SpaceX-JOFOC-additional CCtCap Missions 12-21-21 Redacted.pdf

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

Kennedy Space Center (KSC)

W STIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

(JOFOC)

Additional Missions For the Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) Contract, NNK14MA74C

1. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.303-2(b)(1) -Identification of the agency and the contracting activity, and specific identification of the document as a "Justification for other than full and open competition."

This document is a justification for other than full and open competition prepared by NASA KSC: The procuring agency is NASA and the contracting activity is KSC.

2. FAR 6.303-2(b)(2) - The nature and/or description of the action being approved:

This justification provides the rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition to award a new work modification and extension to contract number NNK14MA74C with SpaceX for up to three additional Post Ce1iification Missions (PCMs) with an estimated period of perfo1mance through the end of April 2025.

The CUITent period of perfo1mance ends on September 30, 2024. The CUITent contract specifies that the maximum quantity of PCMs to be issued is six. SpaceX has been awarded the maximum six PCMs and successfully completed two PCMs, with a third in progress and the last PCM scheduled to launch in March 2023. Approval of this JOFOC will allow NASA KSC to concUITently award and order up to three additional PCMs to SpaceX.

3. FAR 6.303-2(b )(3) - A description of the supplies or services required, to meet the Agency's needs (including the estimated value):

The pUipose of the CCtCap contracts is to complete the final development and ce1iification of United States (U.S.) commercial crew space transpo1iation capabilities to provide safe, reliable, and cost-effective transpo1iation to and from the International Space Station (ISS), and to provide those services as PCMs after the systems are ce1iified. NASA requires two PCMs each year to meet crew rotation needs.

One of the stated Commercial Crew Program (CCP) objectives is to develop and implement a strategy that stimulates the U.S. space transpo1iation industry, encourages the availability of human space tr·anspo1iation services to NASA and other customers, and addresses the needs of industry pa1iners to the greatest extent possible.

NASA KSC awarded CCtCap contr·acts to Boeing and SpaceX on September 16, 2014; they include a Fiim-Fixed Price (FFP) Research and Development (R&D) element (Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) 001) with FFP Indefinite Delive1y /Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) service elements (CLINs 002 and 003).

CLIN 001 is FFP R&D for Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E)/Ce1t ification of the Contractor 's Crew Transpo1t ation System (CTS).

CLIN 002 is FFP IDIQ Services for PCMs to the ISS. Each contract specifies a guaranteed minimum of two and a maximum of six PCMs. The contract also requires the capability of providing PCMs about eve1y six months.

CLIN 003 is FFP IDIQ Services for Special Studies. Special studies task orders enable NASA to identify impacts on the Contractor 's design, schedule, and cost/price resulting from potential new, or changes to existing, Government requirements.

NASA KSC awarded two PCMs (PCMs 1 and 2) to both Boeing and SpaceX in 2015, which satisfied the minimum guarantee under the CCtCap contracts. Subsequently, NASA KSC awarded four additional PCMs (PCMs 3-6) to Boeing and SpaceX in December 2016, which fulfilled the maximum number of PCMs under each of the CCtCap contracts.

Authority to Proceed (ATP) for all six PCMs has been granted to SpaceX, while ATP for PCMs 1-3 has been granted to Boeing pending Ce1t ification by the Agency.

SpaceX achieved Ce1tification in September 2020 and began PCM rotation inissions eve1y six months sta1ting in November 2020. SpaceX is scheduled to launch their last PCM in March 2023. However, Boeing has experienced technical challenges resulting in ce1t ification being delayed. According to cunent development schedules, it is possible that Boeing could achieve Ce1tification under CLIN 001 in 2023. However, due to unresolved technical issues it is unce1tain when Boeing will achieve ce1tification and begin PCMs to the ISS.

As a result of the above and other rationale described in section 5, in order to meet its crew rotation needs and obligations to international pa1tners, NASA has detennined a need to acquire up to three additional PCMs from SpaceX to assure unintenupted crew access to the International Space Station. The FFP PCM prices were competitively defined in the contract during the CCtCap acquisition. The total estimated value of this action to award three additional PCMs to SpaceX is approximately $760M. The estimated period of performance is through the end of April 2025.

4. FAR 6.303-2(b)( 4) - An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The statuto1y authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) §2304(c)(l), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1 Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy Agency requirements.

5. FAR 6.303-2(b)(5) -A demonstration that the proposed contractor's unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited:

The rationale suppo1t ing the use of 10 U.S.C. §2304(c)(l ) is: (1) SpaceX is the only responsible source because the SpaceX CTS is cmTently the only CTS that is ce1tified to perfo1m crew rotation missions to the ISS. SpaceX has successfully completed two crew rotation missions with a third in progress. The Boeing CTS ce1tification date is unce1tain so it is unclear when they will be able to begin flying crew rotation missions to the ISS. There are no other companies capable of suppo1t ing these crew rotation services during the needed timeframe. The Boeing CTS unce1tainty combined with the fact that no other companies are presently capable of providing PCMs beginning in 2023 presents possible gaps in crew rotation services to the ISS; and, (2) Regardless of whether Boeing achieves ce1t ification and staits providing PCMs in 2023, redundancy is critical, and SpaceX is the only responsible source that can provide that redundancy.

(1) As the Only NASA Certified CTS, SpaceX is the Only Responsible Source SpaceX achieved Ce1tification in September 2020 and began PCM rotation missions eve1y six months staiting in November 2020. The goal was that both contractors would be ce1t ified at roughly the same time and alternate PCMs with each contractor providing one launch each yeai· meeting the 6-month crew rotation requirements. However with only one contractor currently ce1tified, SpaceX is perfo1ming consecutive missions, one eve1y six months.

SpaceX has been perfo1ming on schedule for PCM rotation flights while perfo1ming back-to-back flights ( one mission eve1y six months vs. one mission eve1y year) until Boeing reaches ce1tification. In order to compensate for Boeing's delayed ce1tification, Crew-4 and Crew-5 were provided ATP with sho1tened lead times to enable continuous access to the ISS. Shortened lead times have been demonstrated to be achievable by SpaceX since implementing re-use of Crew Dragon spacecraft and Falcon launch vehicles for Crew-2 and Crew-3. Cunently, the sixth crew rotation mission is scheduled for Mai·ch 2023; and an additional three PCMs are needed for September 2023, March 2024, and September 2024.

As stated in paragraph 3, Boeing has experienced technical challenges resulting in certification being delayed. In December of 2019, Boeing conducted its Orbital Flight Test. While many extremely difficult test objectives were met, the Stai·liner CST-I 00 spacecraft failed to rendezvous and dock with the ISS. Specific issues encountered during flight include an en or with the Mission Elapsed Timer, a softwai·e issue within the Service Module (SM) affecting the SM Integrated Propulsion Controller and an Inte1mittent Space-to-Ground fo1ward link issue, which impeded the Flight Control team's ability to command and control the vehicle. As a result, Boeing will re-fly the Orbital Flight Test Stai·liner without a crew to demonstrate the quality of the Starliner system and allow the completion of all flight test objectives and evaluate the perfo1mance of the second Starliner vehicle. With the issues con ected, Boeing completed end-to-end testing of Starliner 's flight software by flying a five-day simulated OFT-2 mission to the station. Subsequently, the actual OFT-2 was scheduled for July 2021. During the prelaunch flight checks a valve anomaly was detected which prevented its launch. The valves are critical as they control aspects of the spacecraft propulsion system. Con ecting the valve issue at the ve1tical integration facility was not possible and the Starliner was rolled back to the Commercial Crew and Cai·go Processing Facility for deeper level troubleshooting. While NASA is fully confidant the issues with the valves will be resolved, they are still outstanding and driving unce1tainty in Boeing's ce1tification schedule. Revised dates for OFT-2, Crewed Flight Test (CFT), ce1tification, and first PCM-I have not yet been detennined .

. These factors contribute to the unce1tainty of the OFT-2 and CFT test flights, ce1t ification and PCM launch dates.

There are no other companies capable of supporting these crew rotation services during the needed timeframe. Discussions with NASA technical expe1ts were held reviewing industry capabilities as to their readiness to provide crew rotation services to the ISS.

NASA technical experts examined existing Space Act Agreements (SAAs) related to launch and human space ti·anspo1tation, siinilar ISS visiting vehicle contl'acts and other siinilar NASA launch contl'acts. The NASA technical expe1is detennined there were no other domestic commercial companies that have made enough significant progress in the Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDTE) of an integrated crewed system capable of docking to the ISS within our needed schedule. Responses from the Request for Info1mation (RFI), issued on October 20, 2021, and Notice of Intent (NOI) issued on December 3, 2021, substantiated the conclusion.

Based on the above discussion, SpaceX is the only responsible source to provide crew rotation Inissions to the ISS.

(2) Dissimilar Redundancy is Essential The ISS is a multibillion-dollar U.S. investinent necessitating a continued U.S. presence on-board for continued safe operation. The ISS facility would be at risk without continued U.S. crew suppo1t. Assured access is critical to ensure the ISS can continue to operate, suppo1t the crew onboard, and conduct the vital research of the unique ISS

National Laborato1y. The natural unce1tainties and exigencies of spaceflight combined with new vehicles still proving their reliability, eno1mous financial investments, and the challenges faced in maintaining sustainable operations require immense effoits from the CCtCap contractors. Therefore, maintaining the redundant capabilities of at least two contractors for all PCMs is paramount to success in providing commercial CTS reliability and suppo1ting NASA's goals and obligations. Without redundant capabilities there is a significant risk there would be unacceptable schedule delays which would result in NASA not being able to meet its statuto1y obligations and its obligations to its international paitners in the 2023 - 2024 timeframe.

Dissimilai· redundancy is essential for at least four impo1tant reasons: (i) the obligation to provide and maintain continuous uninte1n 1pted crewed flight services to the ISS; (ii) the potential for anomalies or accidents; (iii) the potential for lmforeseen external factors; (iv) risks associated with the design and operation of a safe and reliable CTS.

(i) Federal law mandates that NASA maintain continuous flight availability for the safe operation of the ISS until 2024. Specifically, 51 U.S.C. §70907, as recently amended by the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (Public Law 114-90), states the following:

(a) Policy - The Administrator shall take all necessaiy steps to ensure that the ISS remains a viable and productive facility capable of potential U .S. utilization through at least September 30, 2024.

(b) NASA Actions - In fmt herance of the policy lmder subsection (a), the Administrator shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that the ISS, as a designated national laborato1y -

(1) remains viable as an element of overall exploration and pa1tnership strategies and approaches;

(2) is considered for use by all NASA inission directorates, as appropriate, for technically appropriate scientific data gathering or technology risk reduction demonstrations; and

(3) remains an effective, fonctional vehicle providing research and test bed capabilities for the U.S. through at least September 30, 2024. Note that NASA anticipates continued ongoing operations of the ISS beyond 2024.

In its bill for the enactment of the NASA Authorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 810 (Feb. 9, 2015)), the House of Representatives fmt her stated, "It is the policy of the U.S. to maintain an unintenupted capability for human space flight and operations in low-Eaith orbit, and beyond, as an essential instrument of national security and the capability to ensure continued U.S. participation and leadership in the exploration and utilization of space." To folfill this objective and ensure CTS services continue to be available for two PCMs each yeai·, it is critical not only to have at least two CCtCap contractors, but also to ensure that each year both contractors are able and ready to provide PCM services, to ensure redundan t and back-up capabilities.

(ii) The ve1y nature of human spaceflight requires NASA to plan for potential anomalies and accidents and, accordingly, continue its mission uninterrupted if one or more such incidents were to occur. Reliance on a single contractor places the U.S. in a high-risk posture in the event it experiences an incident that causes the contractor or NASA to ground the vehicle. Even though CCP and the Contractors are taking extraordinary measures to ensure that the space transportation systems are as safe and as reliable as possible, there remains a possibility of an anomaly or accident.

Indeed, previous anomalies interrupted cargo services to the ISS from U.S. contractors for more than a year. The Space Shuttle Program also experienced a multiple-year interruption in service due to the Columbia accident. Moreover, because U.S. and international partners’ astronauts’ lives would be in jeopardy, any such anomaly could undeniably delay a resumption in access to the ISS until NASA and the Contractor investigate, understand, and resolve the issue and NASA approves a resumption in flight operations. Reliance on a single provider in any year poses significant risk to the safety of the crew on board the ISS and to ISS mission assurance. Eliminating single points of failure is a fundamental tenet embedded in human rating safety requirements based on lessons learned over decades. The criticality of crew transportation requires at least two separate methods be continuously available to provide uninterrupted crew transportation and rescue services.

