefore not able to respond to all types of incidents. The role of the

SRT is to provide manpower for low-risk clean-up tasks and they will always work under the direction of the Incident Commander. Specific incidents they would not be able to include chemical spills were response activities require chemical protection suits and/or advanced respiratory protection equipment. Peterson AFB will be contacted for assistance in case of an emergency that Thule AB is not equipped or otherwise able to respond to.

5.1.7 Civil Engineering Flight Commander (821 SPTS/CE)

The Civil Engineering QAE will oversee GC response efforts.

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5.1.8 Environmental Engineering (GC/EE)

GC/EE has the responsibility of managing the Thule AB SPRP. In a spill situation, GC/EE is tasked to assist the IC in evaluating the situation and provide guidance in spill containment, cleanup actions and restoration activities. GC/EE will manage a record of all spills at TAB and prepare all required reports and documentation.

5.1.9 Pavement and Grounds (GC/LGTT)

The GC Pavement and Grounds division will perform excavations and transport contaminated snow and/or soil as requested by Environmental Engineering.

5.1.10 Safety Organization

The Chief of Safety (821 ABG/SE) is notified of major spills and evaluates compromises of safety related to spill incidents. GC/OHS will provide technical expertise on safety hazards at the request of the IC or Chief of Safety.

5.1.11 GC Health Services (GC/SG)

GC Health Services (the base hospital) can be activated by the IC to provide medical expertise.

5.1.12 General Personnel

Each individual working at Thule AB including all seasonal contractors are tasked to report any spills to the Alarm Center ext. 911 and to take every reasonable precaution to prevent spills.

Appendix 8 provides data on locations and quantities of spill response equipment at Thule

AB. This is to provide a better and more efficient emergency response to minor spills and to keep a total list of equipment available and updated. Shops can use the lists as a reference, if a spill occurs within their shop and additional spill response equipment is needed.

5.2 Immediate response actions

All permanent residents at Thule AB are obligated to react immediately, when a spill incident occurs and/or is first discovered (e.g. by calling 911). Depending on the quantity of the spill, some personnel groups may be able to initiate an immediate response.

Immediate response actions can include

Restrict all sources of ignition

Check causes and stop source of spill if possible without undue risk of personal injury after stop source of spill or establish containment/diversionary devices to contain release.

Evacuate the area

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Report the incident to the Consolidated Communication Center ext. 911. For spills of less than 25 gallons of POL product the spill can be reported to GC/EE (ext 2698) if personnel at the scene are able to respond to the incident. Adequate response will be verified by GC/EE, Make the spill scene “Off Limits” to unauthorized personnel

Further actions will follow the procedure described in section 5.11

5.3 Emergency Response Team

The personnel involved in spill response actions can be divided in two groups; HAZMAT personnel and the Spill Response Team (SRT).

5.3.1 HAZMAT personnel

The HAZMAT personnel will complete the initial response to any spill situation and get it under control. The IC directs the HAZMAT personnel.

HAZMAT personnel are trained professional responders from the GC Fire Department.

Documentation for educational background for IC and fire fighters is available in GC Human

Resources.

The training requirements for the HAZMAT personnel are provided in the AFI 10-2501, Air

Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. The initial training must be supplemented by annual refresher training through exercises. These exercises are conducted by the Fire Department.

First Responder Awareness

First Responder Operations

First Responder Technician

According to AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and

Operations the HAZMAT personnel may not require technician level training.

5.3.2 Spill Response Team

The SRT will be notified by the IC and requested to initiate cleanup actions when the incident scene is considered under control and safe to enter, using appropriate personal protection if needed.

The Spill Response Team (SRT) consists of designated members mainly from the Fuels

Operation section, but personnel from other shops can also be appointed. The task of the

SRT is to respond to spills when requested by the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief in order to perform spill containment, recovery, disposal, and restoration activities.

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In order to provide the SRT with the skills needed to handle a spill situation, the training will include:

Safety training concerning emergency response information, measures to protect the employee from hazards associated with hazard materials, and methods and procedures for avoiding accidents

Training in the use of respiratory equipment

Training in how to act at spill locations

Training in management of the waste

Performing a drill in cooperation with the HAZMAT team and The Spill Response

Team

Training in the use of Spill Response Equipment (Appendix 8) is accomplished with on-the-job training.

The requirements for the SRT training is not specified in the AFI 10-2501, Air Force

Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations, but will as a minimum include what is mentioned above.

GC Environmental Engineering coordinates this training as a one-day course in cooperation with the supervisor of the Spill Response Team, The Fire Department and GC Occupational

Health and Safety. Training will be based on MSDS information on the general chemicals present at Thule AB and on site-specific conditions.

If respiratory protection is used during cleanup actions, only personnel trained in accordance with SI.02.15.02.007 will be placed on the cleanup team. This training can be obtained through GC/OHS, Occupational Health and Safety.

Training records are maintained at the GC Site Management Support.

5.4 Procedures for ERT alert and response

The Incident Commander or alternate is on duty at all times. The ERT is activated through the Consolidated Communication Center.

When notified about a spill incident by the Consolidated Communication Center (CCC) the

Fire Department responds immediately to contain the incident and initiate the clean-up.

Access to the CCC is available at all times by radio or phone. Maximum response times for different parts of the base are given below:

On-scene response time from pre-positioned airfield locations for pre-announced emergencies does not exceed one minute.

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Initial on-scene response time for unannounced airfield emergencies does not exceed three minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed four minutes of initial notification.

Initial on-scene response time for structural and rescue emergencies on Thule main base does not exceed five minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed seven minutes.

Initial on-scene response time for structural and rescue emergencies at Det-1 does not exceed eight minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed 14 minutes.

Initial on-scene response time by the two fire fighters at BMEWS Site 1 for structural and rescue emergencies does not exceed 7 minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed 30 minutes. For all buildings at BMEWS with the exception of #4002 the response time during storm conditions may not exceed 10 minutes (longer response time due to the fact that the fire fighters will have to respond to the situation via tunnel on an electric powered “golf car”).

Initial on-scene response time for structural and rescue emergencies at North Mountain does not exceed 11 minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed 17 minutes.

Initial on-scene response time for structural and rescue emergencies at South Mountain does not exceed 16 minutes. Full on-scene response time does not exceed 22 minutes.

Ambulance service is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An ambulance is capable of transporting patients and emergency medical technicians. EMTs are under the direction and oversight of a physician when treating patients.

The IC may request the activation of the Spill Response Team. The activation of Spill

Response Team members is coordinated by the operator in the M-plant control room. This position is staffed at all times. The individual Spill Response Team members are activated by telephone or radio. The Spill Response Team will also be assigned to respond to seeping fuel incidents during the summer. GC/EE will request assistance as required through the

GC/OMUFM Supervisor.

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5.5 Notification of Spills

The Consolidated Communication Center (CCC) is manned at all times. For every spill incident, the IC and Chief of Environmental Engineering or alternates are notified by phone or personal pagers. When spills are notified through the Alarm Center ext.: 911 the following roster of persons are notified by phone or personal pagers.

TABLE 5.5

Key personnel Roster regarding spill response

Person/organization Name Office symbol Office Email Phone duty Phone home

CCC Hilltop N/A GC/LGCM N/A 911 N/A Incident Commander Mr. Aage Johansen GC/AMF ajo@gc.gl 3249 3149 GC Env. Engineering Mr. Frederik Cappeln GC/EE fvc@gc.gl 2698 2698 Civil Engineering Capt Robert Marcucci 821 SPTS/CE robert.marcucci-02@thule.af.mil 3277 3277 Chief of Safety TSgt Chad Parana 821 ABG/SE chad.parana@thule.af.mil 2709 3432 GC Operations Mr. Svend Pedersen GC/OPS sgp@gc.gl 3808 3808 GC Site Manager Ms. Inge Bülck GC/CC iwb@gc.gl 3616 3404

Notification of reportable and non-reportable spills will also occur through email as described in chapter 6.2 and 6.3. Spill Memos and CDRLs will use current email addresses from the

CDRL distribution list.

5.6 Notification of IC, Installation Commander and local authorities

When notifying the Fire Department, the following information should be provided:

Name of individual reporting spill

Location of spill

Number of injured personnel and nature of injuries

Substance spilled

Amount spilled (estimated)

Rate substance currently leaking (estimated)

Time spill occurred (estimated)

Extent to which the spill has traveled

Any pertinent information (e.g. other potential hazards)

All notification of the Installation Commander will follow the chain of command and be initiated by 821 SPTS/CE.

The Danish Liaison Officer (DLO) serves as the official representative of Denmark, and

Greenlandic Government at Thule Air Base. All notifications to the DLO and/or external offices must be accomplished by or coordinated with the Installation Commander prior to execution. The role of the DLO is discussed further in section 6.4.

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5.7 Assignment of responsibilities for making notifications

All permanent residents at Thule AB are obligated to react immediately, when a spill incident occurs and/or is first discovered. Specific obligations depend on the size of the spill and the capacity of the shop to perform an appropriate response on their own.

Small POL Spill (< 1 gal.):

If the spill is small and can be responded to by the shop personnel, actions to respond, control and clean up the spill will be initiated. GC/EE must immediately be notified and will verify that the spill has been cleaned up appropriately. If a spill kit is used in the spill response action, this must be properly disposed of in accordance with the Hazardous Waste

Management Plan or guidance provided by GC/EE.

Medium POL Spill (1 gal. – 25 gal.):

If the shop personnel can respond the spill, the above guidelines shall be used.

If the spill cannot be handled or occurs in areas of concern, the personnel on site will notify the Alarm Center ext.: 911

Large POL Spill (> 25 gal.)

The personnel on site will notify the Alarm Center ext.: 911

When receiving a 911 call, the Consolidated Communication Center is responsible for notifications as described in section 5.5

Non-POL HAZMAT or Hazardous Waste Spills of any size:

The personnel on site will notify the Alarm Center ext.: 911

When receiving a 911 call, the Consolidated Communication Center is responsible for notifications as described in section 5.5. Exception: Spills of ethylene- and propyleneglycol do not need to be reported by calling 911 (instead, GC/EE can be contacted directly).

