SOL-517-11-000004_Questions.docx

SOL-517-11-000004

CBSI Monitoring & Evaluation Services

Questions & Answers

USAID/ Dominican Republic received the following questions regarding the referenced solicitation. Below are the USAID/DR responses:

Q1. I am writing regarding the Monitoring & Evaluation Services for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) posting (sol-517-11-000004). I wanted to ask whether this is a new project or if it is a recompete.

USAID Response: This is a new project – it is not a re-compete.

Q2. We are interested in the following solicitation. Is this a new contract and what is the budget.

USAID Response: This is a new contract and we are not disclosing the budget since it is a fixed-price type contract. The expectation is that Offerors will propose target prices for every line item.

Q3. Section B.4 (CLIN Structure) and section C suggests there will be 18 discrete activities on this project over the course of several years. There are 15 countries in the Caribbean Basin per section C.2, and so it seems the 18 discrete activities over several years would not cover all of USAID’s CBSI initiatives. Also, the cover memo notes this is a 5-year project, but the RFP only details specific deliverables into 2015. From this, the question: is the CLIN/budget structure defined in RFP a representative budget onto which USAID intends to add additional activities in the future? Or do the 18 discrete activities represent the full scope over the project’s 5 years?

USAID Response: The 18 discrete activities represent the full scope over the project’s 5 years and are definite items that USAID needs. Although the latest date for a deliverable denoted in the RFP is 2015, USAID anticipates needing deliverables beyond that date. These dates are estimates based on the projected start and end dates for the projects. Some projects that need to be evaluated are not being implemented yet.

Q4. If USAID does increase the scope beyond the currently defined 18 CLIN activities, is it correct to assume that the Target Cost, Target Profit, Ceiling Price, and Share Ratios defined in Section B.3 will also be adjusted?

USAID Response: Yes, the overall target cost, target profit, ceiling price, and share ratios will be revisited and re-negotiated with the contractor.

Q5. Will the implementing contractor be restricted from implementing other CBSI initiatives? All CBSI initiatives, or just those applicable to countries where an assessment has been performed?

USAID Response: Please read H.1 CIB 99-17 ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: PRECLUSION FROM FURNISHING CERTAIN SERVICES AND RESTRICTION ON USE OF INFORMATION.

The contractor will be restricted from implementing any CBSI project that is to be evaluated by the contractor. The contractor will be responsible for writing a report summarizing the regional impact of all the CBSI initiatives (using data gathered from actual evaluations conducted and data gathered from performance reports on CBSI standard indicators for all USAID funded projects – including those not evaluated by the contractor. As such, in order to ensure an independent regional impact report, it would be prudent for USAID to restrict the contractor from implementing any USAID-funded CBSI activities that will be represented.

Q6. Would USAID extend the submission deadline by one month, to December 4th?

USAID Response: USAID extended the submission deadline by two weeks to November 18, 2011.

Q7. Section L.9 states that “offerors are expected to prepare comprehensive price proposals that take into account all expected costs that will be incurred during the period of performance” and “Offerors are to propose one target price for each line item and unit (where applicable) as well as a total target price for the entire effort in accordance with the CLIN structure outlined in Section B above.” While these instructions are clear, it seems that comparability will be an issue without some specifics of the evaluations. Even with knowledge of each project, the rigor and design of each intervention will be unique and based on many factors, including consultation with USAID and stakeholders. Please advise on the methodology for determining price comparability across offerors in this case.

USAID Response: USAID attached a table of the projects to be evaluated and included additional information on target beneficiaries, project description, number of beneficiaries, funding levels and geographic location. Each offeror should assume the general questions and statements outlined in Section C.3 (#3, #4, & #5) will be answered and use those questions, coupled with the additional information in the table, to propose initial target prices for the Mid-term, Final Performance, and Impact Evaluations. USAID changed the contract type to Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets. Key questions will be provided to the contractor during the first year of the award and the contractor will be able to propose and negotiate firm targets based on the specific evaluation information.

