A03_JA_for_Advance_Medium_Mobile_Power_Sources_(AMMPS).pdf

JUSTIFICATION REVIEW DOCUMENT

FAR PART 6 JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR OTHER THAN

FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Program: Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS) Generators, 5 kilowatt (kW) - 60 kW in support of Expeditionary Energy and Sustainment Systems (E2S2)

Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) as implemented by FAR 6.302-1 -Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements

Amount: $490,959.400

Prepared by:

Contracting Officer:

Technical:

Requirements:

Date:

Reviews: I have reviewed this justification and find it adequate to support other than full and open competition.

Project Manager:

Control No. 17-BELV-237 Program: Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS)

Legal Counsel:

Program Executive Officer:

Special Advocate for Competition:

Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting:

Control No. 17-BEL V-237

Department of the Army Justification and Approval for Other than

Full and Open Competition

1. Contracting Activity: Army Contracting Command-Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG), Belvoir Division, ATTN: CCAP-CCV-B-4, 10205 Burbeck Road, Building 362, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5811.

2. Description of Action: This action requests approval to award a firm-fixed-price (FFP), indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract to Cummins Power Generation, Inc. (CPG) for the procurement of approximately 14,985 Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS) generators over a four year period. In order to fulfill Army needs, approximately 9,250 AMMPS are required and 5,735 AMMPS are required to fulfill the other Department of Defense (DoD) services Tactical Electric Power (TEP) needs. AMMPS was developed to support the TEP generation requirements of DoD Directive (DoDD) 4120.11 "Standardization of Mobile Electric Power (MEP) Generating Sources (MEPGS)" and Expeditionary Energy & Sustainment Systems (E2S2). The AM MPS family of generator systems consists of five (5) generator set sizes with 5 kilowatt (kW), 1 0kW, 15kW, 30kW and 60kW capacities and separate models to provide 50/60 Hertz (Hz) or 400Hz power, and includes the associated interface kits, switch boxes, and trailers. There are over 20 distinct configurations within the family. The proposed award will consist of a four year ordering period with a maximum contract ceiling amount of $490,959,400; this is the minimum necessary to allow for an anticipated competitive award and qualification of a new source. The proposed contract and related delivery orders will be funded by Other Procurement, Army appropriations and other suitable appropriations from the other DoD services. The anticipated award date is fourth quarter fiscal year (FY) 2018.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: In accordance with DoDD 4120.11, the Army (through its Project Manager, Expeditionary Energy and Sustainment Systems (PM E2S2)) is designated as the Executive Agent for acquisition of TEP generation equipment for all DoD services. The AMMPS systems are specialized, medium-sized Jet Propellant 8 (JP-8) fueled generators used to supply electricity to military systems away from a fixed electrical power source. The generators are specialized pieces of equipment due to the environmental conditions they must operate in and the weapon systems they power. The proposed acquisition is for production and delivery of AMMPS systems to meet the ongoing needs of the Army and DoD services for medium sized mobile power generators pending award of a competitive contract and achievement of full production capability under that contract. The proposed source is CPG, 1400 73rd Avenue, Fridley, MN 55432, which is Army and DoD's Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the AMMPS systems.

