Juba_Partner_Liaison_Security_Office_(PLSO)_J&A_SIGNED.pdf

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPENCOMPETITION (J&A)

TO: Jack M. Adrien, USAID/South Sudan Contracting Officer

FROM: Susan C. Easley, USAID/South Sudan Supervisory Executive Officer (EXO)

DATE: November 1, 2016

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN

COMPETITION (J&A)

1. This document sets forth the facts and rationale justifying the use of other than full and open competition, in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-1, “Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.”

This document was prepared by the USAID/South Sudan Supervisory EXO, Susan C. Easley

2. The nature or description of the action being approved:

This is a request to approve a sole source award to security firm, Warrior Security, for an estimated value of $1,000,000 and period of performance of 18 months. Under this action Warrior Security shall:

a. coordinate with and provide security support to Mission’s implementing partners (IPs) in countries where the PLSO is established;

b. provide updates to the USAID Mission Director, Office of Security (SEC), and applicable geographic Bureaus regarding all matters related to the security of Mission IPs; and

c. remain responsible for the daily execution and administration of the partner-focused security program.

3. Description of the supplies or services required, including an estimated value:

The basic function of the PLSO is to act as a liaison to and facilitate communications between the IPs operating in South Sudan enabling the IPs to better use and share unclassified and generally publicly available security information. Greater access to available information will allow the IPs to make more informed decisions about risks and their own security. This will entail proactive engagement on the part of the PLSO including meetings, site visits, analysis, and written communications.

The PLSO shall serve as the USAID liaison to the EXO for IP security matters and will serve as the primary security point of contact between USAID and its IPs (i.e., contractors and grantees) on matters relating to security. Activities will include:

Juba Partner Liaison Security Office (PLSO) Justification and Approval for Other than Full and Open Competition (J&A)

ACTIVITY FREQUENCY

Maintaining coordination with pertinent in-country entities such as the United Nations (UN), international NGOs, forums, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and other international donors that are not IPs for the purpose of sharing and aggregating security information among partners working in the same environment. Information collected will be shared with relevant USAID offices at the Mission and in Washington.

Ongoing

Staying informed of USAID and Embassy safety and security policies, practices, and notifications, especially as they apply to or affect USAID’s IPs.

Ongoing

Establishing a formal online community for information-sharing among USAID IPs to support the exchange of pertinent security-related information.

Ongoing

Creating and maintaining templates for standardized documentation and reporting of security incidents to USAID, if international NGOs do not already have their own templates

Ongoing

Developing and maintaining a bulk Short Message Service (SMS) text message notification system and a secure and commonly available internet messaging app to contact IPs during emergency situations in South Sudan.

NOTE: Notifications shall include the disclaimers required by the contract.

Ongoing

Developing and managing an “information cascade” (e.g., phone tree and messaging system) system to help USAID account for its IPs during emergency situations.

Ongoing

Developing and maintaining a database of South Sudan incidents reported by USAID IPs.

Ongoing

Developing and maintaining a contact information database for USAID Chiefs of Party, their deputies, and Security Managers from the respective IPs operating in South Sudan. This database will include contact information, project site location, and may also request (but not require) staff member nationalities.

Ongoing

Providing immediate notification to USAID (all relevant offices at the mission and in Washington, D.C.) regarding security incidents directly affecting IPs. This will include the reporting of the incident date, time, and location of the incident, as well the type of incident and all information relevant to the incident.

As needed

Drafting and distributing regular security information updates to IPs, USAID staff (at the Mission and in Washington, D.C. including USAID’s Office of Security in Washington, DC (SEC/W)) based on information received from IPs, security databases, systems, and other relevant sources.

These update reports should include an analysis of trends.

NOTE: Any security information that is specific, prescriptive and directive in nature and requires an individual to take or not take a security related action will include disclaimers required by the contract.

Weekly, at a minimum

Producing an IP incident report for the Mission Director (MD), and all relevant USAID offices including SEC/W, which reflects security incidents reported by IPs. The report should include an analysis of trends.

Weekly

Producing an activity report for the MD, and all relevant USAID offices, which contains pertinent information regarding the Contractor’s activities and services provided to IPs and security issues and concerns communicated by IPs.