(iii) Crew transportation to the ISS is inescapably susceptible to unplanned and unpredictable external conditions, such as severe weather that may damage ground hardware and delay launch opportunities, as well as uncertainty in geo-political situations. Any unplanned and unpredictable external conditions that may cause delays would cause impacts to the CCtCap planned flight schedules, require additional resources during the delay from both parties, and further complicate the ISS traffic constraints. Reliance on a single point of failure in any year poses significant risk to the safety of the crew on board the ISS and to ISS mission assurance. Eliminating single points of failure is a fundamental tenet embedded in human rating safety requirements based on lessons learned over decades. The criticality of crew transportation requires at least two separate methods be continuously available to provide crew transportation and rescue services.

(iv) There are risks associated with the design and operation of a safe and reliable CTS. Even after achieving certification and performing missions, significant issues may arise between missions. An extensive analysis is conducted after each flight where any issues of concern are assessed, and any corrective actions are performed prior to the next mission. Should a redesign of a component or system become necessary, a delay may be encountered. Boeing is making progress towards completing their CTS, and the vehicles are still in the development and testing stages and, therefore, there are considerable risks associated with the design of a safe and reliable CTS. Due to the inherent complexities involved with the design and development of a safe and reliable CTS, there is a risk that the CTS will be further delayed or will not meet the requirements necessary for NASA certification. Also, the production schedules are challenging and allow minimal margin for resolving technical issues that may be revealed in the rigorous ce1tification process which imposes risk of delay. As previously discussed, we are currently confronted with a scenario in which Boeing is facing technical challenges that are contributing to schedule delays.

Fo1tunately, the availability and readiness of SpaceX is mitigating the risk of unhealthy schedule pressure on a single contractor by allowing the second to provide services. This demonstrates the impo1tance of NASA maintaining at least two CCtCap contractors to provide redundancy for crew transpo1tation services to the ISS. This redundant approach maximizes meeting the program objectives by reducing the overall risk to the program. Regardless of whether Boeing achieves certification and sta1ts providing PCMs in 2023, redundancy is critical, and SpaceX is the only responsible source that can provide that redundancy and mitigate risks associated with unacceptable delays.

Summary The effo1t under the CCtCap contracts is a ve1y complex human spaceflight unde1taking that is subject to significant risks. Ensuring safe, reliable U.S . crew access to the ISS is critical.

SpaceX is the only responsible source cmTently capable of assuring crewed access to the ISS based on the following: (1) SpaceX is cmTently the only contractor that has a CTS that is ce1tified to provide crew rotation missions to the ISS, and the unce1tainty of when the Boeing CTS will achieve ce1t ification and when the system will begin perfonning operational missions presents possible gaps in service to the ISS; and (2) Regardless of whether Boeing achieves ce1tification and struts providing PCMs in 2023, redundancy is critical, and SpaceX is the only responsible source that can provide that redundancy. Having redundancy will help NASA to meet its obligations under Federal law and international agreements and to mitigate risks of unacceptable schedule delays associated with the potential for anomalies or accidents, unforeseen external factors, and the design of the CTS; and, there m·e not any other contractors that are far enough in development of a CTS that could be ce1iified and begin flying crew rotation missions in time to suppo1t the needs for these PCMs.

Awarding up to three additional PCMs to SpaceX will fulfill the Agency's immediate needs and provide the required redundancy necessmy to ensure the continued availability of safe, reliable transpo1iation to the ISS for both planned crew rotations and emergency rescue services until an acquisition strategy can be developed for a competitive procurement of additional crew rotation missions.

6. FAR 6.303-2(b)(6)-A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

A notice to the Government Point of Entiy (GPE) Web site <beta.sam .gov> was published on December 3, 2021, in accordance with FAR Subpa1i 5 .2. This posting info1med potential sources of NASA's intent to awm·d this sole-source Modification and extension to the SpaceX CCtCap contract. The results of this synopsis m·e sunnnm·ized in Section 10 below.

7. FAR 6.303-2(b)(7) -A determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The Contracting Officer's signature on this document indicates that the Contracting Officer has detennined that the anticipated cost to the government will be fair and reasonable.

SpaceX shall be required to submit a proposal to be evaluated and negotiated by the Government. Prior to execution of the contractual instrument, a proposal analysis will be perfo1med. The proposal analysis will include but not be limited to a comparison of historical prices that are cmTently in the CCtCap contract to the prices proposed for the additional PCMs to ensure that the final agreed-to price for the contract action is fair and reasonable.