a. Capabilities and Supported Missions. By design, AMMPS is built to common military use standards established to assure the highest possible standardization of TEP generation applications across all DoD military missions and organizations. This degree of standardization is mandated specifically within DoDD 4120.11 (paragraphs 2.1 and 4.1.2.3) to mitigate the risks of system incompatibility- and potentially, inoperability -that tend to proliferate when different services deploy different systems; and to minimize the burdens of conducting logistics support in diverse and far-flung locations. AMMPS was first conceived in 2002, and began fielding in May 2012. The generator system has successfully satisfied the PM E2S2's original vision of serving as the U.S. military's "workhorse" for medium capacity TEP generation needs. Managed by PM-E2S21; and like other TEP systems, AMMPS is mandated to support not only the Army's specialized TEP needs, but also those of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Government foreign military sales and data interchange customers. Each service must acquire TEP equipment via the Army's contract vehicle or obtain a PM E2S2 waiver for a direct acquisition. AMMPS systems currently support all battlefield electrical systems; such as Command and Control, information dominance, computers, communication, environmental control, sustainment, and illumination. AMMPS systems have proven their capabilities through testing and support of military operations around the world, in a full range of remote and rugged operating environments. AMMPS systems were developed to fill a specific capability gap for state of the art military power generation and offer a combination of significant advantages in the areas of fuel efficiency, maintainability, mobility and durability when compared to other available military generator systems. The need to streamline the maintenance process is particularly compelling in combat theaters, where breakdown of non-standard power generating equipment, which cannot be immediately repaired, can have catastrophic consequences. Therefore, it is less expensive and more effective to field a single generator model - using a unified DoD-based supply chain, a common set of spare parts and expert technicians intimately trained in repetitively servicing a specific chosen model - than it is to support a diverse array of incompatible models, each relying on its own unique spares, maintainers, training and vendor reachback.

When compared to the Army's Tactical Quiet Generator (TQG), the only other medium TEP generator in the Army's fleet, AMMPS requires approximately 21 percent(%) less fuel and can be maintained with 48 % less maintenance hours. Additionally, AMMPS has proven to be about 50 % more reliable than the TQG under field conditions, with a fleet average Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 1,272 hours. AMMPS' advantages in these areas allow U.S. forces to maintain technological superiority in combat operations, where sophisticated equipment and systems require a steady, dependable power source to operate under the widest possible range of ambient conditions. AMMPS' lower fuel consumption also reduces the number of fuel tankers on the battlefield, cuts fuel transportation costs, and reduces Soldiers' exposure to hazardous fuel convoy operations. Its increased reliability reduces the logistics footprint necessary to support mission planning and execution; and minimizes power interruptions to mission critical systems. AMMPS' advantages in maintainability free up Soldier manpower to focus on mission critical tasks.

1 Formerly the U.S. Army Project Manager, Mobile Electric Power (PM MEP). PM E2S2 in 2014 was chartered to assume PM MEP's existing responsibilities, and to assume new responsibilities related to mobile electric power management.

The approved AMMPS Program Objective Memorandum (POM) calls for fielding of approximately 2,700 AMMPS units for the Army and 900 AMMPS units for other DoD services annually in each of FY19 - FY23. AMMPS units fielded during this timeframe are critically needed to replace the less-capable and more-unreliable TQG units now providing support to critical missions. Specifically, in FY18, AM MPS are scheduled to be fielded to multiple Army Combat Aviation Brigades, and to be integrated into units supporting eight separate missile, communication, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems directly supporting combat operations. These systems include: Patriot, Gray Eagle, Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2, Sentinel, Counter Rocket Artillery and Missile, Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, Armament Repair Shop Set and Metal Working, and Machine Shop Set. Any delays in these fielding schedules have the potential to directly impair unit readiness, cause operational impact to critical systems, and result in increased costs. And, considering the approximate 6 - 9 month lead time necessary .to produce AMMPS units, those schedules cannot be maintained unless AMMPS production continues at full levels of over 3,600 units per year. Further, any initial delays in AMMPS fielding during the FY18

- FY19 cycle are likely to have ripple effects in terms of delaying subsequent fielding operations.

b. Acquisition Background. The current AAO for TEP capability (5 - 60 kW configurations) is 29,833. Approximately 13,651 have been procured to date in partial fulfillment and approximately 16, 182 remain to complete fulfillment of the AAO. The current funding profile in the POM does not allow for AAO fulfillment until at least 2025.

The other DoD services have procured 8,523 and approximately 10,047 remain to fulfill the other DoD services' needs.

