NAS15-10000 Ext thru FY24 JOFOC-Redacted.pdf

Enclosure

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER (JSC)

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION (JOFOC)

Pursuant to 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2304(c)(1) and Federal Acquisition Regulation

(FAR) 6.302-1

For the International Space Station (ISS) Vehicle Sustaining Engineering Contract, NAS15-10000

1. FAR 6.303-2(b)(2) – The nature and/or description of the action being approved: This justification provides the rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition with The Boeing Company (hereafter referred to as “Boeing”) to extend the ISS Vehicle Sustaining Engineering Contract (hereafter referred to as the “Boeing 10K Contract”). In accordance with Public Law (PL) 115-10 (signed March 21, 2017), the Government intends to continue to maximize the productivity and the use of the ISS with respect to scientific and technological research and development, advancement of space exploration, and international collaboration to support full and complete utilization of the ISS through at least 2024.

NASA/JSC intends to issue a Cost-Plus Award-Fee (CPAF) contract modification for Boeing to continue to perform integration, verification, sustaining engineering, and Post-Production Support (PPS) of the ISS Vehicle by extending the current contract by four years, from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2024.

2. FAR 6.303-2(b)(3) – A description of the supplies or services required, to meet the Agency’s needs (including the estimated value): In order to maximize the cost effectiveness of long-term space exploration and utilization activities, the ISS Program will support human exploration beyond low-earth orbit by specifically providing a test bed for research data and technology development. This contract extension will provide services needed to support the basic operation of the ISS and support a research program that advances knowledge and provides benefits to the nation. Additionally, technologies used aboard the ISS and by the ISS Program will aid in achieving the Agency’s goals and objectives for human space flight and exploration. This will allow for collaboration with International Partners/Participants (IP/Ps) and provide opportunities for collaboration with domestic commercial firms. These actions not only satisfy the Agency’s requirements and directly align with NASA’s strategic goals, but also align with the intent and are in accordance with PL 115-10.

The functional elements to be performed in support of the ISS Program for this contract include:

• Sustaining engineering of United States On-Orbit Segment (USOS) hardware and software and common hardware provided to IP/Ps, Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) developers, commercial providers and Payload Developers (PDs).

• Integration of the USOS with IP/Ps, GFE, payload, and commercial provider hardware and software.

• PPS of USOS hardware and common hardware provided to the IP/Ps, GFE developers, PDs, and commercial providers.

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• Technical integration across all of the ISS segments (USOS, IP segments, and visiting vehicles).

• ISS end-to-end subsystem management for the majority of ISS subsystems and specialty engineering disciplines (materials and processes, electric, electronic and electromechanical parts, environments, electromagnetic effects).

• USOS and integrated system certification of flight readiness.

• Design, development, certification and production of hardware and software for the

ISS Program.

This extension will include the above mentioned tasks to allow for continued operation of the ISS to support Agency requirements.

Also included in the contract is the H.57 clause, Deliverables After Contract Period of Performance, which contains a list of hardware and the associated negotiated values that will be added to the contract with an extension. Hardware that is purchased under this contract often requires a long lead time, and is scheduled for delivery beyond the current period of performance of the contract. The current contract has a period of performance through September 30, 2020, with ISS Program requirements ending no earlier than 2024. The clause currently contains worth of hardware deliveries through July 2022. This value is expected to increase as the ISS approaches the end of the current period of performance.

The basic period of performance for this contract extension is expected to be four years, from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2024. If a deorbit date is finalized for the end of the ISS prior to September 30, 2024, the contract requirements will be updated specifically for the deorbit requirements and the contract will be renegotiated. The estimated value of this extension period is , which includes hardware, sparing procurements, sustaining engineering, and PPS services to enable utilization of the ISS as a national laboratory through September 30, 2024.

3. FAR 6.303-2(b)(4) – An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition: 10 U.S.C. 2304 requires, with certain limited exceptions, that agencies shall promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government contracts. Under limited circumstances, agencies are authorized to award contracts that restrict competition on a sole-source basis.

The statutory authority for proceeding with this acquisition under other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) as contemplated by the provision of FAR 6.302- 1(a)(2)(ii), which states that full and open competition need not be provided when “supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, including major components thereof.” Additionally, as contemplated by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii), for NASA contracts “services may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of follow-on contracts for the continued provision of highly specialized services.” These exceptions are applicable when it is likely that award to any other source would result in “substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the

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Agency’s requirements.”

