ATT_7_Award_Fee_AMD0001.pdf

ATTACHMENT 7: Award Fee Plan

70RNPP19R00000004/AMD0001

AWARD-FEE PLAN

For

PRIORITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (PTS)

February 2019

APPROVAL:

TBD Date

Fee-Determining Official

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR AWARD FEE

ADMINISTRATION

III. DEFINITION OF CONTRACTUAL ELEMENTS

IV. METHOD FOR DETERMINING AWARD FEE

ATTACHMENTS

Appendix E: Award Fee Criteria

I. INTRODUCTION

This award-fee plan is the basis for the Priority Telecommunications Service (PTS) evaluation of the Contractor's performance and for presenting an assessment of that performance to the Fee Determining Official (FDO). It describes specific criteria and procedures used to assess the Contractor’s performance and to determine the amount of award fee earned. Actual award-fee determinations and the methodology for determining award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.

The Priority Telecommunications Service (PTS) program consists of the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Special Routing and Arrangement Service (SRAS), and Wireless Priority Service (WPS). GETS, SRAS, and WPS provide priority telecommunications services to National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users during and after a man-made or natural disaster by utilizing the surviving assets of the public switched network (PSN).

The GETS mission is to provide nationwide voice and voice-band data telecommunications service under all conditions by utilizing the surviving assets of the public switched telephone network (PSTN). This service is designed to ensure telecommunications services are available to NS/EP users over any surviving connectivity derived from the PSTN, even though there may be widespread or focused PSTN congestion or damage.

SRAS is a classified program providing GETS-type service for special users.

The WPS objective is to provide NS/EP users and first responder leadership with nationwide mobile communications under all circumstances by extending NS/EP priority treatment to calls originating and terminating in cellular services. WPS’ integration with GETS provides NS/EP users with a high assurance of end-to-end call completion.

The Emergency Communications Division (ECD), in partnership with industry and government, has played a pivotal role in providing assured and priority telecommunications to combat terrorist threats. The ECD’s telecommunications programs are used to issue alerts, and to coordinate response, restoration, and protection efforts. These NS/EP Priority Telecommunications Services, when integrated with other government-provided services and programs, provides the Department Of Homeland Security with a robust toolset to ensure effective communications to protect American lives and the Nation’s critical infrastructures.

A. BACKGROUND

A cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is a cost-reimbursement contract as defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). This type of contract provides for a fee, i.e., the contractor’s profit, consisting of a base fee amount and an award fee amount. The base and maximum award fees are fixed when the contract is awarded and remain in effect for the duration of the contract. The contract also includes a schedule of evaluation periods and maximum award fees. At the end of each evaluation period, an award fee amount is determined.

This determination is a judgmental evaluation of the Contractor’s performance by the Government. A CPAF contract is suitable for use when the following conditions are met:

• The probability of meeting acquisition objectives is increased by motivational incentives

• An objective incentive in the areas of cost, technical performance, or schedule cannot be devised.

A hybrid (Firm Fixed Price, Cost Plus Award Fee, and Cost Reimbursement) pricing arrangement has been selected for this NS/EP PTS contract.

B. PURPOSE OF AWARD FEE PLAN

The purpose of the award fee plan is to provide guidance regarding award fee administration for the Government personnel who will be administering the award fee provisions for this contract. It also incorporates the award fee criteria into a document that can be maintained as a ready reference over the life of the contract.

C. DOCUMENT OVERVIEW

Section II of this Plan defines the Government organization to support a CPAF contract. Section III defines the contractual elements used in a CPAF contract. Section IV describes the procedure for Contractor performance evaluation and award fee determination. The Appendices are, as follows:

• Appendix A contains the Contractor Deliverable Evaluation form

• Appendix B contains the Award Fee Evaluator Assessment Report

• Appendix C contains a copy of the Contractor Performance Evaluation Report Summary

• Appendix D contains the contract negotiated estimated costs and maximum award fee amounts

• Appendix E contains the Award Fee Criteria contained in the Request for Proposal (RFP)

Appendices A through D will be completed by the Government after contract award, only Appendix E, attached herein, will be provided to the Contractor.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR AWARD FEE ADMINISTRATION

A. ORGANIZATION

The organization structure necessary to support award fee plan administration will consist of a Fee Determination Officer (FDO) and an

Award Fee Evaluation Board (AFEB). In its deliberations, the AFEB will be supported by the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) and the Contracting Officer. Existing staff assigned to the program will assist the AFEB, and these staff members will act on award fee related matters when required.

B. FEE DETERMINATION OFFICER (FDO)

The FDO shall be the Program Manager. In making award fee amount determination, the FDO will consider the recommendations of the

AFEB. The Contracting Officer will assist the FDO to ensure that the award fee process is compliant with Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) and FAR contractual procedures, policy, requirements, and regulations.

C. AWARD FEE EVALUATION BOARD (AFEB)

The AFEB members will be selected from the PTS Program Office. The criteria for selecting AFEB members will be that their primary duties include the following activities:

• Monitoring the Contractor’s performance on a regular basis; and

• Understanding the technical and management requirements of the tasks.