Q8. Please explain the implementation of a “Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target contract” as mentioned in Section B as well as in Section L.3.

USAID Response: The fixed-price incentive firm target (FPIF) contract type is comprised of a 1) target cost, 2) target profit, 3) price ceiling, and a 4) profit adjustment formula that are all defined during contract negotiations. The proposed FPIF contract type has more flexibility than a FFP contract to allow for the moderate uncertainties faced by the contractor and allow for USAID to share a level of cost responsibility. The share ratio will be negotiated during contract negotiations to reflect the risk that should be borne by both the contractor and USAID. Please see the example below and note that the numbers used do not reflect a USAID negotiation predisposition.

Target Cost: $2,600,000 Target Profit: $260,000 Target Price: $3,050,000 Share Ratio: 70/30 (government/contractor) Ceiling Price: $3,507,500 (115% of Target Cost)

In the above scenario, if the contractor’s final cost is $2,600,000, then USAID will pay $260,000 in profit. If the contractor’s final cost is $2,850,000, then the profit adjustment formula (PA= SC (CT-CF)) will be applied and the contractor will bear responsibility for its share of 30% of the amount over the target cost.

PA = .30*(2,600,000-2,850,000)

= .30*(-250,000) = $-75,000 less than the Target Profit of $260,000

The final (actual) cost would be $2,850,000 The final profit would be $185,000 (260,000-75,000) The total price would be $3,035,000 which is $472,500 less than the ceiling price.

If the contractor’s final cost is $2,500,000, then the contractor’s profit will increase:

PA = .30*(4,600,000-4,500,000)

= .30*(100,000) = $30,000 more than the Target Profit of $260,000

The final (actual) cost would be $2,500,000 The final profit would be $290,000 (260,000+30000) The total price would be $2,790,000 which is $717,500 less than the ceiling price.

Q9. Section L.9.b states that “Direct Labor Rates/Indirect Rates/Escalation. Offerors are required to submit supporting information presenting proposed direct labor rates, indirect rates, factors, G&A and escalation. Provide copies of current Negotiated Indirect Cost Rates (NICRAs).” Will the subcontractors be required to provide this information as well and how will it be taken into consideration, considering the identified fixed price nature of this expected contract?

USAID Response: Although this is a fixed-price contract type, the prices are not firm fixed prices and final costs/prices will be negotiated based on the contractor’s documentation of all reasonable, allocable, and allowable costs. As such, the NICRA is requested for the prime contractor since the percentage of the contractor’s actual indirect costs borne by USAID each year will affect the final contract price. To the extent that the prime contractor expects its actual costs to be impacted by any subcontractor’s final negotiated indirect cost rate, the subcontractor’s NICRA should be submitted. (i.e. if the prime contractor enters into a cost-reimbursement contract with a subcontractor, then that subcontractor’s NICRA should be provided to USAID. If the prime contractor enters into a FFP contract with a subcontractor, then that subcontractor’s NICRA should not be provided to USAID.)

Q10. View the detailed and complex pricing exercise required to provide an accurate target price for each of the 18 deliverables presented in Section B, would USAID consider extending the proposal deadline?

USAID Response: USAID extended the submission deadline by two weeks to November 18, 2011.

Q11. F.3 Section lists no Key Personnel. Please advise on the preferred Key Personnel positions and profiles.

USAID Response: In keeping with the principles of performance-based service acquisitions and recognizing that evaluation services are commercial in nature, USAID made a conscious decision to allow contractors to propose the right mix of key personnel for this award. USAID is not prescribing the education and experience qualifications for personnel beyond what is written in M.4 QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL.

Q12. In section C.4, deliverable # 3 states "Plan to identify any balloon effects across the region..." Can you please explain the meaning of balloon effect?