4. FAR 6.303-2(b)(5) and (9) – A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited and any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition such as:

Boeing has been performing under the ISS Contract since November 1993. Under this contract, Boeing is responsible for sustaining engineering and PPS of the USOS elements and common ISS hardware used by the USOS, IP/Ps, commercial providers, and GFE providers, as well as design, development, testing and evaluation of hardware and software required to continue operation of the ISS. A new contractor’s failure to perform or delay in performing these critical functions would place the mission and crew at risk.

Much of the ISS hardware is complicated, unique, one-of-a-kind hardware, developed specifically for the ISS. The ISS has unique on-orbit environmental, operational, life and crew-tended requirements. Boeing has developed requirements for and designed, developed, and certified the ISS USOS hardware and software, both stand-alone and with the integrated system. This experience makes them unique in their ability to quickly understand the on-orbit performance of the hardware and software, identify anomalies, and resolve issues and anomalies in a timely manner to ensure the safety of the crew and vehicle, and also mission success. Extensive knowledge of the hardware and software systems is essential for quick reaction to problems and minimizing investigation of known conditions. This knowledge is also critical for supporting the integration and operation of payloads and visiting vehicles, including commercial vehicles.

Additionally, the Boeing software team has assembled and maintains highly skilled software developers with extensive Automatic Data Acquisition (ADA) programming experience. In addition to the critical knowledge Boeing’s software developers have accumulated, the availability of ADA programmers is a critical factor affecting the software sustaining aspect of this contract. The supply of software programmers on the current open market with ADA programming experience is extremely low, since the ADA programming language is not widely used in mainstream industry. ADA software is a niche market primarily used by the Department of Defense (DOD) for DOD systems opposed to mainstream programming languages (i.e. Java, HTML, C++). This situation poses a risk for a new contractor recruiting replacements. These software developers currently reside within Boeing, and it would be difficult to replace these programmers without suffering a significant drop in quality and efficiency if a transition to a new software contractor is required. Boeing’s acquired knowledge of the systems currently being used aboard the ISS and experience with ADA programming would be extremely difficult to duplicate. A transition to a new software contractor would also create unwarranted risk and could potentially impact on-orbit operations and safety. This is due to the amount of experience Boeing’s software team maintains in regards to on-orbit anomaly resolutions.

Boeing is currently in the process of building spares, hardware, and software required to maintain ISS vehicle operations, operate with new commercial and international vehicles, and effectively support research. This includes complicated hardware such as additional docking systems and associated critical spares for the Commercial Crew Program, redesign/modification of the current docking system to support deep space exploration, solar array hardware to augment the on-board power system, oxygen generation assembly redesign

BG-18-136, ISS Vehicle Sustaining Engineering Contract JOFOC 4 to support human presence outside low-earth orbit, and hardware to allow faster recovery from component failures in the external thermal system. Some of this hardware will not be completed and/or activated until late in the contract or after the current contract period of performance. Transitioning effort to another contractor prior to completing this work could have substantial cost impacts due to the duplication of contract costs, and could also cause unacceptable delays in product and service delivery.

Boeing’s hardware and software teams have worked extensively with the IP/Ps (Europe, Japan, Russia, and Canada) and the commercial vehicle providers (SpaceX, Orbital ATK, Boeing Commercial Crew, and Sierra Nevada), establishing working relationships and developing the hardware and software interfaces for the IP/P modules and commercial vehicles. The ability to efficiently troubleshoot, identify, and resolve software and hardware issues would be impacted while a new contractor gained experience and established working relationships with the IP/Ps and the commercial vehicle providers.

The ISS is the most complex, international civil engineering collaboration undertaken to date.

Boeing, under the Boeing 10K contract, designed, tested and built the majority of the hardware for the USOS. Additionally, Boeing integrated all the international elements and operating visiting vehicles into the ISS configuration. Given the complexity of the ISS elements and system architectures and the continuous on-orbit operations of the ISS vehicle, transferring this responsibility to a new contractor could pose serious impediments to the operation of the ISS and integration of payloads and new commercial vehicles into the ISS system.

