Justification and Approval Amendment 1.pdf

Distribution Statement A. Approved for Public Release

Justification and Approval (J&A) for Other Than Full and Open Competition

Was a J&A approved for the preceding acquisition where that acquisition re quired a J&A? [gj Yes D No !! Attach the preceding J&A in the staff package for this J&A. The preceding J&A will be used as a reference document.

Is this a new or amended J&A Document ? D New [gj Amended ( Prior to Award Only! )

Is this a Bridge Action as defined at AFFARS 5302.1 O 1? D Yes [g] No OollarV alue ofthisAcquisition: □ �S750K r;gJ > $750Kand �$15M D > $15M and �$100M □ > $100M

Contracting Activity: AFLCMC/HBNK

Purchase Request {if available)/ Local 10 N umber : TBO

Program/ Project {and PE, if applicable):

Program Type { PEO, Enterprise, of Operational): PEO

Supplemental Authority {if applicable):

Radar Upgrade

6.302-1 - 10 USC 2304(c)(l), Only One Responsible Source - No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements

Estimated Contract Cost {including options): S- J&A Type: D Class [gJ Individual

COORDINATION ( AFFARS 5306.304(a))

Date

12 Jul 2022

Date

12 Jul 2022

Date

12 Jul 2022

Date

Project Lead / Program Mgr / Requiring Activity Scott Page

HBNS /

Contracting Officer Myrka Mikhail

HBNK/

Local Legal Reviewer Kerry A. Carlson

66 ABG/JA/

Division Chief o f Contracts James A. Hammond

HBNK/

APPROVAL ( AFFARS 5306.304(a))

Date

04Aug 2022

Competition Advocate Joseph J. Buzzell, NH-04 AFLCMC/PZC-Hanscom OL /

Signature PAGE .SCOTT.A.1- DlgttaUyslgnedby

PAGE.SCOTT A

Signature

MIKHAIL

Signature

C ARLSON.KE RRY.A■

Signature

Date:2022.07.12 07:06:S3 -04'00'

DlgltaUy signed by MIKHAILMYRl<A.

Date: 2022.07.12 10.08:22 -04'0CY

DlgltaHy signed by CARl.50N .KERRY .A Date: 2022.07.12 10:57:25 04'00'

HAMMONDJAMES .AMI l)igitalysignedt,y

HAMMOhOJAMES.AMISSAlt-

SSAH 0ate,2022.01.1s 13:09:09-olro

Signature

BUZZELLJOSEPH .J ■

Olgltallyslgned by

BUZZELLJOSEPHJ

Date: 2022.0&04 09:34:20 -04'00'

13 May 2022 Page 1 of8

I. Agency and Contracting Activity.

The contracting activity responsible for this Justification and Approval (JaA) is the United States Air Force (USAF) Materiel Command, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Division (AFLCMC/HBN), located at 11 Eglin Street, Bldg. 1618, Hanscom AFB MA, 01731-2100. The Contracting Officer is Ms. Myrka Mikhail a he Program Manager is Scott Page at

II. Nature and/or description of the action being approved.

This is an Individual JaA, for a new contract action, requiring the upgrade of-TPS-77 Long Range Radar, to enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities. This requirement was implemente , 10 U.S. Code§ 333, Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance No.

The BPC Section 333 was created under the provisions of the FY2017 NOAA which uses U.S. appropriated funds to expand the Global Train and Equip scope for the purpose of building the capacity of foreign national security forces to conduct activities that will aid in the furtherance of U.S. national security objectives in accordance with 10 U.S. Code§ 333, (e.g. counter-terrorism, counter-weapon of mass destruction operations, operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation, air domain awareness operations, cyberspace security, etc.). Moreover, this effort is in accord with the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies Wales Summit, in which each Ally committed to enhance NATO's Defense and Deterrence strategy by ensuring that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO-agreed guidelines for deployability, sustainability and other agreed metrics, so that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of NATO standards and doctrines.