USAID Response: The balloon effect is an often cited criticism of United States drug policy (see author Frank O. Moya). Drawn on the analogy of what happens to the air inside a balloon when it is squeezed – displacement (of the air)– the criticism is that applying pressure on the drug trade in one area simply pushes that activity into a new area for exploitation, where there is less resistance. Although USAID’s role in the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is focused in the area of social justice, it’s work in this area complements the efforts of other USG agencies. The CBSI follows in the steps of Plan Colombia, Mérida Initiative and CARSI (Central American Regional Security Initiative), which all follow the security issues of the drug trade. As the different projects that fall under CBSI get underway throughout the Caribbean, it is important to try to assess to what degree, if any, increased “pressure” from successful activities in one country leads to (correlates with) increased security problems in another country. To sum it up in basic terms, the question is: Is the success of CBSI projects in any one part of the Caribbean contributing to increased problems in another part?

Q13. On page L-10, please confirm offeror is to propose its own labor categories per line item outlined in section B.

USAID Response: Yes, Offerors should propose their own labor categories per line item outlined in Section B. Offerors should also include a description of each labor category proposed.

Q14. On Page L-7, the RFP indicates that proposals should be submitted to drrco@usaid.gov, however elsewhere it states that proposals should be submitted to aangulo@usaid.gov. Would USAID please confirm which email address we should submit proposals to?

USAID Response: All proposals should be submitted to drrco@usaid.gov. Based on USAID’s review of the RFP, aangulo@usaid.gov is listed in the cover letter to identify the e-mail address for potential Offerors to submit questions and twice in section L.7 as part of the information provided about the Point of Contact for this RFP and again to remind potential Offerors to submit questions to aangulo@usaid.gov.

Q15. Would USAID like to see 5 PPRs overall for the offeror team or 5 PPRs for the prime offeror and 5 PPRs for each of its major subs?

USAID Response: Offerors should list up to 5 past performance references of the most recent and relevant contracts for efforts similar to the work in the subject proposal for the prime Offeror and each of its major subs. Please note that 5 past performance references are not required for each organization – this is the maximum.

Q16. Would USAID please clarify the approach being used to respond to the B.3 cost requirements? USAID is asking bidders to propose fixed prices for each CLIN deliverable (0001 through 0018), and to substantiate how each of CLIN were priced. As part of this documentation, it appears USAID is asking each bidder to specify the fixed fee percentage being proposed. Please confirm the following: a) the target cost is equal to all program costs, including subcontractors’ costs and ODC’s, for a given CLIN, exclusive of the prime’s proposed profit; b) the “target profit” is equal to the prime’s proposed profit for each CLIN; c) the target price is the sum of the target cost and the target price.

USAID Response: a) USAID is asking bidders to propose target prices for each CLIN deliverable and to substantiate how each CLIN was priced. These target prices are not firm fixed prices. b) USAID is not requesting a fee. USAID is requesting a target profit for each CLIN and an overall target profit expressed as a whole number and a percentage. c) The target cost is equal to all program costs, including subcontractors’ costs and ODCs for a given CLIN, exclusive of the prime’s proposed target profit. d) The target profit is equal to the prime’s proposed profit for each CLIN. e) The target price is the sum of the target cost and the target profit for each CLIN.

Q17. Would USAID please clarify the “share ratio” being request in B.3.b?

USAID Response: USAID is not requesting Offerors to propose a share ratio as part of the proposal. The share ratio will be determined during contract negotiations. The share ratio, expressed as 75/25, 80/20, 50/50, and so forth, provides for the proportionate division of cost overruns (costs above the target cost) and cost underruns (costs below the target cost) between the government and the contractor. The government percentage is listed first and the terms used are "government share" and "contractor share." For example, on an 80/20 share ratio, the government's share is 80 percent and the contractor's share is 20 percent. Thus, if the final negotiated cost of a contract is less than the target cost, an "underrun" has occurred and the contractor will be rewarded with a share of the "savings." The contractor's reward will be computed by applying the share ratio to the difference between the target cost and the actual cost. Conversely, when the final cost is more than the target cost (overrun), profit will be reduced since the sharing ratio works to require the contractor to also share in the overrun by giving up part of the target profit.

