WALTER S. DIEHL Revised JA 060920_Redacted.pdf

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND NORFOLK

SP64 471 EAST C STREET

NORFOLK, VA 23511-2419

J&A No. N32205-20-R-4002

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN

COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity: Department of the Navy, Military Sealift Command (MSC) - Norfolk.

2. Description of the Action Being Approved: This is a justification for work to be provided under Work Items (WI) 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 451, 452, 453, 456, 501, 509, 610, 611, 651, 653 of the Statement of Work (SOW) for the Mid Term Availability (MTA) of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193) under RFP N32205-20-R-4002. This Justification covers only the portion of the acquisition which an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Authorized Facility/Manufacturer/Representative is required.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: MSC Norfolk requires OEM authorized technical field service representatives and OEM parts to accomplish the requirements of (WI) 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 451, 452, 453, 456, 501, 509, 610, 611, 651, 653for a 64-day Mid Term Availability (MTA). The estimated dollar value of the Fifteen (15) WIs is $748,858.00, which will be funded utilizing FY 21 Operations & Maintenance funds.

4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition: 10 U.S.C 2304 (c)(1), Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements, as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a).

5. Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Authority:

a. WI 201, 202, 205, 206, Main Engine Technical Representative; Provide

The OEM for the vessel’s Main Engine are MAN ES and Fairbanks Morse. MAN ES and Fairbanks Morse, as the OEM in partnership, are the only authorized vendors to provide parts to their equipment. Factory parts and proprietary technical data/drawings are only available from the original manufacturer. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Propulsion CRP System as critical equipment. Failure of the CRP System will severely impact the safe operation of the ship. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Main Engine Propulsion System is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

b. WI 203 Overhaul Main Engine and SSDG Turbochargers

The OEM for the vessel’s Main Engine and SSDG Turbochargers is Asea Brown-Boveri (ABB).

ABB as the OEM is the only authorized vendor to provide parts to their equipment. Factory parts and proprietary technical data/drawings are only available from the original manufacturer. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Propulsion CRP System as critical equipment. Failure of the CRP System will severely impact the safe operation of the ship. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Main Engine Propulsion System is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

c. WI 451, and 452, Radar and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)

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The OEM for the vessel’s Radar is FURUNO and the ECDIS is TRANSAS. FURUNO and TRANSAS have numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. The vendor is required to provide documentation with a Certificate of Approved training for the FURUNO Radars and TRANSAS units that are installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer or authorized vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment. The Radar and ECDIS are intricate components within the Bridge Navigation equipment. Failure of the Radar and ECDIS will severely impede the ship’s ability to safely navigate and identify other vessels operating in/around the vessel. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Radar and ECDIS is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

d. WI 453, NAVIGAT X Gyro Systems Preventive Maintenance

The OEM for the equipment is Sperry Marine. A Sperry qualified rep for servicing, parts and repairs is required to certify and ensure proper operation and bearing (heading accuracy). This is the primary electronic means available for determining the ship’s heading and supplies this information to multiple equipment on the bridge, and must be certified accurate and available for the vessel during navigation for safe passage. This is a Coast Guard requirement. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Gyro Compass is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical and is required by ABS and USCG. Service of the GYRO must be accomplished by USCG/ABS approved and OEM trained vendors. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the GYRO is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

e. WI 456, Annual service and adjust Magnetic Compass

The OEM for the vessel’s Magnetic Compass is Baker Lyman and company. Baker Lyman and company has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. The vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training as a magnetic compass adjuster. Factory authorized and proprietary technical data/drawings are only available from the original manufacturer and authorized vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

f. WI 501, Incinerator Annual Maintenance

The OEM for the vessel’s incinerator is Scandinavian Boiler. Scandinavian Boiler has several authorized vendors to provide parts to their equipment. Factory parts and proprietary technical data/drawings are only available from the original manufacturer. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the incinerator as critical equipment. Failure of the incinerator will severely impact the safe operation of the ship. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the incinerator is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

g. WI 509, Auxiliary Boilers Inspection & Repair

The OEM for the vessel’s Boilers is Clayton boilers, which is the only authorized vendor to provide parts to their equipment. Factory parts and proprietary technical data/drawings are only available from the original manufacturer. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the boilers System as critical equipment. Failure of the boilers will severely impact the safe operation of the ship. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the boilers is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

h. WI 610, Annual Inspection of SCBA Equipment

The OEM for the vessel’s SCBA breathing apparatus and Refill Station is Interspiro Inc.

Interspiro Inc has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. The vendor is required to provide documentation with a Certificate of Approved training for the Interspiro Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units including backpack with air flask, facemask, and harness that are installed aboard the ship. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer authorized vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment. The vessel’s SCBA is required to allow crewmembers to perform fire-fighting duties while fighting a shipboard fire or addressing a HAZMAT situation.

