Sol_72066022R00008 final.pdf

Physical Address:

U.S. Agency for International Development Mobil Building N° 198 Avenue Isiro Gare Centrale / Gombe / Kinshasa Democratic Republic of Congo

U.S. Postal Address:

USAID/DRC Tel: (+243) 81 555 4430 Unit 31550 Fax: (+243) 81 555 3528 APO AE 09828-1550 http://www.usaid.gov/cg

Solicitation Issue Date: October 7, 2022 Questions Due Date: October 21, 2022 Closing Date: November 18, 2022 Closing Time: 9:00 am Kinshasa time

SUBJECT: Request for Proposal (RFP) Number: 72066022R00008

USAID/DRC Good Governance Activity

Dear Offerors, The United States Government, represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), requests proposals from interested offerors in providing technical support services as detailed in the attached solicitation.

Subject to availability of funds, USAID anticipates awarding one (1) Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Completion contract as a result of this solicitation to one organization or firm eligible to receive an award. This procurement will be conducted through full and open competition and follow procedures set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15. The magnitude of the contract is estimated between $35 to $40 million for a period of five (5) years.

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for this acquisition is 541990

- All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services. The authorized geographic code for this procurement is 937 (the United States, the recipient country, and developing countries other than advanced developing countries, but excluding any country that is a prohibited source).

Offerors are encouraged to read the entire solicitation, which includes all pertinent contract requirements, and the conditions and instructions required for submitting a proposal. Proposals in response to this RFP are due by electronic email to mmaximilien@usaid.gov and kinshasaproposals@usaid.gov with a copy to lgilpin@usaid.gov and gkyazze@usaid.gov.

All questions relating to this solicitation must be submitted to mmaximilien@usaid.gov, kinshasaproposals@usaid.gov with a copy to lgilpin@usaid.gov and gkyazze@usaid.gov no later than the due date indicated above. Unless otherwise notified by an amendment to the RFP, no questions will be accepted after this date.

Issuance of this solicitation does not in any way obligate the U.S. Government to award a contract, nor does it commit the U.S. Government to pay for costs incurred in the preparation and submission mailto:mmaximilien@usaid.gov mailto:kinshasaproposals@usaid.gov mailto:lgilpin@usaid.gov mailto:gkyazze@usaid.gov mailto:mmaximilien@usaid.gov mailto:kinshasaproposals@usaid.gov mailto:lgilpin@usaid.gov mailto:gkyazze@usaid.gov

RFP NO.: 72066022R00008

USAID/DRC Good Governance Activity of a proposal. The Government reserves the right to reject any and all offers, if such action is considered to be in the best interest of the U.S. Government.

Sincerely, Kathlyn Bryant, Contracting Officer Office of Acquisition and Assistance USAID/Democratic Republic of Congo

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD 1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER RATING

UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 7900)

PAGE OF PAGES

3 174

2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER

720666022R00008

4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION

SEALED BID (IFB)

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

5. DATE ISSUED

09/30/2022

6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

REQ-660-22-000043

7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than item 7)

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

SOLICITATION

9. Sealed offers in original and copies for furnishings the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in item 8, or if hand carried, in the depository located in until local time

(Hour) (Date) CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

10. FOR

INFORMATION

CALL:

A. NAME

Lauralea Gilpin

B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

lgilpin@usaid.gov

AREA CODE

NUMBER

EXT.

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

A SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM

I CONTRACT CLAUSES

B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

C DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT

J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

D PACKAGING AND MARKING PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

E INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

K REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER

STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

F DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

L INSTRS., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

H SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

M EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror)

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT

(See Section I, Clause No. 52.232-8)

10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS(%)

14. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AMENDMENTS

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated):

AMENDMENT NO. DATE AMENDMENT NO. DATE

15A. NAME AND

ADDRESS

OF OFFER-

OR

CODE FACILITY 16. NAME AND THE TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER

(Type or print)

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER 15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS IS

DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE - ENTER SUCH

ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE.