Q18. Would USAID please clarify the difference between the ceiling price and the target price?

USAID Response: The target cost is an estimate that, both parties believe reflects the costs likely to be incurred during the contract's execution. The ceiling price is stated as a percent of the target cost and a whole number, this is the maximum price the government expects to pay. Once this amount is reached, the contractor pays all remaining costs for the original work.

Q19. Would USAID please clarify why bidders are expected to re-negotiate a final cost in B.5, and on what basis, at the end of the contract? Either each deliverable has been submitted, been approved by USAID, and has been paid in accordance to the proposed target price for each CLIN, or some CLIN deliverables have not been accepted by USAID, and the contractor has not been paid. The risks have been assumed by the contractor and it has either satisfied the requirements or it has failed to do so, and not been paid for certain CLINs. We find this re-negotiation of a final cost to be arbitrary and confusing. At first blush, it would appear that USAID is trying to find a way not to pay the negotiated fixed fee, even though it has total control over acceptance of each CLIN, and the payments against those CLINs.

USAID Response: To clarify, bidders are expected to negotiate final costs in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements outlined in FAR 16.403 and FAR Clause 52.216-16 incorporated in section I.3 of the original RFP. USAID intends to make progress payments to the contractor USAID will pay all allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs up to the ceiling price – even if the actual costs are higher than the negotiated target costs. There is no negotiated fixed fee in this contract type – there is a negotiated target profit. Please read FAR 52.216-16 Incentive Price Revision – Firm Target and see the USAID response to question Q9 above.

Q20. We believe that there is insufficient information for pricing each of the separate CLINs at this stage of the proposal, given the likely differences in evaluation methodology for each CLIN, size of each program, locations, etc. and this costing approach will further complicate a “final renegotiation” at the end of the contract. Please advise.

USAID Response: USAID changed the proposed contract type to Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets. With this contract type, the Contractor will propose and negotiate initial target prices for each CLIN based on the information USAID is providing at this time. At a pre-determined time within the first year of the award, USAID will provide key evaluation questions and other relevant information to the Contractor and the Contractor and USAID will negotiate firm target prices or firm fixed prices for each line item based on the Contractor’s updated cost estimates and new information. (Please read FAR 16.403-2) and see the attached illustration of an FPI Successive Targets contract.

Q21. Would USAID please clarify the quarterly payment process, which seems like another convoluted process not to pay the contractor what it has proposed for a given CLIN. On what basis would USAID propose to pay or not pay for an accepted deliverable? If USAID is asking for contractors to assume the risk of delivering an “evaluation” or similar deliverable on a fixed price basis, and then also wanting to ensure you did not “overpay” through some arbitrary review of costs each quarter, this seems like a misplaced pricing methodology. Please reconsider this approach, to ensure fairness to all concerned: there is so much uncertainty involved with implementing 18 evaluations, that we suggest that pricing be evaluated on the basis of standard labor category prices (fully-burdened) and the pricing for an illustrative evaluation to determine reasonableness and ability to price a detailed evaluation approach.

USAID Response: Please read FAR 52.216-16 Incentive Price Revision – Firm Target and the answers to Questions Q9 and Q19. This quarterly statement is required by the required FAR clause incorporated in the RFP. USAID will pay costs above the target costs negotiated in the contract as long as they are allowable, allocable, and reasonable and do not exceed the ceiling price of the contract. USAID and the contractor will share a portion of the cost responsibility burden.

Q22: Per FAR 16.403-1 governing Fixed Price incentive (firm target) contracts, it specifies that the contract must specify target cost, target profit, and a ceiling price. However, Section B.4 Contract Line Item (CLIN) Structure, on page B-1 only shows the Fixed Price by CLIN.

· Should offerors show the target cost and target profit by CLIN?

· Does USAID expect to adjust the profit on a CLIN basis (based on the actual costs for each CLIN)? Or to adjust profit on an overall basis, based on the costs for the entire contract?