The AFEB membership is as follows:

• The Chairman shall be the FDO; and

• Membership will consist of: Program Manager; GETS/WPS Lead-Engineers; Operations Officer; Contracting Officer (cost and rates/non-voting); and the COR.

The AFEB will advise the FDO in the determination of an award fee. The FDO will take the AFEB recommendation under advisement;

however, the FDO has full discretion in award fee determination.

D. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE (COR)

In support of the AFEB, the COR will:

• Collect and organize all input from technical and program personnel for AFEB consideration;

• Ensure briefing from Contractor is incorporated into the evaluation;

• Prepare documents necessary to record and implement AFEB findings and recommendations to include: important CDRLs, unresolved technical and performance issues; and strengths and weaknesses of Contractor’s performance;

• Coordinate AFEB findings and recommendations;

• Perform other award fee actions as directed by the AFEB and FDO; and

• Prepare award fee letter for FDO signature.

E. CONTRACTING OFFICER

The Contracting Officer or his representative will perform AFEB calculations to determine/establish award fee pools, and to apply FDO recommended percentage against the pools to determine monetary amount for the award fee. On an as required basis, the Contracting

Officer will serve as the contractual advisor to the AFEB and FDO.

F. TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL/PERFORMANCE MONITORS (PM)

Individuals who support technical oversight of the Contractor’s efforts have an important role in the award fee process. In pursuit of their normal day-to-day duties, these personnel observe the Contractor’s performance by assessing deliverable products for technical compliance.

The COR shall incorporate these observations into the award fee process.

III. DEFINITION OF CONTRACTUAL ELEMENTS

This is a hybrid contract with Program Management (CLIN XX01) and Transition Phase Out (CLIN XX11) being designated as firm fixed price tasks. The Award-Fee value is proposed by the Offeror during the solicitation process and can be no higher than 9.25% of the estimated costs. Award Fees are applicable to the following Cost-Plus-Award-Fee CLINs: Engineering Support (X002), GETS Carrier

Agreements Engineering (X003), WPS Carrier Agreements Engineering (X005), Operational Support (X007), Safeguarding of Sensitive

Information (X008), Technology Refreshment – Optional Work (X011), Service Support Center (X012), GWIDS Security Upgrade (X013).

It should be noted that the first 25% of the total Award Fee for CLIN X007 Operational Support is aligned to the Quality Assurance

Surveillance Plan (QASP) Performance-Based Requirement of Readiness. The Contractor must achieve and maintain full readiness to earn the first 25% of Award Fee for CLIN X007.

There are certain contractual elements that are necessary for the formulation of a CPAF contract. The definitions of these elements, as they apply to this contract, are described below:

1. ESTIMATED COST

The estimated cost in a CPAF contract is negotiated in the same manner as cost in any form of cost-reimbursement contract. It is the result of forecasting a future cost for the contract using the best information available at the time the cost is negotiated.

2. BASE FEE

The base fee is the minimum dollar amount fee that a Contractor can earn on a CPAF contract. It is expressed as a percentage of the estimated CLIN cost. For this contract, the Government has chosen to set the base fee at zero ($0) dollars.

3. AWARD FEE

The award fee is the maximum allowable amount of discretionary fee a Contractor can be awarded on a CPAF contract. The award fee payable will be determined every six months by the FDO in accordance with this plan. It is expressed as dollar cost and the total value is negotiated prior to award. Based on contract performance, the Contractor can receive: no award fee, a percentage of the award fee, or the entire award fee. The award fee percentage varies by work category. Award fees for labor (CLIN X002, X003, X005, X007, X008, X011, X012, X013) other than under the Program Management task (CLIN X001), provided by Contractor can be no higher than 9.25% of the estimated cost. Monthly recurring charges (MRCs) for carrier services (CLINS X009, X010) are excluded from award fee.

The direct labor award fee for CLIN X007 will be tiered by splitting fee into two parts – Readiness and Non- Readiness. As specified in the

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP), for the Contractor to receive the first 25% of the total Award Fee for CLIN X007, readiness must be maintained at 100%. The first 25% of the total Award Fee for CLIN X007 is set-aside for readiness and will be fully paid only if readiness levels of 100% are maintained throughout the period. The Contractor will not receive any portion of the first 25% of the total

Award Fee for CLIN X007 if readiness falls below 100% in the period. The remaining Non-Readiness portion (75%) of the total Award Fee for CLIN X007 shall be determined by the AEFB in accordance with the Award Fee Criteria and this plan (See Attachment E).

4. MAXIMUM FEE

The maximum award fee is proposed by the Offeror during the solicitation period and is established at no more than 9.25% of the total estimated costs.

5. AWARD FEE CRITERIA

The award fee criteria establish the basis for the evaluation of Contractor performance. It is essential that these criteria be established prior to contract award and that the criteria are included in the solicitation. The criteria are limited in number in order to accomplish the following objectives:

• Efficiently manage the award fee process;

• Prevent individual criterion from offsetting one another; and

• Eliminate confusion as to what the Contractor performance is being rewarded.

