SOL-660-15-000007_-_Integrated_Governance_Activity_(IGA).pdf

RFP Issuance Date: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 Questions due date and time: Friday, September 04, 2015, 8:00 AM, Local Time (Kinshasa) RFP Closing date and time: Friday, October 02, 2015, 8:00 AM, Local Time (Kinshasa)

SUBJECT: Request for Proposals (RFP) No. SOL-660-15-000007 – Integrated Governance Activity (IGA)

Dear Potential Offerors:

The United States Government, represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Mission, is soliciting proposals from qualified organizations for the performance of services detailed in the attached Request for Proposals (RFP) to support a contract that will be administered by USAID’s DRC/Democracy, Rights and Governance Office in the DRC.

This is a full and open competition, under which any type of organization, large or small, commercial (for profit) firms, faith-based, and non-profit organizations in partnerships or consortia from geographical code 937, are eligible to compete. The procedures for “contracting by negotiation, trade‐off process” method of procurement, as described in Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and AIDAR, will apply.

An electronic response is required (See Section L.5). Please submit your proposals to all of the email addresses below by the time and date specified on the top of this cover page. Receipt at either address on or before the RFP closing date will constitute timely receipt of Offeror’s proposal. The addresses for the receipt of proposals are:

KinshasaOAA@usaid.gov.

The Technical Proposal has a strict 35 page limit as noted in Section L.6 of the RFP. Offerors are advised that any pages exceeding this limit will not be evaluated. Offerors are reminded that the Evaluators have to be able to read the proposal, so presentation and legibility is crucial. This is discussed in more detail in Section L.

Subject to availability of funds, USAID contemplates award of a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) completion type contract. The maximum estimated cost of the contract (costs and fee), as further discussed in Section L.7, is between $38 and $42 million covering a period of performance of five (5) years. Offerors should not necessarily strive to meet the maximum amount. However, Offerors must propose costs that it believes are appropriate, realistic and reasonable for the work. The cost proposal will be evaluated as part of the Best-Value procedure in determining contract award, including cost effectiveness of approaches to achieve the desired results.

It is the responsibility of the recipient of this solicitation document to ensure that it has been received in its entirety, including subsequent solicitation amendments, if any. USAID bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from transmission or conversion processes. Any questions, comments and requests for clarifications must be addressed to KinshasaOAA@usaid.gov. No phone calls will be accepted.

Issuance of this solicitation and the submission of a proposal do not constitute any guarantee or a commitment on the part of the U.S. Government or USAID to make an award; neither does it constitute any obligation or authorization by USAID to reimburse any costs incurred in the preparation and submission of a proposal. USAID reserves the right to reject proposals received. Award of a contract will be subject to availability of funds and proper completion of required USAID internal processes.

Thank you for your interest in working with USAID.

Sincerely, Javier O. Castano Contracting Officer USAID/D.R. Congo – Office of Acquisition and Assistance mailto:KinshasaOAA@usaid.gov mailto:KinshasaOAA@usaid.gov

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD 1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER

UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

RATING PAGE OF PAGES

2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER 4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION 5. DATE ISSUED 6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

CODE7. ISSUED BY 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than item 7)

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

SOLICITATION

9. Sealed offers in original and copies for furnishings the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in item 8, or if hand carried, in the depository located in until local time

CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

10. FOR

INFORMATION

CALL:

A. NAME B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS)

AREA CODE NUMBER EXTENSION

C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. PAGE(S)DESCRIPTION

A B C D E F G H

I

J

K

L

M EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER

STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

CONTRACT CLAUSESSOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM

SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT

PACKAGING AND MARKING

INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror)

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT

(See Section I, Clause No. 52.232-8)

14. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AMENDMENTS

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated):

10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS(%)

DATEAMENDMENT NO.AMENDMENT NO. DATE

15A. NAME AND

ADDRESS

OF OFFER-

OR

CODE FACILITY 16. NAME AND THE TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER

(Type or print)

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE NUMBER EXTENSION

15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS IS

DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE - ENTER SUCH

ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE.