USAID Response: a) Offerors should show the target cost and target profit by CLIN. b) USAID expects to apply the profit adjustment formula based on the actual costs for the entire contract. USAID will not adjust profit on a CLIN basis.

Q23: Throughout the RFP, it makes reference to this being an acquisition of Commercial Items. We are confused by this since the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) specifies that a Commercial Item is an item that is customarily used by the general public and sold to the general public.

FAR: 2.101: Definitions - Commercial item” means—

(1) Any item, other than real property, that is of a type customarily used by the general public or by non-governmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes, and—

(i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or

(ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public…

The services requested in this RFP, i.e. the evaluation of USAID assistance projects and programs, do not seem to be an item that is customarily used by the general public, or sold to the general public. Could you please provide additional information regarding how offerors should interpret the requirement for the provision of commercial items?

USAID Response: USAID determined that the services and deliverables required in this RFP are commercial in nature based on market research and guidance provided in the FAR and the Commercial Item Handbook issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. A service is considered a commercial item when it is provided in support of a commercial item. A service is also considered a commercial item when it is of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial market on the basis of established catalog or market prices for specific tasks performed under standard commercial terms and conditions. In the section on Common Misperceptions about Commercial Item Acquisitions, it states, “the fact that an item may meet unique Government requirements does not, in and of itself, mean that it is a Government-unique item.”

Through USAID’s market research, we found that a) Program monitoring and/or evaluation professionals are hired by foundations, corporations, school systems, nonprofits and governments; b) non-governmental organizations are actively recruiting evaluation professionals for open positions; and c) a major USAID contractor issued FFP sub-contracts for M&E services for projects conducted in extremely dangerous environments and d) professional organizations exist for evaluation specialists, along with standard ethical codes of conduct.

Q24: Section B.2 Contract Type, on page B-1 states that this will be a Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target completion contract. We are very concerned that this may not be the most beneficial contract type to either the Offeor or USAID. We have outlined our concerns below:

· Minimum Flexibility: Since fixed prices are identified by evaluation and by project, reaching 5 years into the future, it will be very difficult to modify the evaluation program should USAID’s needs change. Given the funding uncertainties within USAID at the moment, as well as cyclical shifts in priorities, it is possible that programs may not be fully funded or could change over the next 5 years. Programs that are significantly smaller or larger would not have the same evaluation requirements, yet USAID would be locked into evaluation parameters as identified now along with their corresponding pricing assumptions.

USAID Response: Although the contract period reaches 5 years into the future, most of the anticipated evaluations will need to conducted within the first 3 years of the contract and will be for projects that already started or will begin during FY 2012. The only anticipated evaluation that will take place five years into the future is the DR At-Risk Youth Initiative’s Impact evaluation. Additionally, USAID referenced FAR Clause 52.243-1 Changes – Fixed Price Alternate I (APR 1984) in Section I.1 of the RFP which address the concern that it would be very difficult to modify the contract and USAID would be locked into evaluation parameters. See text of referenced clause below:

(a) The Contracting Officer may at any time, by written order, and without notice to the sureties, if any, make changes within the general scope of this contract in any one or more of the following:

(1) Description of services to be performed.

(2) Time of performance (i.e., hours of the day, days of the week, etc.).

(3) Place of performance of the services.

(b) If any such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed by the order, the Contracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the contract price, the delivery schedule, or both, and shall modify the contract.

(c) The Contractor must assert its right to an adjustment under this clause within 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order. However, if the Contracting Officer decides that the facts justify it, the Contracting Officer may receive and act upon a proposal submitted before final payment of the contract.

(d) If the Contractor's proposal includes the cost of property made obsolete or excess by the change, the Contracting Officer shall have the right to prescribe the manner of the disposition of the property.

(e) Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute under the Disputes clause. However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the contract as changed.