Weekly

Participating in regular meetings with the EXO and other relevant USAID offices at the Mission to report on PLSO and IP activities.

Weekly

Organizing IP risk-management meetings including formulating agendas, soliciting topics of interest from IPs, developing presentations and training materials, and arranging guest speakers and soliciting feedback on PLSO services.

Quarterly, at a minimum

Meeting with and providing informational briefings to newly arrived USAID IPs.

As needed

Providing information on available security training programs to IPs. As needed

Informing USAID on potential and actual security factors affecting USAID operations.

As needed

Participating as a member of the Overseas Security Advisory Council

(OSAC).

As needed

Provide non-prescriptive guidance to IPs regarding security upgrades and security-related contract modifications in coordination with the Contracting Officer Representative (COR).

As requested by IPs

Sharing non-prescriptive best practices in security plan development or updates among IPs.

As requested by IPs

4. Statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) permits an agency to use other than competitive procedures in acquiring goods or services where the agency’s requirement is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals. Thus, in light of ongoing fighting, intercommunal violence, and violent crime as well as per FAR 6.302-2(b)(2), delay in award of a contract to provide security support would result in exposing USAID IPs to serious injury.

5. A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition that requires use of the authority cited:

Although FAR 6.302-2(c)(2) requires that agencies request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the circumstances, an agency may limit a procurement to the only firm it reasonably believes can properly perform the work in the time available. Thus, only Warrior Security has the demonstrated capacity to meet the agency’s unusual and compelling urgent needs based on the fact that it is already conducting this work in neighboring Kenya for the USAID mission and is operational in South Sudan and in Juba, the capital. Lastly, whereas the Mission considered a direct award to local contractors, no local contractor demonstrated the non-prescriptive advisory capacity to provide holistic security and safety related support to a broad range of conflict mitigation, democracy, education, health, economic, and humanitarian activities implemented through USAID/South Sudan’s IPs.

6. Description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 5.202.

As per FAR 5.202(a)(2), the Contracting Officer need not submit the notice required by FAR

5.201 based on a determination that the proposed contract action is made under the conditions described in FAR 6.302-2 and the Government would be seriously injured if the agency complies with the time periods specified in FAR 5.203.

7. A determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable per information acquired on the level of local capacity available provided by the USAID/South Sudan’s EXO coupled with basing the feasibility of the requirement against a PLSO established by neighboring USAID/Kenya.

8. Description of the market research conducted, and the results or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted:

Specific market research was not conducted given the unusual and compelling urgency with which the Mission intends to launch the 18-month project. As stated elsewhere in this document, ongoing fighting, intercommunal violence, and violent crime as well as per FAR 6.302-2(b)(2), delay in award of a contract to provide security support would result in exposing USAID IPs to serious injury. It is USAID/South Sudan’s intention that a full and open competitive process will be used to award subsequent work in this area.

9. Other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

Since the outbreak of the recent violent conflict in December 2013, South Sudan has experienced a continuous rise in crime. This trend can be directly attributed to continued political instability, a failing economy, enormous displacement of civilians, weak or nonfunctional institutions, and widespread corruption. Years of violent civil war, tribal conflict, and political unrest have provided the population with ready access to weapons and the knowledge of how to use them. Violent crimes (murder, armed robbery, home invasions, cattle raiding, kidnapping) and non-violent petty theft and fraud are pervasive both in and outside the capital, Juba. In addition, neighborhoods where government leaders, business professionals, non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, and foreign diplomats reside have seen a marked increase in criminal activity as the economy continues to worsen. This coupled with rising frustrations and tensions between both government and civilian groups against the international community including the United States has led to an increasingly threatening and insecure environment in South Sudan. The expectation is that the political and security situation will remain volatile for the foreseeable future.

USAID partner international staff members have begun to return to South Sudan following the July 2016 renewed unrest in Juba that resulted in widespread looting and violence targeting civilians including members of the international community. Due to continuing violence and a

14. Clearance

//Cleared via email// November 14, 2016

Mark L. Driver Legal Counsel

Date