8. FAR 6.303-2(b)(8) - Description of the market research conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons a market research was not conducted:

An RFI was issued on October 20, 2021, with a closing date of November 19, 2021, to solicit info1mation from potential sources for Commercial Crew S ace Trans 01iation Se1v ices to and from the ISS. As a result of the RFI,

- responded with capability statements to express an interest in perfo1ming Crew Transpo1iation Se1v ices. The capability statements were dispositioned as follows:

fu addition, NASA technical expe1is examined existing SAAs related to launch and human space transpo1iation, similar ISS visiting vehicle contracts and other similar NASA launch contracts to assess industiy capabilities as to their readiness to provide crew rotation services to the ISS. The NASA technical expe1is detennined there were no other domestic commercial companies that have made enough significant progress in the DDTE of an integrated crewed system capable of docking to the ISS within our needed schedule, which aligns with the info1mation obtained from the RFI responses.

9. FAR 6.303-2{b)(9) -Any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

Further suppo1t ing other than competitive procedures, NASA has an unusual and compelling urgency to acquire the aforementioned services, as authorized by 10 U.S.C. §2304 (c) (2) .

Nominally, SpaceX requires a - lead time between ATP and flight but has been able to provide an expedited lead time at additional cost. To suppo1t consecutive SpaceX missions, if needed, beginning in September 2023, additional missions need to be added to the contract ~ ble. ATP for the first additional PCM should have been provided by- and is needed by - and for the next two PCMs.

Similarly, and consistent with 10 U.S.C. §2304 (c)(4), the U.S. has obligations under international agreements with our ISS Paitners to provide for crew transpo1tation to and from the ISS for Canadian, European, and Japanese crews. Under the legally binding international agreements that implement the ISS pa1tnership, the U.S. is responsible for providing transpo1tation to and from the ISS, including emergency rescue capability, for both its own crew and the crew of other ISS International Paitners. Specifically, the U.S. is required to "provide or anange for provision of crew rotation" and "provide or an ange for provision of crew and rescue capability" under Alticle 6. 1.a. 22 and 23 of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Japan, Section 6. 1.a.20 and 21 of the Memorandum of Understanding with the European Space Agency, and Section 6. 1.b.14 and 15 of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Canadian Space Agency. NASA and its partners cannot maintain crew on board the ISS without assured transpo1tation and rescue capability.

Without safe, reliable, human-rated transportation systems, the ISS cannot operate, and the U.S. is not able to meet its international obligations. Due to technical challenges and associated risks discussed above, as well as the fact that there are no other companies capable of suppo1t ing these crew rotation services during the needed timeframe, it has been detennined that SpaceX is the only responsible source that can cunently provide crew rotation services and is the only contractor that can provide the redundancy needed to ensure NASA continues to meet our obligations under international agreements with our ISS Paitners.

10. FAR 6.303-2(b)(10) - A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed an interest in writing in the acquisition:

As described in Section 8 above, several sources responded to the RFI (issued on October 20, 2021, with a closing date of November 19, 2021) with capability statements to express an interest in performing future Crew Transpo1tation Services. Based on the review of the RFI responses, it has been detennined that SpaceX is the only company that currently has the capability to provide crew rotation missions to the ISS.

A notice of NASA's intent to award this sole-source action was synopsized on the GPE Web site <SAM.gov> per FAR Subpait 5.2 (See Section 6 above). No sources expressed an interest in response to the NOI (issued on December 3, 2021, with a closing date of December 18, 2021).

11. FAR 6.303-2(b)(11) – A statement of actions, if any, the Agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

NASA will continue to examine the market in the future for alternative solutions or new sources before executing any subsequent acquisitions for the same requirements.

NASA will take into consideration information received in response to the RFI when developing an acquisition strategy for any procurement of additional Commercial Crew Space Transportation Services.

Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) Contract, NNK14MA74C

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

SIGNATURE PAGE

I certify that the facts presented in this justification are accurate and complete.

Deborah Cole Technical Representative

I hereby certify that the above justification is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Brian Hine1i h Contracting Officer

CONCURRENCES:

Laura B. Rochester Procurement Officer

Burton R. Summerfield Competition Advocate Kennedy Space Center

I.,_ Jason T. Detko Head of Contracting Activity, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate

I.,_ Jason T. Detko Agency Competition Advocate

Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) Contract, NNK14MA74C

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

SIGNATURE PAGE

APPROVAL:

Karla S . Jackson Senior Procurement Executive