(End of clause)

· Parameters do not seem clearly defined: FAR 16.202-2 describes the application of fixed price contracting mechanisms for items or services with “reasonably definite functional or detailed specifications.” While USAID has been clear about the numbers of evaluations to be conducted, the requirements for evaluations of these types of programs can vary dramatically, depending upon a variety of factors. A few examples are provided below:

· Size of the program

· Geographic range of the program

· Scope of the program

· Numbers of beneficiaries

· Types of beneficiearies (e.g. organizations, individuals, counterpart government entities)

· Location of beneficiaries (e.g. rural or urban) Without specifications of the above information, it is virtually impossible to reasonably estimate the costs associated with conducting an impact evaluation on a given program. Additionally, without further specificity, USAID will potentially get dramatically different assumptions in the scope of work and pricing for each of the fixed priced tasks thus making comparable evaluations of proposals very difficult.

USAID Response: FAR 16.202-2 referenced in the concern above specifically addresses firm fixed price contracts and allows for some level of uncertainty as outlined in subpart (d). USAID changed the proposed contract type to Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets to address this issue. With this contract type, the Contractor will propose and negotiate initial target prices for each CLIN based on the information USAID is providing at this time. At a pre-determined time within the first year of the award, USAID will provide key evaluation questions and other relevant information to the Contractor and the Contractor and USAID will negotiate firm target prices or firm fixed prices for each line item based on the Contractor’s updated cost estimates and new information. (Please read FAR 16.403-2) and see the attached illustration of an FPI Successive Targets contract.

· Maximum risk for Small Business implementer: As indicated in FAR 16.202-1 “This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk …” Small Businesses by definition have lower cash flows and liquidity than larger businesses, putting Small Businesses at significantly higher performance risk with this type of contract. For a SB, one fixed price evaluation where costs exceed the price could leave the SB unable to continue funding project operations, which would not seem to be in USAID’s best interest. This type of maximum risk contract mechanism for Small Businesses, the implementers who are least able to manage this risk, does not seem in keeping with USAID’s practice of strengthening its SB partner community.

USAID Response: FAR 16.202-1 specifically addresses firm fixed price contracts and yes, FFP contracts place the maximum risk on the contractor. Because USAID recognizes that there is a moderate level of uncertainty surrounding the required evaluations, USAID is proposing a Fixed Price Incentive contract type. This contract type does not place maximum risk on the contractor and when the share ratio is negotiated, it will allow for USAID to assume a level of cost responsibility and risk.

USAID recognizes that small businesses have lower cash flows and liquidity and as such, intends to make progress payments to the successful contractor as indicated by referenced clauses 52.232-13 Notice of Progress Payments (April 1984) and 52.232-16 Progress Payments (Alternate I) August 2010.

Given the above issues, we respectfully request that USAID consider changing the contracting mechanism to a Cost Reimbursable type contract. Perhaps USAID could consider a Cost plus Award Fee or a Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract, either of which would minimize the inherent risk to the Small Business implementer, while maintaining fees tied to performance and/or cost control.

USAID Response: Based on USAID’s determination that the services and deliverables requested are commercial items, we are prohibited from using a cost reimbursement contract type. See FAR 16.301-3 (b). USAID is now pursuing a Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets contract type.

Q25. In order to afford Offerors a reasonable basis for estimating the fixed costs of conducting the evaluations envisioned under this RFP, we respectfully request the following information on each of the projects to be evaluated:

· Scope of Work

· Dollar value and length of the project

· Geographic focus

· Description of beneficiaries (e.g. organizations, individuals, counterpart government entities)

· Location of beneficiaries (e.g. rural or urban)

· Number of beneficiaries

· Other materials such as reports, or hard-copy materials are to be produced for dissemination and if so, in what quantities.

USAID Response: Please see attached document providing as much of the information requested above as is available for each project to be evaluated. USAID will not provide scopes of work for each evaluation. USAID is now pursuing a Fixed Price Incentive Successive Targets contract type and Offerors should propose initial target prices based on the information available at this time. At a predetermined time during the first year of the award, USAID will provide the contractor with key evaluation questions and more specific information about each project to be evaluated. The contractor and USAID will negotiate firm target prices or firm fixed prices based on the new information and revised cost estimates.