17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE

AWARD (To be completed by Government)

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL OPEN COMPETITION:

10 U.S.C. 2304 (c) ( )41 U.S.C. 3304(a)

24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7)

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

AUTHORIZED FOR LOCAL REPRODUCTION

Previous edition is unusable

23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN

(4 copies unless otherwise specified)

25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY

27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

28. AWARD DATE

CODE

ITEM

STANDARD FORM 33 (REV. 6/2014)

Prescribed by GSA - FAR (48 CFR) 53.214 (c)

SEALED BID (IFB)

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

(Hour) (Date)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

2 149

REQ-660-15-000026

KinshasaOAA@usaid.govUSAID/DRC - Office of Acquisition and Assistance

Embassy of the United States of America - Kinshasa, D.R. Congo

TBD SOL-660-15-000007

See instructions on Page one (1) of RFP

51 119

TBD

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1. PURPOSE

USAID seeks to implement an Integrated Governance Activity (IGA) to strengthen key governance institutions1 in order to improve the delivery of health, education, and economic growth services at the community level and to strengthen the social contract between citizens and government2 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as further detailed in Section C.

B.2. CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) completion type contract. The Statement Of Objective (SOO) for this contract is contained in Section C of this document.

For the Total Estimated Cost and Fixed Fee set forth in B.3, the Contractor must achieve the deliverables described in Sections, C, D and F and otherwise comply with all contract requirements.

B.3. ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The Total Estimated Cost and fixed fee is as follows (TBD):

Item Year 1

(USD)

Year 2

(USD)

Year 3

(USD)

Year 4

(USD)

Year 5 (USD) Total

1 Salaries 2 Fringe Benefits 3 Consultants

4 Travel, Transportation and Per Diem

5 Allowances 6 Subcontracts 7 Other Direct Costs 8 Indirect Costs Total Costs

9 Fixed Fee

Total Estimated Cost (including Fixed Fee)

(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance of the contract period hereunder is $TBD. The Contractor must not

1 “Key” institutions could include national, provincial, and local executive bodies and national and provincial legislatures. An underlying premise of IGA is that it must be implemented in cooperation with willing and motivated GDRC partners. IGA’s focus on USAID priority sectors such as health, education, and economic growth, restricts the choice of counterparts somewhat, but bidders are still expected to base their choices of beneficiaries on an analysis of political will and opportunities to achieve activity results.

2 Work in education will be limited to the national-level at first, because USAID and DFID will already have substantial activities related to education governance underway by the time IGA starts. See the Coordination with Host Country and other Donor Activities section below.

exceed the aforesaid obligated amount unless authorized by the Contracting Officer pursuant to the clause of this contract entitled “Limitation of Funds” (FAR 52.232‐22). See Section I of this contract.

(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through TBD.

B.4. INDIRECT COSTS

The contract clause entitled “FAR 52.216‐7, Allowable Cost and Payment (JUN 2011)”, specifies that the indirect cost rates must be established for each of the contractor’s accounting periods that apply to this contract. Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs must be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

1/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

Source:

2/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

Source:

[To be determined]

Note: The Contractor is allowed to recover applicable indirect costs (i.e., overhead, G&A, etc.) and other direct costs (ODCs), if it is part of the Contractor’s usual accounting procedures, consistent with FAR Part 31, and Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA). Indirect costs must not be allowed for local organizations. All costs for local organizations must be budgeted and billed as direct costs.

B.5. CEILING ON INDIRECT COST RATES AND FINAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR INDIRECT

COSTS

(a) Reimbursement for allowable indirect costs must be at final negotiated rates but not in excess of the following ceiling rates:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

[To be completed by the Offeror]

(b) The Contractor must make no changes in its established method of classifying or allocating indirect costs without the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

(c) USAID is not obligated to pay any additional amount on account of indirect costs above the ceiling rates established in the contract.

(d) This understanding will not change any monetary ceiling, obligation or cost limitation established in the contract.

(e) Because the clauses entitled "Allowable Cost and Payment" (FAR 52.216-7) and "Fixed Fee" (FAR

52.216-8) are incorporated into this contract, the terms and conditions of these clauses apply after total payments of fixed fee reach eighty-five percent (85%) of the total fixed fee.

B.6. MULTI-YEAR CONTRACT

The U.S. dollar costs allowable must be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 31 (Contract Cost Principles), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-21 (Cost Principles for Educational Institutions), OMB Circular A-122 (Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations), FAR 52.216-7 (ALLOWABLE COST AND PAYMENT), FAR 52.216-8 (FIXED FEE), if applicable, and USAID Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR) 752.7003 (Documentation for Payment).

B.7. MULTI-YEAR CONTRACT

This contract is considered non-severable, and this is therefore a multi-year contract as defined in FAR

17.103. Therefore, this contract is subject to the requirements of FAR 17.106.

Cancellation Dates:

Contract Year 2: (At the beginning of Contract Year 2) Amount: $______ Contract Year 3: (At the beginning of Contract Year 3) Amount: $______ Contract Year 4: (At the beginning of Contract Year 4) Amount: $______ Contract Year 5: (At the beginning of Contract Year 5) Amount: $______

Note: The appropriate Contract year needs to be filled prior to award.

Cancellation Ceiling:

This is a CPFF completion type contract where the Contractor is authorized to be reimbursed for all costs which are allowable in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, “Allowable Costs and Payment.” Therefore, the Contractor will not incur any costs which would have been amortized over the life of the contract should the contract be cancelled in accordance with FAR 52.217-2.

B.8. PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

A percentage of the payment of the fixed fee under this contract is tied to the achievement of the deliverables as described in Section F.

Upon successful achievement of a deliverable, the Contractor must provide evidence of its achievement to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) and the Contracting Officer (CO). Upon receipt of COR concurrence and written approval by the CO, the Contractor must submit an invoice for the amount of the associated fee.

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

C.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this Statement of Objectives (SOO) is to provide guidance to Offerors on the development of a Performance Work Statement (PWS) that fulfills the implementation of the Integrated Governance Activity (IGA). This SOO states the results USAID intends to achieve through IGA. USAID is open to diverse approaches and calls on bidders to justify their proposed approaches based on past success, analysis of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and development literature.

The purpose of the Integrated Governance Activity (IGA) is to strengthen key governance institutions3 in order to improve the delivery of health, education, and economic growth services at the community level and to strengthen the social contract between citizens and government4 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). USAID believes that by enabling the Government of DRC (GDRC) to assume its responsibilities (through strengthened capacity) and increasing its accountability to citizens, improvements to service delivery will be more sustainable and result in better health, education, and economic outcomes for beneficiary populations. This activity has three objectives:

1. Strengthened capacity of select Congolese government institutions (both executive and legislative branch) to fulfil mandates;

2. More effective development of targeted sub-national government entities through collaboration with citizens; and

3. Increased citizen demand for accountable, transparent and participatory government services.

The activity will focus on four categories of beneficiaries: (1) GDRC executive and legislative institutions at the central and provincial levels; (2) local government actors responsible for delivering services; (3) civil society; and (4) citizens of DRC, with special emphasis on including historically marginalized groups, including women and youth. The anticipated period of performance for this award is five years, beginning in early 2016.

Helping the government ensure the population has access to the healthcare, education, and economic development it demands will increase the legitimacy of the state and strengthen the social contract between citizens and their government. This activity will not provide services in place of the state but, rather, strengthen government capacity to provide these services itself, in cooperation with Congolese citizens and civil society, thereby creating more accountable and effective governance.

This activity will foster strengthened public financial management, decentralization, and greater citizen engagement in and oversight of government service provision. The activity must include an integrated approach to improve governance of Congolese education, health, and economic growth systems in order to improve service delivery to Congolese citizens. Although the activity will address national level reforms and work with institutions based in DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, the bulk of assistance is for targeted provinces, which include Katanga, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kasai Oriental, and Kasai Occidental. This geographic focus overlaps with that of other USG-funded governance, health, education, and economic growth activities. IGA will complement and must be closely coordinated (see Section C.4 for details) with the following USAID activities that will be launched in 2016 or are already underway. USAID has already

3 “Key” institutions could include national, provincial, and local executive bodies and national and provincial legislatures. An underlying premise of IGA is that it must be implemented in cooperation with willing and motivated GDRC partners. IGA’s focus on USAID priority sectors such as health, education, and economic growth, restricts the choice of counterparts somewhat, but bidders are still expected to base their choices of beneficiaries on an analysis of political will and opportunities to achieve activity results.

4 Work in education will be closely coordinated with the USAID-DFID Education project, because USAID and DFID will already have substantial activities related to education governance underway by the time IGA starts. See the Coordination with Host Country and other Donor Activities section below.

published Requests for Information (RFI) or solicitations for the second and third activities (see Section J for links), and the first was launched in late 2014:

• Health Finance and Governance (HFG) Project

• Integrated Health Project (IHP)5

• USAID-DFID Joint Education Program (includes two mechanisms: Equitable Access to Education and

Learning and Improving Governance and Accountability in the Education Sector in DRC)

At the outset of IGA, health will be the biggest sectoral focus, given the important health activities cited above to which IGA relates, USAID’s overall financial investment in health, and the fact that the USAID/DFID education partnership will have a strong governance component. This should not however, exclude approaches to improving governance in other sectors. There are likely to be significant opportunities for IGA to contribute to strengthened public financial management and citizen participation and oversight in the education sector at the sub-provincial level, so close coordination with the three USAID/DFID mechanisms cited above will be essential. USAID is likely to launch other activities in 2015-16 and beyond, including related to economic growth and agriculture, with which IGA will also need to be coordinated. IGA’s ability to improve service delivery in targeted sectors will depend largely on how effectively its activities complement those of the USAID activities mentioned above.

C.2. BACKGROUND

Located at the crossroads of the African continent and sharing borders with nine countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the second largest country in Africa in terms of area and the fourth largest in terms of population. It has unparalleled natural resource wealth, including cobalt, copper, gold, tantalum, tin, diamonds, and petroleum. Fifty percent of the world’s cobalt production occurs in the DRC. It has abundant water resources, sufficient for consumption, agriculture, and environmental protection, but also enough to provide electricity to most of Africa. It has the second highest agriculture potential on the continent, over 60 percent of the second largest forest basin and carbon stocks in the world, and substantial fish and livestock resources. Despite all its extraordinary resource endowments, the DRC’s development progress remains elusive and has yet to benefit the broader population. The country is at or near the bottom of several major indexes: It ranks 154th out of 177 on Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, 184th out of 185 on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR) for 2015, and second to last on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2014 Human Development Index (HDI). On the World Bank Governance Indicators, DRC remains between the first and tenth percentile for all six, including political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality, with government effectiveness having falling to a low of 1.44 since 2003. There are some silver linings: the 2014 HDI report for DRC notes a positive trend despite its low ranking, the World Bank included DRC as one of 10 economies improving the most across three or more indicators of the DBR, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative admitted DRC as a full member in 2014 in recognition of its compliance with reporting requirements.

Governance

Governance failures are at the heart of the challenges facing the DRC today. The inability or unwillingness of the government to carry out essential functions, like administering justice, guaranteeing public security, and providing healthcare and education, seriously undermines its legitimacy. Therefore, USAID/DRC has placed governance at the center of its Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS)6, whose goal is to support a long-term transition to more effective and empowering development in the DRC.

A key aspect of failed governance in the DRC is the corruption that exists at all levels of government and society. Corruption is pervasive, corrosive, and systemic. It robs the GDRC of revenue that could fund services, contributes to violence and a lack of security for citizens, stunts economic growth, and serves as a

5 There will be three IHPs, one for East and West Kasai, one for eastern DRC, and one for Katanga and the national level. The RFI for IHP East and West Kasai has already been published and a link is provided in Section J.

6 The CDCS is available at http://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/newsroom/key-documents.

http://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/newsroom/key-documents disincentive for domestic and foreign investment. Underlying this corruption is the lack of accountability to citizens at all levels of government. Since its colonial foundations, the Congolese state has been used primarily to control the population and extract resources from the country.7 The predatory nature of the state has intensified since independence, creating a culture of clientelism wherein political leaders are only accountable to their bosses and officials at all levels can preserve their privileges and unlawful access to resources by meeting the demands of their political superiors. Therefore, a vicious cycle is established whereby corruption and clientelism reinforce each other, and the interests of the public are neglected or undermined. One recent article calls this the “logic of patrimonial predation and informal redistribution” and estimates that this may cost the Congolese people up to $4 billion annually (20% of GDP) in foregone public revenues.8

Decentralization

The 2006 Constitution offers the best opportunity since independence to build the DRC’s democratic foundations, including through decentralization and the election of local and provincial officials who are accountable to citizens. Decentralization entails that greater financial and administrative authorities will shift to provincial and local levels, enabling them to be more responsive to citizen needs. However, these levels of government need to improve their capacity in order to assume new responsibilities, a factor used by some central authorities to justify delaying implementation of decentralization. USAID anticipates that continued delegation of authority to provincial and local levels will occur during the implementation of this activity, especially for the health, education, and agriculture sectors, which are in the process of being decentralized to the provincial level. President Kabila, in a State of the Union address in December 2014, reiterated his commitment to decentralization, and called on Parliament to pass the remaining laws needed for its implementation, including a law on the National Investment Fund (Caisse de Perequation) and the National and Provincial Civil Service law, as well as putting in place a legal framework for retrocession. In January 2015, the President signed a law mandating the division of eleven existing provinces into twenty-six, a process known by the French term decoupage. While this is consistent with the vision outlined in the Constitution, it further complicates an already difficult decentralization process and threatens to overwhelm the already limited physical assets and human capacity of the GDRC to implement the process. Meanwhile, local and provincial elections are expected in 2015-16. Implementing decoupage at the same that elections are being planned and held will be difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, the elections themselves will provide a further impetus and opportunity to build local and provincial officials’ capacity by creating a direct link between them and citizens, which should enable more effective implementation of decentralization.

Among the key aspects of decentralization, the Constitution calls for 40 percent of national revenues to remain at the provincial level, of which a further 40 percent is to be allocated to rural and urban municipalities (referred to in French as entités territoriales décentralisés – ETDs). However, neither the national government nor the provinces have fully implemented this provision. The President signed a law in 2013 establishing a list of taxes and dividing up taxation authorities between local, provincial, and national governments. Some provincial governments are now experiencing rapidly increasing revenues, but the mechanisms to ensure these resources (or resources remitted by the national government) are effectively and transparently managed to benefit the public have yet to be put in place.9 A number of challenges hinder progress in decentralization and the establishment of more accountable government, including:

1. External and internal controls of public resources are weak or nonexistent.

7 Young, Crawford. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). Young sees the Belgian Congo as the quintessential example of the predatory nature of colonial rule in Africa.

8 Englebert, Pierre. Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges and Opportunities for a New Economic Future (The Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper, June 2014). Englebert allows that while there are reformers among Congo’s elite, that the Congolese system remains dictated by this logic.

9 Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, “One Thing Led to Another: Donors, Decentralization, and the Consequences of Partial Reform in DR Congo,” draft, February 2014.

2. Public resources are allocated on a patron-client basis. This results, among other things, in the excessive hiring of staff members at all levels of governments, without regard to existing staff, the work that needs to be done, the qualifications of those hired, or available office space.

3. The capacity of public servants is often weak, with contributing factors including the absence of a retirement system, poor hiring practices (see above), and lack of in-service training.

4. The President, through his government and political party, exerts undue influence over the Provincial and National Assemblies, limiting their ability to serve as a check on executive power and represent citizens’ interests.

5. National and provincial executive officials control provincial and local administrations through appointments and other means.

6. Citizen and civil society voices have grown dramatically in the past decade, but they are still often sidelined from policy making and are perceived as being hostile to government.

7. Media are weak. Journalists and human rights defenders are targeted when they report on human rights abuses, corruption, and other sensitive matters. This has led to self-censorship.

The weak governance, poor public financial management and control of corruption, and slow implementation of reforms described above means the GDRC is failing Congolese citizens on many fronts.

For every dollar the government spends on education, Congolese parents spend nearly three. This contributes to one of the highest out-of-school youth populations in Africa, at over 5 million. Meanwhile many health workers continue to work without salaries. An official in one province recently shared with USAID the fact that 80% of his province’s Health and Social Affairs personnel receive no monthly salary, as they have not yet been entered onto official payrolls, which are managed in Kinshasa. The non-payment of salaries results in hospitals charging fees, one of the main barriers to accessing health services. A demographic and health survey completed in 2014 showed that 43 percent of Congolese children under five are stunted, despite the fact that they live in the country with the second highest agricultural potential in all of Africa. These failures are unacceptable, and there is no good reason that they cannot be overcome through changing the attitudes and behaviors that shape how Congolese citizens and government officials interact and building government and citizen competencies to ensure that the management of public resources benefits the broad public.

C.3. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Introduction

The modernization of the DRC Government envisioned in the 2006 constitution requires a strong enabling policy framework, new and strengthened public institutions, and a cadre of public servants that is professional and accountable. This enabling environment does not yet exist, due to both a lack in capacity (including skills, knowledge, information management, policies, laws, and regulatory oversight) and to insufficient willingness of Congolese institutions and the individuals employed in them to work in a way that serves the broad public interest. This governance activity will address capacity gaps in a limited number of institutions and provinces of the DRC with the aim of enabling these institutions to assume their responsibilities and effectively perform their functions in response to citizen demands. It will strengthen the argument for accelerating decentralization by preparing provincial and local government institutions to fulfill their mandates, specifically those related to the delivery of health, education, and economic growth services. Specific capacity gaps to be targeted include budget and development planning, financial management, and internal and external controls. The activity will also support select national reforms that are essential to strengthening service delivery in targeted sectors and to enable provincial and local government to function more effectively. At the same time, to address the insufficient willingness of officials to reform government bodies so that they serve the public good, this activity will build similar capacities among citizens and civil society and empower them to participate in a more informed manner in government planning and budgeting, and to conduct oversight of government decision making, including the use of public funds. Increased citizen and civil society oversight and participation combined with increased capacity of all parties will result in systems, processes, and mechanisms that increase accountability and incentives for being more accountable. The success of this activity will depend in large part on changes in the attitudes of beneficiaries about the roles and responsibilities of government officials, civil society, and citizens. Through this activity, USAID will provide ongoing coaching and mentoring to government, civil society, and citizen beneficiaries, enabling them to apply new skills and facilitating positive changes in behavior that will lead to sustainable improvements in governance. The Results Framework presented in Annex 2 of Section J lists the three objectives of IGA and the intermediate results (IRs) that USAID believes are necessary and sufficient for achieving these objectives and the overall activity purpose. Below is the narrative explaining each objective and listing the IRs and sub-IRs in full, as well as more specific Illustrative Results and Indicators. USAID recognizes that there could be multiple approaches to achieving the three objectives outlined below, and the specific illustrative results may vary somewhat depending on the approaches and target beneficiaries offerors propose.

Objective 1: Strengthened capacity of select Congolese government institutions to fulfil mandates 10

Currently there is limited Congolese government capacity to inform decision-making or policy creation based on evidence, experience, strategic planning, or citizen input.11 This prevents national government actors from developing and deploying effective solutions to fundamental challenges that hinder improvements across sectors (i.e. civil service recruitment and retirement, salary payment systems). Roles and responsibilities of key national actors and their sub-national counterparts (for example, territories and ETDs, which fall under, respectively, the Ministries of Interior and Decentralization) are often poorly defined, resulting in confused and ineffective implementation. Weak GDRC financial management practices are an additional barrier to achieving development results. GDRC efforts to undertake development will not succeed or be sustainable unless adequately resourced. Actual transfers to provinces (retrocession) have fallen well short of the constitutional requirement of 40 per cent of domestic national revenue.12 In individual sectors where budgets have risen, budget execution often falls short. For example, the already meager 2014 agriculture budget was executed at a rate of 15.25%.13 Poor budget management stems from: a) corruption; b) poor understanding of budget processes; c) incorrect application of procedures; d) inability or unwillingness to spend resources received; and e) poor revenue collection due to corrupt tax collection. Overall, while some positive steps have been made toward increased transparency (see, for example, DFID’s business case for their Public Financial Management activity listed in Section J), there continues to be insufficient commitment to transparent budgeting, revenue collection, allocation, and spending. Civil society, legislative bodies, and external audit bodies are key partners in countering this because they can provide oversight and advocate for greater transparency, anti-corruption measures, and demand greater accountability. Accomplishing this objective will first require addressing the capacity gaps of diverse government actors. Work under Objectives 2 and 3 will then complement that under Objective 1 by strengthening checks and balances between government and citizens to ensure government policy reflects citizen priorities and advances the public interest. USAID believes the IRs below are necessary and sufficient for achieving Objective 1.

• IR 1.1 National policy-making and legislative entities create effective and responsive policies, plans, and business processes that address fundamental barriers to improving health, education, and economic growth services.

• IR 1.2 Communication and coordination between national and provincial government policy-makers enables informed and effective policy implementation.

10 Fulfilling mandates refers to 1) setting strategic direction and objectives; 2) making policies, laws, rules, regulations, or decisions; 3) raising and deploying resources to accomplish strategic goals and objectives; and 4) ensuring that strategic goals and objectives are accomplished (implementation) 11 The 2012 USAID/DRC Gender Analysis pointed to an absence of data management, monitoring systems, and disaggregated data as a constraint.

12 The very necessity of these transfers is not in accordance with the 2006 constitution, but rather, revenues should be retained at the source. See Paulin Punga Kumakinga. Autonomie financiere des Provinces et problematique du principe constitutionnel de la retenue à la source de 40% des recettes a caractere national. Essai d’evaluation a mi-parcours. La decentralisation territoriale en Republique Democratique du Congo sous le regime de la constitution de 18 fevrier 2006: Bilan et perspectives. Editions de la Campagne pour les droits de l’homme au Congo. Kinshasa, 2014.

13 Rapport d’Analyse du Projet de Loi de Finances 2015 des Organizations de la Societe Civile, Réseau de Gouvernance Economique et Démocratie, October 2014.

• IR 1.3 Targeted provincial and local service delivery units have capacity to plan and effectively manage public finances in their respective sectors.

• IR 1.4 Provincial Assemblies’ capacity to scrutinize and enact budgets strengthened.

• IR 1.5 Provincial Assemblies, financial control authorities, and line ministries at provincial level regularly conduct public audits to counter poor performance and corruption.