17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

AWARD (To be completed by Government)

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL OPEN COMPETITION:

10 U.S.C. 2304 (c) 41 U.S.C. 253 (c)

23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM

(4 copies unless otherwise specified)

24. Administered By (If Other Than Item 7)

25. Payment Will Be Made By Code

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

Kathlyn Bryant

27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

28. AWARD DATE

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

AUTHORIZED FOR LOCAL REPRODUCTION STANDARD FORM 33 (REV,. 9-97)

Previous edition is unusable Prescribed by GSA - Far (48 CFR) 53.214 (c)

USAID Dem. Rep Congo Mobil Building, Avenue Isiro No. 198/ Kinshasa mailto:lgilpin@usaid.gov

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRF Anti-Corruption Response Fund AMELP Activity Monitoring Evaluation and Learning Plan APLC L'Agence de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption AWP Annual Work Plan BIP Branding Implementation Plan CCF Complex Crisis Fund CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CENAREF Cellule Nationale des Renseignements Financiers COR Contracting Officer’s Representative COREF Comité d'Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques CSO Civil Society Organization DO Development Objective DRM Domestic Resource Mobilization ECOFIN Economic and Financial Committee EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EMMP Environmental Monitoring and Mitigation Plan ESR Environmental Status Report ETD Decentralized Territorial Entities FCDO United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office GDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo GIZ German Agency for International Development GRB Gender-Responsive Budgeting GSB Gender Sensitive Budgeting GUC Grants Under Contract IEE Initial Environmental Examination IGA Integrated Governance Activity IGF General Inspectorate of Finance IMF International Monetary Fund INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (U.S. State Department) LGBTQI+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex LOFIP Law on Public Finance M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MEL Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning MOU Memo of Understanding PEA Political Economy Analysis PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability PFM Public Financial Management PMP Performance Management Plans PPP Public-Private Partnerships PPR Performance Plan and Report SOW Statement of Work TOC Theory of Change UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program WB World Bank

SECTION A - TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS…………………………

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK……...……………………………

SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING…………………………….……………….. 29

SECTION E – INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE………………………..………………...31

SECTION F – DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE……………………………….………... 32

SECTION G – CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA…………………………………... 44

SECTION H – SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS………………………………….. 49

SECTION I – CONTRACT CLAUSES……………………………………………………

SECTION J – LIST OF ATTCHMENTS……………………………………………….…... 126

SECTION K – REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF

OFFERORS………………………………………………………………..…... 127

SECTION L – INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS……… 139

SECTION M – EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD………………………………

ATTACHMENTS………………………………………………………………………….…... 163

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to provide services as described in detail in Section C – Statement of Work for the implementation of the “USAID/DRC Good Governance” Activity.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee, Completion Type contract. For the consideration set forth below, the Contractor shall achieve the performance objectives and deliverables, or outputs described in Sections, C, D and F and otherwise comply with all contract requirements.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fee is (To Be Determined ($TBD)). The fixed fee is ($TBD). The estimated cost-plus fixed fee is ($TBD).

(b) Within the estimated cost-plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is ($TBD). The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount. The Contract will be incrementally funded throughout the performance period in accordance with FAR 52.232-22, Limitation of Funds.

(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through (TBD) based on the date of award).

B.4 CONTRACT LINE ITEMS (CLINS)

CONTRACT LINE 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total Salaries and Wages $ $ $ $ $ $ Fringe Benefits $ $ $ $ $ $ Allowances $ $ $ $ $ $ Travel, Transportation, and Per Diem

Supplies $ $ $ $ $ $ Equipment $ $ $ $ $ $ Subcontracts $ $ $ $ $ $ Other Direct Costs $ $ $ $ $ $ Grants Under Contract $ $ $ $ $ $1,000,000.00 Total Direct Costs $ $ $ $ $ $ Indirect Cost $ $ $ $ $ $ Total Estimated Cost $ $ $ $ $ $ Fixed Fee $ $ $ $ $ $

CONTRACT LINE 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Total Total Estimated Cost + Fee $ $ $ $ $ $

The abbreviated budget above does not obviate the requirement for prior approval by the Contracting Officer of cost items designated as requiring prior approval by any of the terms and conditions of this contract including the applicable cost principles (See FAR §52.216-07 “Allowable Cost and Payment”); nor does it constitute a determination of allowability by the Contracting Officer of any item of cost, unless specifically stated elsewhere in this contract. Also, these amounts may not be adjusted without a written modification signed by the Contracting Officer.

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

a. Pending the establishment of a revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs shall be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases:

For the Prime Contractor:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application:

Type or Rate:

Period:

1/ Base of Application:

Type or Rate:

Period:

For Each Major Subcontractor*:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application:

Type or Rate:

Period:

1/ Base of Application:

Type or Rate:

Period:

*A major subcontractor is one whose proposed costs individually exceed 20% of the total estimated contract cost of the contract. Indirect rates must be proposed for all major subcontractors.