The country of-has been a NATO Ally�- Thellll region is one of the most complex regions that the Alliance is obligated to defend. The�tegrated and Air Missile Defense (IAMD) program contributes towards deterring foreign aggression and attacks in the - by providing enhanced sensors and helping the- better deal with hybrid threats. The BPC Pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for this effort, provides for a refurbishment to the existing Lockheed Martin (LM) TPS-77 Long Range Radar (LRR), located at . These upgrades will allow for the existing TPS-77/LRR to match similar Lockheed Martin's product-line radars being used across the- region, while also relieving existing obsolescence concerns and increasing the radar's operational longevity. The system upgrade will be delivered with associated equipment, software, technical manuals, warranty, and any necessary on-the-job familiarization training. The contractor will be responsible for performing necessary ancillary services, e.g.

Program Management, integration, testing, and transportation, in order to deliver the equipment and complete the system upgrade.

The TPS-77 Long Range Radar upgrade requirements are listed in the- Pseudo LOA_, under Lines 001, 003, and 005 and Notes 1 and 23 [Ref. Attachment 1 - Basic LOA and Attachment 3 - LOA Amendment 1 ]. The Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 15, for BPC Programs requires a JaA for BPC Pseudo LOAs that include a sole source requirement, such as the-Pseudo LOA-.

Ill. Description of supplies/services required to meet agency needs.

The upgrades to the Lockheed Martin (LM) TPS-77 LRR will include: (1) a radar antenna upgrade to the Digital Array Row Transceiver (DART) antenna configuration modification kit, to include five (5) years' worth of spares

(2) an Environmental Control Unit (ECU) shelter upgrade modification kit , (3) a North Alignment Module (NAM), (4) Mode 5 contractor test support and equipment, and (5) cybersecurity updates for the TPS-77

13 May 2022 Page 2 of8 product line to allow for platform level Mode-5 certification.

See below for a further description of the supplies and ancillary services being procured:.

A) DART Mod-kit: A radar is a detection system that uses radio waves to determine the distance, angle, or velocity of objects. Signals sent and received from the original TPS-77 LRR's used 34 rows of receivers and 34 rows of transmitters to determine the distance, angle, or velocity of objects. The newer versions of the TPS-77 LRR use an active electronically scanned array (AESA), to generate a number of pencil beams, and the planar antenna is made up of 34 rows with 34 solid-state row transmit/ receive (TR) modules into a single line replaceable unit (LRU) located on the antenna array and directly coupled to their antenna elements. These TR-modules are called Digital Array Row Transceiver (DART), which employs Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology to provide increased reliability, extend the service life of the radar, and reduce life-cycle costs.

B) ECU Mod-kit: The ECU regulates the internal radar shelter temperature by heating or cooling appropriately and maintaining the inside of the shelter at the required temperature necessary for operation.

C) North Alignment Module (NAM): The NAM is an "add-on" vectoring component of the AN/TPS-77, enabling the radar to quickly align to 'Magnetic North' when deployed. The 'Magnetic North' is the true vectoring point used to guide and track targets.

D) Mode 5 Test Support: The Mark XIIA Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe is a cooperative identification system that uses interrogators and transponders located on host platforms to send, receive, and process friendly identification data. The contractor will be required to provide testing support services to the United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) International Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System, Identification Friend or Foe, Mark XII/XIIA Systems (AIMS) Program Office to ensure the AN/ TPS-77 can be fully operational using Mode 5. This is part of the DoD AIMS platform certification process and a requirement of the to be able to operate and interface with NATO allies using global positioning data and Mode 5 secure communications to share real-time intelligence and information in order to make informed, timely, and accurate judgments while fulfilling their mission.

E) Cybersecurity Updates: The cybersecurity updates will allow the AN/TPS-77 hardware and software to meet the current Risk Management Framework (RMF) required to support the Mode 5 architecture established by DoD AIMS Program Office.

F) Technical Data: The USG will be acquiring Commercial Off-The-Shelf technical manuals for the equipment being delivered. The technical manuals will be delivered to the. for operational guidance purposes. The USG will also receive the Mode 5 Test Report data which will be used by the USG AIMS Program Office to approve/disapprove Mode 5 Certification for the. TPS-77 platform. Any other technical data used for the delivery and integration of the equipment being procured is proprietary to Lockheed Martin. The BPC Pseudo LOA doesn't require the procurement of technical data beyond the Contract Data Requirement List (CORL) below:

i. A001 -COTS Manuals

ii. A002 - COTS Supplemental Data

iii. A003 - Technical Report - Study Services; Mode 5 Test Support Deliverable

Government Cost Estimate: The overall Government Cost Estimate IGCE is-. The estimate was mainly based on a bottoms-up-analysis, using a combination of historical values, engineering assessment, and observed industry actuals. Specifically, AFLCMC/ HBN leveraged actual material costs for the individual items that make up the DART from the TPS-77/LRR Iraq IADS LRR-3 Contract No. FA8730-19-C-0008, as well as the individual DART materials cost from the TPS-77 Jordan Gap Filler Multi-Mode Radar (GFR) Contract No.

FA8730-17-C-0005. The ECU independent estimate was based on market research results of comparable units and the Mode 5 Test support was based on engineering assessment of anticipated number of labor hours needed to complete the testing and observed industry standards for test equipment. The USG relied on cost data

13 May 2022 Page 3 of8 provided by Lockheed Martin to develop an estimated amount for the added work associated with the NAM and Cyber security updates as there is no readily available cost data or industry actuals. The USG cost analyst evaluated the contractor provided data by conducting a cost risk analysis simulation and reliance on engineering assessment. The overall cost estimate includes cost escalation based on the FY22 USG Inflation Index and is adjusted for risk at the 80% confidence level (meaning there is an 80% �ility that the cost of this effort will not exceed the total value of the government estimated value of -

Funding Profile: The allocates a total of to execute the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Radar Upgrade Program as described in this J&A under LOA Line 001 (Radar Equipment), LOA Line 003 (Transportation Costs), and LOA Line 005 (Spare Parts for Communications Equipment/Supplies/Support). The funds provided are DoD Operations and Maintenance FY21/22 0100 funds.

The funds obligation period of availability ends on 30 September 2022. The LOA_, Note 16 enables the availability of funds across fiscal years in accordance with 10 USC 333(g)(2)(A) · Cross Fiscal Year authority.

Contract Type: The below recommended contract type offer a balanced risk allocation for this effort.

However, if new information is presented during negotiations, the Contracting Officer may change the contract type for this effort to achieve a balanced risk allocation between the parties.

Firm Fixed Price (FFP) - DART and ECU Mod-Kit upgrades, DoD AIMS platform test support services, North Alignment Module, and Cyber Security Updates.

Cost Reimbursable (CR) · Travel and Transportation.

Recommended CUN Structure

CUN NOMENCLATURE

0001 DART Mod-kit upgrade 0002 ECU Mod-kit upgrade 0003 DoD AIMS Platform Certification Test Support Services 0004 Travel 0005 Transportation 0006 Data (NSP) 0007 DART Spares 0008 North Alignment Module 0009 Cybersecurity Upgrades

QUANTITY

1 EA

1 EA

1 LOT

1 EA

1 EA

N/A

1 EA

1 EA

1 EA

Period of Performance: The anticipated delivery timeframe for the overall effort is 45 months from contract award.

IV. Demonstration that the contractor's unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited above.

The AFLCMC/HB�Program Team believes that the articles and services being procured are unique and critical in nature, and are available from only one source with unique capabilities.

Specifically, the articles being procured must be compatible in all aspects (form, fit, and function) with the existing Lockheed Martin (LM) AN/TPS-77 Long Range Radar presently installed. Furthermore, award to any other source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the requirements, in accordance with FAR 6.302-1 (a)(2)(iii)(B).

The country o- first procured the Lockheed Martin AN/TPS-77 Long Range Radar (LRR) Air Surveillance System in the year., as it was one of the NATO entry requirements in order to become an Ally. Th� AN/TPS-77 Radar provides advance threat detection and next generation intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for the-. The procurement of the radar was done via Direct Commercial Sales, as enabled by the Department of State and agreement entered directly

13 May 2022 Page4 of8

13 May 2022 Page 5 of 8 between Lockheed Martin and . Since then, has continued to maintain the radar primarily through direct dealings with Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), sole designer, developer, and integrator of the AN/TPS-77 LRR. As such, the products and services identified for the radar upgrade in the pseudo LOA are specific to Lockheed Martin.

Articles and services being procured are available from only one source with unique capabilities, FAR FAR 6.302-1(b)(1) (1)(ii):

Lockheed Martin developed the new DART technology at private expense, as part of their obsolescence management, and in response to evolving needs of armed forces on the battlefield. The original AN/TPS-77 LRRs came with 34 rows of receivers and 34 rows of transmitters located on the back of the antenna array.

The DART technology replaces the individual receivers and individual transmitters by combining them into a singular transceiver (T/R) module. While the DART technology is now embedded with every new radar procured, Lockheed's DART Mod-kit makes this technology available for legacy radars such as the existing AN/TPS-77. The DART Mod-kit upgrade will extend the older radar's useful life by combining row transmitters and row receivers into a single line-replacement unit T/R modules, reducing array power consumption and improving the overall row electronics reliability. The DART/DART Mod-Kit is an LM proprietary design and LM is the sole manufacturer of it, to include the subcomponents that make up the kit. As such, LM is the only firm that has the ability to perform modifications or engineering changes to the DART Mod-kit, the AN/TPS-77 antenna array configuration where the DART is installed, and any other component that interacts with the DART Mod-kit.

To develop a custom ECU Mod-kit solution, Lockheed Martin, independently, requested pricing from at least two different vendors and selected Tekgard environmental control systems and technical support for the operational sustainment of all of their surveillance radars ECUs. While the ECU A/N TPS-77 Mod-kit solution was developed and designed in partnership with another company, its form, fit and function characteristics were custom-built and designed to fit and maintain the inside of the shelter at the required temperature necessary for operation of the Lockheed Martin's AN/ TPS-77 Long Range Radar Surveillance System. For example, the ducting interface from the ECU to the shelter wall was uniquely design and configured for the AN/TPS-77. If another company were to replicate the ECU Mod-kit solution being procured, it would need to obtain the particular specifications from Lockheed Martin to address the ducting interface from the ECU Mod-kit to the shelter wall, as the government does not own the technical data for said solution. This would require time and effort that is well beyond the scope of the BPC Pseudo LOA.

Lockheed Martin developed the NAM at private expense in response to evolving needs of armed forces on the battlefield to rapidly deploy/redeploy the radar system in theater. The AN/TPS-77 LRRs are not produced standard with the NAM, this is an “add-on” quick vectoring feature. The NAM is an LM proprietary design and LM is the sole manufacturer of it for the TPS-77. If another company were to replicate the NAM being procured, it would need to obtain the particular specifications from Lockheed Martin to address the interfaces and the Human Machine Interface (HMI) language for alignment and calibration to Magnetic North. The government does not own the technical data for the NAM, and as such, would require time and effort that is well beyond the scope of the BPC Pseudo LOA to reverse engineer the product and fulfill the requirement.

Accordingly, Lockheed Martin is the only manufacturer that can guarantee that they can meet the DART Mod-kit, ECU Mod-kit, and NAM for form, fit and function specifications on the current AN/TPS-77 Long Range Radar while also returning the radar to its functional performance level post Mod-kits and component integration.

13 May 2022 Page 6 of 8

Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Agency's requirement, FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii)(B):

The Mode 5 certification is already late to need. The National Security Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and NATO required Mode 5 to replace Mode 4 by June 30 of 2020. The Test Support Services effort and the cybersecurity upgrades effort require qualified staff to meet Risk Management Framework requirements, to operate the AN/TPS LRR, and to directly support the DoD AIMS Program Management Office during the certification testing to demonstrate Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder operation. The AIMS Program Office located in Robins Air Force Base is responsible for providing this certification, while depending on the contractor for the test support services necessary to demonstrate interoperability of Mode 5 with the AN/TPS-77 LRR. Based on the current Pseudo LOA BPC funding provided, the certification work has to be completed by 30 September 2022 and can't expand past this date due to BPC accounting rule changes restricting U.S. Government efforts to only be executed through the period of the funds availability.