The award fee criteria are contained in Appendix E. These criteria focus on the quality of work and management effectiveness. The

Government may change the Contractor’s criteria during the contract period of performance, but not during the award fee period. Changes in criteria may result from: revised mission; modification of acquisition objectives; and/or acquisition reform initiatives.

6. AWARD FEE PERIOD

An award fee period is the period of time over which the Contractor’s performance is evaluated and on which cost is estimated for the determination of the amount of award fee. The Contractor will be evaluated every 6 months throughout the contract’s period of performance. An award fee period of 6 months has been established for this contract for the following reasons:

• It is sufficiently long to make a reasonable judgment of Contractor performance based on actual accomplishments;

• It is short enough to have an impact on current performance and to allow the Contractor to take timely corrective action, if required;

and

• It balances Government effort required to administer the program with benefit anticipated from additional Contractor incentive.

7. EARNED AWARD FEE

Earned award fee is the amount actually awarded to the Contractor following the evaluation of Contractor’s performance against the award fee criteria at the end of an award fee period. The earned fee is always less than or equal to the maximum award fee.

IV. METHOD FOR DETERMINING AWARD FEE

The establishment of the award fee procedure is equally as important as the definition of the CPAF contract elements. The AFEB will use this procedure to determine the actual amount of the award to be recommended to the FDO. The procedure involves two steps: performance evaluation and award fee determination.

1.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The AFEB will evaluate Contractor performance by comparing actual performance against Appendix E, Award Fee Criteria. Members of the AFEB will base their observations of Contractor performance on the following items:

• Evaluation of Contractor generated technical items provided in accordance with the Contract Deliverable Schedule using the Contract

Deliverable Evaluation forms contained in Appendix A;

• Contractor Monthly Progress Reports and Quarterly Project Management Reviews (QPMR) which include routine and performance monitoring summaries;

• Material presented during Technical Reviews;

• Correspondence, memoranda, and reports containing contract performance; and

• Other information from Government sources having knowledge of the Contractor’s performance.

The AFEB may request briefings from technical leads and supporting Contractors having knowledge of program issues that are related to evaluation. The AFEB may also request that the Contractor provide information on evaluation issues.

1.1.1 Contractor Briefing to the AFEB

The Contractor will be given the opportunity to brief the AFEB concerning information that the Contractor would like the Government to consider during a given evaluation.

1.1.2 Technical and Management Personnel

While performing their normal duties, personnel acquire first-hand knowledge about the Contractor’s performance. This knowledge is acquired as a result of participation in one or more of the following activities:

• Review of the technical data submitted in response to the deliverables of the contract;

• Day-to-day observation of the Contractor’s performance; and

• Attendance at Quarterly Program Management Reviews and technical reviews.

Less formal procedures may be used when Contractor performance issues are identified as a result of day-to-day observations, program reviews, or audits. At the individual’s option, a memorandum identifying and defining the program issues and estimating their probable impact may be sent to the COR through the normal supervisory chain of communications. The COR will collect and organize the input from technical and management personnel along with the evaluation report defined in 1.1.7 of this plan; into an integrated documentation package for AFEB consideration.

1.1.3 Contracting Officer’s Representative Cost Evaluation

The Contracting Officer’s Representative will review the estimated cost and cost information as provided in Contractor management products and evaluate the Contractor’s cost related performance in accordance with Appendix E, B-2, and Performance to Cost.

1.1.4 Importance of Contract Deliverable Evaluations

Technical and management personnel will evaluate all critical contract deliverables. Deliverable Evaluation forms will be used to document the findings. All other routine and less critical deliverables will be evaluated on a semi-annual basis by rating the QPMR via a Deliverable

Evaluation form.

1.1.5 Relationship to the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)

The QASP contains mandatory readiness goals and measures. If the Contractor’s readiness performance is below 100%, no fee will be awarded on the first 25% of the Award Fee for CLIN XX07.

The Award Fee will be based on the Government’s assessment of the quality of the contractor’s performance for a six (6) months evaluation period. Objective and subjective assessments will be used to evaluate Contractor’s overall performance and corresponding Award Fee during each evaluation period. Determination of Contractor’s performance and Award Fee eligibility will be based on attainment of the objective and subjective performance measures outlined in this plan, and further explained in the QASP (Attachment 4).

1.1.6 Evaluation Rating

The AFEB will evaluate the Contractor’s performance based on the Contractor’s Monthly Reports, QPMR, critical deliverable ratings, and the Contractor’s briefing.

For each of the award fee criteria, individual AFEB members will assign an appropriate numerical rating. Individual AFEB members must process the development of the numerical ratings for the Award Fee Evaluator Assessment Report contained in Appendix C. Numerical ratings are intended only to provide the structure for the application for a mature professional judgment by the AFEB. These ratings are intended only as guides to an intelligent decision-making and should reflect the judgmental evaluation of the Contractor’s performance. In addition to the numerical rating, the AFEB, based on the material presented for review, will highlight material that greatly exceeds or falls below satisfactory levels. Award fee shall not be earned if the contractor's overall cost, schedule, and technical performance in the aggregate are below satisfactory.