If a major subcontractor does not have a Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA) with a U. S. Federal Government Agency, they may be afforded a maximum of 10% de minimus rate in lieu of a NICRA.

b. The Contractor is allowed to recover applicable indirect costs (i.e., overhead, G&A, etc.) on other direct costs (ODCs), if it is part of the Contractor’s usual accounting procedures consistent with FAR Part 31, and the Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA).

c. The Contractor and or Subcontractor is not authorized to make changes in its established method of classifying or allocating indirect costs without the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.6 COST REIMBURSABLE

The U.S. dollar costs allowable shall be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, FAR 52.216-8, Fixed Fee, if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment.

B.7 MULTI‐YEAR CONTRACT

The Contract is considered non‐severable and is therefore a multi‐year contract as defined in FAR

17.103. Therefore, this Contract is subject to the requirements of FAR 17.106. However, this is a CPFF type contract where the contractor is authorized to be reimbursed for all costs which are allowable in accordance with FAR 52.216‐7, “Allowable Costs and Payment.” Therefore, the contractor will not incur any costs which would have been amortized over the life of the Contract should the Contract be cancelled in accordance with FAR 52.217‐2. The cancellation ceiling for each cancellation date is $0 and there is no requirement to include cancellation dates in the contract.

B.8 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

Payment of the fixed fee will be made as follows: The Contractor’s fixed fee is tied to the accomplishment of performance objectives and deliverables, or outputs described in Sections C, D and F, as well as complying with all contract requirements. Normally, the Contractor will be paid in the proportion of the fee that corresponds to the proportion of cost incurred by the Contractor during the period covered by the invoice divided by the total estimated costs (exclusive of fee).

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C - STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW)

C.1 GOAL

The goal of USAID’s Good Governance Activity (GGA) is to improve the financial management of public resources to increase the transparency, accountability and availability of local resources for the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) development. The Contractor must address the institutional conditions that enable corruption through improved public financial management at the provincial and local levels. As part of the Anti-Corruption Response Fund (ACRF) pilot component, USAID’s Good Governance Activity will also focus on improving transparency and accountability in the public financial management of mining resources and align this approach to address the Mission’s interagency anticorruption priorities related to the mining sector.

C.2 CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

The DRC is endowed with bountiful natural resources estimated at $24 trillion1, and yet the country struggles to convert this wealth into benefits for the majority of its population. Corruption is a key barrier to using these resources to finance DRC’s development and uplift its population out of poverty.

In order to use these resources in this manner, the government of DRC must: 1) effectively, efficiently, and transparently collect and administer revenues and 2) plan and use public funds in response to citizen needs, building public trust and social cohesion at all levels. Additionally, DRC’s political dynamics reinforce the kleptocratic nature of the government and its allocation of resources that exclusively benefit the political elites. Lack of clarity in the regulatory environment, taxation system, procurement system, and transparent mechanisms to track funding and expenditures at all levels of government (central, provincial, and local) exacerbates public financial management (PFM) problems and severely limits transparency and accountability, contributing to an ongoing cycle of corruption in every sector and consistent underdevelopment.

The recent release of documents in the Congo Hold Up2 investigations demonstrate how DRC’s corruption is trapped in an intricate web of political deals, siphoning of mining revenues for the elites in political power, international banks involved in schemes to take Congolese public money abroad, and the manipulation of even the elections process to perpetuate grand corruption. President Tshisekedi has declared the fight against corruption as one of his top priorities, however corruption is endemic and systemic, both at the institutional and individual levels, and social norms tolerate corrupt practices. Grand corruption cost the state about $4 billion per year during the Kabila era.3 Petty corruption is often required and exacerbated by unpaid government salaries.

1 DRC National Agency for Investment:

https://www.investindrc.cd/en/Natural-Resources-and-Geographic-Profile 2 https://eic.network/projects/congo-holdup.html 3 https://enoughproject.org/files/A_Criminal_State_Enough_Oct2016_web.pdf

While the issues seem insurmountable, the GDRC has progressed on a national reform plan through the Ministry of Finance’s Reform and Public Finance Guidance Committee (COREF).

With support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, they have plans for national and sub-national public financial management (PFM) reforms, including tax rationalization, overhaul of the procurement systems, and assistance to public control institutions like the Cour des Comptes (Supreme Audit Institution). USAID seeks to complement these reforms by working on PFM, control of corruption, and empowering citizens to participate in government processes and monitor government budgeting and expenditures at the provincial and local level. These efforts should enable targeted provincial and local governments to expend funds which meet citizen demanded needs.