The initial requirement for AMMPS production was solicited and awarded using full and open competitive procedures. The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMO) was conducted in two phases. EMO Phase I (Prototype phase) comprised a competitive award (September 2004) to two contractors to design, test and demonstrate an AMMPS prototype system to required performance specification parameters. At the conclusion of Phase I (June 2006), the Government down-selected to only one contractor, CPG, and entered into EMO Phase II (Pre-Production phase). EMO Phase II was completed during the ensuing five year period resulting in the successful testing and approval of the current AMMPS design. In June 2011, Milestone C was approved and AMMPS entered into Phase Ill (Production and Deployment Phase). The initial fielding of AMMPS began in May 2012. This contract's term was for 7 years which included delays from Phase I to Phase Ill such as a 3-month administrative delay, a 17-month protest delay, and an additional 8-month effort to redesign CPG's initial design based on Government input. AMMPS was officially granted approval to enter into production, only after its design passed intensive Army review to assure the design's viability met the established performance criteria. Moreover, the Army's official production decision was premised on AMMPS units being produced identical to the design CPG had proven during the test and evaluation process, and with documented approval being required for any deviations. The approved AMMPS design was ultimately set forth in a 1,300 page Technical Data Package (TOP) detailing design specifications and was accepted by the Army in 2011. This TOP formed the basis for production of the AMMPS units manufactured and delivered to the Government under this and subsequent contracts.

A follow-on, Contract No. W909MY-15-D-0010, was awarded in 2015 for production and delivery of up to 6,000 AMMPS units over a 17-month period. This follow-on contract was awarded to CPG under the authority of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-1, Only One Responsible Source, due to Sequestration-related budgetary uncertainties which made the Army's AM MPS requirements during FY16 and FY17 susceptible to definition only in the short term. Based on projections indicating dramatically reduced AMMPS procurement during the relevant period, costs and delays of competitive procurement were deemed to offset any resulting savings offered by competition. Deliveries under this follow-on contract will continue until December 2017, although no further orders may be executed.

Together with a planned "bridge" contract to meet current AMMPS needs in the short term, this action will provide for uninterrupted production and fielding through FY22.

4. Authority Cited: Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2304(c)(1 ), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii), Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

5. Reason for Authority Cited: As described at FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii), full and open competition need not be provided for and supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original sources in the case (as here) of a follow-on contract for the continued production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, when it is likely that award to any other source would result in (A) substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition OR (B) unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency's requirements. Full and open competition of the Army's requirement for further AMMPS production during the ensuing four-year period would be neither cost effective nor timely, as is demonstrated in paragraphs a-c below. Moreover, based on lead times to award a competitive contract (18 months), plus an estimated minimum 26 months after award to qualify a new manufacturer and ramp-up to full production levels, a minimum of four years is anticipated for a contractor other than the original source to provide deliveries of AMMPS units to the Army.

Accordingly, CPG is the only responsible source capable of providing AMMPS units satisfying agency requirements during the proposed four-year period of performance.

a. Unique Capabilities. As stated above, the Army is the lead integrator for DoD battlefield TEP. AMMPS is an Acquisition Category II program of record which provided a family of generator sets that met the needs of DoD as defined in the TEP Capability Production Document (CPD). AMMPS has over 20 different configurations and numerous Key Performance Parameters which must:

1) Operate in adverse environments and with the weapon systems they power;

2) Operate in conditions from -50°F to +135°F;

3) Support a 72 hour mission without failure and no more than 1 hour of maintenance;

4) Must not be susceptible to electromagnetic interference;

5) Must not create electromagnetic interference for supported systems;

6) Survive High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse;

7) Meet strict noise levels to prevent detection;

8) Meet fuel consumption requirements while running on non-diesel fuel;

9) Be certified for low velocity airdrop and helicopter sling load.

Based on these unique capabilities, AMMPS generators are in high demand to support specific operations and missions across the force,· and these missions are subject to negative impact unless AMMPS deliveries continue unabated. The schedule constraint is a break in production, which impacts the Government's ability to meet the Total Package Fielding schedule in accordance with the Army Force Generation priorities.