Further notification procedures are given in section 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4

5.8 Surveillance procedures for early detection of spills

All bulk quantity tanks, fuel pipeline system, and valves are supplied with alarms that notify operators when a leak occurs.

The 2-person principle is used during fuel transfer processes. One operator is located at the facility where the transfer process begins – and one operator is located at the facility where the transfer process ends. Both operators are in radio contact to ensure quick response and a complete stop if a leak occurs.

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The Preventive Maintenance Program (PMP) calls for regular inspections and maintenance of all bulk quantity tanks, the fuel pipeline system, and valves. Monthly inspections include check of corrosion, damages and leaks (Appendix 14).

Each year during July and August GC/EE will conduct field inspections to document seeping fuel and fuel sheens on water bodies and provide protection of the waterways in a timely fashion. All observations will be electronic documented in the GC/EE department.

HAZMAT storage areas inspected by GC/OHS and GC/EE at least twice annually.

5.9 Surveillance and logging of historical spills

The soil at Thule Air Base is known to be contaminated from old fuel spills and practices. For

Example, a fuel spill near the M-plant has 35000 gallons of aviation fuel unaccounted for. It is extremely difficult to quantify the volume of fuels which has evaporated from these historical fuels spills as is to quantify the volume which has already reached the waterways. The, by

Thule standards, warm and wet summer in 2010 revealed a large number of locations where

POL sheen could be observed on the surface of ponds and puddles created by rain water.

These 2010 observations were during the 2011 followed by weekly inspections by the

GC/EE.

During the summer 2011 GC/EE has systematically surveyed throughout The Thule defense area (area accessible by car) in order to meet the demands of the FGS. The defense area has been divided into 5 sections were each section were inspected (as all-round inspections) once a week by a member of the GC/EE-team.

Sections:

1. Tank farm and Nord Mountain

2. Off base: BMEWS complexes, Water lake, shelters, P-mountain, Camp Tuto, South mountain, Fox canyon, Shelters, and active landfill ( except UXO areas)

3. Taxiway/airport, south mountain slope towards main base (except UXO areas)

4. South beach, Hangar 1-2, the Land farm – and area towards D-launch

5. Main base, port and coast line

The observations and actions taken on the urgent observations were documented in sections diaries. These diaries were updated after each inspection. To each POL observations a memo for registration of this were made and appropriate actions (The evaluation, monitoring and interim response solutions are described for each location) were taken. Reports regarding the POL surveillance are available in GC/EE on request, this report ties the

Thule Air Base 29 observations together and present information that will provide input for contamination survey.

The summer 2011 was not as wet as the summer 2010. Hence the seeping observations mostly were reported after 4th of July 2011 and the first rain during the summer. This confirms that seepage primarily occurs in a wet environment as water leads the POL pollutions from the permafrost area in the ground towards the surface.

Some areas of concern were larger (in square footage) in 2011 than in 2010. This may indicate that the level at which the POL contamination in the ground may be found may be rising and that the POL contamination is of a larger size.

During August 2011 Jacobs Engineering visited Thule Air Base. Jacobs Engineering provides Thule Air Base with a list of areas of concern. Jacobs engineering rated 34 observations including. other pollutants than POL products. This list may provided basis for the GC/EE inspections to be performed during the summer 2012.

5.10 Critical Water and Natural resources

GC/EE must notify 21 CES/CEAN if a spill occurs in an area of sensitive areas or natural resources. All reporting must be coordinated with 821 SPTS/CE and the Installation

Commander. The Thule Defense Area has several areas of concern that must be protected in the event of a spill. A prioritized list is given below:

1 Lake Crescent (drinking water resource)

2 North Star Bay (coastal water)

3 Wolstenholme Fjord (coastal water)

4 North Star River

5 Streams, rivers and lakes

6 Locations that cannot be properly cleaned and reestablished

Among the lakes in the area, Lake Crescent must especially be protected from any pollution, as this lake is used as Thule AB’s supply of potable water.

The North Star Bay and Wolstenholme Fjord are very vulnerable areas in case of POL

(Petroleum, oil and lubricant) spills during the tanker operations, or release of POL elsewhere at Thule AB. A spill may result in potential damage of the arctic environment around the Thule Defense Area.

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The many streams and rivers flowing through the Thule Defense Area lead to coastal waters, therefore any spill in these streams and rivers will eventually end up in the coastal waters.

Soil and Vegetation: In high arctic areas, natural degrading of contaminated soils happens very slowly due to the harsh conditions. Therefore inaccessible locations such as mountainsides are areas of concern.

In general the best way to protect critical water and natural resources is to prevent spill from entering the Storm Water Drainage System. Best management practices for various activities are described in the Storm Water Management Plan CDRL CEV-15G. Early detection of seeping fuel from historical spills is a priority for GC/EE.

5.11 Additional Emergency Assistance Organizations

A major peacetime accident may occur involving POL and/or hazardous materials. Actions required may range from simple suppression to highly complex and time-consuming operations with international and/or political implications.