Q26. On page H-1, Section H.2, Source, Origin and National Requirements, states that the authorized geographic code for this procurement is 000. While we understand that this allows for local procurement of goods and services, it does not seem to allow for the use of regional subcontractors (organizations in one of the covered countries) to work across a variety of the other countries. This may be particularly important both in terms of building local expertise as well as for cost containment. Would USAID therefore consider changing this to a 935 Geo Code?

USAID Response: USAID put a Source, Origin, and Nationality waiver in place in response to this request. The contract will authorize procurement of services from geographic codes 000 (United States), 517 (Dominican Republic), 532 (Jamaica), 504 (Guyana) and 538 (Caribbean Regional). This will permit the contractor to procure services in one of the countries covered by the M&E contract for use in any of the countries covered by the M&E contract.

Q27: Item B.4 in the RFP lists the evaluations to be carried out, identifying each project to be evaluated. At the same time, page C4 specifies that for every project listed under point (7) on page C-5 (eight projects) a mid-term evaluation is required (per point (6) on page C-4) as well as a final evaluation (per point (7). Does this mean that every project listed in item B.4 actually involves two rather than one evaluation, i.e., a mid-term and a final evaluation for each of those eight projects.

USAID Response: Section C.4 (#6) specifies that mid-term evaluations be conducted on the projects identified below and only one project at sub-point (a.) is identified – the Youth Entrepreneurship Program for the Eastern Caribbean). Section C.4 (#7) outlines the requirements for the performance evaluations and lists projects in sub-points (a.) through (h.) that need performance evaluations. The line items in B.4 clearly identify the type of evaluation that required for each project as either a performance evaluation, mid-term evaluation, or impact evaluation. There is only one project that will receive a mid-term and a performance evaluation identified in the RFP.

Q28: Are the 18 items in section B.4 to be done over a five year period? Is the contractor expected to do more/other activities? Sections C has more requirements that do not link to this list e.g. mid-term evaluations not mentioned. How do we cost out the management activities e.g. annual work plan, periodic reports or programs that have not begun implementation? Which activities are to be included in Year One work plans?

USAID Response: Yes the 18 items in section B.4 are to be done over a five-year period and in Section C.4 estimated general delivery dates for the evaluations are outlined. The contractor is not expected to provide more services than what are identified in the RFP. Section C lists all deliverables and reports that must be provided to USAID, including reports that are customarily required and used to facilitate contract implementation. Offerors should not cost out an annual work, progress reports, or financial reports that have to be delivered to USAID as separate line or sub-line items. USAID will not pay for the delivery of an annual work plan or progress and financial reports separately. The costs of producing these reports should be reflected as part of the prices for each CLIN since they are not separate deliverables but USAID recognizes costs are associated with producing these reports. USAID expects the Contractor to conduct activities related to the following services/deliverables during Year 1: (a) Compilation of inventory of all studies/assessments/ evaluations, (b) Creation of a social justice index, (c) DR At-Risk Youth Impact Evaluation, (d) Knowledge sharing/networking mechanism, (e) Plan to identify balloon effects, (f) Recommendations to Improve CBSI Performance Management Plan, (g) Mid-term Evaluation on Youth Entrepreneurship Program for the Eastern Caribbean, and the (h) Performance Evaluations for the Community policing, anti-corruption program.

Q29: CLIN does not account for evaluating future programs. Is USAID anticipating new projects? If so, how does USAID want to address monitoring-i.e. does USAID want to address monitoring such as setting baseline and doing midterm evaluations?

USAID Response: USAID does not anticipate new projects at this time and the Contractor will not be responsible for monitoring any CBSI projects.

Q30. In section C.2 “The first year of CBSI funding includes $14 million to strengthen Caribbean partners’ ability to control their maritime borders, $10.6 million for law enforcement capacity building, and $20 million to be implemented by USAID in crime prevention programs…” Could you specify which year you are referring to?