Likewise, AMMPS offers capabilities that are not available commercially. Ongoing surveys of the commercial marketplace, last updated in August 2016, verify there are no available medium sized generators that have AMMPS' unique combination required attributes, including performance under temperature extremes, high reliability (tested and verified MTBF of at least 750 hours), electromagnetic pulse resistance, and ability to survive low velocity airdrops. Without the combination of technological advantages provided by AMMPS, the capability of a lean fighting force to operate under extreme conditions, at the levels of fidelity required, will be significantly compromised; and there are no other medium power generation systems available today - either in the existing Army fleet or in the commercial marketplace - that provide AMMPS' unique combination of capabilities.

CPG is the current contractor for AMMPS and is the only source that has produced the required sets, passed necessary First Article Testing (FAT) requirements, and has all the necessary specialized tools for fabrication and testing. Likewise, CPG is the current manufacturer of AMMPS, and is the only source that has an active, in-place, operational production line that is capable of manufacturing these generator sets in sufficient quantities to meet current AMMPS fielding schedules. Additionally, CPG retains the technical data rights for a substantial portion of the AMMPS components which essentially precludes other sources from successfully manufacturing a compliant generator set.

The requirement to be filled here is for production and delivery of AMMPS units that are 100% compliant with 1,300 pages of design specifications developed by CPG under the 2004 contract; and accepted and used ever since by the Army as the required AMMPS production baseline. By law and regulation, AMMPS must either be manufactured in accordance with these specifications, or documented approval by PM E2S2 for each deviation proposed.

Over 2 of AMMPS production costs are attributed to components that are source controlled to CPG as OEM, i.e., not available in the open competitive marketplace.

There are components that are source controlled, which include major AMMPS subsystems: These components can be broken down in several ways. First, some of the components are manufactured only by CPG or under exclusive arrangement with CPG suppliers, and are unique in form, fit, and function. Second, other components are not unique in terms of form, fit, and function, but have undergone specified testing and/or certification to assure performance to military standard, at CPG's expense, making it the only qualified source of supply.

In an effort to level set the competition, in July 2017 the Government requested, and CPG declined to furnish, a priced proposal to provide the necessary rights in technical data (Unlimited Rights or Government Purpose Rights) for the source controlled parts or components. CPG maintains that some of the parts at issue contain commercial components from CPG's suppliers, whose commercial intellectual property CPG has no ability to price or sell to the Government; and that other source controlled parts contain CPG commercial intellectual property and trade secrets that are too valuable for CPG to consider releasing, even as part of a negotiated sale. The result is that CPG disproportionally controls access to the "approved" components specified on the design specifications that govern any AMMPS production efforts.

Based on these specific AMMPS conditions, there are no alternate products available.

Additionally, the minimum 18 months needed to award a competitive contract to any non-CPG source, coupled with lead times necessary to achieve full production capability under even the least impactful of the various alternatives considered, would cause an unacceptable delay of at least four years to the current AMMPS fielding schedule.

b. Alternatives. A full array of competitive acquisition approaches were considered as alternatives to the proposed acquisition strategy. However, these were all determined to be unacceptable. First, based on the lead times and unacceptable delays involved, none of the alternatives considered could yield production of AMMPS units at current rates within the four year period covered by the proposed acquisition strategy. Second, all the considered alternatives involved duplicative or additional cost or cost risk to the Government, not expected to be recovered via competition.

Alternative 1: The Government considered an open competitive "build-to-print" acquisition that would require the selected awardee to produce AMMPS units built to the Government owned TOP developed by CPG. This scenario is expected to yield full competitive pricing benefits (estimated at 10% of the requirement value, or $49.1 million (M)). On the other hand, this alternative

2 Analysis performed by PM E2S2 on the three major AMMPS subsystems: engine, alternator, and DCS.

This included estimating the total burdened material costs of the major subsystems, divided by the CPG total generator price of various gen set sizes and separate models.

based on historical data is also projected to generate duplicate/additional costs totaling and delays of at least 26 months, even once a competitive contract has been awarded. 3The specific efforts required, and the associated costs and times to complete, include:

• First Article Test model fabrication (22 models, including skids and power units (PUs) and power plants (PPs): 9 months

• Government Qualification Testing and associated Physical Configuration Audit of First Article and resulting drawing changes, following First Article delivery (reliability, transportation, environmental, electrical, Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), 10 skids, 16 PU/PPs): 11 months; cost to Government, estimated contractor cost of on-site support to Government Qualification Testing of First Article:

• Time needed to fully ramp-up production line after First Article approval: 6 months

Additionally, the 26 month delay in AMMPS fielding associated with this alternative would require the Government to forego about $129.4M in projected operating cost savings that would have been realized by fielding AMMPS generators on schedule. Current AMMPS fielding schedules, if maintained under the proposed acquisition approach, will allow the Army to switch-out 7,800 legacy TQG systems over a 26 month period. By Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) estimates, use of legacy systems as compared to AMMPS will entail additional expenditures of $SOM annually for maintenance costs and $9.7M annually for fuel. 4

Alternative 2: The Government considered a variation of the Alternative 1 open competitive "build-to-print" acquisition approach that would attempt to neutralize CPG's competitive advantage via a tailored cost evaluation. Specifically, the Government would (1) evaluate all proposals received by using a common "plug number" for any CPG source controlled parts; and (2) set prices for those components after award on a cost reimbursement basis. This alternative would involve (after contract award) the same duplication of time and expense as in Alternative 1 to get a non-OEM source to full production readiness (26 month

3 These estimates are based on actual costs and times of performance experienced under the original competitively awarded AMMPS Contract (Contract No. W909MY-04-D-A003) for production qualification.

These costs would be necessary to prove out any new manufacturer's production line.

4 The additional maintenance costs are estimated based on 1) the number of legacy units that would be displaced by AMMPS during the 20 month delay; and 2) average estimated annual maintenance hours for both the AM MPS and legacy systems (as calculated in February 2017 by Army Manpower Cost System published at https://www.osmisweb.army.mil). The additional fuel costs are estimated based on 1) the number of legacy units that would be displaced by AMMPS during the 20 month delay; 2) average tested gallons per hour fuel usage statistics for the AMMPS and legacy generators (as calculated in MONTH YEAR (AMMPS) and MONTH YEAR (legacy) by the Army Test and Evaluation Command); 3) an average annual use rate per unit of 1,280 hours; and 4) the DLA Energy Procured Fuel standard pricing rate as effective July 2017 for JP-8 fuel.

delay and ; and would also involve the same $129.4M in lost fuel/operating cost savings. But this alternative would also introduce an additional degree of cost escalation risk that cannot be quantified at this time due to the high percentage of source controlled components (estimated ) involved. A source selection reliant on fictitious plug numbers, which bear no relation to the Government's final cost the Government, has the potential for increasing the complexity of the evaluation and opportunity for unbalanced or strategic component price distortions by the offerers. This has already generated industry objections, and potentially obligates the Government to paying significantly inflated prices for AMMPS, which could not be accurately or realistically projected at time of award. For the same reason, any benefit of savings from competition would be reduced under this alternative, since about of unit cost would be removed from the competitive arena via the artificially leveled "plug numbers." Using a basic assumption that an "average" savings of

(here, would result from full and open competition, the potential savings here would be reduced by approximately or almost

