Solicitation_1010.pdf

U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) (USAID)

ACI 2000, Rue 243 Porte 297 Tel: (223) 2070-23-00 2050 Bamako Place - AAO P.O. Box 34 Fax: (223) 2022-39-33 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue Bamako, Mali http://mali.usaid.gov Washington, D.C. 20523-2050

RFP Issuance date: October 10, 2017 Deadline for questions: October 19, 2017, 11:00 pm

U.S. Eastern time RFP Closing Date: November 17, 2017 11:00 pm

U.S. Eastern time

SUBJECT: Request for Proposal (RFP) No. 72068818R00001 for Implementing the Mali Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation Project.

Dear Potential Offerors:

The U.S. Government, represented by the Agency for International Development (USAID) is soliciting proposals to implement the Mali Peace and Stability Project (PS&R) which aims to improve prospects for long-term peace, security, and reconciliation by strengthening the positive resilience of communities working in partnership with their elected officials.

This is a full and open competition, under which any type of organization (U.S. and non-U.S including Malian, large or small commercial, for profit firms, educational institutions, and non-profit organizations) is eligible to compete. In support of USAID’s interest in expanding the number and sustainability of development partners, USAID/Mali encourages proposals from U.S. small businesses and potential new local partners as prime or sub-contractors.

USAID/Mali contemplates award of a Cost‐Plus‐Fixed‐Fee (CPFF) completion type contract with a total estimated cost of $US20.00 million for a period of five (05) years. However, the award will also have a $4.9 million ‘Crisis Modifier’ cost line item, and therefore the potential to increase the total of the contract to a maximum of $ 24.9 million; the crisis modifier cost line item will be available to respond to emergencies which may occur in or near the activity work areas. While cost effective approaches to achieving the results stated are encouraged, offerors must not necessarily strive to meet the maximum amount. However, Offerors must propose costs that they believe are appropriate, realistic and reasonable for the work. The procedures set forth in FAR Part 15 shall apply. Cost proposals will be evaluated in accordance with Best‐Value procedures, including the cost effectiveness of approaches to achieve the desired performance and deliverables.

Please refer to Section L for information regarding proposal requirements and all instructions for the preparation and submission of required proposal contents. Also please pay careful attention to, and complete in full, RFP section K – Representations, Certifications, and Statements of Offerors.

Section M states the criteria by which proposals will be evaluated.

Questions are to be submitted electronically to bamakoaao@usaid.gov. The deadline for receipt of questions is specified at the top of this letter. Offerors are responsible to ensure that proposals are received at USAID by the due date and time as specified above. Failure to comply with the submission date and email transmission method may result in no-response to your questions.

If substantive questions are received which affect the response to the solicitation, or if changes are made to the closing date and time, as well as other aspects of the RFP, this solicitation will be amended. Oral explanations or instructions given before award of the contract will not be binding.

USAID bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from transmission or conversion processes.

http://mali.usaid.gov/ mailto:bamakoaao@usaid.gov

SOL No. 72068818R00001 - Mali Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation Project

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT

(See Section I, Clause No. 52.232.8)

10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS (%)

14. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AMENDMENTS

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated):

AMENDMENT NO. DATE AMENDMENT NO. DATE

15A. NAME

AND

ADDRESS

OF

OFFEROR

CODE FACILITY 16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER

(Type or print)

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER 15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS

IS DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE - ENTER

SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE.

17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD

1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED

ORDER UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

RATING PAGE OF PAGES

1 96

2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER

72068818R00001

4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION

SEALED BID (IFB)

X NEGOTIATED (RFP)

5. DATE ISSUED

10/10/2017

6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than Item 7)

Bamakoaao@usaid.gov

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE OFFICE

BAMAKO – MALI

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

SOLICITATION

9.

PROPOSALS ARE DUE ELECTRONICALLY TO THE

ADDRESS INDICATED IN BLOCK 8 ABOVE

Until 11:00pm Eastern time 11/17/2017 (Date)

CAUTION: LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

10. FOR

INFORMATION

CALL:

A. NAME

B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

bamakoaao@usaid.gov

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

X A SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM 3 X I CONTRACT CLAUSES 58-61

X B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS 9-11 PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

X C DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT 12-30 X J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS 62

X D BRANDING AND MARKING 31-32 PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

X E INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE 33 x K

REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND

OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

63-70

X F DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE 34-41

X G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA 42-44 X L INSTRS., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS 71-84

X H SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS 45-57 X M EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD 85-88

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror)

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within _____120 calendar days (120 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

AWARD (To be completed by government)

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION:

10 U.S.C. 2304 (c) ( ) 41 U.S.C. 253 (c) (

23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN

IN

(4 copies unless otherwise specified)

ITEM

24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7) CODE 25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY

CO

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

28. AWARD DATE

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

AUTHORIZED FOR LOCAL REPRODUCTION

Previous edition is unusable

STANDARD FORM 33 (Rev. 9-97) Prescribed by GSA - FAR (48 CFR) 53.214(c) mailto:Bamakoaao@usaid.gov mailto:bamakoaao@usaid.gov

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

The following terms and acronyms are used in this RFP with meanings as reflected below:

Acronyms Meaning

ACCORD Mali Peace Initiative ADR Agences de Développement Régionales ADS Automated Directives Systems ARPP Advancing Reconciliation and Promoting Peace COR Contracting Officer Representative CDCS Country Development Cooperative Agreement CEP Civic Engagement Program CMA Coalition des Mouvements de l’Azawad CMM Conflict Management and Mitigation COP Chief of Party COREM Convergence pour la Resilience au Mali CVE countering violent extremism DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DNH Do No Harm DO Development Objective DRG Democracy Human Rights and Governance ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EMMP Environmental Monitoring and Mitigation Plan EESA Emergency Education Support Activity ERSA Education Recovery Support Activity EWRS Early Warning and Response Systems EU European Union FAF or F Foreign Assistance Framework Indicators FAMa Malian armed forces GBV Gender-based Violence GLEE Girl’s Education Empowerment Project GOM Government of Mali ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICT Information and Communication Technology IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IOM International Organization on Migration IR Intermediary Results M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MESA Mali Elections Support Activity MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MJP Mali Justice Project MOC Mechanismes Operationelles de Coordination MSF Doctors without Borders MTAD Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation / Ministry of Territorial

Administration and Decentralization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OAA Office of Acquisition and Assistance OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OTI Office of Transition Initiative PAT Programme D’assistance Technique/ Technical Assistance Program PDG Peace, Democratic and Governance PDI Programme de Developpement Institutionnel/Institutional Development Program for

Public Services PDSEC Plan de Développement Social, Économique et Culturel/ Socio-economic and Cultural development plan PISRC Plan Intégré de Sécurisation pour les Régions du Centre PMP Performance Monitoring Plan P2P People-to-People https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20ARPP%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL_0.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20CEP%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20Mali%20Justice%20Program%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20'16_FINAL.pdf

P&S Peace and Security PWD People with Disabilities RSO Resident Security Office SBCC Social Behavior Change Communication SNGP Sub-National Governance Project SOW Scope of Work SSR Security sector reform TO Transition Objective UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSR United Nations Security Resolution UPR Universal Periodic Review USAID US Agency for International Development USG United States Government VE Violent Extremism WPS Women, Peace, and Security YPS Youth, Peace, and Security

Table of Content

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE AND CONTRACT SERVICES

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

B.4 CONTRACT BUDGET AND CEILINGS

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

B.6 CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS

B.7 FEE SCHEDULE

B.8 REIMBURSABLE COSTS

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

C.1 SUMMARY

C.2 BACKGROUND

C.3 GUIDING PROGRAMMATIC AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

C.4 RESULTS, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND ACTIVITIES

C.5 MONITORING & EVALUATION (M&E)

C.6 MANAGEMENT & STAFFING

C.7 USAID’S MANAGEMENT APPROACH

C.8 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION D: BRANDING AND MARKING

D.1 BRANDING POLICY

D.2 752.7009 MARKING (June 1993)

D.3 MARKING AND BRANDING STRATEGY

D.4 BRANDING IMPLEMENTATION AND MARKING PLAN

SECTION E: INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

E.2 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.3 RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

E.4 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTS

SECTION F: DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

F.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

F.2 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

F.3 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

F.4 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

F.5 DELIVERABLES – PLANS, REPORTS AND OTHER

F.6 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE REPORTING

F.7 CONFIDENTIALITY AND OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

F.8 KEY PERSONNEL

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

G.1 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S AUTHORITY

G.2 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE (COR)

G.3 COR TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS

G.4 AIDAR 752.7003 DOCUMENTATION FOR PAYMENT (NOV 1998)

G.5 PAYMENT AND VOUCHERS

SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

H.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

H.2 AUTHORIZED WORK DAY/WEEK

H.3 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL COMPENSATION

H.4 TRAVEL

H.5 752.7004 EMERGENCY LOCATOR INFORMATION (JUL 1997)

H.6 AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

H.7 TITLE TO PROPERTY

H.8 CONFIDENTIALITY AND OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

H.9 AIDAR 752.225-70 SOURCE AND NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTS (FEB 2012)

H.10 CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACT

H.11 APPROVALS FOR NONEXPENDABLE PROPERTY PURCHASES

H.12 GRANTS UNDER USAID CONTRACT

H.13 CONSTRUCTION

H.14 PRESS RELATIONS

H.15 LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

H.16 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES (JUN 2012)

H.17 FAR 52.232-99 PROVIDING ACCELERATED PAYMENT TO SMALL BUSINESS SUBCONTRACTORS

(DEVIATION) (AUG 2012)

H.18 REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES (JUL 2007)

H.19 NONDISCRIMINATION (JUN 2012)

H.20 USAID DISABILITY POLICY - ACQUISITION (DEC 2004)

H.21 USAID-FINANCED THIRD-PARTY WEB SITES (AUG 2013)

H.22 USAID IMPLEMENTING PARTNER NOTICES (IPN) PORTAL FOR ACQUISITION (JUL 2014)

H.23 SUBMISSION OF DATASETS TO THE DEVELOPMENT DATA LIBRARY (DDL) (OCT 2014)

H.24 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

H.25 CONTRACTOR’S STAFF SUPPORT, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS..55

H.26 EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORISM FINANCING

H.27 LOGISTIC SUPPORT GOVERNMENT FURNISHED FACILITIES OR PROPERTY

H.28 GENDER CONSIDERATION

H.29 CONTRACTOR’S USE OF PROJECT VEHICLES AND LIABILITY INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

H.30 MOBILE BANKING

H.31 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEM

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES

I.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 52.252-2 CLAUSES ..58

I.2 52.204-1 APPROVAL OF CONTRACT (DEC 1989)

I.3 AIDAR 752.211-70 LANGUAGE AND MEASUREMENT (JUN 1992)

I.4 AIDAR 752.242-70 PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS (OCT 2007)

I.5 AIDAR 752.7001 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (JUL 1997)

PART III – LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

SECTION J -LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

PART IV – REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION K – REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS OR

RESPONDENTS

K.1 NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

K.2 FAR 52.204-3 TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION (OCT 1998)

K.3 REPRESENTATION BY CORPORATION REGARDING A DELINQUENT TAX LIABILITY OR A

FELONY CRIMINAL CONVICTION (Deviation OAA-DEV-14-02c) (August 2014)

K.4 FAR 52.204-8 ANNUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS (DEC 2014)

K.5 FAR 52.209-5 CERTIFICATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (APR 2010)

K.6 FAR 52.222-22 PREVIOUS CONTRACTS AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS (FEB 1999)

K.7 FAR 52.222-25 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPLIANCE (APR 1984)

K.8 INSURANCE ‐ IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY

K.9 AGREEMENT ON, OR EXCEPTIONS TO, TERMS AND CONDITIONS

K.10 AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATORS

K.11 SIGNATURE

SECTION L – INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS OR RESPONDENTS

L.1 52.252-1 SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

L.2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

L.3 SUBMISSION/DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

L.4 FORMAT AND PRESENTATION

L.5 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

L.6 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COST/BUSINESS PROPOSAL

L.7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF BRANDING IMPLEMENTATION AND MARKING

PLANS

L.8 52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (SEP 2006)

SECTION M – EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

M.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

M.2 EVALUATION SYSTEM

M.3 TECHNICAL PROPOSAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

M.4 COST EVALUATION

- ATTACHMENTS -

ATTACHMENT 1 - MAP OF USAID MALI PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES

ATTACHMENT 2 - USAID MALI RESULTS FRAMEWORK

ATTACHMENT 3 - BUDGET FORMAT TEMPLATE

ATTACHMENT 4 - LOCAL COMPENSATION PLAN (Effective October 02, 2016)

ATTACHMENT 5 - SMALL BUSINESS SUBCONTRACTING PLAN TEMPLATE

ATTACHMENT 6 - SF LLL – DISCLOSURE OF LOBBYING ACTIVITIES

ATTACHMENT 7 - SF – 294 SUBCONTRACTING REPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to acquire services for the implemention of the Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation Project which aims to improve prospects for long-term peace, security, and reconciliation by strengthening the positive resilience of communities working in partnership with their elected officials.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE AND CONTRACT SERVICES

This is a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) completion-type contract.

Note to Offerors: For the consideration set forth below, the Offeror will develop a statement of work proposing an innovative development approach responding to the requirements of the Statement of Objectives (SOO) described in Section C of the solicitation and in accordance with the performance standards specified herein.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required during the Base Period (Years 1-3) hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $__________. The fixed fee, if any, is $________. The estimated cost plus fixed fee is $_______.

(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance of the contract period hereunder is TBD. The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount unless authorized by the Contracting Officer pursuant to the clause of this contract entitled “Limitation of Funds” (FAR 52.232-22). See Section I of this contract.

Funds obligated hereunder for the base period are anticipated to be sufficient through TBD.

B.4 CONTRACT BUDGET AND CEILINGS

(a) The contract budget found below is based on the contractor’s original proposal and/or final proposal revision, which was accepted by USAID through award of this contract.

(b) Without the prior written approval of the contracting officer, the contractor may not exceed the total estimated cost set forth in the budget hereunder or the obligated amount, whichever is less.

(c) The following itemized budget sets forth the estimates for reimbursement of dollar costs for individual line items of cost, and the fixed fee (if any).

Line Item Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total Labor (Salaries & Fringe

Consultants Sub-contracts Travel, Transportation & Per

Equipment and Supplies Activities Support Costs Other Direct Costs

Total Estimated Direct Costs Indirect Costs

Total Estimated Cost Fixed Fee Total Est. Cost Plus Fixed Fee Crisis Modifier

Total Estimated Cost Ceiling

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs shall be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases for the prime contractor and its major subcontractors (“major subcontractors” are those subcontractors expected to perform at least 20% or more of the technical effort):

Prime:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD 1 % 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD 2 % 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application:

Type of Rate: TBD

Period: TBD

2/ Base of Application:

Period: TBD

Subcontractor(s):

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD 1 % 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD 2 % 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application:

Period: TBD

2/ Base of Application:

Period: TBD

B.6 CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS

Reimbursement for allowable indirect costs shall be at final negotiated rates but not in excess of the following ceiling rates:

Contractor TBD 1 Rate %

TBD 1 Ceiling Rate %

TBD 2

Rate %

TBD 2 Ceiling Rate %

PRIME

MAJOR

SUBCONTRACTOR(S)

(1) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

(2) This understanding shall not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.7 FEE SCHEDULE

Pursuant to FAR 16.306 (d), Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts - completion and term forms, the fixed fee payable under this contract is tied to the completion of the deliverables identified in Section F.5, and in accordance with approved Fee Schedule below.

B.8 REIMBURSABLE COSTS

This is a Cost Reimbursable contract type. The U.S. dollar costs allowable shall be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, FAR 52.216-8, Fixed Fee, if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment.

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

C.1 SUMMARY

C.1.1. Activity Purpose and Goals

The purpose of this activity is to improve prospects for long-term peace, security, and reconciliation by building trust between conflict-affected communities and their government, strengthening the ability of communities to mitigate and manage conflict, prioritize and implement their community’s most pressing development needs, and empowering marginalized youth as change agents. The goal is to see measurable improvement in the efficiency, effectiveness and capacities of the local communities to be more resilient to the conflict and violent extremism by the end of this contract.

This activity will achieve this through three objectives:

1) Objective 1 – Community resilience to violence and conflict reinforced

2) Objective 2 – Inclusive governance and civic engagement strengthened in conflict-affected communities

3) Objective 3: Youth empowerment and strengthened resilience to violent extremism

Given the fragile nature of the Malian state and the need to implement and show tangible results with the Algiers Peace Accord, USAID/Mali’s Peace and Democratic Governance (PDG) Office anticipates quick impact activities that respond to community needs through tangible development investments and that challenge the worldview of individuals susceptible to extremism.

C.1.2. Purpose and Scope of the Contract

The purpose of the contract is to acquire technical assistance and other resources necessary to build Malian resilience to local conflict and radicalization by working with Malian government actors and local communities to improve perceptions of the Government of Mali (GoM), address priority development and reconciliation needs and strengthen women and youth’s voices.

To do so, part of the activity will require that the contractor negotiate and award a number of small grants in areas of Mali identified by USAID and the Contractor as susceptible to violent extremism. The small grants will, promote participatory processes that lead to good governance and community cohesion in the areas identified as susceptible to violent extremism. The small grants will be significant part of the contract and fund will be available for community-driven activities, which will support all three objectives.

The small grants fund will include a rapid response mechanism that will be available for targeted quick-impact activities that prevent or mitigate violence or take advantage of emerging windows of opportunity or urgent need.

Theory of change

Collectively, these activities will support the Theory of Change, “If communities are better able to identify and respond to threats to social cohesion and security, if the relationship between citizens and their government is improved, and if youth are engaged in development and democratic change, then community resilience to violence and conflict will be fortified, and the foundations for peacebuilding, stabilization and reconciliation will be strengthened.”

C.2 BACKGROUND

The Republic of Mali is at once blessed with the sprawling inland Niger Delta in the nation’s central regions and cursed by the inexorable encroachment of the Sahara to the North. Despite a rapidly growing population, increasing at a rate of 3.6% per year (67% of whom are under 25), and an economic growth rate of 5.2%, Mali ranks 175th on the Human Development Index (2016) and faces numerous economic, social and political challenges.

Although previously and often erroneously described as a bastion of regional stability and democracy, Mali is yet to emerge from a history of political instability characterized by three coups and four large-scale rebellions since its independence from France in 1960. Continuing to struggle against the challenges of post-independence concepts of citizenship across its vast territory, unrest, violent uprisings and uneven socioeconomic development have left the country vulnerable to instability and division of its population along ethnic and regional lines (north-versus-south; Mali-versus-“Azawad”).

The crisis in Mali has been worsening since the Touareg-led rebellion and subsequent coup of 2012, resulting in extreme instability in the North and Central part of the country. The June 2015 Peace Accord opened the door for dialogue between armed groups of the north and the Bamako-based government.

Competition for places around the table and the refusal of the government to engage in negotiations with designated terrorist organizations have contributed to the proliferation and involution of armed groups while terms continue to be thrashed out. The eventual formation of two coalitions – Coalition des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the Plateforme – temporarily eased tensions as various criminal, political, and extremist elements vied for space and primacy. However, disharmony within the two groups, fighting between the groups, and shifting loyalties have put the peace process in jeopardy more than once. The presence of violent extremist (VE) elements within CMA and Plateforme, as well as involvement in illicit trafficking and criminal networks, has left confidence in the process shaken at best, with many Malians questioning the will of the parties to move forward when they have so much illicit revenue to lose by doing so.

Renewed fighting between CMA and the Plateforme in the north has left the Accord on unstable ground, but the transition from conflict to peace five years after the crisis is further complicated by the spread of violence into the central regions. Rich in natural resources and left out of the peace process (and dividends), the central regions have long been the scene of conflict over agricultural land and pasture, access to water, and animal corridors, leading to conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists. More ethnically diverse than the northern regions, these divisions in economic activity often correspond with ethnic identity, and increasing tensions over access and management of these resources provide an opportunity for exploitation from armed and extremist groups.

Violent extremists, forced out of negotiations in the north, have increasingly infiltrated parts of Ségou and Mopti in a bid to increase their influence, extend their territory and compete for resources. Regional links to transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida and the Islamic State extend networks into neighboring countries and make the fight for central and northern Mali an increasingly international one.

As a consequence of the insidious increase in presence of extremist groups in the center, Malian State authorities, from police, to administrators, teachers and nurses, are being driven from key areas. Without state arbitrators, and without the presence of effective, credible law enforcement, communities are without a functioning judicial system and protections against these extremist elements. In the vacuum left by the retreating authorities, youth are mobilizing into armed “self-defense” groups, increasingly at the urging of their families and communities, to take responsibility for community protection. These groups often take on ethnic dimensions, exacerbating fundamentally economic issues and leading to catastrophic incidences of communal violence.

In this fragile security environment, inter- and intra-community relations in Mali are increasingly strained as competition for depleting natural resources becomes more and more a question of survival. Previously peaceable communities, struggling to mitigate conflicts over management of priority resources including water, access to pasture and land for cultivation, are increasingly turning to these self-defense groups, and, more frequently, to armed and violent extremist groups, for protection of their members, assets, and livelihoods.

Reasons for youth membership and community involvement in armed groups - pro-government, anti-government, and violent extremist - are varied and rarely based on religious motivations; economic drivers, such as income or protection of livelihoods, community protection and self-defense, identity and “belonging” are all strong factors that mobilize youth in the north and the center (Institute for Security Studies, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2017). Countering VE in Mali is a complex problem set requiring a nuanced, community-focused approach. Interestingly, evidence from studies in Mali indicates that motivations for joining extremist/designated terrorist groups are not markedly different from motivations to join armed and self-defense groups, although the reasons for remaining may vary. In addition, as a consequence of widespread confusion over the terms of the Peace Accord, many youth and their families mistakenly believe that membership of any armed, extremist or self-defense group will lead to eventual integration into the Malian national army (and a secured livelihood) through the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process.

Growing allegations of abuses by Malian security forces in their fight against extremists, and atrocities committed on both sides with impunity, have further eroded community trust and confidence in the state, resulting in a fractured social contract. Communities no longer rely on the state to protect them, and, faced with corruption and abandonment, armed and VE groups present viable alternatives, and as their influence increases, a widening space for violence and division is exploited, spreading instability.

C.2.1 Government of Mali (GOM) Response

The response of the Malian government in the face of rapid territorial expansion of an organized, well-armed, and highly motivated rebellion in the north in 2012 was to enlist the help of the French military.

Operation Serval halted a rapid march south and led to a sustained and increasingly unpopular French military presence, later replaced by Operation Barkhane, and international peacekeeping forces were introduced in 2013 with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Peace Accord of 2015 presented an opportunity for peace and a strategy to integrate the northern regions into the Malian nation. However, two years later, the cease-fire repeatedly violated, increasing asymmetric attacks against peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, and civilians, and DDR yet to begin, the Malian people are still waiting for a long-term, sustainable solution that is more than simply military.

The challenge for the Malian authorities after the DDR process is complete will be to demonstrate its commitment to the development objectives outlined in the Peace Accord in the short, medium, and long-term while ensuring representation from the northern regions in the implementation of this strategy.

Pressure to demonstrate meaningful change is compounded by the deteriorating security situation, in the north and now in the center, leaving Malians dissatisfied with a large foreign military presence, and pushing the government for improved management, leadership, and most importantly, demonstrable commitment to the peace process.

The Government’s “Projet de Stratégie Spécifique de Développement Intégré du Nord du Mali” has been laid out by the signatories to the Accord, and the “Plan de Sécurisation Intégré pour les Régions du Centre” lays the groundwork for addressing the roots of dissatisfaction in the central regions. The newly-created Agences de Développement Régionales (ADRs) and the commune-level Plans de “Développement Social, Economique et Culturel (PDSECs)” are the first steps towards greater regional autonomy, as outlined in the Peace Accord, and the devolution of development management and funding to the regions.

Five years after the crisis and more than two years since the signing of the Accord, northern populations are waiting to see visible improvement in the provision of basic social services. Interim authorities have been appointed and nominally installed, although their presence and credibility is limited in conflict-affected northern communities, as Bamako-based appointees returned to the capital within hours of official ceremonies. This action was intended as a compromise until regionally elected authorities have been put into place, but their legitimacy has been strongly contested, and thus their ability to govern is limited. The Mechanismes Operationelles de Coordination (MOCs), combined security units comprised of representatives of CMA, Plateforme and Malian armed forces, were set back immeasurably by the terrorist attack in Gao in January 2017, in which dozens of representatives from CMA, Plateforme and the Malian armed forces (FAMa) were killed. The two new northern regions established in the Accord, Taoudénit and Ménaka, are in response to dissatisfaction over administrative boundaries and a further step forward towards regional autonomy. Growing widespread unease in the presence of international military actors despite the worsening security situation is putting ever greater pressure on the GoM to take leadership, commit to terms of the Accord, and make required changes in governance to convince an increasingly disillusioned population that a long-term solution is in place. In this challenging context, Malian voters prepare to go to the polls for a busy electoral cycle of presidential and legislative elections that will be a critical milestone for stability and democratic consolidation in Mali.

C.2.2 International Response

Security sector reform (SSR) remains the primary focus for stabilization interventions in the north and center, for international agencies as well as the U.S. government, bringing heavy investment from the European Union (EU) Delegation, particularly border and frontier management, training, non-lethal material support to the police and gendarmes, and in tackling the factors leading to mass migration to Europe from Mali and the wider region. The EU Training Mission is building capacity of the FAMa and works closely with MINUSMA, which had its mandate extended to 2018. MINUSMA, in addition to peacekeeping and SSR, is managing the DDR process, including garrisoning and reintegration of ex-combatants. The G5 Sahel announced a new (2017) multi-national armed force tasked with counterterrorism in the Sahel region, due for deployment from this year and with the explicit support of the UN Security Council through the adoption of resolution 2359 (2017), as well as international actors including the United States and France. France’s Operation Barkhane, the successor to Operation Serval, is also active in the wider region targeting VE groups.

In addition to military solutions to the situation, humanitarian actors are active in all regions of Mali.

Emergency responders including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Doctors without Borders (MSF) are active in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, providing humanitarian support despite being repeatedly targeted, closing and reopening offices and suffering losses. Humanitarian agencies are routinely targeted for vehicle theft, carjacking, robberies, and kidnapping and access for foreigners in the northern regions is very dangerous. Mali is the world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission and MINUSMA’s bases are frequently attacked, as are all troops, both foreign and domestic. Despite the dangers of implementation, some bilateral donors are developing conflict mitigation and management responses, support for transitional justice, and youth-focused skills development activities (for further details see Table of Key USAID Projects at the end of this Section C). However, these responses have limited funding and do not have strategic, large-scale geographic coverage.

C.2.3 U.S. Government Response

Stabilization of conflict-affected areas is the first Transition Objective (TO) as outlined in USAID Mali’s 2015-20 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food for Peace, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Health and Education Offices were able to extend humanitarian assistance and early-stage basic public services to conflict-affected communities in the north immediately after the crisis, and continue to provide a base for desperately needed long-term development efforts in a highly insecure environment. Five “cercles” of Mopti region in central Mali, were designated as USAID’s “resilience zone” - Tenenkou, Youwarou, Douentza, Bandiagara, and Mopti. These areas were identified as having the highest need with the greatest potential for resilience programming, and are part of the “Feed the Future” zone of influence.

These investments were also intended to create a stability buffer between still volatile northern areas in Timbuktu and Gao and the rest of the country, as well as a forward-leaning platform for pushing resilience and development efforts northward as and when security conditions allow. Today’s deteriorating security situation in most of these cercles underlines the necessity for urgent action, to stop the spread of instability having a catastrophic effect on Mali’s ability to recover from political, social, economic, and climatic shocks.

However, there have been some gains, including the partial election of communal authorities in November 2016 and installation of the Interim Authorities in accordance with the Accord. With USG support, former jihadist-occupied communities have been engaged in small-scale reconciliation and socio-economic recovery efforts, community-based conflict resolution mechanisms are being reinforced to reduce inter- and intra-ethnic conflict, and women and youth are actively engaged in promoting peace and reducing vulnerability to Violent Extremism VE. Now, five years after the coup and two years after the signing of the Peace Accord, USAID/Mali and other donors are looking to transition out of the emergency assistance phase and into longer-term, sustainable and scalable peacebuilding, stabilization, and reconciliation activities to build on these investments and support implementation of the vision outlined in the Peace Accord.

C.2.4 Current Programming

Peace, democracy and good governance support USAID’s Mali strategy, as Mali’s resilience to conflict is integral to its development and prosperity. There are two USAID’s five-year (2016 - 2021) projects to support good governance and decentralization include the nationwide $22 million Sub-National Governance Project (SNGP) and the complementary $12 million Civic Engagement Program (CEP).

SNGP supports the GOM in its commitment to decentralization and greater regional representation, prioritizing public financial management and budget transparency, community participation in local https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Mali%20Sub-National%20Governance%20Project%20-%2010%20mar%20%2716.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Mali%20Sub-National%20Governance%20Project%20-%2010%20mar%20%2716.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20CEP%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL.pdf governance, and institutional strengthening of the newly-created ADRs for PDSEC implementation.

SNGP works with regional authorities but not at commune or circle level, and focuses on public financial management. CEP works nationally through grants to local organisations, strengthening civil society’s role in governance and public oversight, community organizing, and advocacy at the local level, building capacity of civil society organizations to identify and advocate for community needs, monitor service delivery, budget allocation, and development implementation at a local level, and increase grassroots mechanisms of social accountability. In addition there are two two-year conflict management and mitigation (CMM) activities, the Advancing Reconciliation and Promoting Peace (ARPP), $1,143,670 and the Participatory Peace Process (3P),$817,000, both ending mid-2018, covering Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka to strengthen community ability to manage conflicts in the absence of state authorities and partner with women’s and youth organizations to increase their role in peacebuilding. ARPP also supports a community-based early warning system and trains paraprofessional counselors to provide psychosocial services to gender-based violence (GBV) survivors. Furthermore, the is the five-year, $21 million Mali Justice Project (MJP) that deals with justice system reform, tackles corruption, works with the informal and formal justice system to map local conflicts and actors, increases access to justice, particularly for women and marginalized populations, and provides GBV-sensitive legal services. Also, there is the $8.2 million Mali Peace Initiative (ACCORD) ending in March 2018, that provides infrastructure support, engages and sensitizes communities on peace processes, capitalizing on windows of opportunity to reduce VE as part of the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Finally, USAID/Mali will soon be launching a new, two-year, $6 million Mali Elections Support Activity (MESA) to support the upcoming 2018 election cycle. It is expected that the new Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation project will coordinate closely with and leverage impact, relationships, and activities of current and previous humanitarian and development programming to maximize outcomes, increase access to services and resources for target beneficiaries, and consolidate transition gains.

C.3 GUIDING PROGRAMMATIC AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES

C.3.1 Geographic Focus:

Offerors must propose areas of intervention with a target population in specified cercles and communes in northern and central regions of Mali which are Segou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal Menaka and Taoudeni with an explanation of how interventions will be delivered. Level of efforts for phased approaches in different targeted areas or varying approaches for working in conflict, buffer and resilience zones must be clearly defined. A contingency strategy to respond to changes in security, positive windows of increased access or stability, or the erosion of stability due to increased conflict requiring a change in operating status must also be addressed. Efforts must be made to leverage impact from concurrent USG-funded activities and other international assistance. This will be especially relevant in the designated “resilience zone” where multiple USAID activities are currently active and offerors will be expected to demonstrate how coordination will maximize project impact (see Table in Annex to Section C entitled: “Project Coordination - Table of Key USAID Projects”).

C.3.2 Adaptability and Flexibility:

The ability to respond to the changing security situation will be critical for this project. Offerors must clearly show how implementation will adapt as operating environments become less or more permissive.

Given the nature of project objectives and the fluid security situation in target geographic areas and communities, the successful offeror will create flexible, agile mechanisms for adaptive management, correction, and response to ensure continuity of operations, implementation, achievement of results, and “Do No Harm (DNH)” principles. Successful offerors must demonstrate the ability to respond in a timely, safe, technically-sound, and cost-efficient manner.

C.3.3 Conflict Sensitivity and Do No Harm:

To ensure all forms of citizen engagement are safe, productive, and do not exacerbate existing tensions or conflict, conflict sensitivity will be mainstreamed into all project activities. Successful offeror will demonstrate a conflict-sensitive approach that goes beyond “Do No Harm” in anticipating and mitigating risk and spoilers and assessing triggers, trends, and windows for atrocity risk, while maximizing and reinforcing peace. Successful offeror will include a robust Do No Harm analysis that demonstrates an understanding of the nuanced context of the conflict in each proposed targeted area and thoughtful https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20ARPP%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL_0.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%203P%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20Mali%20Justice%20Program%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Nov%20'16_FINAL.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID%20PDG%20-%20ACCORD%20Fact%20Sheet-English%20-%20Nov%20%2716_FINAL_0.pdf consideration of any risks associated with the proposed assistance program, and participatory processes that challenge participants to do their own analysis and apply problem-solving skills to their situation.

Conflict-sensitivity, atrocity risk assessment, and “Do No Harm” must be reflected in the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan and ongoing analyses must be incorporated to inform how interventions will adapt to the changing context.

C.3.4 Gender and Youth-positive:

Successful offeror will explicitly discuss the separate and distinct experiences of men and women, boys and girls, adolescents and youth, as it relates to conflict, violence, and violent extremism, and identify barriers to full and meaningful participation in peacebuilding, access to justice, protection, resources, and influence over decisions that affect their lives. Such approaches must be carefully tailored to facilitate constructive, inclusive dialogue and mitigate potential backlash and harm to participants. Successful offeror will differentiate the various roles, vulnerabilities, and contributions of women, men, and young people as it relates to project objectives and interventions.

In line with UN Security Resolution (UNSR) 1325, the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) promotes the substantive participation, influence, and leadership of women and girls, including those with disabilities, in peace processes and decision-making, protection from violence, conflict prevention, and equitable and safe access to relief and recovery. UNSR 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) extends and reinforces the principles of prevention, protection, and participation and recognizes the important contributions that young people make in countering violent extremism (CVE) and supporting peacebuilding efforts around the world.

C.3.5 Empowerment and Inclusion:

In addition to prioritising youth and women, the offeror must mainstream empowerment and inclusion of other marginalized populations including but not limited to people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, former combatants, child soldiers, returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, survivors of sexual and gender based violence, as well as victims of other human rights violations including forced marriage, slavery and trafficking in persons. Initiatives designed to expose participants to inclusive, democratic, participatory processes and decision-making will ensure their interests are represented, increase their sense of agency, improve their ability to influence policy and distribution of resources, increase equitable access to justice, protection, and peace dividends, while breaking down barriers to inclusion and acceptance in their communities. Successful offeror will use its convening power as a USAID partner to create the space, opportunity, and culture for constructive dialogue between and among citizens and government, rather than conducting efforts on their behalf.

Inclusion of people with disabilities (PWDs) in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconciliation is essential to ensure incorporation of their unique needs, avoid harmful distinctions between those with pre-existing and conflict-related disabilities and thus disparities in access to peace dividends, and further political alienation when expectations are not met. Like women and youth, PWDs have a positive role to play in highlighting structural violence and exclusion, proposing innovative solutions, and ensuring equitable and fair allocation of post-conflict resources and service provision.

C.3.6 Communication and Outreach for Transformative Social Change:

Communication strategies are essential to promote a community’s positive resilience and tap into the tipping points for change. Thus, community-level development and governance activities shall be complemented with a comprehensive communication and outreach plan designed to reach diverse and marginalized populations with a wide range of messages to motivate community engagement, peace and reconciliation. This strategy shall potentially use a social behavior change communication (SBCC) approach if appropriate. Although this approach has traditionally been applied in the health sector, state-of-the-art SBCC approaches are evolving to other sectors and working cross-sectorally. For example, community radio programming that encourages transformational, people-to-people, inter- and intra-communal engagement, information sharing about positive resilience initiatives, disseminates news, and serves as a source of positive messaging on social cohesion and reconciliation as a counter to extremist messaging can play a critical role. Media also has a key role to play in informing citizens, through public service announcements, on key national and local issues.