Hexagon GAJT SAP Justification_Redacted1.pdf
PDF 674 KB Posted
- Attached to
- Hexagon GAJT Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas for Department of Transportation (DOT) Pilot Program
- Solicitation number
- 6913G623Q300006
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Other files
| File | Type | Posted |
|---|---|---|
| 6913G623Q300006 Amended Specifications.pdf | ||
| FAR 52.204-24_OCT20.pdf | ||
| 6913G623Q300006 52213-4.pdf | ||
| 6913G623Q300006 52 212-3.pdf |
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Text version
V220T.12 (01/19)
Procurement Request No. V3452223
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
VOLPE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER (VOLPE CENTER)
V345
SOLE SOURCE OR BRAND NAME SAP JUSTIFICATION
A. Description of Supplies/Services.
On February 12, 2020, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13905, "Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services.” The goal of the EO is to promote responsible use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services by critical infrastructure owners and operators (now known as Sector Risk Management Agencies [SRMA] which includes the transportation sector) to strengthen national resilience. EO 13905 seeks to ensure that disruption or manipulation of PNT services does not undermine the reliability or efficiency of critical infrastructure by:
• Raising awareness of the extent to which critical infrastructure depends on PNT services,
• Ensuring critical infrastructure can withstand disruption or manipulation of PNT services, and
• Engaging public and private sectors to promote responsible use of PNT services.
As required by EO 13905, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) executed an initial pilot program addressing vulnerabilities of PNT services, particularly the Global Positioning System (GPS), to intentional manipulation ("jamming" and "spoofing") and unintentional outages that impact maritime operations. Working closely with the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the Volpe Center conducted a pilot program (under IAA OS92A421) which focused on the MARAD Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels. The Volpe Center conducted testing to determine RRF GPS receiver vulnerabilities and possible mitigation through use of complementary PNT (CPNT) and GPS augmentation technologies. A final report was released in July 2022 which provided promising results of a Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) used for GPS augmentation and a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Satellite Constellation CPNT service both with a recommendation for further maritime vessel testing.
Under Phase II, the Volpe Center will execute the recommendations from the initial pilot program by conducting maritime vessel testing of CRPA GPS augmentation and CPNT solutions and working with MARAD on adoption of these solutions for RRF vessels. Also, the Volpe Center will execute an additional pilot program focused on the rail sector, working closely with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
The Volpe Center, in coordination with the MARAD Office of Safety, shall conduct testing of CRPA and CPNT technologies that were recommended from the July 2022 Pilot Program Report focused on the maritime sector, specifically the Hexagon GAJT, a GPS anti-jam technology antenna. The testing will be conducted using MARAD’s RRF fleet vessels in which the technologies will be installed and tested during sea operations.
The Volpe Center will develop a final report to document the results and effectiveness of the technologies against any encountered threats and any recommendation for implementation into RRF vessels.
B. Market Research.
Market research was conducted by Christopher Scarpone in September/October 2022 A market survey of available CRPA equipment was done and all devices fall under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).
Companies that manufacture CRPA are:
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .