SOL-267-11-000003 rtf.doc

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Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum RFP No. SOL-267-11-000003

ISSUANCE DATE:

April 8, 2011

DEADLINE FOR QUESTIONS:

April 20, 2011; 4:00 P.M., Eastern Standard Time

CLOSING DATE AND TIME:

May 8, 2011, 4:00 P.M., Eastern Standard Time

SUBJECT:

Request for Proposals (RFP) Number SOL-267-11-000003 Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission to Iraq is seeking proposals from qualified organizations to implement the Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum, as described in Section C of the attached RFP. The purpose of the Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum is to empower and build capacity of Iraqi sub-national government units to effectively respond to the needs of their constituencies.

The base period of performance for this contract is four (4) years, plus one (1) one-year option. This contract is expected to be awarded not later than September 30, 2011.

This procurement will be conducted under full and open competition, pursuant to Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (48 CFR Chapter 1). All types of organizations are eligible to compete. If your organization decides to submit a proposal in response to this solicitation, it must be submitted in accordance with Section L of this RFP. USAID/Iraq anticipates awarding one cost reimbursement term-type contract as a result of this solicitation covering an estimated period of four base years, plus one one-year option, subject to availability of funds and successful performance. The estimated level of effort for this procurement is 20,000 – 21,000 person-days for the base period, 2,500 – 3,000 for option year 1, with the following distribution per project component: Component 1: 15%; Component 2: 50%; and Component 3: 35%.. Offerors must propose the level of effort they believe is realistic and reasonable for the work described herein.

USAID encourages the participation to the maximum extent possible of small business concerns, veteran owned small business, service-disabled veteran small business, HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned small business concerns in this activity as the prime Contractor or as subcontractors.

If substantive questions are received which affect the response to the solicitation, or if changes are made to the closing date and time, as well as other aspects of the RFP, this solicitation will be amended. Any amendments to this solicitation will be issued and posted on the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website. Offerors are encouraged to check this website (http://www.fbo.gov) periodically.

An Interested Vendor List is not included in this solicitation. Offerors can register and use the Interested Vendor List (IVL) on the FBO page, so that firms can contact one another for consideration of teaming arrangements and/or small business subcontracting opportunities in response to this solicitation.

It is the responsibility of the recipient of this solicitation to ensure that the solicitation has been received from the Internet in its entirety. USAID bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from download or conversion processes. If your organization decides to submit a proposal in response to this solicitation, it must be submitted by the designated closing date and time and as indicated in Block 9 of the RFP Cover Page (Standard Form 33). Proposals received after the closing date and time will be processed as late and handled in accordance with FAR 52.215-1. Proposals in response to this solicitation shall be valid for 120 days.

Only electronic submissions will be accepted, at the following address: Baghdadsolicitations@usaid.gov. No other forms of submission will be accepted. Please note that the designated initial point of entry to the Government infrastructure for proposal submission is the USAID/Washington Internet server.

Any questions regarding this RFP are to be submitted in writing to the attention of Mr. Mohammad Kamal Ayub and Ms. Aissatou Kane via e-mail at KAyub@usaid.gov and akane@usaid.gov,respectively, by the date and time specified above. Oral instructions or explanations given before the award of the contract resulting from this solicitation will not be binding. Answers to all offerors’ questions will be provided in writing, via solicitation amendment.

Please pay careful attention to, and complete in full, RFP Section K – Representations, Certifications and Acknowledgements.

Offerors should carefully consider Section L – Instructions to Offerors and Section M – Evaluation Factors for Award, Sections B through I of the solicitation will become substantive part of the anticipated contract with blanks to be completed by the Contracting Officer upon award. Proposals must be signed by an official who is authorized to bind the offeror’s organization.

Issuance of this solicitation does not in any way obligate the U.S. Government to award a contract nor does it commit the U.S. Government to pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission of a proposal. Furthermore, the Government reserves the right to reject any and all offers, if such action is considered to be in the best interest of the U.S. Government. USAID anticipates award of one contract under this solicitation.

Thank you for your interest in USAID programs.

Sincerely, Mohammad Kamal Ayub

Contracting Officer

TABLE OF CONTENT

10ABBREVIATIONS

11PART I – THE SCHEDULE

11SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

11B.1

PURPOSE

11B.2

CONTRACT TYPE

11B.3

ESTIMATED COST, FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

12B.4

BUDGET LINE ITEMS

13B.5

INDIRECT COSTS

13B.6

ADVANCE UNDERSTANDINGS ON CEILING INDIRECT COST

13RATES AND FINAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR INDIRECT COSTS

14B.7

COST REIMBURSABLE

14B.8

PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

15SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

35SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING

35D.1

AIDAR 752.7009 MARKING (JAN 1993)

35D.2

BRANDING STRATEGY

35D.3

BRANDING AND MARKING POLICY

36SECTION E – INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

36E.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

36E.2

INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

36E.3

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

38SECTION F – DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

38F.1NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

38F.2

PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

38F.3

PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

38F.4

TECHNICAL DIRECTION AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE USAID OFFICIALS

38F.5

AUTHORIZED WORK DAY / WEEK

38F.6

LEVEL OF EFFORT

40F.7 REPORTS, plans, DELIVERABLES AND expected results

48F.8

AIDAR 752.242-70 PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS (OCT 2007)

49F.9 AIDAR 752.7005 SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE DOCUMENTS (JAN 2004)

51F.10

KEY PERSONNEL

52SECTION G – CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

52G.1

CONTRACTING OFFICER'S AUTHORITY

52G.2 TECHNICAL DIRECTION and relationship with usaid

53G.3

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

53G.4

INVOICES

54G.5

AIDAR 752.7003 DOCUMENTATION FOR PAYMENT (NOV 1998)

56SECTION H – SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

56H.1

NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

56H.2

AIDAR 752.7004 EMERGENCY LOCATOR INFORMATION (JUL 1997)

56H.3 aidar 752.228-3 WORKER’S COMPENSATION INSURANCE (DEFENSE

56BASE ACT)

57H.4

INSURANCE AND SERVICES

57H.5

AIDAR 752.7007 PERSONNEL COMPENSATION (JULY 2007)

58H.6

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL COMPENSATION

60H.7 AIDAR 752.231-71 SALARY SUPPLEMENTS FOR HOST GOVERNMENT (HG) EMPLOYEES (OCT 1998)

60H.8

AIDAR 752.7031 LEAVE AND HOLIDAYS (OCT 1989)

63H.9 aidar 752.228-70 MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC) SERVICES

63(July 2007)

63H.10

TRANSITION OF KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITIES

64H.11

USAID DISABILITY POLICY (DECEMBER 2004)

64H.12

AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

64H.13

EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORISM FINANCING

64H.14

NONEXPENDABLE PROPERTY PURCHASES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES

65H.15

GOVERNMENT FURNISHED FACILITIES OR PROPERTY

65H.16 USAID IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 508 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND FEDERAL ACQUISITION CIRCULAR (FAC) 97-27 "ELECTRONIC AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACCESSIBILITY

65H.17 SUBCONTRACTING PLAN AND THE SF 294 – SUBCONTRACTING REPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS AND SF 295 – SUMMARY CONTRACTING REPORT

66H.18

CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACT

66H.19

DISCLOSURE OF OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF A TERRORIST COUNTRY

67H.20 SUBCONTRACTING WITH FIRMS THAT ARE OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF A TERRORIST COUNTRY

67H.21

REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES (JULY 2007)

68H.22

GRANTS UNDER USAID CONTRACTS

70H.23 AIDAR 752-209-71 Organizational Conflicts of Interest Discovered After Award (June 1993)

70H.24

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

70H.25

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS AND REPORTING

70H.26

PRESS RELATIONS

70H.27

USAID/IRAQ A&A NOTICES

70H.28

GENDER CONSIDERATION

71H.29

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

71H.30

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT -- IMPROPER BUSINESS PRACTICES

71H.31

LIFE SUPPORT AND SECURITY SERVICES

72H.32

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-12 (HSPD-12) (SEPTEMBER 2006)

73H.33

ACCESS TO DOD FACILITIES

73H.34

USF-I BADGES

74H.35 SPECIAL IRAQ CLAUSE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) COMMON ACCESS CARD (CAC) (SEPTEMBER 2007)

74H.36

SYNCHRONIZED PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL TRACKER (SPOT)-LOA REQUIREMENT

75H.37

SPECIAL INCIDENT REPORTING (SEP 2010)

76H.38

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL APPROVAL

77H.39

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

78PART II – CONTRACT CLAUSES

78SECTION I – CONTRACT CLAUSES

78I.1

NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

80I.2

NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED IN FULL TEXT

80I.2.1

52.203-13 CONTRACTOR CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT (APR 2010)

83I.2.2 52.216-7 Allowable Cost and Payment (DEC 2002)

87I.2.3

52.217-8 OPTION TO EXTEND SERVICES (NOV 1999)

87I.2.4

52.217-9 OPTION TO EXTEND THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT (MAR 2000)

87I.2.5 52.225-19 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN A DESIGNATED OPERATIONAL AREA OR SUPPORTING A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR MISSION OUTSIDE THE U.S. (MAR 2008)

93I.2.6 USE OF SYNCHRONIZED PREDEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL TRACKER (SPOT) FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORTING A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR MISION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES (SUPPLEMENT TO FAR 52.225-19)

94I.2.7

52.227-23 RIGHTS TO PROPOSAL DATA (TECHNICAL) (JUN 1987)

94I.2.8

52.229-8 TAXES--FOREIGN COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS (MAR 1990)

94I.2.9

52.243-7 NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES (APR 1984)

96I.2.10 52.244-2 Subcontracts - Alternate I (JUN 2007)

98I.2.11 752.202-1 Definitions (JAN 1990)

100I.2.12 752.211-70 Language and measurement (JUN 1992)

101I.2.13 752.219-8 Utilization of Small Business Concerns and Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns

101I.2.14

752.219-70 USAID MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ PROGRAM (JULY 2007)

102I.2.15

752.219-71 MENTOR REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION (JULY 2007)

102I.2.16 752.225-9 Buy American Act - Trade Agreements Act - Balance of Payments Program.

102I.2.17

752.225-71 LOCAL PROCUREMENT (FEB 1997)

102I.2.18 752.228-7 Insurance - Liability to Third Persons

103I.2.19 752.229-70 Federal, State and Local Taxes

103I.2.20 752.245-70 Government Property - USAID Reporting Requirements

104I.2.21

752.7001 Biographical Data (JUL 1997)

104I.2.22

752.7002 Travel and Transportation (JAN 1990)

109I.2.23

752.7003 Documentation for Payment (NOV 1998)

111I.2.24

752.7006 Notices (APR 1984)

111I.2.25

752.7008 Use of Government Facilities or Personnel (APR 1984)

111I.2.26

752.7010 Conversion of U.S. Dollars to Local Currency (APR 1984)

112I.2.27

752.7011 Orientation and Language Training (APR 1984)

112I.2.28

752.7013 Contractor-Mission Relationships (OCT 1989)

113I.2.29

752.7014 Notice of Changes in Travel Regulations (JAN 1990)

113I.2.30

752.7015 Use of Pouch Facilities (JUL 1997)

114I.2.31

752.7018 Health and Accident Coverage for USAID Participant Trainees (JAN 1999)

116I.2.32

752.7019 Participant Training (JAN 1999)

116I.2.33

752.7023 Required Visa Form for USAID Participants (APR 1984)

116I.2.34

752.7025 Approvals (APR 1984)

116I.2.35

752.7027 Personnel (DEC 1990)

118I.2.36

752.7028 Differential and Allowances (JUL 1996)

121I.2.37

752.7029 Post Privileges (JUL 1993)

121I.2.38

752.7032 International Travel Approval and Notification Requirements (JAN 1990)

121I.2.39

752.7033 Physical Fitness (JUL 1997)

123I.2.40

752.7101 VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES (jun 2008)

126PART III – LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

126SECTION J – LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

127PART IV – REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

127SECTION K - REPRESENTATIONS, INSTRUCTIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

127K.1

NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

127K.2

52.204-8 ANNUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS (FEB 2009)

130K.3

52.222-21 PROHIBITION OF SEGREGATED FACILITIES (FEB 1999)

131K.4

52.230-1 COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NOTICES AND CERTIFICATION (OCTOBER 2008)

133K.5

52.230-7 PROPOSAL DISCLOSURE--COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICE CHANGES (APR 2005)

133K.6

INSURANCE - IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY

133K.7

AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATORS

133k.8

SIGNATURE

135SECTION L - INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

135L.1

52.252-1 SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

135L.2

52.215-1 INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS—COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION

135(JAN 2004)

139L.3

52.216-1 TYPE OF CONTRACT (APR 1984)

139L.4

52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (SEP 2006)

139L.5

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS

140L.6

PROPOSAL SUBMISSION

141L.7

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

146L.8

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COST PROPOSAL

154SECTION M - EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

154M.1

52.252-1 SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY

154REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

154M.2

GENERAL INFORMATION

155M.3

DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE RANGE

155M.4

TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

157M.5

PRICE/COST EVALUATION

158M.6

SOURCE SELECTION

158M.7

CONTRACTING WITH SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS

159ATTACHMENT J.1 PAST PERFORMANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

161ATTACHMENT J.2 BUDGET FORMAT TEMPLATE

162ATTACHMENT J.3 BRANDING AND MARKING STRATEGY

167ATTACHMENT J.4 CONTRACTOR BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET

168ATTACHMENT J.5 MODEL SUBCONTRACTING PLAN OUTLINE

172ATTACHMENT J.6 Additional Background

188ATTACHMENT J.7 TAQADUM RESULTS FRAMEWORK

ABBREVIATIONS

AAPD

Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive

ADS

Automated Directives System

AIDAR

Agency for International Development Acquisition Regulation

CCR

Central Contractor Registration

CFR

Code of Federal Regulation

CO

Contracting Officer

CPFF

Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee

COTR

Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative

D&B

Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.

DBA

Defense Base Act

DEC

Development Experience Clearinghouse

DUNS

Data Universal Numbering System

EFT

Electronic Funds Transfer

FAR

Federal Acquisition Regulation

GAO

General Accounting Office

HSPD-12

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12

IT

Information Technology

M/IRM

Office of Information Resource Management

MEDEVAC

Medical Evacuation

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

ORCA

Online Representations and Certifications Application

PDF

Portable Document Format

PIV

Personal Identity Verification

PMP

Performance Management Plan

RFP

Request for Proposals

SOW

Statement of Work

TIN

Taxpayer Identification Number

US

United States of America

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USAID/W

USAID Washington

USG

United States Government

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

B.1

PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to empower and build capacity of Iraqi subnational government units to effectively respond to the needs of their constituencies.

B.2

CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) reimbursement, term type contract of four (4) years base period and one (1) one-year option period. For the consideration set forth below, the Contractor shall provide Level of Effort as described in Section F.6.

B.3

ESTIMATED COST, FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for the base period and option periods combined hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $

. The fixed fee, if any, is $

. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is

(b) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for the base period hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $

. The fixed fee, if any, is

. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is $

(c) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for the option year 1 hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $

. The fixed fee, if any, is

. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is $

(e) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is $TBD. The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.

(f) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through [To be inserted at the time of award].

B.4

BUDGET LINE ITEMS

TOTAL ESTIMATED COST

TOTAL COST PLUS FIXED FEE

These are costs that support all three project components and cannot be segregated for CLINS 001-003, such as Security and Life Support.

(*) Any Indirect Costs and fees applicable to CLINS 004-005 and CLINS 004-006, respectively.

B.5

INDIRECT COSTS

Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs will be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases:

Description Rate Base Type Period

% 1/ 1/ 1/

% 2/ 2/ 2/

% 3/ 3/ 3/

1/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

2/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

3/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

B.6

ADVANCE UNDERSTANDINGS ON CEILING INDIRECT COST

RATES AND FINAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR INDIRECT COSTS

(a) Reimbursement for indirect costs will be at the lower of the negotiated final (or re-determined) rates or the following ceiling rates:

Description Rate Base Period

% 1/ 1/

% 2/ 2/

% 3/ 3/

1/ Base of Application:

Period:

2/ Base of Application:

Period:

3/ Base of Application

Period

(b) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

(c) This understanding will not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.7

COST REIMBURSABLE

Allowable costs will be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment (DEC 2002), FAR 52.216-8, Fixed Fee (MAR 1997), if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment (NOV 1998).

In addition, the requirement and conditions concerning estimated cost and funding apply as detailed in FAR 52.232-22, Limitation of Funds (APR 1984).

B.8

PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

Monthly payment of fixed fee will be paid in proportion to the LOE delivered during that month and pursuant to FAR 52.216-8, it will be made upon receipt of a proper invoice. In the event the contractor has not delivered the total LOE at the expiration of the contract period, the fixed fee will be adjusted proportionately to the LOE delivered. For example, if the contractor has expended 85% of the total level of effort, then the contractor is entitled to 85% of the fixed fee amount, provided that the performance has been satisfactory.

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

This section provides background and describes in detail the requirements of the USAID/Iraq Governance Strengthening Project.

C.1.1 Development Challenge

The creation and maintenance of social and political stability are the primary challenges for the Government of Iraq (GoI). The GoI has identified one of their greatest risks to social stability is their ability to improve the delivery of basic services (electricity, water, infrastructure, etc.) to the citizens of Iraq. Public discontent continues to grow over the perceived and actual lack of progress in improving service delivery. Despite the fact that the line Ministries are exclusively responsible for service delivery, the provincial authorities, as the closest government unit to the people, are increasingly becoming the target of public wrath. As stated in the Iraqi National Development Plan (2010-2014), “decentralization can foster greater accountability and responsiveness in service provision and strengthen citizens’ ability to participate in the decision-making process and claim their rights.”

The bureaucratic machinery of the Iraqi Federal Ministries continues to embody a centralist approach to governance, which inhibits the decentralization of authorities to provincial and local governments in Iraq. Iraq is in the process of transitioning from a unitary to a federalist state. The Constitution and the 2008 Provincial Powers Law (PPL) set broad parameters for decentralized governance. However, the Government of Iraq has struggled at all levels to develop, finance, and implement programs and projects designed to meet local service needs in a timely manner. Over the past three years the Provincial Governments have gained relatively broad powers to manage local affairs, but they continue to lack specific authorities, capacity and resources to deliver basic municipal services. Despite the passage of several important decentralization laws and commitment within the Iraqi National Development Plan additional reform is needed along with continued support to build the capacity and systems in subnational government institutions.

The end of Iraq’s Provincial Councils first electoral term in office (2009-2013) and the beginning of their second (2013-2017) is a critical period in their development. This is a period where practices and precedents under new authorities will become institutionalized and will heavily influence the long-term trajectory of Iraq’s decentralized, federal system of government. The next four years will offer a “window of opportunity” for international donor assistance organizations to focus their efforts on helping Iraqis define and refine the roles and responsibilities of provincial governments and the overall division of labor between national and sub-national governing units in service delivery. There is a critical need to guide the development of provincial governments in Iraq along a more sustainable democratic path, thereby strengthening Iraq’s overall democratic transition over the next five years. A critical development challenge is to decentralize tangible service delivery authorities to provincial and local government, while also deconcentrating authorities within line Ministries to improve service delivery to citizens.

The Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum (“Progress” in Arabic) will assist Iraq’s transition to a more decentralized federal system of government. The project’s operating hypothesis is that through decentralization Iraq’s provincial and local governments’ will be more effective in responding to community needs, improve the perception of state legitimacy and stability, provide greater accountability and transparency of local authorities, improve efficiency in delivering provincial government based services, and increase citizens participation in local decision-making. The Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum will assist to address the challenges of:

1. Reforming the legal framework governing Iraq’s federal system by clarifying and expanding the responsibilities, authorities and resources to be decentralized from the central government to the provincial and local governments;

2. Enhancing the institutionalization of decentralized authorities within provincial and local governments and improving resource management; and

3. Leveraging elected provincial officials constituent support and oversight powers to hold central line ministries accountable for delivery of services not decentralized.

C.1.2 Background

Legal and Political Structures

Since 2003, Iraq has undergone major transformations in governance despite the significant security threats that still plague the country. The constitutional structures of government have changed in major ways several times, with sovereignty passing from the United States led Coalition Provisional Authority, to an interim Iraqi government under the “Transitional Administrative Law,” and finally to a fully sovereign Iraqi government operating under a popularly ratified constitution of 2005.

The 2005 constitution outlines a number of changes to historic governing norms—ones that (1) protect basic democratic liberties; (2) institute checks and balances among legislative, executive and judicial branches of government; and (3) distribute power across a federal model of government, providing the central government with certain “exclusive authorities” and decentralizing power to autonomous units of government at the regional and provincial levels.

Caught in the throes of a growing insurgency, the new Government of Iraq that took office in 2006 was slow to enact necessary implementing laws required by the constitution to codify the framework of a decentralized federal state. As a result, state operations remain rooted in Iraq’s unitary history, reflecting customs and practices familiar to a centrally planned and controlled state. Thus, implementation of decentralization has progressed slowly; however, slow progress on implementation should not be confused for a lack of substantive political will toward decentralization. Since 2006, key decision makers have demonstrated a strong commitment to decentralization through legal and policy commitments, budget, legislative, regulatory, judicial, electoral and constitutional actions. For example, in 2008 the Provincial Powers Law was enacted that decentralized additional authorities to Provinces and in 2010 the Iraqi National Development Plan (NDP) was approved, which emphasizes a strategic focus on decentralization of the Iraqi Government.

Beginning in 2006 the GoI initiated an important decentralization of budget allocations by transferring reconstruction funds directly to provincial governments — funds to provide short-term (one year) needs within the province. The budget account was called the Accelerated Reconstruction and Development Program (ARDP), and each annual General Federal Budget Law has since upheld the same authorization for provincial reconstruction funding. Annual allocations for the ARDP are based on population and prioritized according to public service needs. Over the past few years on average ARDP allocations constituted around 14% of total GoI capital investment budget for provincial use. According to the 2010-2014 NDP the ARDP allocations are anticipated to be on a swift upward trajectory reaching around 18%. According to the Minister of Finance (MoF) the draft 2011 federal budget indicates $2.6 billion for ARDP allocations, which is a 20% increase from 2010 levels ($2.16 billion).

As of 2010 the provincial governments possess meaningful resources of their own and have an improving track record in making budgetary and investment decisions independent from central government line Ministries. In addition to the ARDP the federal budget includes allocations of significant extra petro-dollar revenues to be directly provided to provinces. The first of these resources have been received in Basrah and for some provinces the petro-dollar revenues will be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Without continued technical assistance in strategic planning, prioritizing project lists and budgeting, this significant increase in resources will inevitably overwhelm the growing yet limited capacity for budget execution at the provincial level and result in greater opportunity for corruption and further erode public trust in the GoI.

As Iraq undertakes this generational effort to sort out the balance of power between the center and periphery, more immediate action is required to meet the increasing public demand for improved basic services (electricity, water, infrastructure, etc.). Almost every central line Ministry, including key service-providing ministries (health, education, electricity, etc.) has regional branches in each province managed by Director Generals. The central government—through the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works—controls even universally localized services such as water, sewage, trash pick-up and street lighting. The systematic collaboration between Provincial Councils, Governors, and line Ministry Director Generals remains hampered by unclear legal authorities and basic administrative capacity of the implementing staff.

For the stated goals, within the National Development Plan, for decentralization to be fully materialized provincial and local officials require improved ability to legislate, plan, budget, and manage resources to meet community needs. Where the central government retains responsibility for service delivery, provincial and local councils need to make better use of their monitoring and legislative oversight powers to hold executive units accountable for results. For additional background on the legal and political structures see Section J.

Past USAID Program Engagements

Between 2003 and 2010, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has supported programs that have directly assisted the Iraqi government’s transition from its former unitary system to a federal system. It must be noted that throughout this period there was a high threat security situation in the country that significantly affect the operational capacity of USAID and its implementers and their approaches for delivering development assistance. Understanding that, the following three programs gradually evolved from applying rudimentary technical assistance to an increasingly complex capacity building approach. The programs have addressed issues of service delivery, implementation of decentralization reforms and efforts to deconcentrate powers within select line ministries:

Local Governance Program (LGP)

In 2003 USAID began implementing the first of three consecutive projects to build local government policy and capacity, and increase citizen participation to facilitate Iraq’s transition to democracy. The first iteration of the Local Governance Program (LGP-I, 2003–2005) helped Iraqis define the role local government would play within their shifting political structure. When the multinational Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was replaced by an elected transitional government in January, 2005, Provincial Council (PC) elections were held. LGP-I helped strengthen local government by training 85% of the council members on their new roles and responsibilities. When phase two of the Local Governance Program began (LGP-II, 2005–2009), Iraq was governed under a transitional government and writing its constitution. Through regional workshops in all 18 provinces the program allowed Provincial Council members to meet with the constitution’s drafters and provide input on the constitution. In October 2005, Iraq adopted its constitution, which established a federal political system that includes national and local governments. However, the constitution addressed these roles broadly, indicating that further elaboration would be provided by later legislation. In January 2009 USAID launched the LGP-III (2009–06/2011), which currently works in 15 provinces, with an emphasis on the implementation of the Provincial Powers Law of 2008. Specifically, LGP-III provides technical assistance to provincial government to strengthen their capacity in planning, budgeting, legislating and oversight over provision of basic municipal services. This program will come to an end in June 2011 and the Governance Strengthening – Taqadum program will serve as the next generation of USAID’s local governance program.

Community Action Program (CAP)

Since 2003, USAID’s Community Action Program works at the grassroots level to foster citizen involvement and give communities the opportunity to activate their skills and mobilize resources to solve community priorities and local development needs. During the height of the insurgency movement in Iraq, this program played an important role in the U.S. Governments counter insurgency strategy. As the constitution was established and provincial elections held, CAP has continued to support grass roots programs but works to link these activities with the new sub-national structures of the Iraqi government. The program facilitates the creation and training of community action groups responsible for identifying and prioritizing community needs, mobilizing community and other resources, and monitoring project implementation. Additionally, the CAP program helps mitigate violence, providing citizens with an opportunity to participate in decision-making and local development initiatives that affect their everyday lives. The CAP program also assists victims of military operations in Iraq through the Congressionally-mandated Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund. It provides assistance to innocent victims of war or their families, either with direct medical help, replacement of damaged property, or assistance in establishing businesses such as grocery stores, bakeries, electronics shops or farms. This program is funded through September 2012.

National Capacity Development Program – Tatweer

From 2006 to 2011 USAID’s National Capacity Development program (also known as Tatweer) has built the capacity in ten Iraqi ministries. Tatweer’s objectives were to increase the effectiveness of ministries through reforming internal operational systems and instituting best practices and international standards. The program worked with national and provincial level ministry offices to: improve the public management skills of ministerial civil servants; introduce permanent and sustainable improvements to management systems; expand and institutionalize the GoI’s training and consultancy activities; and establish Civil Service institutional and legislative reforms. Core public administration areas included contract and procurement management, human resource management, project management, leadership and communication, strategic planning and information technology. Tatweer works with several cross-cutting technical assistance initiatives including the organizational self-assessment and transformation program, anti-corruption, and the social safety net.

Tatweer worked closely with the GoI and the Civil Service Committee (CSC) as they drafted and revised laws that significantly impacted the civil service. Buoyed by the success to establish the Federal Civil Service Commission, the CSC is finalizing a draft civil service law to develop a professional, effective, and transparent civil service system. The program offered in-service training for civil servants, approximately two-thirds of which work outside of Baghdad. As of September 2010, more than 105,000 civil servants have been enrolled in courses delivered by Tatweer. In addition, the program provided assistance to Ministerial Director Generals and their staff in the provinces in the area of procurement, human resource development and project management. Tatweer was committed to anchoring training capacity in Iraqi institutions. To accomplish this, they coordinated with Iraqi training entities and ministerial training centers to develop a rigorous “training of trainers” program. Nearly 900 of these government trainers now deliver basic training in public management skills. Partner ministries are now assuming the costs and implementation of training delivery, adapting training management systems, and adopting Tatweer training materials in public administration. The program has also assisted with the GoI budget execution and provided key ministries with knowledge on procurement policies stipulated in GoI regulations. Additionally, the project provided training and technical assistance to ministry inspector generals in the field of ethics and governance. With the completion of Taweer in June 2011, USAID has a request for proposals for the implementation of a new four-year project entitled Iraq National and Provincial Administrative Reform Project – Tarabot which may be found in https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=2f463b9dceaa13c03a780f414dd5cd41&tab=core&_cview=1 ).

C.1.3 USAID Strategic Linkages

Direct USAID Program Linkage

The project will complement the transition of overall U.S. Government (USG) assistance to the GoI from one rooted in a reconstruction, stabilization and counterinsurgency strategy, to a long-term strategic partnership and sustainable development strategy. It will be important for the Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum to link with a number of USAID and U. S. Government activities, however, USAID will require that the Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum and the Iraq National and Provincial Administrative Reform Project – Tarabot to operate as companion projects that mutually reinforce each other to meet an overarching USAID/Iraq objective of promoting a just, representative and accountable government.

The two projects have been designed to be complementary working in close collaboration at the program level rather than overlap/duplicate each other’s efforts However, USAID recognizes that there are aspects of the projects that will require both implementers to offer support to the same GoI entity, specifically the Provincial Governors’ offices. The convergence point in the Provincial Governors’ offices embodies both the duality and duplication of Iraq’s current federal system. The hybrid functions of the Governor’s Office make it an indispensible partner to both projects—with the Governance Strengthening Project - Taqadum building the office’s capacity as a responsive, democratically accountable unit and the National and Provincial Administrative Reform Project - Tarabot strengthening its linkages to federal line ministries and its compliance with federal standards. , The dual roles of the Governor are:

· Executive of the Province: the governor is the highest ranking, democratically accountable official in the province. He is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of elected Provincial Council (PC) members. The Governor is subject to PC oversight powers and must submit key strategic and legal matters (such as his capital investment budget) to the PC for approval. As a politician, his ability to connect with the population and key national decision-makers is matched only by the PC Chair.

· Oversight of Ministries: the Governor serves at the rank of “Deputy Minister,” making him the highest official among all federal line Ministries operating in the province. The Governor’s responsibilities as “chief technocrat” make him an indispensible figure for overseeing public administration reforms and line Ministry work at the provincial level—particularly in the following areas: (1) implementation of civil service reform and workforce management issues; (2) ministry project management, budget, finance and other core systems; (3) investment policy and aligning provincial budgets with federal strategic guidelines, and (4) administrative oversight of sub-national ministry operating units.

To promote a complimentary division of labor, USAID’s Democracy and Governance Office (DGO) and Capacity Building Office (CBO) will negotiate joint Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with targeted governors’ offices. The MOUs will detail conditions and offers of assistance, including respective cost share agreements and a menu of technical services available from each project. Implementing partners will conduct joint needs assessments, workplans and produce project reports - all subject to oversight and approval by USAID Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTRs).

The following chart highlights the components of each project, organized under “decentralization ” and “Deconcentration.”

Component 1:

Law Reform - Legal and regulatory decentralization reforms clarify the authorities and responsibilities of provincial and local governments.

Component 1: Civil Service Reform to include comprehensive civil service legislation reform and institutional reform within the Federal and Provincial Civil Service Commissions

Component 2:

Institutional Strengthening - Targeted provincial and local governments institutionalize core authorities and responsibilities.

Component 2: National Policy Management to include central executive policy formation and dissemination across ministries and development of cross-ministerial reform.

Component 3:

Executive Oversight - Targeted provincial and local elected officials hold executive ministries accountable for improved services.

Component 3: Administrative Decentralization Reforms to facilitate devising of regulations, decrees, and administrative orders to delegate central ministry functions to lower rungs of service delivery.

Other USG Program Linkages

Under Component 1, the Governance Strengthening Project - Taqadum will harness the support of the Iraqi Parliament. Therefore, it is expected that the project collaborates with USAID’s Legislative Strengthening Program and State Department funded programs that provide support to Parliament. Specifically, the State Department funded programs in the Council of Representatives worked to develop: (i) professional Research Directorate office and Media Center (ii) rules of procedure for the parliamentary committees, parliamentary reference guides, and an internship program, and (iii) efforts to form a minoritie’s caucus and professional training for female representatives.

The Governance Strengthening Project’s - Taqadum crosscutting emphasis on community outreach, civil society mobilization, and inclusion of civic organizations into public decision requires collaboration with USAID’s Community Action Program (CAP), which assists community groups to mobilize resources to meet priority local needs. Finally, the project’s work on improving the responsiveness of provincial services to disadvantaged and vulnerable populations will be informed by USAID’s Access to Justice Project, which assists vulnerable populations to petition GoI offices for rights under the law.

C.1.4 USAID and USG Assistance Priorities

The Governance Strengthening Project - Taqadum’ s expected results support broad U.S. Government (USG) development strategies for the Middle East, correspond to the USG – Iraq Foreign Assistance Framework Agreement, and reinforce Government of Iraq National Development Plan. This project will directly support the Strategic Framework Agreement by “supporting Iraq’s efforts to invest its resources towards economic development, sustainable development and investment in projects that improve the basic services for the Iraqi people”. It directly supports the Government of Iraq’s National Development Plan (2010-2014) that calls for support to decentralization in order to bring basic services to an acceptable level.

The project will support USAID’s and Office of Management and Budget’s “High Priority Performance Goal” for Iraq: “Partnership with the GoI and private sector to create responsive, institutional foundations for prosperity.” It will also link to the USG Foreign Assistance

Framework under Project Objective “Governing Justly and Democratically,” and Project Area 2.2: “Good Governance,” covering the following project elements and sub-elements:

· Project Element 2.2.3: Local Government and Decentralization -- Sub-Element 2.2.3.1: Representative and Responsive Local Government; Sub-Element 2.2.3.5: Decentralization Enabling Environment; Sub-Element 2.2.3.6: Local Public Sector Associations

· Project Element 2.2.2: Public Sector Executive Function -- Sub-Element 2.2.2.1: State Formation and Democratic Legitimacy; Sub-Element 2.2.2.2: Strategic Planning and Policy Making; Sub-Element 2.2.2.4: Oversight of the Executive Branch.

C.1.5 Critical Assumptions

A critical assumption under this project is that over the next five years the security environment will permit the implementation of project activities at the provincial and local levels. The project also assumes that major parties will peacefully and constructively engage the political process, even as they reach decision points over: (1) the status of disputed internal territories; (2) the distribution and control of natural resources; (3) the timing and content of local elections, constitutional referenda and provincial elections; and (4) other contentious policy issues relevant to center-peripheral relations and local self-government. The Governance Strengthening Project - Taqadum assumes continued political will and national commitment toward reforms in a number of policy and institutional areas:

· Key constituencies in the National Parliament, Council of Ministers, and Judiciary support decentralization laws.

· National Ministries—especially the Ministry of Finance—recognize decentralization laws and support commitments in the National Development Plan to decentralize power to provincial and local authorities.

· Provincial Councils willing to undertake significant cost sharing in exchange for technical assistance.

· Technical Assistance to local councils is conditioned on progress made to hold local elections.

· Kurdistan Regional Government ratifies constitution and hold provincial elections.

C.2 Statement of Work C.2.1 The Governance Strengthening Project – Taqadum is a five year project, with four base years and one (fifth) optional year. The project is expected to have a national scale. The assistance objective for the project is for the targeted provincial and local governments to be more able to effectively respond to community needs. The three components of the project are:

Component 1:

Law Reform - Legal and regulatory decentralization reforms clarify the authorities and responsibilities of provincial and local governments.

Component 2:

Institutional Strengthening - Targeted provincial and local governments institutionalize core authorities and responsibilities.

Component 3:

Executive Oversight - Targeted provincial and local elected officials hold executive ministries accountable for improved services.

The three components stated above will work to: (1) assist in law reform to further decentralize authorities; (2) promote provincial and local government institutional development; and (3) build constructive executive branch oversight mechanisms. Activities under these components will be Iraqi-led, supporting GoI and civil society efforts to strengthen the responsiveness of provincial and local governments to community needs.

The Governance Strengthening Project is of national reach. Component 1 by its nature and definition is a national (Baghdad based) activity, Components 2 and 3 are mainly focused on provincial level. Components 2 and 3, shall have the flexibility to provide a level of effort that meets the demand from participating provinces, with the following established criteria for to determinie Provinces that will participate under component 2 and 3: that promotes:

· Commitment of candidate province to provide matching funds/cost sharing;

· Commitment of candidate province to accept and implement reform; and

· Commitment of candidate province to conduct public outreach and include community groups in decision making.

The following is a summary of anticipated interventions and types of implementation mechanisms, by component.

Component One – Law Reform - Legal and regulatory decentralization reforms clarify the authorities and responsibilities of provincial and local governments.

This component is expected to be about 15% of the total effort related to this program.

While Iraq’s 2008 Provincial Powers Law provides a basic framework for provincial governance—and is the most significant achievement the Council of Representatives has made towards political decentralization, the law, in practice, is a peculiar and cumbersome interweaving and duplication of federal and local competencies for councils and merging of federal and local executive functions.

There is a high level commitment to clarify these authorities. For instance, the incoming Speaker of the CoR has placed reform of the PPL—to be “in line with the constitution”—as one of his top legislative priorities. This will not be the only decentralization issue the CoR is likely to tackle. Other significant pieces of legislation are likely to include devolution of ministry functions, the Baghdad Law, fiscal disbursement to provinces through the federal budget, and a local elections law. To address these issues, activities under this component will support Iraqi constituencies to clarify Federal-Provincial authorities.

Component Objectives

This Component entails delivery of technical assistance, skill training and material support for purposes of achieving the following intermediary results:

1. Provincial and local elected official, professional associations and civil society advocate national policy makers for consensus decentralization reforms.

2. National legislative and executive authorities undertake decentralization reforms.

3. Government lawyers better understand decentralization laws.

To inform activities under this component, the Program shall draw on technical manuals on international best practices, concepts and models/approaches applied in the region, guidebooks on decentralization, new local functions, or exemplary democratic practice. This analysis will inform a comprehensive examination of Iraq’s legislative framework governing decentralization.