Alternative 3: The Government considered a second variation of the Alternative 1 open competitive "build to print" acquisition approach, in which the Government would separately procure, and provide to a non-OEM production contractor as Government Furnished Property (GFP), all OEM-source controlled components needed for production. This alternative is deemed to involve an additional/duplicate cost expenditure of and an additional delay of 43 months, vis-a-vis the proposed acquisition strategy. Like Alternatives 1 and 2, this alternative would require duplication of the same previously completed 26 month effort (post contract award) to qualify a new, non-OEM AMMPS production line to the current state of readiness. Moreover, even before a competitive AMMPS contract could be solicited, an estimated 17 months would be needed to solicit, negotiate and award to CPG a separate contract for the source controlled components to be furnished as GFP. Due to the resulting 43 month delay in fielding AMMPS units, the Government would face about $213M in foregone operating/fuel_ cost savings associated with extended operation of legacy TQG systems, which would otherwise have been switched out for the more efficient AMMPS units. Finally, this alternative entails other substantial costs and inefficiencies, not associated with the proposed acquisition strategy, that are not easily susceptible to being quantified. These include (1) the need for the Government to incur duplicative costs to administer the two contracts; (2) handling, shipping, and storage costs for the GFP components; (3) risk of loss associated with the GFP components; and (4) increased risk of claims (and associated delays) from the AMMPS production contractor for any quality issues associated with the GFP components. Moreover, as with Alternative 2 above, this strategy is expected to yield only limited pricing benefits, since about of unit cost would be sole-source procured and therefore removed from the competitive arena. Using a basic assumption that an "average" savings of 10% (here, $49.1 M) would result from full and open competition, the potential savings here would be reduced by approximately or almost

Alternative 4: The Government considered an open competitive acquisition allowing offerers to propose different AMMPS design approaches against a pure performance specification. This scenario is expected to yield full competitive pricing benefits (estimated at 10% of the requirement value, or $49.1 M). Any competitive savings, however, would be more than offset by the enormous duplication of cost and effort involved in a full redesign, ab initio, of the AMMPS system. Any selected non-OEM contractor would be required (after competitive contract award) to substantially duplicate from scratch CPG's efforts to complete an intensive EMO process necessary to successfully create, test, demonstrate, and document an alternative feasible AMMPS d~sign that complies with the needed performance parameters (based on historical data, over at least 50 months). 5Only after completing this initial design stage would the non-OEM contractor be in a position to duplicate the 26 month effort associated with qualifying a new, non-OEM AMMPS production line and bringing that line to its current state of readiness. Based on the resulting total delay of 76 months in fielding AMMPS units (as compared with the proposed approach), foregone operation/fuel cost savings associated with delayed switch-out of legacy systems would escalate to $378M. Finally, there are long-term additional costs, not immediately subject to quantification, associated with the need to establish two separate and distinct supply chains to support two different versions of AMMPS.

This will be most disruptive at the tactical edge of the battlefield as maintainers would have to duplicate stockage lists and manage very similar but incompatible parts.

Alternative 5: The Government considered an open competitive acquisition which would combine elements of a design and performance specification approach. Under this "hybrid" approach, offerors would propose to the current build-to-print AMMPS design specification, but could propose non-OEM substitutes for any source controlled components. This scenario - like Alternative 4 - is expected to yield full competitive pricing benefits (estimated at 10% of the requirement value, or $49.1 M). As with Alternative 4, however, duplication of cost/effort is substantial, based on the need for EMO to successfully create, test, demonstrate, and document an alternative feasible AMMPS design; to repeat production qualification and ramp up a production line to current levels; and to delay replacement of legacy TQG systems in the field until full production readiness is achieved. There is deemed to be no benefit over Alternative 4 in terms of the necessary efforts (and cost and delays associated with those efforts), for the following reasons:

• The source controlled components at issue include three major AMMPS subsystems: engine, alternator, and OCS. Change-out any one of these components - even for alternate components with similar form, fit and function - equates to a full system redesign that would have second and third order (e.g., different radiator, new wiring harness) effects on total

5 Based on the completion timeframes expenditures experienced under the original, competitive AMMPS design/production contract (Contract No. W909MY-04-D-A003).

system operation. Incorporation of the new components require repetition of full-blown system-level testing and qualification procedures to assure that the alternate component/subsystem, when integrated into the overall system, does not negatively impact AMMPS performance as a whole.

• This 'hybrid' scenario may actually involve even more engineering risk than a full AMMPS system redesign, because a new contractor's design options would be constrained by the other elements of the existing (CPG originated) design drawings and limit available component options. This has the potential to generate substantial inefficiencies in the design process, and more importantly, to negatively impact AMMPS system functionality.