In addition to organizing the briefings that include Contractor input; critical deliverable evaluations; QPMR evaluation; technical, and contractual issues; and assessment of the Contractor strength and weaknesses, the COR will:

• Consolidate critical deliverable evaluations using the form in Appendix B;

• Complete the Contractor Performance Evaluation Report Summary based on individual Award Fee Evaluator Reports contained in

Appendix C;

• Complete the computations required for the Contractor Performance Evaluation Report Summary, Appendix D (award fee evaluator assessments will be averaged); and

• Consolidate all prior periodic and cumulative Award Fee rating results and produce a summary for AFEB review.

1.1.7 Evaluation Report

After the award fee evaluation meeting, the results of the AFEB evaluation will be documented in a memorandum to the FDO. The memorandum will be prepared by the COR and it will include the following items:

• The complete Contractor Performance Evaluation Report Summary, Appendix D;

• A narrative summary indicating problems, areas requiring improvements, and significant Contractor achievements;

• The range of award fee ratings resulting from the AFEB evaluation; and

• A recommended draft FDO letter to the Contractor concerning the results of the Award Fee Evaluation; this draft letter will include as a minimum the discussion of the problems and areas where improved Contractor performance is required.

After AFEB deliberations, the COR will prepare and submit a summary evaluation report with supporting documentation to the FDO within

10 working days after each evaluation period.

1.2 AWARD FEE DETERMINATION

After review of the AFEB Report, the FDO or his designated representative will complete the award fee determination. In support of the

FDO award fee determination, the COR will perform the following steps: (1) Have the Contracting Officer identify the maximum award fee for the period; (2) Prepare for the FDO a draft letter notifying the Contractor of the award fee results; (3) Provide the AFEB’s recommendation of an award fee for FDO consideration; and (4) Accomplish the goals for processing the award fee determination.

1.2.1 Maximum Award Fee for the Period

The maximum award fee cannot be higher than 9.25% of estimated costs.

1.2.2 Earned Award Fee Determination

Based on a review of the recommendations contained in the AFEB Report, a determination will be made by the FDO regarding the award fee for the award fee period being evaluated; the earned award fee is always less than or equal to the negotiated available award fee (See paragraph 3). Upon FDO determination of the earned fees, the Contracting Officer will be notified and, in turn, authorize to the Contractor the amount of money via a contract modification. The Contractor will then be able to invoice the Government for payment of fee. As stated in the special contract requirements, the award fee determination is a unilateral Government action and is not subject to the Disputes clause under the FAR.

1.2.3 Goals for Processing Award Fee Determination

The following goals will be established for processing the award fee determination:

• Within 10 working days after AEFB deliberations on the prior six months period, the COR shall prepare and submit an Award Fee

Report to the FDO. The report shall set forth recommended performance ratings with supporting justification.

• Within five working days after receipt of the AFEB recommendation, the FDO shall notify the Contractor in writing of such ratings.

• Within five working days after receipt of such notification, if the Contractor disagrees with the ratings, he may submit a written statement of issues or clarification that shall be considered by the FDO.

• Within five working days after the period for, or receipt of, the Contractor's written statement of disagreement, the FDO shall determine the award fee amount, and notify the Contracting officer of this determination.

• Within fifteen working days of receipt of this notification, the Contracting Officer will add the award fee amount to the contract by a unilateral modification.

• The Contractor shall be paid award fee, if any, upon submission of a proper invoice or voucher to the cognizant payment office together with a copy of the unilateral modification to the contract authorizing payment.

1.2.4 Award Fee Criteria

Appendix E contains a Ratings Matrix for Evaluation Factor Criteria within each Award Fee Pool for each CPAF CLIN in order measure how the contractor’s performance will be evaluated and earned Award Fee will be determined each period. The contractor’s performance under each CPAF CLIN will be evaluated and rated in respect to weighted Evaluation Factors that tier up to several, weighted Award Fee

Pool categories that together total the available Award Fee for that respective CLIN. When a contractor’s performance is rated under each

Evaluation Factor, the contractor will receive the designated percentage (0%, 40%, 60% 80% or 100%) of the pre-determined Evaluation

Factor amount which tiers up to total of that respective Award Fee Pool. For example, an “Excellent” rating will earn the contractor 100% of that Evaluation Factor’s pre-determined amount while a “Satisfactory” rating will only earn the contractor 40% of that Evaluation

Factor’s pre-determined amount. This will allow the Government to assess and individually evaluate various performance criteria under each CPAF CLIN as well as provide the Contractor the ability to maximize their earned Award Fee. An example of how the weighted

Evaluation Factors under the weighted Award Fee Pool determined the contractor’s earned Award Fee for each evaluation period is show below, using the criteria from CLIN 0007 as a sample:

CPAF CLIN EVALUATION: % Total Award Fee Available Period Award Fee Available Earned Award Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good Very Good Excellent

