Helicopter Active RPG Protection (HARP)

Added: Sep 25, 2015 2:45 pm Amendment 0002 is now published.  The purpose of Amendment 0002 is to respond to questions submitted.  See full amendment for answers. 

Added: Sep 15, 2015 11:00 am

Amendment 0001 is now published.  The purpose of Amendment 0001 is to respond to questions submitted.  See full amendment for answers. 

Added: Aug 18, 2015 1:52 pm The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is interested in receiving white papers and full proposals for design, development, and demonstration of Helicopter Active Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) Protection (HARP) Future Naval Capability (FNC) aircraft survivability products to demonstrate the ability to defeat a RPG with an expendable countermeasure launched from a tilt-rotor or rotary-wing aircraft.

Background

Unguided anti-aircraft weapons pose a unique problem for Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) solutions. Currently fielded ASE is dependent upon the existence of threat weapon guidance, for example an Infrared seeker on a Man Portable Air Defense System (ManPAD). Attacking the guidance system, today's ASE seeks to jam, degrade, spoof or decoy guided anti-aircraft weapons. Unguided anti-aircraft projectiles are immune to these ASE techniques. Aircrews are dependent upon tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to counter unguided threats. Due to their flight profiles, tilt-rotor and rotary-wing aircraft are particularly vulnerable to low-tech, unguided anti-air threat missile and rocket systems. HARP seeks to address this material capability shortfall for transport tilt-rotor and rotary-wing aircraft defense against RPGs. Technologies are emerging that provide capabilities for countering hostile unguided ballistic threats with hard-kill expendables. These capabilities will be developed and demonstrated by the HARP FNC.

Program Objectives

HARP technology should be designed and demonstrated in a manner consistent with the Department of Defense's Open Systems Approach (OSA) concept. Specifically the proposed HARP architecture should include the capability to be linked into the existing ASE as part of an integrated suite of survivability equipment. HARP may utilize existing rotorcraft ASE for initial Hostile Fire Indication (HFI) cueing from the AN/AAQ-24(V) Advanced Threat Warning (ATW) HFI sensor. Consistent with an OSA approach, the feasibility of integrating HARP command and control processing onto an Advanced Single Board Computer (ASBC) in the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure (LAIRCM) System Processor Replacement (LSPR) must be established. HARP's expendable countermeasure must be compatible with launch from the AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispense System (CMDS), and while some modifications are allowable, the current aircraft set back load of 3,000 lbs shall not be exceeded. Upon cueing, the HARP system must execute the following tasks: sense the inbound RPG, reject false alarms with high probability, command expendable countermeasure launch when appropriate, accomplish RPG intercept at sufficient range to prevent helicopter damage, and defeat the RPG. HARP solutions must address fratricide and collateral damage risks. HARP designs should reflect a balanced approach to technical risk with consideration of the technical maturity of system and subsystem elements. The HARP effort should include a measure of effectiveness that reflects the projected non-recurring and recurring costs associated with transitioning HARP technology onto a CH-53K after the completion of the FNC.