USAID Response: USAID is referring to Fiscal Year 2010.

Q31: In section C.2 “The $20M is spread among the Caribbean Missions as follows: Barbados (Lead on juvenile justice) and Eastern Caribbean (Co-lead on workforce development) $7.4M; Jamaica (Lead on at-risk youth, anti-corruption, and community policing) $5.7M; and Guyana (co-lead on workforce development) $1.5M” – this adds up to 14.6. Does this mean DR gets the rest? Also, what does ‘lead’ or ‘co-lead’ mean at the mission level? Does this mean that Barbados will lead the strategy/thinking on juvenile justice projects for the E Caribbean?

USAID Response: Yes, the Dominican Republic is managing the rest of the funding. The terms Lead and Co-Lead is used in the context of the overall CBSI programming in the region and is based on the Mission focus and resource levels, e.g. USAID/Barbados has a significant focus on Juvenile Justice backed by resources for the OECS countries, Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname hence the term Lead. Co-Lead positions are shown where there is similar programming such as workforce development for the respective Missions.

Q32: Haiti is listed as one of the 15 countries in the CBSI, however there is no mention of Haiti in the SOW. Would Haiti be included in the project, and if so, in what capacity?

USAID Response: No, Haiti is not included in the project. The Contractor is not expected to work on any efforts in Haiti.

Q33: The SOW states only evaluation, research, planning, and knowledge management. There is no reference to monitoring. Please clarify.

USAID Response: The Contractor will be responsible for making recommendations to USAID on how to improve the CBSI Performance Management Plan – which contributes to USAID’s overall CBSI monitoring effort.

Q34: In Section C.4, Requirements for Evaluation Reports, there is no section on analysis. Does USAID want an analysis chapter?

USAID Response: Although the outline does list an analysis chapter, the Scope of Work provided by the Contractor for all evaluations to be conducted should have a section on “data analysis methods”. In this section, the Contractor’s evaluation team should explain how data are to be analyzed and an explanation of the data analysis plans. The findings, conclusions and recommendations will be based on that analysis.

Q35: Are the Estimated dates of the projects listed in performance evaluations in section C.4 currently when the evaluation would occur?

USAID Response: Yes, the estimated dates are the dates the evaluations would occur.

Q36: The only midterm evaluation listed is the Youth Entrepreneurship Program for the Eastern Caribbean. Is this the only mid-term evaluation?

USAID Response: Yes, this is the only mid-term evaluation.

Q37. Does the contract include implementing the plan to identify "Balloon effect" or is it only to develop the plan?

USAID Response: Yes, the contract includes implementation of the plan. USAID revised the solicitation to incorporate the balloon effect into appropriate deliverables and eliminated it as a separate deliverable.

Q38. Are we correct in understanding that the contract includes implementing the plan for CBSI knowledge sharing and networking (CLIN 0017) as well as developing the plan (CLIN 0013).

USAID Response: Yes, the contract includes implementing the plan (CLIN 0017) and developing the plan (CLIN 0013).

Q39. Does CLIN 0011 refer to the M&E Framework and Plan for all 9 projects evaluated as this project, or it means the M&E Framework and PMP for the CBSI? If it is the latest, does it mean that this PMP will then be implemented in CLIN 0016?

USAID Response: CLIN 0011 refers to the 9 projects only. CLIN 0016 refers to the technical assistance that will be provided to improve CBSI PMP (developed by USAID).

Q40. Is there any expectation on the level or effort or number of activities for CLIN 0016 “Technical support for the CBSI M&E”?

USAID Response: For CLIN 0016, the Contractor is only expected to do the following: Make recommendations to improve the overarching CBSI Performance Management Plan. Review the CBSI PMP and provide feedback to the Missions (through the COTR) on the CBSI performance indicators selected and identify and recommend other possible common impact indicators that can enrich the analysis across the region/countries.