0007 Base Operational Support (Period 1) 20,000.00$ 10,000.00$ 0% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Pool A - Readiness 25% 5,000.00$ 2,500.00$ Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good Very Good Excellent

Total Pool A Earned 2,500.00$ X

Pool B - Engineering Quality of Work 25% 5,000.00$ 2,500.00$ Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good Very Good Excellent

B-1 Engineering Competence 40% 2,000.00$ 1,000.00$ 800.00$ X

B-2 Thoroughness of Work 30% 1,500.00$ 750.00$ 450.00$ X

B-3 Adherence to Requirements 30% 1,500.00$ 750.00$ 750.00$ X

Total Pool B Earned 2,000.00$

Pool C - Technical Effectiveness 25% 5,000.00$ 2,500.00$ Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good Very Good Excellent

C-1: Use of Resources & Personnel 10% 500.00$ 250.00$ 250.00$ X

C-2: Performance to Cost 25% 1,250.00$ 625.00$ 625.00$ X

C-3: Adherence to Schedules 30% 1,500.00$ 750.00$ 300.00$ X

C-4: Remedial Action 20% 1,000.00$ 500.00$ -$ X

C-5: Initiative 15% 750.00$ 375.00$ 300.00$ X

Total Pool C Earned 1,475.00$

Pool D - GETS and WPS OAM&P 25% 5,000.00$ 2,500.00$ Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Good Very Good Excellent

D-1: GETS and WPS Performance 35% 1,750.00$ 875.00$ 875.00$ X

D-2: Thoroughness of Testing 30% 1,500.00$ 750.00$ 450.00$ X

D-3: Cost Effectiveness 35% 1,750.00$ 875.00$ 700.00$ X

Total Pool D Earned 2,025.00$

Maximum Potential to Be Earned 20,000.00$ 10,000.00$

Total Award Earned This Evaluation Period 8,000.00$

* Each Evaluation Period Represents Six (6) Month Period. Each Period of Performance (Base and Subsquent Option Year) Equals Two (2) Evaluation Periods

Appendix E

PTS Contract

Award FEE CRITERIA

CLIN X002 – Engineering Support (IAW Section C – Section 5.3):

CLIN X002 Award Fee

Pools and Weighted Evaluation Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Excellent

100% Earned

Pool A - Engineering Quality of Work (50% of CLIN Award Fee Total)

(A-1) Engineering Competence (40% of Pool A)

Contractor fails to identify potential problems that could impact GETS and WPS.

Has to rely extensively on Government personnel to analyze technical problems.

Unable to develop technical solutions or concepts. Plans and other technical data have significant technical errors.

Contractor partially identifies potential problems impacting GETS and WPS in a timely manner. Often requires Government support in analyzing technical problems. Seldom capable of developing acceptable technical solutions or concepts.

Plans and other technical data frequently require correction.

Contractor identifies potential GETS and WPS problems. Seldom is it necessary to call upon the Government for technical assistance.

Able to develop economical, feasible technical solutions and concepts with limited Government support.

Plans and other technical data have only minor technical errors.

Contractor rarely calls upon the Government for technical assistance Able to develop economical, feasible technical solutions and concepts with very little Government support.

Performance is a valuable asset to the overall effort.

Within budget, on time or ahead of schedule.

Contractor always provides timely identification of GETS and WPS problems. Able to analyze all technical problems without Government assistance.

Consistently able to develop affordable, innovative technical solutions or concepts, plans and other technical data are without technical errors.

(A-2) Thoroughness of Work (30% of Pool A)

Technical data is usually submitted with errors.

Most technical solutions or concepts are incomplete and do not consider related factors.

Plans and technical data require frequent modification and resubmission prior to acceptance.

Technical data often required correction.

Technical errors are evident in the data submissions. Plans and technical data require several submissions prior to acceptance.

Technical data seldom require correction.

Technical errors are seldom evident in any submission. Plans or technical data normally require only a draft and final submission prior to acceptance.

Technical data rarely requires correction. Plans or technical data rarely require modification to be considered acceptable Task is performed in professional and thorough manner.

Technical data is always accurate and easy to read and understand. Plans and technical data never require more than minor modification to be considered acceptable.

(A-3) Adherence to Requirements (30% of Pool A)

Contractor needs constant reminder, correction, or direction in the performance of tasks.

Falls to prioritize work in order to meet contractual requirements. Fails to provide plans and technical data lAW established contract requirements.

Contractor often requests or requires Government correction or direction when accomplishing required tasks. Often submits plans and technical data with significant requirements errors.

Contractor seldom requests direction to produce required results.

Accomplishes the contractual requirements with little or no Government required adjustments.

Occasionally submits plans and technical data with minor requirements errors.

Contractor rarely requests direction to produce required results& Contractor's performance is well above the level expected. Within budget, on time or ahead of schedule. Rarely submits plans and technical data with requirements errors.

Contractor does not request unnecessary direction to produce desired results.

Constantly keeps contractual requirements clear during engineering and operations efforts.

Prioritizes work such that all contractual requirements are met.