• As with Alternative 4, Alternative 5 is likely to result in the fielding of two separate and distinct AMMPS designs. Whether the Army fields two independently .designed TEPs, or fields two versions of the same TEP that use different major components, the result is the same -- two different logistics tails to support one single functionality.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition:

a. Effective Competition: Market research and analysis was conducted January 2015 - December 2016 in support of a planned competitive award for the requirement covered by this action. The details are in the market research section of this document. These efforts did identify manufacturers other than CPG which are capable of producing the AMMPS system. However, as stated above, none of these other sources was deemed capable of meeting the Government's requirements to produce AMMPS units on a "build to print" basis without interruption to the fielding schedule; and options that transform this requirement from a simple "build to print" effort to a full-fledged effort to generate, and build to, a new performance specification are not considered feasible due to the costs and delays involved. ,

b. Subcontracting Competition: The resultant AMMPS contract will include FAR clauses 52.219-8 "Utilization of Small Business Concerns," FAR 52.219-9 "Small Business Subcontracting Plan," and FAR 52.244-5 "Competition in Subcontracting" to ensure that the prime contractor obtains as much competition as possible in their subcontracting efforts. In addition, FAR 52.244-5, has been required in the previous AMMPS contracts, with the contractor required to accept responsibility for the parts pricing and configuration control of his vendors' parts. In the event of any subcontractor inabilities to continue the furnishing of any part of the generator, the prime contractor is responsible for providing research and testing to find replacement and to present request for approval of an Engineering Change Proposal to make a permanent parts change to the Government's TDP.

c. Publication of Notice: Notices required by FAR 5.201, "Synopses of Proposed Contract Actions," shall be published via FedBizOpps (FBO) and any responses received shall be evaluated and considered.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: Additional market research will be performed in FY19 to determine if there is competition for the remaining AM MPS requirements. A acquisition strategy will be developed to complete the fulfillment of the AAO and to complete other DoD Services requirements. For this action, measures will be undertaken to assure that the proposed action benefits to the maximum extent possible from competition at other levels. For example, in negotiations for this action, the Contracting Officer will encourage the original source to maximize opportunities for teaming and subcontracting with other industry members providing capabilities in the TEP area. CPG will also be encouraged to maximize small business competition in performing the requirement, and any prime contract will incorporate FAR clauses 52.219-8, 52.219-9, and FAR 52.244-5. PM E2S2 remains committed to fostering future competition for similar requirements and will assure that future development contracts minimize reliance on source controlled parts; and that the life cycle cost impact of designs utilizing source controlled parts is properly evaluated in future competitive hardware development acquisitions.

Acquisition Data Availability. The AMMPS generators will be purchased against a Government owned TOP. However, CPG retains the technical data rights to a substantial portion of the TOP.

8. Market Research: Since January 2015, Army contracting officials, and technical and operations experts at PM E2S2, have continually investigated the generator marketplace (both commercial and military) to identify availabilities, capabilities, and opportunities for competition.

a. On 29 January 2015, Sources Sought Notice (SSN) W909MY-15-R-H009 was posted to the FBO website, seeking sources that have available, or have the capability to manufacture, test and delivery AMMPS using Government furnished Technical Data Packages. Eleven companies responded (six were small businesses) on 2 March 2015.

Four large businesses and one small business had current on-going or previous experience with the manufacture and delivery of military generators and possessed experience to be considered as potential sources.

b. On 2 April 2015, ACC-APG, Belvoir Division received a letter from a capable source

c. On 29 - 30 April 2015, AMMPS Industry Day event was held at the District of Columbia Army National Guard Facility on Davison Army Airfield located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in follow-up to the Sources Sought released on January 2015. This provided an opportunity for an equipment display, and allowed companies to ask questions in an open forum and conduct one-on-one sessions with the Government. Of the 24 companies that attended, 16 were small businesses. The Industry Day brief, list of attendees, and questions/answers were posted to the FBO website on 1 June 2015.

