TSA STSS Class JA Redacted.v2.pdf
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- Attached to
- STSS IDIQ Justification and Approval Federal contract opportunity
- Solicitation number
- JA-2023-04-0903
About this file
This document is a justification and approval for other than full and open competition under FAR Part 6 authority. The Transportation Security Administration requires engineering and technical support services from the original equipment manufacturers of various transportation security equipment to maintain effectiveness against evolving threats. Support includes security patching, anti-virus updates, and system upgrades for fielded equipment such as checked baggage and checkpoint screening technologies. As the OEMs hold proprietary rights to software, firmware, designs, and configurations, they are the only responsible sources capable of meeting specialized requirements to TSA specifications. The agency conducted market research and issued notices of intent but received no information to contradict the sole-source awards. The contracts will have a combined estimated value that is fair and reasonable per price analysis. The Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration will award the indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts on a sole-source basis to each qualified OEM.
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Justification and Approval FAR Part 6 authority
(c) Information Technology (IT) Support Support services to comply with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) IT Security
Requirements for all fielded TSE such as security patching and anti-virus updates.
The scope of the proposed contracts are for life cycle support services only and do not include procurement of the systems, installation and integration of system upon initial deployment, initial training, and maintenance. The purpose of the resulting contracts is to provide all support services required (except those previously identified) throughout a deployed system’s life cycle to meet ongoing and evolving requirements throughout a system’s useful life.
4. Identification of Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition.
The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 41 U.S.C.3304(a)(1) implemented by the FAR Subpart 6.302-1 entitled “Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.”
5. Demonstration that the Nature of the Acquisition Require Use of the Authority Cited.
The threat to transportation security evolves constantly while the systems and solutions TSA deploys to counter terrorist and other security threats may remain in service for many years. In order to maintain effectiveness while maximizing return on fielded technology solutions, TSA requires flexible solutions that can adapt to maintain a high level of effectiveness as threats and adversaries change. If the subject Class Justification were not approved, and consequently, if contracts are not available to provide the needed technical and engineering services, TSE may not continue to meet updated security and safety requirements, could fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence or cyber vulnerability, may not be able to address unknown deficiencies experienced after deployment, or may not be able to upgrade TSE to meet new evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.
The OEMs of TSE have proprietary rights in the technology. This consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may include networking configuration for applicable TSE. TSA generally does not own the intellectual property or data rights for TSE equipment. As a result, usually only the equipment manufacturer is capable of fulfilling specialized technical and engineering support requirements at the level of expertise required to ensure that the work is completed to the TSA specifications and other (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) guidance. System engineering services are especially critical to improving the detection capabilities and cybersecurity of TSE in the field and necessary to meet TSA security technology mission and objectives. As such, the OEMs are the only responsible source capable of satisfying TSA’s requirements at the level of expertise needed.
Further, the checked baggage and checkpoint security technology requires customized electrical, mechanical, and networking component configurations in order to conduct high volume automated screening and movement of baggage, people, and commerce. Because of these unique configurations, the costs involved to substitute presently-available TSE are prohibitive. Factors such as Baggage Handling System (BHS) redesign, reprogramming, removal of existing systems and mechanical components, disposal, equipment movement, additional electrical requirements and operational testing all must be considered when evaluating the potential cost of switching or substitution. TSA would also suffer the loss of operational capability, decreasing TSA’s ability to screen baggage, people, and commerce accurately and efficiently while redesign and technology substitution is ongoing. These factors represent substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.
As TSA does not own adequate technical data or data rights, the OEM is the only source responsible to meet TSA’s configuration management requirements. This includes management of all configurable and adjustable parameters and adaptation data used to tailor the system, as well as their settings and values and inventory of hardware Configuration Items (CIs), software CIs, and firmware CIs with configuration identification data. Configuration management is also integral to implementing TSA’s changing security posture. As security technology systems are re-located, the OEM must perform site acceptance tests (SAT) to verify the system has been properly installed and integrated in the operational environment and verify the configuration baseline is consistent. Due to proprietary restrictions, the OEM is the only sourc e that can install the changes to the fielded systems. Such services are critical in order to ensure that there will not be a negative impact on airport operations due to inoperable or malfunctioning security technology or ancillary equipment.
6. Description of Efforts Made to Ensure that Offers are Solicited from as Many Potential Sources as is Practicable.
On November 10, 2022 and January 3, 2023, TSA issued Notices of Intent (TSA25-04-03771 and TSA25-04-03778) on the sam.gov website regarding TSA’s intent to contract using other than full and open competition with the OEMs for engineering and technical services. In the Notices of Intent, TSA offered interested parties the opportunity to identify their interest and capability to respond to the requirement by November 25, 2022 and January 17, 2023. TSA did not receive any information to contradict the findings in this Justification.
Further information regarding the market research that was conducted is described in Section 8.
7. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the Anticipated Cost to the Government will be
Fair and Reasonable.