Evaluation Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Excellent

100% Earned Pool B

Technical Effectiveness (50% of CLIN Award Fee Total)

(B-1) Use of Resources & Personnel (10% of Pool B)

Often assigns over qualified or under qualified personnel to work tasks. Falls to plan and schedule use of adequate resources IAW each task requirement.

Often has periods of peak or slack demands for resources and personnel.

Frequent reassignment of personnel and relocation of resources to meet demands result in frequent schedule modifications. Disruptive changes are necessary to meet peak or slack demands.

Personnel assignments are based on sound assessments of skill levels and number of personnel necessary to accomplish work tasks.

Seldom necessary to reassign personnel or reallocate resources;

however, when necessary, this action is accomplished with low impact.

Rarely reassigns personnel or reallocates resources; however, when necessary, this action has minimum impact. Periods of peak and slack demand impacts are minimized by management action.

Extremely effective assignment of personnel.

Resources are consistently used in a very efficient manner.

Some tasks are completed early or with less resource allocation.

There are no periods of peak or slack demands that impact schedules, personnel assignments, or resources allocation.

(B-2) Performance to Cost (25% of Pool B)

Fails to use sound basis for cost projections.

Consistently overruns original cost estimated by 5% during any given six-month period using cost analysis. Government consistently identifies shortcomings in Contractor cost estimates.

Contractor fails to keep Government informed of potential estimate risks.

Provides cost projections justified in Government review. Contractor identifies some cost risks but does so incompletely and does not effectively assess the degree of risks.

Costs frequently exceed

Consistently provides quality cost projections and estimates based on substantial analysis and study. Government seldom identifies errors in cost estimates and projections. Contractor identifies and notifies Government of potential cost risks in sufficient time for necessary review and decision process.

Almost always provides quality cost projections and estimates based on a complete analysis and study. Government rarely identifies minor errors in cost estimates. Contractor almost Always identifies and notifies Government of potential cost risks in sufficient time for necessary review and decision process

Always develops excellent cost projections based on completely sound analytical studies. Cost estimation and cost tracking data are always complete and accurate.

Contractor always identifies potential cost risk areas with sufficient lead time for the necessary review and decision process.

(B-3)

Adherence To Schedules (30% of Pool B)

Tasks are seldom completed within established time constraints. Schedule adjustments are frequent and untimely. Contractor scheduling fails to account for sufficient management, administrative, or technical schedule requirements.

Contractor often requires adjustments which impacts on ability to meet required delivery. Contractor planning to meet schedules often requires major adjustments due to insufficient analysis.

Schedules to attain requirements require minimal periodic adjustment. Contractor plans for accomplishment of required work tasks routinely account for sufficient technical, management, and administrative actions.

Deliverables are consistently on time.

Schedules to attain requirements rarely require adjustment.

Contractor plans for accomplishment of required work tasks almost always account for sufficient technical, management, and administrative actions.

Contractor always meets or exceeds required contractual schedule.

Contractor always amply considers management, administrative, and technical time requirements.

Evaluation Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Excellent

100% Earned

(B-4) Remedial Action (20% of Pool B)

Contractor seldom completes technical evaluation and correction of reported problems with sufficient timeliness to ensure no interruption of required work and service. Identification, through performance and routine monitoring, and resolution of a major service problem(s) are not timely. Carrier and vendor support of OAM&P is inadequate.

Contractor often has difficulty in completing the evaluation and correction of reported problems with sufficient timeliness to ensure no interruption of required work and service.

Identification, through routine and performance monitoring, and resolution of service problems are not timely. Carrier and vendor support of OAM&P is not timely.

Contractor normally completes the technical evaluation and correction of reported problems in a timely manner with minimal interruption of required work and service. Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner.

Contractor is successful in obtaining vendor and carrier support to effect the timely resolution of service problems.

OAM&P is fully supported, and service problems are handled in a professional manner.

Contractor almost always completes the technical evaluation of reported problems in a timely manner without interruption of required work and service.

Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner.

Contractor is successful in obtaining vendor and carrier support to effect the timely resolution of service problems.

OAM&P is fully supported, and no major service problems occur during this period.

Contractor always completes technical evaluation of reported problems in a timely manner without interruption of required work and service.

Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner. And, all service problems are corrected immediately. OAM&P is fully supported, and service problems are very minor during this period.

(B-5)

Initiative (15% of Pool B)

Contractor generally shows a lack of initiative to the point where Government direction or intervention is required. Contractor does not work to reduce time consuming administrative procedures. Contractor fails to identify and propose opportunities for technical improvements.

Improvements and initiatives are too late to be effectively implemented.

Considers timeliness as an element of efficiency;

however, often fails to fully analyze schedule impacts.

Usually proposes and initiates sound improvements with ample consideration to time required for decision-making and effective technical implementation.

Usually measures schedule impacts fully and reports results to the Government.

Almost always proposes and initiates improvements with ample consideration to time required decision-making and effective technical implementation.

Almost always measures schedule impacts fully and reports results to the Government.

Contractor always shows significant initiative and self-motivation in meeting program objectives.