Boeing has been performing under this contract since 1993. To transition this contract to another company while ensuring uninterrupted operations would create unacceptable risk and delay, given the frequency of system issues and anomalies. These anomalies require timely resolution and Boeing possesses the experience required to quickly resolve anomalies and mitigate unwarranted risk aboard the ISS. Additionally, it would involve a high transition cost and significantly increase the risk to successful operation and safety of the ISS vehicle and crew. Boeing’s years of experience and expert understanding of the USOS hardware and software, ISS end-to-end subsystem design, performance requirements, IP/P hardware designs, and visiting vehicle designs and certification requirements make them the only company currently able to satisfy the unique needs of the ISS within the needed timeframe of the ISS extension. Therefore, it is recommended that the ISS Vehicle Sustaining contract be sole sourced to Boeing.

a. FAR 6.303-2(b)(9) (ii) – When 6.302-1 is cited for follow on acquisitions as described in 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii), an estimate of the cost to the Government that would be duplicated and how the estimate was derived: Since 1993 Boeing has been performing as the prime contractor and has the corporate knowledge of this program within its current workforce. Much of the data produced for the program was delivered in the contractor’s own formats and is not packaged for transition to another contractor.

Packaging and delivering this data in a format usable to a successor contractor is a large task that is currently not planned or budgeted for. It would be necessary for the ISS Program to spend in the magnitude of $133 million or more and several months, if not years, to obtain this data for transition. Additionally, the magnitude of the data alone would require an incoming contractor to spend months reviewing the data to ensure it

BG-18-136, ISS Vehicle Sustaining Engineering Contract JOFOC 5 was complete and to understand it. Boeing would need to be available to address concerns associated with the data for a substantial length of time. The ISS Program has experienced transition of flight support equipment hardware from Boeing to the Cargo Mission Contract (CMC) and months transpired before the CMC contract could operate without Boeing’s assistance. The amount and complexity of hardware (and associated data) transferred from Boeing to CMC was very minor compared to the amount of hardware and software Boeing is currently sustaining.

In addition to costs associated in data packaging, Boeing would be responsible for transitioning the USOS hardware and software to the incoming contractor. To transition this hardware and software to a new contractor would require additional costs by the Program, which were not captured in the previously mentioned $133 million estimate.

Maintaining the contract with Boeing eliminates the need for costs associated with duplicating data packages and transitioning hardware and software to a new contractor.

5. FAR 6.303-2(b)(6) – A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

On April 12, 2018, a Non-Competitive Synopsis was issued on the Federal Business Opportunities website for Vehicle Sustaining Engineering services, with a closing date of May 14, 2018. This synopsis stated the Government’s intent to extend the current contract for these requirements on a sole source basis to Boeing with an anticipated period of performance from October 1, 2020, for a period up to the end of the ISS Program (2024 or beyond). No responses were received. No companies expressed any concerns with or interest in competing for this extension.

6. FAR 6.303-2(b)(7) – A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable: In order to demonstrate that the Government has received a fair and reasonable price, the contractor will be required to provide the Government with cost and pricing data in accordance with FAR 15.403-4, and will be required to provide a certificate of current cost or pricing data in accordance with FAR 15.406-2. In addition to the technical evaluation that will be developed by the requiring technical organizations, an independent Government estimate of the proposal will be conducted by the ISS Assessments, Cost Estimating and Schedules Office. The Government has successfully negotiated six contract extensions with Boeing under this contract. Based upon past experiences, and the data and resources available to the Contracting Officer (to include audited rates with the prime contractor), it is anticipated that the Government will be able to negotiate a fair and reasonable price for these services.

7. FAR 6.303-2(b)(8) – Description of the market survey conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons a market survey was not conducted: A Non-Competitive Synopsis was issued on April 12, 2018, with a closing date of May 14, 2018, that serves as a market survey for the proposed contract modification. As a result of this market survey, no company expressed any interest in or capability to perform this work, nor has NASA identified any company that could acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to perform the critical and complex activities associated with this contract in such an abbreviated period of time.

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8. FAR 6.303-2(b)(10) – A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed an interest in writing in the acquisition: To date, no potential contractor has contacted the Contracting Officer expressing an interest in performing this work as the prime contractor.

9. FAR 6.303-2(b)(11) – A statement of actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required: Removing barriers to competition would be cost prohibitive because Boeing has possession of much of the data and tools produced for the ISS Program.

Most of the data and tools that were delivered by Boeing are in the contractor’s own formats and are not packaged for transition to another contractor. Packaging and delivering the data and tools in a format usable to a successor contractor is necessary to allow for a competition and transition of this contract and would be very costly. Additionally, a lengthy transition period would be required to ensure a new contractor was sufficiently prepared to sustain the ISS Vehicle without compromising safety or operations. As stated above, removing barriers to competition would be cost prohibitive for a contractor other than Boeing to sustain the

ISS.