The Contracting Officer will ensure that the anticipated cost to the Government is fair and reasonable through price analysis techniques in accordance with FAR 15.404-1 prior to award. In order to determine fair and reasonable pricing, the Contracting Officer anticipates using the IGCE for comparison, historic al contract pricing, and actual cost data for comparison purposes.
8. Description of Market Research.
Market research is based on products that have passed qualification requirements for respective TSE for the past 10 years. Products that successfully passed qualification testing requirements are placed on TSA’s Qualified Product Lists (QPLs). The QPLs emanate from an unrestricted open testing process that allows any interested vendor an opportunity to test products against TSA detection and operational specifications and standards. The testing may include technology readiness and certification, successful completion of Transportation Security Lab (TSL) Certification Testing (CERT), TSA Systems Integration Facility (TSIF) Integration Testing, and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) for any TSE.
Only equipment placed on the QPL is determined to satisfy program requirements and considered for deployment in the field. While other commercial providers of similar services exist, the OEMs of TSE acquired by TSA have proprietary rights in the technology which preclude these services from being provided by a third party. This consists of software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may also include proprietary networking configuration for applicable TSE. Awarding a contract for these services to a third party would infringe upon the intellectual property of the OEMs.
9. Any Other Facts Supporting the Use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.
The intended IDIQ contracts will be awarded on a sole source basis to each OEM as they are the only source able to upgrade, test, and change their systems due to proprietary restrictions. TSE are sophisticated electronic screening devices, and all of TSA’s deployed TSE for which TSA requires engineering services has proprietary information that is specific to the OEM. The proprietary information of the security technology consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated w ith the security technology and networking configuration. TSA does not own the intellectual property or data rights for the security technology to support a third party providing engineering services. Therefore, the OEM is the only source capable of providing services for the system it manufacturers. Efficiencies will be gained as one single contract for security technology support services will be in place for each OEM vendor, rather than separate contracts by technology.
Without this support, TSE deployed by TSA may not continue to meet updated security and safety requirements, could fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence, may not be able to address known deficiencies experienced after deployment, or may not be able to be upgraded to meet new evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.
10. A Listing of the Sources, if Any That Expressed, in Writing, an Interest in the Acquisition.
None.
11. A Statement of the Actions, if Any, the Agency May Take to Remove or Overcome Any Barriers to Competition Before Any Subsequent Acquisition for Supplies or Services Required.
APM is actively seeking out opportunities that will improve the interoperability of TSE through standardized interfaces for security system components and establishing standard image and data formats for certain technology systems. The standardization of component interfaces will allow accelerated independent development of critical component technologies as well as the establishment of modular security system platforms. Standardized image and data formats will reduce barriers to integration that exist because of the technical differences between vendor proprietary systems. It will also provide flexibility to acquire capabilities that have the potential to be integrated with independently developed detection algorithms, imaging programs, and operating platforms. Efforts such as development of common graphical user interfaces (CGUI) are ongoing to support common system platforms as well.
Once common system architecture is developed, APM intends to engage in new partnerships to inc rease the number of vendors to support TSA security technology. Leveraging awards that allow for f lexibility like the use of Targeted Broad Agency Announcements (TBAA), allows TSA to seek out innovative concepts and explore the potential and viability of a solution or concept.
Until system architecture allows for more competition of security technology systems and engineering support services, TSA will continue to need the expertise supplied by TSE OEMs to assure that its fleet of TSE is able to evolve and meet new challenges that may not have been present when the TSE initially was procured and deployed.
12. Contracting Officer’s Certification.
I certify that the data supporting the recommended use of other than full and open competition is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Joseph Furtek Contracting Officer
Date
13. Technical/Requirements Personnel Certification.
I certify this requirement meets the Government’s minimum need and that the supporting data, which forms a basis for this justification, is complete and accurate.
Marilyn Gray Date Technical Representative
14. REVIEWS
Marvin Grubbs Date Procurement Activity Advocate for Competition Transportation Security Administration
J. William Weinberg Date Head of Contracting Activity Contracting and Procurement Transportation Security Administration
JOSEPH R FURTEK
Digitally signed by JOSEPH R
FURTEK
Date: 2023.02.06 13:35:44 -05'00'
MARILYN R GRAY
Digitally signed by MARILYN R
GRAY
Date: 2023.02.06 14:06:07 -05'00'
CHARLES M GRUBBS Digitally signed by CHARLES M GRUBBS Date: 2023.02.06 15:25:32 -05'00'
JOSEPH W
WEINBERG
Digitally signed by JOSEPH W
WEINBERG
Date: 2023.02.06 16:40:18 -05'00'
14. APPROVAL
Chief Procurement Officer Date Office of the Chief Procurement Officer Department of Homeland Security
PAUL R
COURTNEY
Digitally signed by PAUL R
COURTNEY
Date: 2023.02.23 08:10:19 -05'00'
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