LM is the only vendor capable of providing the RMF updates and the support test services to enable the Mode 5 platform certification related work without incurring in significant delays in fulfilling the NSA, JCS, and NATO requirements for several reasons:

(1) Lockheed Martin is the OEM for the radar system being upgraded, as well as for the upgrade equipment to be procured for this effort, (2) they are intimately familiar with the existing state of the radar since they performed all original tests on the system and are currently under a Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) contract for a firmware update on the Hensoldt Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar (MSSR) Front End Panel which will bring the system into compliance with STANAG ed. 2++1, (3) the test support and cybersecurity updates to be provided are a follow-on effort of an on-going Direct Commercial Sales between Lockheed Martin and the Air Force [LM received a request for quotation from the

Air Force regarding updating their MSSR to be compliant with STANAG ed.3, which is a current requirement/ pre-requisite needed for the AFLCMC/HBN to complete the Mode 5 Platform Certification as described in Pseudo LOA], (4) Lockheed Martin has existing TPS-77s that are Mode 5 certified and thus have in-depth, working knowledge of the DoD AIMS Program Office Mode 5 requirements, process, and required testing to be performed (e.g. azimuth AIMS flight test), and lastly, (5) this case utilizes BPC expiring funds, the time it would take for another contractor [selected through competitive procurement/ ~18 months source selection] to gain the knowhow to perform the test services and complete the cybersecurity upgrades will far exceed the funds obligation period of 30 September 2022.

Accordingly, Lockheed Martin is the only firm capable of providing the unique test services described above without the Forces and the experiencing unacceptable delays in fulfilling its requirements.

V. Description of efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under

FAR 5.202 applies.

On 30 August 2021, the Government issued a Sources Sought notice to determine industry interest in the TPS-77/LRR Upgrade effort [Notice ID FA873021R0028]. The only response received was from Lockheed Martin. In accordance with FAR 5.204, on 02 September 2021 a Notice of Contract Action was posted to www.SAM.gov for 15 days [Notice ID FA873021R0028]. No response was received from industry. Thus, this is an indicator that no other company is interested in fulfilling this requirement.

13 May 2022 Page 7 of 8

VI. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable.

The contracting officer will evaluate the contractor's price/cost proposal in accordance with FAR 15.404-1, using proposal analysis techniques to include price analysis, cost analysis, and profit/fee analysis. A technical analysis will be performed to evaluate adequacy of the materials, hours, labor categories, technical risk, etc., as it relates to the technical requirements. The information gathered from the analyses will be used as the basis for negotiations and to develop a price reasonableness determination. In accordance with FAR 15.403-4(a)(1), the contractor must submit certified cost or pricing data for all contract actions >$2M. When negotiations conclude, the contractor must submit a certificate of current cost or pricing data, in the format specified in FAR 15.406-2, certifying that to the best of its knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data were accurate, complete, and current as of the date of agreement on price or, if applicable, an earlier date agreed upon between the parties that is as close as practicable to the date of agreement on price. Based on the above, the Contracting Officer anticipates that the government will have enough data to substantiate a price reasonableness determination for this effort.

VII. Description of the market research conducted and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted.

See section V above.

VIII. Any other facts supporting the use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.

None.

IX. List of any sources that expressed, in writing, an interest in the acquisition.

Lockheed Martin. No other source expressed interest in this acquisition. See section V above.

X. A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisitions for the supplies or services required.

Since the AFLCMC/HBN-FMS Program Office will not receive nor owns the Mod-kits technical specifications, the Government cannot reasonably expect any other potential bidders to have enough information to provide an accurate and sufficient response to the Sources Sought Notice and/or Pre-Solicitation Notice until Lockheed Martin, as the OEM, makes this information available to other parties. The USAF is acting as the Implementing Agency and has no influence on the development of the BPC Pseudo LOA requirement.

Therefore, no further actions can be taken to overcome potential competition barriers.

XI. Certification by the Contracting Officer.

As evidenced by my signature above, I have determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

XII. Certification by the technical/requirements personnel.

As evidenced by my signature above, I have determined this document to be both accurate and complete

13 May 2022 Page 8 of 8 to the best of my knowledge and belief.