Failure of the SCBAs will result in physical harm to the user and severely reduce the Ship’s Force capability to control/extinguish a fire and save the vessel from further damage.

i. 611, Annual SCBA Compressor and Refill Station Service

The OEM for the vessel’s Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Compressor and Refill Station is MAKO. MAKO has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. The vendor is required to provide documentation with a Certificate of Approved training for the MAKO Model No. 9400E3 Compressor and Model No. M3100 Refill Station unit that is installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer authorized vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment. The vessel’s SCBA Compressor and Refill Station is required to refill expended SCBA bottles used when fighting a shipboard fire or addressing a HAZMAT situation. Failure of the SCBA Compressor and Refill Station will severely reduce the Ship’s Force capability to control/extinguish a fire and save the vessel from further damage.

j. WI 651, Annual Lifeboat and Davit Inspection

The OEM for the vessel’s Lifeboats is Schat-Watercraft (Palfinger Inc.) and is the authorized vendor and supplier of approved repair parts and services of their equipment. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of Lifeboats is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-ALL lists the Lifeboats as critical equipment. Failure of Lifeboats is a major loss in safety and lifesaving equipment required for the vessel to get underway for vessel operations. The loss of major safety and lifesaving equipment poses a hazard to the crew. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Lifeboats is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-A0 193).

k. WI 653, Annual Rescue Boat and Davit Inspection (Allied)

The OEM for the vessel’s Rescue Boat Davits is Allied Technical Services. Allied Technical Services is the authorized vendor and supplier of approved repair parts and services of their equipment. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of Rescue Boat Davits is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-ALL lists the RHIB and Davit Assemblies as critical equipment. Failure of RHIB and Davit Assemblies is a major loss in safety and lifesaving equipment required for the vessel to get underway for vessel operations. The loss of major safety and lifesaving equipment poses a hazard to the crew. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB) and Davit Assemblies is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-A0 193).

l. WI 653, Annual Rescue Boat and Davit Inspection (Palfinger)

The OEM for the vessel’s STBD Rescue Boat Davit is Schat-Harding (Palfinger) and is the authorized vendor and supplier of approved repair parts and service of their equipment. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of STBD Rescue Boat Davit is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-ALL lists the RHIB and Davit Assemblies as critical equipment. Failure of RHIB and Davit Assemblies is a major loss in safety and lifesaving equipment required for the vessel to get underway for vessel operations. The loss of major safety and lifesaving equipment poses a hazard to the crew. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the RHIB and Davit Assemblies is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-A0 193).

m. WI 653, Annual Rescue Boat and Davit Inspection (Willard)

The OEM for the vessel’s Rescue boats is Willard Marine Inc., which is the authorized vendor and supplier of approved repair parts and services for their equipment. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Rescue boats is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-ALL lists the Rescue Boats as critical equipment. Failure of Rescue boats is a major loss in safety and lifesaving equipment required for the vessel to get underway for vessel operations. The loss of major safety and lifesaving equipment poses a hazard to the crew. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Rescue Boats is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-A0 193)

n. WI 651, Annual Lifeboat and Davit Inspection

The OEM for the vessel’s Lifeboat Winches is Schat-Harding (Palfinger) which is the authorized vendor and supplier of approved repair parts and services for their equipment. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of Lifeboat Winches is critical to the safe operation of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T- AO 193). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties and ensures equipment reliability and crew safety, therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

SMS number 10.6-002-ALL lists the Lifeboats as critical equipment. Failure of Lifeboat Winches is a major loss in safety and lifesaving equipment required for the vessel to get underway for vessel operations. The loss of major safety and lifesaving equipment poses a hazard to the crew. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the Lifeboat Winches is critical to the safe operations of the USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193).

6. Description of Efforts Made To Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable: The Government intends to post a synopsis and a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Ship Repair Availability at the Government Point of Entry (GPE), beta.sam.gov website, with the intent of awarding a firm-fixed-price contract to the lowest price offeror. Any prospective contractor will be required to use the OEM or OEM authorized vendor(s) as a subcontractor to perform the work in the related WIs.

7. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost: The Contracting Officer will determine the anticipated cost to the Government of the supplies/services covered by this J&A will be fair and reasonable in accordance with FAR Part 15.

8. Actions To Removed Barriers to Future Competition. For the reasons set forth in Paragraph 5, MSC has no plans at this time, other than synopsizing the requirements, to allow prime contractors to solicit these requirements competitively. If another potential source emerges, MSC Norfolk will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible.

CERTIFICATION AND APPROVALS