Contractor continually strives to improve the overall program. Technical efforts show innovative application of technology to tasks and problems.

CLIN X003, X005 – GETS and WPS Engineering (Section C – Section 5.2):

CLIN X003 & X005

Award Fee Pools and Weighted Evaluation

Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Excellent

100% Earned

Pool A- Engineering Quality of Work (34% of CLIN Award Fee Total)

(A-1) Engineering Competence (40% of Pool A)

Contractor fails to identify potential problems that could impact GETS and WPS.

Has to rely extensively on Government personnel to analyze technical problems.

Unable to develop technical solutions or concepts. Plans and other technical data have significant technical errors.

Contractor partially identifies potential problems impacting GETS and WPS in a timely manner. Often requires Government support in analyzing technical problems. Seldom capable of developing acceptable technical solutions or concepts.

Plans and other technical data frequently require correction.

Contractor identifies potential GETS and WPS problems. Seldom is it necessary to call upon the Government for technical assistance.

Able to develop economical, feasible technical solutions and concepts with limited Government support.

Plans and other technical data have only minor technical errors.

Contractor rarely calls upon the Government for technical assistance Able to develop economical, feasible technical solutions and concepts with very little Government support.

Performance is a valuable asset to the overall effort.

Within budget, on time or ahead of schedule.

Contractor always provides timely identification of GETS and WPS problems. Able to analyze all technical problems without Government assistance.

Consistently able to develop affordable, innovative technical solutions or concepts, plans and other technical

Most technical solutions or concepts are incomplete and do not consider related factors.

Plans and technical data require frequent modification and resubmission prior to acceptance.

Technical data often required correction.

Technical errors are evident in the data submissions. Plans and technical data require several submissions prior to acceptance.

Technical data seldom require correction.

Technical errors are seldom evident in any submission. Plans or technical data normally require only a draft and final submission prior to acceptance.

Technical data rarely requires correction. Plans or technical data rarely require modification to be considered acceptable Task is performed in professional and thorough manner.

Technical data is always accurate and easy to read and understand. Plans and technical data never require more than minor

Requirements (30% of Pool A)

Contractor needs constant reminder, correction, or direction in the performance of tasks.

Falls to prioritize work in order to meet contractual requirements. Fails to provide plans and technical data lAW established contract requirements.

Contractor often requests or requires Government correction or direction when accomplishing required tasks. Often submits plans and technical data with significant requirements errors.

Contractor seldom requests direction to produce required results.

Accomplishes the contractual requirements with little or no Government required adjustments.

Occasionally submits plans and technical data with minor requirements errors.

Contractor rarely requests direction to produce required results& Contractor's performance is well above the level expected. Within budget, on time or ahead of schedule. Rarely submits plans and technical data with requirements errors.

Contractor does not request unnecessary direction to produce desired results.

Constantly keeps contractual requirements clear during engineering and operations efforts.

Prioritizes work such that

Weighted Evaluation

Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Excellent

100% Earned

Pool B- Technical Effectiveness (33% of CLIN

Award Fee Total)

(B-1) Use of Resources & Personnel (10% of Pool B)

Often assigns over qualified or under qualified personnel to work tasks. Falls to plan and schedule use of adequate resources IAW each task requirement.

Often has periods of peak or slack demands for resources and personnel.

Frequent reassignment of personnel and relocation of resources to meet demands result in frequent schedule modifications. Disruptive changes are necessary to meet peak or slack demands.

Personnel assignments are based on sound assessments of skill levels and number of personnel necessary to accomplish work tasks.

Seldom necessary to reassign personnel or reallocate resources;

however, when necessary, this action is accomplished with low impact.

Rarely reassigns personnel or reallocates resources; however, when necessary, this action has minimum impact. Periods of peak and slack demand impacts are minimized by management action.

Extremely effective assignment of personnel.

Resources are consistently used in a very efficient manner.

Some tasks are completed early or with less resource allocation.

There are no periods of peak or slack demands that impact schedules, Cost (25% of Pool B)

Fails to use sound basis for cost projections.

Consistently overruns original cost estimated by 5% during any given six-month period using cost analysis. Government consistently identifies shortcomings in Contractor cost estimates.

Contractor fails to keep Government informed of potential estimate risks.

Provides cost projections justified in Government review. Contractor identifies some cost risks but does so incompletely and does not effectively assess the degree of risks.

Costs frequently exceed

Consistently provides quality cost projections and estimates based on substantial analysis and study. Government seldom identifies errors in cost estimates and projections. Contractor identifies and notifies Government of potential cost risks in sufficient time for necessary review and decision process.

Almost always provides quality cost projections and estimates based on a complete analysis and study. Government rarely identifies minor errors in cost estimates. Contractor almost Always identifies and notifies Government of potential cost risks in sufficient time for necessary review and decision process

Always develops excellent cost projections based on completely sound analytical studies. Cost estimation and cost tracking data are always complete and accurate.

Contractor always identifies potential cost risk areas with sufficient lead time for the

To Schedules (30% of Pool B)

Tasks are seldom completed within established time constraints. Schedule adjustments are frequent and untimely. Contractor scheduling fails to account for sufficient management, administrative, or technical schedule requirements.