• IR 1.6 Newly elected and existing ETD officials’ have capacity to deliver responsive governance at the local level.

o Sub IR 1.6.1 Newly elected and existing ETD officials understand their roles and responsibilities, including their lines of accountability.

o Sub IR 1.6.2 Newly elected and existing ETD officials have financial management and planning skills necessary to lead local development processes.

Illustrative Output

• Key legislation regulating human resources management and facilitating its decentralization in

USAID-targeted sectors passed.

• The Health Human Resources Observatory14 linked to USAID-assisted CSOs in targeted provinces and making use of information provided (from citizen score cards, participatory budget process, public forums) to strengthen national-level planning and decision-making about personnel management.

• USAID-assisted provincial health ministries15 (Divisions Provincials de Santé – DPS) have sustainably institutionalized annual operational planning that integrates education and agriculture, in order to address cross-cutting challenges such as malnutrition.

• Provincial authorities conduct regular performance and financial audits of health zones and facilities and education sub-provinces and schools and make results available to the public.

• USAID-assisted DPS (starting with the six to be targeted by USAID health activities, see Geographic Scope in Section C.4 below) and provincial education ministries conduct annual public hearings to present provincial accounts for their sectors, discuss medium-term priorities and planning, and provide a venue for citizen input.

• USAID-assisted DPS produce and publish accounts annually showing all revenues (including fees) and expenditures by health zone and facility.

• Food security and nutrition policy analysis units established and funded by GDRC at the national level and in one province.

• Two evidence-based food security or nutrition policy reforms at the national level and two at the provincial level presented to GDRC leadership.

Illustrative Results

• Score on financial management competencies milestone scale of assisted local service delivery entities increased

• Number of public audits or oversight hearings conducted by provincial assemblies or other provincial audit authorities increased

• Increase in proportion of health budget disbursed in targeted provinces

• Increase in proportion of health zone funding available for front line service delivery16

14 This body, consisting of officials from multiple ministries, aims to improve the management of human resources for health. For details, see http://www.hrh-observatory.afro.who.int/en/home/40-european-regional-consultation-on-international-recruitment-o f-health-personnel-draft-global-code-of-practice-who-headquarters-geneva-switzerland-8-december-2009.html.

15 USAID’s Health Financing and Governance (HFG) activity will work with two DPSes initially and may add more subsequently.

16 This requires refinement based on an assessment of what change is feasible and can be measured, but the idea is that improved financial management by health zones and facilities will free up funding, leading to improved and/or increased services. This will also strengthen the argument for additional financing from provincial budgets and the

DPS.

http://www.hrh-observatory.afro.who.int/en/home/40-european-regional-consultation-on-international-recruitment-of-health-personnel-draft-global-code-of-practice-who-headquarters-geneva-switzerland-8-december-2009.html http://www.hrh-observatory.afro.who.int/en/home/40-european-regional-consultation-on-international-recruitment-of-health-personnel-draft-global-code-of-practice-who-headquarters-geneva-switzerland-8-december-2009.html

Objective 2 More effective development of targeted sub-national government entities through collaboration with citizens

The lack of collaboration between citizens, the state, civil society, and the private sector is part of the challenge in developing and implementing government policies that respond to citizen needs. Recent research demonstrates that a dual-pronged approach that strengthens and scales up citizen engagement while bolstering government capacity can result in improved social accountability and better public services.17 In DRC, where decentralization is proceeding, working with local and provincial governmental institutions has great potential to improve service provision and allow people greater control over their government. Rising provincial and local revenues provide a further opportunity to have an impact, and it is essential to strengthen citizen engagement and oversight of local and provincial governments to ensure these resources are channeled to citizen priorities, including investment in public services and infrastructure. Mechanisms and space for joint stakeholder planning and prioritization can enable communities to influence government and become more engaged in finding local solutions to local problems. There are a number of existing mechanisms in DRC that can be strengthened to provide such space, including Rural Agriculture Management Councils (CARGs), Community Health and Development Committees (CODESAs), Parent Education Committees (COPAs), and School Management Committees (COGEs). Women’s voices in these dialogues and consultations are particularly important, given evidence that women are more likely to invest in public and community services18 and given the historical marginalization of women in public affairs in the DRC. USAID believes the IRs below are necessary and sufficient for achieving Objective 2.

• IR 2.1 Participatory and inclusive planning, budgeting and expenditure management processes operational in targeted ETDs and local service delivery units.

• IR 2.2 Revenue and expenditure information of targeted entities (Provincial Assemblies and Ministries, ETDs, health zones, medical facilities, education sub-provinces, and schools) is available to the public.

• IR 2.3 Cross-sector (ETDs, health zones, education sub-provinces, CARGs, etc.) development planning and budgeting process in place in targeted municipalities.