d. On 25 June 2015, Request for Information (RFI) W909MY-15-R-H009 was posted to the FBO website seeking industry feedback pertaining to the Government's proposed acquisition strategy which consisted of a full and open competition, five year IDIQ with up to two awardees. Of the five respondents, three - all large businesses) were considered to have the capabilities to be considered potential sources.

e. On 24 - 25 February 2016, as a follow-up to these concerns, PM E2S2 and Army contracting representatives met with CPG leadership to candidly discuss the challenges and issues associated with the many source control restrictions in CPG's AMMPS TOP.

This discussion focused on ascertaining whether CPG would be willing to release the source controlled items without any CPG intellectual property or use restrictions.

Ultimately, CPG responded that it would support a full and open competitive effort by permitting other vendors to procure CPG source controlled parts; however, CPG would not provide these parts without CPG intellectual property restrictions, and would not commit to providing the components at any specific price levels.

f. On 5 August 2016, RFI W909MY-16-R-H003, which provided for use of plug numbers for various source controlled parts, was posted to the FBO website seeking information.

Four companies ( ) responded.

In response to the Government's indication of excluding the evaluation of the source controlled parts prices from the Total Evaluated Price during source selection,

g. On 23 November 2016, the Government posted a draft solicitation W909MY-17-R H002 to the FBO website which provided for open competition of its build-to-print AMMPS requirement, without any adjustments based on source controlled components.

The draft solicitation also announced to industry that the portion of the TDP owned by the Government, Technical Manuals, and photos would be available by request and that an Equipment Display event would be held for interested vendors to simultaneous access the systems.

h. On 5 - 9 December 2016, an AMMPS Equipment Display, which made all five (5) generator set sizes available to assist potential Offerors with developing its solution for the re-procurement effort, was held. Industry interest was minimal, as the display was attended only by CPG and .

i. On 12 December 2016, CPG was the only respondent who submitted questions and comments to the draft solicitation published on 23 November 2016.

In summary, no small businesses have the combination of demonstrated experience, manufacturing capabilities, and logistics capabilities that would indicate ability to successfully perform the requirement at low risk, while meeting applicable subcontracting limitations. Over the past year, three large businesses ( responded to the August 2016 RFI.

Two large businesses attended the November 2016 Equipment Display. Only one large business (CPG) responded to the December 2016 draft solicitation. Therefore, , only CPG expressed interest on the draft solicitation which was based on a full an open competition on a "build to print" basis with no pricing exclusions or GFE of the source controlled items.

9. Interested Sources: In accordance with FAR 5.201, this action will be synopsized on the FBO website. Any proposals that are received will be evaluated.

10. Other Facts:

a. Procurement History.

Contract Number: W15P7T-04-D-A003 Contractor: CPG Award Date: 29 September 2004 Expiration Date: 28 September 2014 Competitive Status: Full and Open Competition

Contract Number: W909MY-15-D-0010 Contractor: CPG Award Date: 15 May 2015 Expiration Date: 14 July 2016 Competitive Status: Sole source award made in accordance with FAR 6.302-1

b. Unusual and compelling urgency. Not applicable.

11. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: 15 SEP 2017

12. Requirements Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date:

15 SEP 2017

13. Fair and Reasonable Cost Detennination: I hereby determine that the anticipated cost or price to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable. The basis for this determination will be founded on a combination of proposal analysis techniques (e.g., cost analysis, advice and assistance of other experts). Additionally, certified cost or pricing data will be obtained.

Date: 15 SEP 2017

14. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: 15 SEP 2017

Control No.: 17-BELV-237

APPROVAL

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of the Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources Generators, SkW - 60kW on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant to the authority of Title 10, United States Code, Section 2304(c)(1 ), as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 6.302-1 (a)(2)(ii)(A) and (8), "Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements." The total estimated value of this procurement is $490,959,400.

The approval is subject to the availability of funds, and provided the services and property herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition.

,,J<t I ,1- Date