Contractor often requires adjustments which impacts on ability to meet required delivery. Contractor planning to meet schedules often requires major adjustments due to insufficient analysis.

Schedules to attain requirements require minimal periodic adjustment. Contractor plans for accomplishment of required work tasks routinely account for sufficient technical, management, and administrative actions.

Deliverables are consistently on time.

Schedules to attain requirements rarely require adjustment.

Contractor plans for accomplishment of required work tasks almost always account for sufficient technical, management, and administrative actions.

Contractor always meets or exceeds required contractual schedule.

Contractor always amply considers management, administrative, and

Weighted Evaluation

Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

Action (20% of Pool B)

Contractor seldom completes technical evaluation and correction of reported problems with sufficient timeliness to ensure no interruption of required work and service. Identification, through performance and routine monitoring, and resolution of a major service problem(s) are not timely. Carrier and vendor support of OAM&P is inadequate.

Contractor often has difficulty in completing the evaluation and correction of reported problems with sufficient timeliness to ensure no interruption of required work and service.

Identification, through routine and performance monitoring, and resolution of service problems are not timely. Carrier and vendor support of OAM&P is not timely.

Contractor normally completes the technical evaluation and correction of reported problems in a timely manner with minimal interruption of required work and service. Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner.

Contractor is successful in obtaining vendor and carrier support to effect the timely resolution of service problems.

OAM&P is fully supported, and service problems are handled in a professional manner.

Contractor almost always completes the technical evaluation of reported problems in a timely manner without interruption of required work and service.

Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner.

Contractor is successful in obtaining vendor and carrier support to effect the timely resolution of service problems.

OAM&P is fully supported, and no major service problems occur during this period.

Contractor always completes technical evaluation of reported problems in a timely manner without interruption of required work and service.

Routine and performance monitoring detect service problems in a timely manner. And, all service problems are corrected immediately. OAM&P is fully supported, and

Pool B)

Contractor generally shows a lack of initiative to the point where Government direction or intervention is required. Contractor does not work to reduce time consuming administrative procedures. Contractor fails to identify and propose opportunities for technical improvements.

Improvements and initiatives are too late to be effectively implemented.

Considers timeliness as an element of efficiency;

however, often fails to fully analyze schedule impacts.

Usually proposes and initiates sound improvements with ample consideration to time required for decision-making and effective technical implementation.

Usually measures schedule impacts fully and reports results to the Government.

Almost always proposes and initiates improvements with ample consideration to time required decision-making and effective technical implementation.

Almost always measures schedule impacts fully and reports results to the Government.

Contractor always shows significant initiative and self-motivation in meeting program objectives.

Contractor continually strives to improve the overall program. Technical efforts show innovative application of technology to tasks and problems.

Pool C- GETS and WPS OAM&P (33% of CLIN Award Fee Total)

(C-1) GETS and WPS Performance (35% of Pool C)

Fails to improve methods and processes for assessing GETS and WPS performance.

Marginal improvements are identified for measuring GETS and WPS performance. Enhanced WPS call completion methods are inadequate to truly assess WPS performance.

Meaningful and implementable performance metrics are identified that represent cost-effective solutions for measuring GETS and

The Contractor identifies cost-effective outcome metrics for GETS and WPS that clearly demonstrate the value of these Services to critical NS/EP users.

The Contractor identifies and implements cost-effective outcome metrics for GETS and WPS that clearly demonstrate the value of these Services to critical NS/EP users.

Weighted Evaluation

Factors

Unsatisfactory

0% Earned

Satisfactory

40% Earned

Good

60% Earned

Very Good

80% Earned

(C-2) of Testing (30% of Pool C)

Post-deployment and regression testing is not adequate to identify existing GETS and WPS problems, as it does not identify 100% of the problems.

Testing is not cost-effective and the testing program is not adequate for predicting GETS and WPS performance during disaster and crisis.

The testing program is cost-effective and captures 100% of GETS and WPS problems in the carrier networks. Testing serves as a good indicator for GETS and WPS performance during disaster and crisis.

The testing program is cost-effective and captures 100% of the GETS and WPS problems in the carrier networks, GETS and WPS readiness is ensured because the Contractor is proactive and the carriers are active participants.

The testing program is cost-effective and captures 100% of the GETS and WPS problems in the carrier networks, The Contractor shows innovation and is able to utilize events that stress carrier networks to conduct GETS and WPS testing in a stressed environment

(C-3)

Cost Effectiveness

(35% of Pool C)

Fails to identify cost-effective OAM&P processes and procedures.

OAM&P processes and procedures are too costly, and the Contractor struggles to right-size the OAM&P staff.

OAM&P processes and procedures are cost-effective.

OAM&P processes and procedures are cost-effective and the Contractor makes good use of automation to reduce staffing.

OAM&P processes and procedures are cost-effective and the Contractor makes good use of automation, and the Contractor is able to matrix manage surge capabilities to support emergencies.

CLIN X007 – Operational Support…