• IR 2.4 Targeted Provincial Assemblies’ contribution to development planning reflects citizen priorities.

• IR 2.5 Local own-source revenues and allocated funds available and used for public services and infrastructure increased.

• Three full participatory budget cycles (budget development, revenue collection, and execution) completed in targeted ETDs with full participation of citizen/civil society actors.

• Health zone and education sub-province financial accounts, including revenues (including fees collected) and expenditures, are available to CODESAs, COPAs, and general public.

• Three full cycles of participatory budgeting and planning process (analogous to ETD-focused process) completed in health zones and education sub-provinces targeted by IGA.

• Fees for all services provided by assisted local service delivery entities (health facilities, schools, ETDs, CARGs, etc.) posted prominently and publicly.

• Assisted ETDs include health zone management, CARGs, education sub-provinces, and other service provision entities in annual budgeting exercise in order to rationalize budget requests across all local entities.

• Tax revenues of targeted ETDs increased by 50%.

• Spending on public infrastructure and services increased in targeted local entities (ETDs, health zones, education sub-provinces).

• Provincial budget allocations for services prioritized by citizens increased.

17 “Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?,” Jonathan Fox, GPSA Working Paper No. 1, September 2014.

18 Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)

• Tax nomenclature updated to remove antiquated taxes and more clearly establish the taxation authority of different levels of ETDs and distinguish these from provincial authorities.

• Reduced illegal business taxes and other payments collected at provincial and ETD levels from entrepreneurs and farmers.

• Local development planning reflects an analysis of constraints to private sector growth and includes plans for mitigating these.

• Local public-private partnerships implemented in three ETDs.

• Proportion of public sector spending (versus user spending) on health and education services increased.

• Citizens and civil society organizations use data from Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reports to advocate for increase public sector spending.

• Increase in revenues of assisted ETDs

• Number of public budget hearings held by assisted Assemblies or deputies in their constituencies increased

• Increase in provincial budget revenues allocated to health, education, and agriculture service delivery

• Percentage of assisted health zones, DPS, and education sub-provinces that make annual expenditures and revenues (overall and by health facility) available for public scrutiny increased

• Percentage of assisted local service delivery entities that post their fees increased

• Percent of targeted communities with CODESAs actively involved in management of health services increased

• Number of ETD development plans that reflect priorities across sectors (health, education, economic growth, and agriculture) increased

• Proportion of health zone and education sub-province revenues from public budget versus fees paid by users increased

Objective 3 Increased citizen demand for accountable, transparent and participatory government services

Effective citizen participation and demand is a critical element of improving equitable service delivery at all levels. Empowerment of the population through greater public participation, strengthened civil society, and alliance building is the necessary complement to ensuring that state institutions targeted by this activity serve the public good rather than merely enjoying increased capacity for predation. By addressing the demand and supply sides of service delivery, this activity will lead to more sustainable changes in governance. Currently many Congolese do not know what services they should receive from state, NGO, or private sector service providers, nor do they have sufficient knowledge of their rights or the law.19 They are not working with other stakeholders who might be interested in improved governance, including private sector actors. They also do not understand the workings of local governance bodies in key sectors, such as the administrative and management councils in health zones or the parent councils and management committees in education. These bodies are key players in managing public resources and the delivery of services that are among citizens’ top priorities. USAID believes the IRs below are necessary and sufficient for achieving Objective 3.

• IR 3.1 Community-based civil society organizations20 become more effective21 links between government and citizens.

o Sub IR 3.1.1 CSOs disseminate public information and better inform citizens about their rights, duties, and how to participate in governance.

19 USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Final Report, November 2012, pg. ix.

20 Focusing on CODESAs (Health sector), Conseils Agricole Rurales de Gestion (CARGs), natural resource user groups, agriculture cooperatives, governance CSOs, etc.

21 Develop the skills and abilities necessary to engage with GDRC and other development actors.

o Sub IR 3.1.2 CSOs increase their accountability to citizens to ensure they are representing citizen interests.

o Sub IR 3.1.3 CSOs strengthen communication, coordination, and alliance building vertically between national, provincial, and local levels, and horizontally across socio-economic sectors to maximize impact.

o Sub IR 3.1.4 CSOs conduct more effective outreach to vulnerable or historically marginalized people to include them in local governance processes.

• IR 3.2 Target CSOs have the technical capacity to actively participate in and influence policy, development planning, and public financial management at local, provincial, and national levels.22

• IR 3.3 Accountability tools (scorecards, audits, etc.)…