SEE_Attachment_H_CUI+Guide.docx
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- Space Environment Exploitation (SEE)
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- HR001118S0055
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| SEE_Attachment_B_Abstract_Template.docx | DOCX document | |
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| SEE_Attachment_D_Proposal_Template_Vol._1_-_Tech_&_Mgmt.docx | DOCX document | |
| SEE_Attachment_F_Proposal_Template_Vol._2-Cost_Summary_Spreadsheet.xlsx | XLSX spreadsheet | |
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| SEE_Attachment_A_Abstract_Summary_Slide_Template.pptx | PPTX presentation | |
| HR001118S0055.pdf | ||
| SEE_Attachment_F-2_Proposal_Template_Vol._2-Cost_Breakdown.xlsx | XLSX spreadsheet | |
| SEE_Attachment_E_Proposal_Template_Vol._2-Cost.docx | DOCX document |
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Controlled Unclassified Information Guide
Program: Space Environment Exploitation Program Manager: Maj. Charlton “David” Lewis II, Ph.D.
Program Security Officer: Mr. Gregory Woosley
Date: July 9, 2018 Version: 1.0
CUI Guide Space Environment Exploitation
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Version 1.0, 2018-0709 Page 3 of 3 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Background The Space Environment Exploitation (SEE) program seeks to accurately predict near-earth space environment disturbances and perturbations with scale lengths as small as 100 km and one-hour temporal resolution for 72-hour forecast periods over a representative area of responsibility (AOR). These small-scale phenomena can include sporadic-E, auroral-E, spread-F, plasma bubbles, F-region blobs, or scintillation. Successful execution will broadly enable nowcast/forecast of the near-earth space environment, attribution of human-made vs. naturally occurring phenomena, and exploitation of the ionosphere.
DARPA anticipates that SEE will include two Technical Areas (TAs): TA1 develops holistic space environmental models using modern theory and leading edge computational standards (e.g. HPCs, GPUs, TPUs), while TA2 develops an extensible assimilation framework to unify current monitoring assets and develop/exploit non-traditional sources of measurement.
Purpose This guide identifies those aspects of the program that performers must handle as Controlled Technical Information (CTI). In addition, each performer must determine and assert the export controls (either Export Administration Regulations (EAR) or International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)) relevant to their project.
Non-U.S. organizations and/or individuals may participate to the extent that such participants comply with any and all necessary nondisclosure agreements, security regulations, Government export controls and regulations, including the ITAR, export control laws, and other governing statutes applicable under the circumstances.
Questions concerning the content and interpretation of this guide and/or recommendations for changes due to current conditions, progress made in program research, scientific technological developments, advances in state of the art, or other factors should be directed to the DARPA Program Manager. All users of this Guide are encouraged to assist in improving its currency and adequacy.
Definition of Controlled Technical Information for the Program DARPA considers all documentation, system outputs, test results and work products related to the application of any model, algorithm, technique, or capability developed under this program to an asset that is classified or militarily relevant to be minimum CTI, because such application could produce or embody detailed technical information regarding the capabilities and/or vulnerabilities of that asset. The above definition of CTI applies to both TA1 and TA2 work.
As part of their efforts on this program, TA2 performers will develop an extensible assimilation framework to unify current monitoring assets and develop/exploit/integrate non-traditional sources of ionospheric measurement. All assimilation frameworks, protocols, algorithms, and other work developed under TA2 of the program shall be considered CTI due to their military relevance and are subject to Sections 4 and 6 of this Guide. Additionally, instances of algorithms that have been trained on or configured by CTI data must be treated as CTI. For example, a trained neural network would be CTI if it were trained on a CTI dataset.
Safeguarding CTI Performers shall omit discussion of applications, hypothesized or known, to classified or militarily relevant platforms when publishing or presenting results. Performers that believe reference to such applications is essential context for their publications or presentations should refer to the guidance in Section 6 of this guide to obtain the necessary permissions.
Performers wishing to use CTI data sources (e.g. data from military sensing platforms) or test their model in classified or militarily relevant applications shall deliver to DARPA a detailed plan for safeguarding and processing the data without divulging any CTI. All performers must submit this plan to DARPA no less than 90 days prior to commencing work on the CTI data or the classified or militarily relevant application, to allow sufficient time for discussion with the Government team and the completion of any necessary revisions.
Performers may propose use of an external cloud service provider to store, process, or transmit information as part of their effort on TA1 and/or TA2. The performer shall require and ensure that the cloud service provider meets security requirements equivalent to those established by the Government for the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Moderate baseline (https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/) and that the cloud service provider complies with requirements in paragraphs (c) through (g) of the DFARS Clause (252.204-7012) on Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting for malicious software, media preservation and protection, access to additional information and equipment necessary for forensic analysis, and cyber incident damage assessment.
Aspects of the Program that Will Not Generate CTI DARPA considers that the models developed in TA1 of this program will constitute advances to the state of the art and are not CTI when realized in source code or executable formats, or when documented in written reports. The outputs and work products resulting from application of algorithms to non-militarily relevant platforms are not considered CTI. Performers uncertain about whether a given dataset contains CTI should request guidance from DARPA. Specifically by Technical Area, the following work products are not considered CTI:
TA1 High resolution coupled space environment models
· Space environment models that are presented agnostic of military application
· Fundamental physical interactions and sub-models TA2 Integrated measurement framework and non-traditional observations
· Individual sensor technology disjoint from the data assimilation framework, assuming that technology is not CTI
· Generic machine learning or training algorithms that have not been specifically adapted for work on the SEE program
Publication Academic performers on this program may publish papers describing scientific or engineering advances that are general in nature and adhere to the above guidance. Non-academic performers shall submit any publications to DARPA’s DISTAR process for pre-publication review.
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