PSP JOFOC Action Memo.pdf
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| KPSP_Justification_and_Approval_FINAL.pdf |
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-2-u.s. policy interest in developing stable and professional democratic systems in Kyrgyzstan. The proposed Parliamentary Strengthening Program ("PSP") will need to respond to this opportunity quickly to restore both credibility and capacity to the Parliament immediately following the elections in October 2010. The PSP will initially assess the needs of the new Parliament, which will lead to the development of appropri~te training and technical assistance in support of the new legislative body. This assistance will support and facilitate the establishment of key procedures and operations within the Parliament that will increase its overall effectiveness, accountability, and transparency.
The urgency of the program is to ensure from the outset that the new Parliament and its members understand their representative roles and functions and that democratic processes and systems for an effective, accountable and transparent institution are established from the very foundation of this institution. Without timely assistance to its democratic governance and processes, Kyrgyzstan is at serious risk of continued political upheaval and violence, including inter-ethic violence that resulted in thousands of casualties just last month. The situation remains tense in some regions of the country, and with a newly elected Parliament taking office in October the Parliament will need to build confidence with and among the people of Kyrgyzstan.
Because the need for a Parliamentary strengthening program only materialized recently after the rapid collapse of the authoritarian regime and the approval of a Parliamentary system with the adoption of a new Constitution, the need to deploy and have in place a program in October makes a full and open competition or a limited competition not possible, and would impair foreign assistance objectives and would be inconsistent with fulfillment of the foreign assistance program in Kyrgyzstan.
Pursuant to the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 it is understood November
16, 2009 was the last day that a USAID official could serve as the acting official for this Presidentially appointed position. That said, USAID' s standing delegation in ADS 103.3.6e provides that "an official other than the first assistant can be authorized to exercise all of a PAS' [Presidentially-Appointed, Senate-Confirmed position] authorities under an alter ego delegation. However, the official is not the acting PAS, but acts in his or her own' capacity. For example, a Deputy AA taking action under an alter ego delegation signs as Deputy AA, not acting AA." The
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SDAA may no longer be referred to as an Acting AA but is still authorized to head their respective bureau under these standing alter ego delegations and therefore the SDAA can approve OAA's request for a decision regarding the most effective delegation of the Agency's suspension and debarment responsibilities.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Explanation and Support Justifying Determination and Finding
Attachment 1: Market Survey Details
A list of 38 firms including universities that have previously implemented good governance and democratic reform programs for USAID was compiled.
Research was conducted on these 38 firms, identifying those firms that had implemented parliamentary programs in the former Soviet Union during the past five years. Three firms and one university were identified that fit this criterion.
Two of the firms demonstrated the relevant experience in the former Soviet Union, but would not be willing to work under contract mechanisms. An assistance award would leave too much direction and control of the program with the grantee rather than the United States. For this reason, neither are acceptable partners for the current program in Kyrgyzstan.
A fourth potential partner was considered which had implemented a parliamentary program under a contract in Kyrgyzstan from 2006-2007. However, that program performed poorly and failed to produce acceptable results. It was eliminated from consideration for this reason.
Of the three firms and one university identified with relevant necessary experience, the only suitable implementing partner for PSP in Kyrgyzstan was DAI. The Agency then undertook further due diligence on DAI’s capabilities, experience, and past performance.
o Based on consultations with USAID’s legislative strengthening technical experts, two organizations were identified with parliamentary strengthening experience and were willing to work under a contract mechanism. One was DAI and the other a university.
o The university was reviewed but eliminated because it does not have experience in the former Soviet Union which USAID felt was critical for the PSP. Further, past performance information identified some management and customer satisfaction problems with similar contracts.
USAID’s legislative technical experts also believed that DAI would be better positioned to rapidly deploy a team for Kyrgyzstan.
o DAI was identified as the potential implementing partner with the most appropriate experience in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
DAI was found to be the only contractor which had worked directly with other parliaments in the former Soviet Union on such issues as improving governmental oversight and representative functions, supporting internal parliamentary procedures, training new staff, strengthening legislative committees, and promoting citizen involvement into policy-making.
o Moreover, DAI has an in-house legislative strengthening team that is quickly able to mobilize and provide the needed short and long-term technical support. This was noted by USAID/Washington as an advantage to DAI as most firms and organizations do not employ in-house legislative strengthening personnel. Given the need to rapidly deploy a team within a few weeks of award, this was seen as a particular advantage to meeting the USG’s requirements for the proposed PSP.
o Further, the program most comparable to that proposed in the PSP was a Parliamentary Program in Azerbaijan, implemented by DAI. This program was described as “the most successful DG program” in the region by a senior USAID governance specialist with the E&E Bureau who is familiar with DAI’s work in Azerbaijan.
o Moreover, DAI recently successfully concluded a legislative program in a conflict environment, experience on which it could draw in operating in the current environment in Kyrgyzstan. This program, the Legislative Strengthening Project in Pakistan, likewise received high praise in the Contractor Performance Report.
o The Agency found that based on price and availability communication with DAI, DAI indicated it would be willing to submit a proposal for a potential program. DAI also confirmed that it had in-house legislative staff with the experience necessary to deploy quickly to Kyrgyzstan. With the recent conclusion of the successful Pakistan program, it was likely that the same management team for that project would now be available for PSP in Kyrgyzstan.
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