Eighty percent of DRC’s budget comes from mineral extraction. The sector is impacted by private and public sector corruption that allows a significant amount of minerals to be smuggled or vanish from the country without financial returns benefiting the public.4 However, in 2018, a revision to the mining code required mining companies to pay a percentage of all mining royalties directly to the provinces (25%) and Decentralized Territorial Entities (ETDs) (15%).5 Industrial and artisanal mining has the potential to generate exponential economic growth for ETDs, but they lack the ability to absorb and manage these funds and political leaders use these funds for patronage.

Unfortunately, little has been done to advance PFM reform and adopt good practices at the local and provincial levels to ensure increased control over the management of these critical resources from the mining sector and other domestic resources. Many urban and peri-urban areas lack the strategic planning, budgeting, and project management capacities needed to provide even basic services to their residents. However, a bright spot is that at the local level, USAID programming has demonstrated that local community participation and oversight, coupled with assistance to the local government in development planning, domestic resource mobilization, procurement, and tax rationalization can result in tangible results (schools, potable water, electricity, etc.) that reflect the needs of the local community. This investment in core municipal services will result in a building of community resilience and trust necessary to support government institutions and reduce corruption.

DRC must also diversify its revenue sources for domestic resource mobilization (DRM). However, the complexity of the taxation system serves as a deterrent to investment and because one must evade taxes in order to make profit, it has caused serious losses to GDRC’s potential revenue. In 2019, only 60% of the government budget passed through the public procurement system, and a very small percentage of that through a standardized process as most use exceptional procedures or completely by-pass budgetary channels.6 According to civil society organizations (CSOs), public procurements are mostly conducted through exceptional procedures, which allows for bribery and mismanagement resulting in the loss of about two-thirds of the public resources in projects that are neither completed nor executed within legal standards.

4 The IMF’s program also seeks to continue to push the GDRC to publicize mining contracts. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative national secretariat is also pushing for the disclosure of all mining contracts and the GDRC has made progress in publicizing some of these contracts.

5 https://leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2018/JOS.28.03.2018.pdf 6 IMF Country Report No. 19/286

Key decision-makers in PFM acknowledge that macroeconomic frameworks are gender-neutral, and fiscal policy does not take into consideration the requirements for addressing gender biases.

As such, budgets are gender blind in their overall conceptualization, formulation, execution, and impact. The local government has a central role in gender-responsive budgeting (GRB). However, inconsistencies between legal frameworks and policy commitments, as well as a lack of guidance on the operationalization of priorities at the local level leave implementation priorities to the discretion of key ministries based on available funds.7

Audit, controls, and oversight are also crucial to PFM reforms. The Cour des Comptes (Supreme Audit Institution) (“The Cour”), has the authority to investigate budget expenditures and sanctions mismanagement for all branches of government, but it does not have an independent budget nor adequate financing.8 The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) is the executive branch’s internal audit institution across the country. Upon calls from CSOs and the international community, President Tshisekedi has committed to addressing both. Most recently, the IGF, with support from the World Bank, has conducted corruption investigations in connection with President Tshisekedi’s 100 Days Program.9 Since that time, with political support from the President’s Office, the IGF has increased its operations and control over government finances, mostly focusing on procurement and budget expenditures through its financial examinations. CSOs have advocated their support for strengthening both institutions. In late June 2022, the President appointed the President of the Cour, who was sworn in with other magistrates of the Cour on August 31, 2022.

While other donors plan to provide direct assistance to the Cour and IGF, USAID seeks to work with provincial and local governments to address findings and recommendations of these institutions10.

The parliament at the national and provincial levels has independence to conduct oversight, but rarely exercises it.11 Additionally, The Law of Public Finance Management provides for the provincial governments to establish their own inspectorates. However only three provinces have established inspectorates and other provinces cite a lack of resources to establish inspectorates. As a result, there is an important gap in the control and audit functions across the board.

In the face of limited capacity within the government, USAID has seen that citizen oversight and watchdog functions provide an option for increased participatory decision-making around public resources, controls, and demand for accountability. For example, in 2019, DRC increased its Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) budget transparency scores12 after taking a number of steps to include CSOs in the budget process and publish budget expenditures. While these practices are not formalized into law nor equally implemented at the provincial level, the local level participatory budget processes allow for dialogue around budget issues. DRC is also a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and its national secretariat, includes government representatives and CSO members. It has started to play an important role to ensure transparency in the payment and transfer of mining revenues at the local level.

7 USAID’s Strategy. An Annex to Workplan 6. September 2021 8 IMF Country Report No. 19/286 9 VOA. “Où sont les 15 millions ? La question qui embarrasse la présidence congolaise.” September 12, 2019 10 USAID’s Office of Financial Management signed an MOU with the Cour des Comptes in August 2022 to strengthen their auditing capacity.

11 USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2020.

12 PEFA Report https://www.voaafrique.com/a/o%C3%B9-sont-les-15-millions-la-question-qui-embarrasse-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-congolaise/5080776.html https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XDVS.pdf https://www.pefa.org/country/democratic-republic-congo

USAID has also seen a positive impact in harnessing the abilities of the private sector. Under USAID’s Integrated Governance Activity (January 2017-2023), the Contractor developed partnerships with industrial mining companies and used its convening powers to engage private sector to help ETDs finance their local development plans. USAID seeks to continue fostering these types of partnerships to increase the ability of governments to use its own revenue to provide citizen demanded services at the provincial and local levels.

C.3 PROPOSED THEORY OF CHANGE

The proposed theory of change for this activity is:

IF provincial and local governments improve the quality and inclusiveness of their development planning processes; AND

IF control and audit institutions strengthen oversight of public resources, AND

IF civil society continues to play a watchdog role while promoting citizen engagement to demand accountability;

THEN provincial and local institutions can secure and manage resources in a transparent and accountable way to finance local development that addresses Congolese community needs.

Contractors may propose a revised theory of change in their proposal to achieve the intended goal (achieve the “THEN” statement above).

C.4 TASKS and REQUIRED OBJECTIVES

1) Objectives

The objective of USAID’s Good Governance Activity is to improve the transparency and accountability of provincial and local government authorities to manage public financial resources, thus increasing the availability of resources for local development. This activity builds on USAID’s Integrated Governance Activity (IGA), which worked primarily at the local level. With this activity, USAID seeks to expand its engagement to the provincial level, as local level bodies have a mandate to manage certain aspects of ETDs. USAID also sees increased GDRC interest in accelerating development outcomes at the ETD and provincial level. The IMF requirement to increase the level of subnational transfers from the national budget and the new World Bank project will incentivize this process through a budget support mechanism, thus contributing to a greater likelihood for GDRC commitment to actually transfer funds at provincial and local levels.

In addition, the GDRC financial decentralization strategy and its implementation plan are currently under review. The GDRC seeks to conduct PEFA at the provincial level as a way of setting up a baseline for this strategy. The Contractor could be requested to conduct a PEFA for selected provinces in order to contribute to the review and GDRC strategy baseline as well as Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to better understand the context at the provincial level. Both the strategy and implementation plan will enable the Contractor to adjust the GGA approach in the most relevant way for the targeted provinces and ETDs.

2) Intermediate Results

IR 1 Local and provincial government capacity to plan and implement budgets enhanced

The DRC’s 2006 constitution provides provincial and local governments with the mandate to lead local development and collect revenues, including taxes and mining revenue. The Contractor must tailor assistance to ETDs and provinces based on their needs, the participation of CSOs and communities in local planning and oversight, and gender sensitivity.

IR 1.1 Increased participatory and inclusive mechanisms for local and urban development planning Urban and local development planning are crucial to transparent and accountable public financial management. Participatory mechanisms enable the participation of members of the community, ministry extension representatives, private sector, and CSOs. Their participation is crucial to ensure revenues are planned and budgeted according to the needs of the community. The Contractor must pay particular attention to the inclusion and empowerment in decision-making of youth and women in these mechanisms. Some ETDs have development plans and functioning participatory mechanisms, while the provincial level governments have often not adopted this practice.

For those ETDs that are excelling in participatory mechanisms in their five-year development planning, they may benefit from assistance to engage in longer term urban planning, especially in settings where demographic growth has taken a toll on the environment. Small towns in mining regions have seen significant population growth which increases pressure on the environment. In areas around forests and rivers, little has been done to respond to the needs of the population without harming its natural resources.13

IR 1.2 Budget planning and strategies better aligned The Contractor must support ETDs and provincial governments to understand and adhere to the Ministry of Budget’s budget planning process, defined in the Law on Public Finance (LOFIP).

Even where local governments have a development plan and a participatory budget planning process, the limited level of collaboration amongst different Ministry sectors, and their planning and budgeting processes, results in noncoherent budget and planning processes. The Contractor must implement activities to enhance collaboration between the sectoral ministries delivering public services to improve budgeting and planning processes.

Furthermore, while the GDRC has adopted gender sensitive budgeting (GSB) and has made efforts to pay attention to analyzing the women and gender issues, much more needs to be done to prioritize services that disproportionately impact women and girls, including those services needed

13 One of USAID’s priorities for Environment and Natural Resource Management is strengthening the governance of municipalities and utilities to adopt the inclusive management of natural resources.

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/USAID_ENRM_FRAMEWORK.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/USAID_ENRM_FRAMEWORK.pdf to address and prevent gender-based violence in DRC. The current prioritization process does not result in a gender sensitive budget as the budget preparation and execution is unclear and often faces external political pressure. As a result, proposed solutions do not align with the analysis.

IR 1.3 Procurement and oversight mechanisms strengthened Public procurement is an important aspect of budget execution but is currently highly affected by mismanagement and corrupt practices. Subnational governments face numerous challenges with respect to improving the efficiency and integrity of public procurement. Below a certain threshold of $250,000,14 ETDs can procure their own goods and services. Above this threshold, they must seek procurement services at the provincial level. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, whose responsibilities include both regulating and auditing public procurement, is not empowered to validate procurement processes as political actors are involved and manipulate these processes.

The provincial directorates of public procurement are not fulfilling their mandate by deploying officials at the ETD level to allow for closer control of local procurement processes.

Procurement integrity is a massive problem in DRC, therefore the Contractor must seek to find ways to improve procurement at the local level to enable communities to implement their development plans and get their needs met.

IR 1.4 Transparency of government spending improved Transparency of budget execution helps build community trust, accountability, and traceability of public funds. ETDs and provincial level governments have tax authority powers, and provinces and ETDs are also entitled to mining revenues as stipulated in the 2018 revision to the Mining Code. Further government transparency will help CSOs, and citizens play their role in monitoring these funds. The Contractor must support ETDs and provincial level governments to release information related to budget execution.

The GDRC has taken an interest in digitization and plans to digitize public finances at the national level. At the local level, past USAID programs have helped ETDs institute accounting software for digital management of their budgets and expenditures. Digitization of public expenditures at the ETD and provincial level is one required option to support transparency.

Required Activities

● Increase citizen participation through different processes including budget preparation and gender sensitive budgeting at the ETD level and the provincial level with a focus on strengthening the resilience of women and the most vulnerable groups

● Pilot urban development planning that is sensitive to climate change, safeguards the environment, and seeks climate sensitive financing for basic infrastructure

● Training for both public officials and civil society to empower women’s voices and influence to hold the government accountable for gender equitable programming and budgeting

● Promote multi-sectoral coordination in planning focused on issues such as gender responsive budgeting and resource distribution

14 http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20administratif/Urbanismevoiries/Div/D.010.34.28.12.2010.htm

● Train and provide technical assistance to civil society and government partners on instituting GRB approaches and monitoring of budget allocations and implementation of gender sensitive priorities through social audits

● Training to improve officials’ knowledge of procurement guidelines, streamline procurement processes, improve oversight and monitoring, and reduce political influence over procurement decisions in the selected focus ETDs.

● Facilitate procurement support between the ETD and provincial level, if the threshold is above the ETDs’ ability to procure goods and services at the local level.

● Expand and pilot digital solutions to improve transparency and accountability of public funds and expenditures

● Strengthen ETD capacity to identify solutions to improve the tax collection system through innovative design with private sector and youth entrepreneurs

● Pilot and promote small public-private partnerships (PPPs)15 for urban planning and innovative solutions, and results-based financing in collaboration with the private sector

The Offeror can propose additional interventions based on the technical approach.

IR 2 Local government revenue mobilization improved

Mobilization of DRC’s resources, together with prudent and transparent financial management, has the potential to transform DRC and its development trajectory. While ETDs should receive 40% of national and provincial revenues, this is often not followed. As mentioned above, the revision of the 2018 Mining Code designated that 25% of mining revenues in a province should go to the provincial government while 15% to the surrounding ETDs. However, distribution, transparency, and traceability of all revenues remains problematic. Besides mining royalties, there are other sources of revenue for local and provincial governments, including public utilities payments and tax revenue. In some places in DRC, these services have been digitized to ensure citizens get the services they have paid for.

EDTs can maintain their own bank accounts to receive these funds directly. The private sector has a role to pay in revenue generation and collection. For example, USAID worked directly with Alpha mines and Barrick Gold under the Integrated Governance Activity (IGA) to ensure mining revenues went to the surrounding ETDs and were transparently managed. The Contractor, together with USAID, must engage private sector actors to seek partnerships under this activity to support the transparent flow of revenues, including mining royalties, to the ETD and provincial levels.

Furthermore, the Contractor, together with local CSOs, must continue to push for clarification of regulations on the transfer of revenues.

IR 2.1 Improved transparent revenue collection The GDRC budget is among the lowest in the region, as a result of weak resource mobilization (including an archaic and complex tax system) and weak financial management which encourages resource leakage and corruption at the national, provincial, and local levels of government. The Contractor must find ways to improve transparent revenue collection which is traceable and allows for direct oversight of funds. Digitization may be one option, as the GDRC is promoting

15 https://leganet.cd/Legislation/Dfiscal/Loi13005.11.02.2014.htm digitization as part of its Public Finance Management Reform. An improvement in transparent and traceable tax collection or collection of public utility costs can improve domestic revenue mobilization, allowing local and provincial governments to finance their development plans and provide needed services to citizens, such as water and electricity. For example, the GDRC has developed the ISIS-REGIS platform, with support of the French Cooperation to electronically collect and track tax collection. At the provincial level, many provinces are exploring different models to collect taxes based on their technical capacity.

However, if prerequisites for digitization are fulfilled, the Contractor must ensure that digitalization does not simply adopt the current failed system without attention to the practices and systems that enable corruption. The Contractor must address system weaknesses to reduce the occurrence of corrupt practices IR 2.2 Systems and practices for reducing corruption in tax administration supported There are several institutions in charge of tax collection at the national and provincial level.

Ministries also have the ability to enact taxes by decree. Provinces and ETDs can also create taxes;

however, ETDs must have prior provincial authorization. As mentioned above, the tax system is complex and needs national level rationalization. While the IMF and the World Bank are engaging with the Ministry of Finance on taxation, there are local level improvements that could improve domestic resource mobilization in the focus ETDs and provinces. At the local level, the Contractor can assist in streamlining the local level tax regime, including reducing overlapping local taxes and fees. This could facilitate increased opportunities for private sector engagement and investment in ETDs and provinces.

Streamlining taxes and improving transparent tax collection is not enough to improve the system on its own. The Contractor must accompany its assistance with approaches to address norms and behaviors by considering additional interventions that incentivize change in behaviors and adherence to good practices.

IR 2.3 Taxpayer education and taxpayer services provided The Congolese public has limited access to public services which has created inherent mistrust that the GDRC is willing to address the needs of its citizens. To address this, USAID programs have supported select ETDs in streamlining local taxes, participatory planning around tax revenue that includes taxpayers, including local businesses, in public development planning to determine how to spend revenues. Publishing the taxes and fees and explaining to taxpayers which taxes are legitimate, as well explaining how those revenues are spent can stimulate local economic growth and curb corruption. The Contractor must work with local and provincial governments to design activities to strengthen access and availability of user-friendly tax regime information and promote streamlined and transparent payment systems to reduce the time and cost required to pay taxes, foster improved voluntary tax compliance, and improve the local business operating environment.

IR 2.4 Innovative solutions for financing local needs supported As an incentive to improve PFM with focus ETDs and provinces, the Contractor must explore, pilot, and implement different approaches to diversify and encourage DRM. The Contractor must facilitate private sector engagement to support financing of local and provincial development plans, while mitigating the potential for corruption. In particular provinces, the Contractor may be able to leverage other USAID programming to bring private sector investors together, such as USAID’s INVEST program.

Required Activities

● Systematically assess and improve local revenue and fee administration to reduce the administrative complexity of the revenue system and reduce opportunities for corruption

● Experiment with mobile solutions to increase citizens ability to pay for public services or taxes electronically

● Introduce tools to strengthen transparency, control, and traceability of public revenues to reduce opportunities for bribery

● Improve provinces' rationalization of and capacity to transparently collect and trace taxes

● Facilitate private sector engagement at the local and provincial level that can contribute to own source revenues for development.

The Offeror can propose additional interventions based on its technical approach.

IR 3 Ecosystem for local and provincial government financial oversight and anti-corruption promotes citizen engagement, social accountability and behavior change Creating an eco-system and shifting cultural norms is also needed to address corruption. The Contractor must strengthen local CSOs to monitor corruption, increase inclusive citizen participation, conduct awareness campaigns based on social norms, and strengthen accountability institutions through working with local and provincial; strengthening local organizations.

Local CSOs have expressed their support for the Cour des Comptes, IGF, and other accountability institutions to strengthen their ability to provide oversight of public funds and root out corruption.

Public and political support and technical assistance to implement these institutions recommendations at the provincial and local levels can help increase the efficacy of these institutions to fully play their role. The Contractor must support local organizations to examine budget expenditures, and other data released as a result of its efforts in IR1 and IR2, to advocate with the government for improved accountability and processes.

The Contractor must also coordinate efforts at the local and provincial level with other anti-corruption activities in DRC. For example, State INL is supporting DRC’s Anti-Corruption Agency/L’Agence de Prévention et de Lutte Contre de la Corruption (APLC), DRC's financial intelligence La Cellule Nationale des Renseignements Financiers (CENAREF), and IGF. The Contractor must also work in close collaboration with the implementing partner for USAID’s Promoting Rule of Law Activity which will work directly with the judiciary and CSOs to tackle corruption in DRC. USAID will also make sure programmatic efforts align with diplomatic pressure to encourage improved public financial management and the reduction of corruption in public services.

IR 3.1 Reinforced capacity of external audit and control to monitor public finance operations The government’s weak capacity in internal controls and auditing, at all levels, has created a hospitable environment for corrupt practices, depriving the GDRC of the resources needed to respond to its citizen needs. The Cour des Comptes (“Cour”) and IGF have been increasingly effective in identifying and highlighting weaknesses in the PFM system and cases of waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of public funds. The World Bank, European Union (EU), and UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) projects will provide technical support to the Cours des Comptes and IGF to strengthen their capacity to fulfill their mandates. In addition, the USAID’s Office of Financial Management recently signed a MOU to support the Cour des Comptes in building their auditing capacity.

The Contractor must work with the selected ETD and provincial level governments to enable regular audits by the Cour and IGF and strengthen their ability to adopt findings and recommendations to improve their ability to serve the public need.

The Contractor must collaborate with donor projects focusing on building capacity of these control institutions, at the national level, to identify further opportunities at the provincial and local levels (reference C.7). By doing so, this project will leverage donor resources and reinforce an improved accountability system at all levels of government.

IR 3.2 Enhanced capacity of CSOs to monitor government planning and expenditures, government adherence to audit recommendations, and monitoring of service delivery Increased citizen oversight and CSO watchdogs can create a check on the government to identify corruption and call the government to account. CSOs have played a key role in raising awareness on public financial management issues. Their investigations and denunciation of corrupt practices has allowed for the trial and conviction of key political actors, including the President’s Chief of Staff. Key actors such as ODEP or BUFORDI have played whistleblower roles and drawn the public's attention to major corruption issues. Through this activity, the Contractor must continue to support these CSO efforts at the provincial and local levels. The Contractor may also consider digital solutions to increase tracking and monitoring of these processes.

The Contractor must build CSO capacity for investigation and oversight of budget execution, including public procurement and taxation at the local and provincial levels. Citizen oversight activities, together with audit and controls, are meant to reduce the occurrence of corrupt practices and increase accountability. The Contractor must provide grants to local CSOs under this award’s Grants Under Contract (GUC) mechanism and provide direct support for any capacity building these organizations may need, including financial management, organizational capacity, and strategic planning.

IR 3.3 Empowered citizens to participate in the fight against corruption As long as corruption is tolerated in the public opinion, no effort can result in substantial change.

It is important to increase public awareness of the negative impact of corruption in their daily lives, and provide citizens with tools to recognize corruption, denounce it and rise up against it. Increased citizen participation, especially that of women and youth, should ensure inclusive citizen oversight of public actions. Without such engagement, there will not be any pressure for public institutions to be accountable for their actions. The Contractor must design and implement activities to ensure that citizen participation is inclusive, representative, and of high quality to trigger the right debates around public spending and influence public opinion to change norms around corrupt practices. In conducting this work, the Contractor must analyze and consider culture and social norms in DRC to understand what will drive behavior change.

IR 3.4 Increased ability of government officials to be AC reform champions Government officials, including those elected, are deeply involved in perpetuating corruption as a norm. However, USAID’s recent work with local governments has helped identify champions that are willing to change the paradigm. The Contractor, using the PEA, must seek to identify those champions, including elected officials, across the board and provide them with technical support, expertise and skills to influence a larger number of peers. The aim is to shift the mentality within the public administration and elected institutions to promote good practices to counter corruption and support activities that address public needs. The Contractor will provide additional technical assistance to the best performing government officials to address the needs of their communities and improve development outcomes. The Contractor should select individuals that have a good reputation and can influence public opinion to shape and improve practices by provincial and local governments and IGF and Cour de Comptes actions. The ultimate goal is to shift normative corrupt practices and reduce public tolerance for corruption. By doing so, the Contractor should seek to shift social norms around how the public perceives corruption. USAID will also work with the Contractor to identify incentives to bring these stakeholders together, elevate their voices, and champion their efforts through other USG programming and opportunities.

Required Activities

● Support internal and external audit and control activities in the targeted provincial and ETD governments in collaboration with other donors’ projects

● Support greater oversight by provincial assemblies, through the Economic and Financial Committee (ECOFIN), and create…