JandA posting.pdf

Justification and Approval (J&A) for Other Than Full and Open Competition

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I. Contracting Activity.

United States Air Force

AFMC OL:H/PZAAB

6050 GUM Lane, Bldg 1215 Hill AFB, UT 84056-5825 Contracting Officer: Travis Stephens Phone Number: 586-5091

II. Nature and/or description of the action being processed.

A. Upon approval to use other than, full and open competitive procedures the Air Force will issue a five year contract (five one year ordering periods) to repair the F-16 Expanded Computer Interface Unit (XCIU) and Stores Control Panel (SCP), with minimal amount of remanufacturing, for the QF-16 Regeneration Program used by the United States Air Force (USAF), and the F-16s Aggressor Program used by the United States Navy (USN).

B. The new contract will be awarded to:

International Enterprises, Inc. (IEI) 108 Allen Street, Talladega, AL 35160

CAGE 50218

C.

D. Contract Type & Structure: A five year Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Requirements type contract for repairs with a five year ordering period. The five year ordering period will begin from the date of contract award through 60 months, with an anticipated award date of April 2021. Total period of performance of this contract will not exceed five years.

III. Description of supplies/services required to meet agency needs.

A. This is a service acquisition in accordance with FAR 37.101 for depot level repair of the following F-16 Expanded Computer Interface Unit (XCIU) and Stores Management System Stores Control Panel (SCP) with minimal amount of remanufacturing. The XCIU is a component of the Stores Management and provides all commands to and receives status from the nine weapon station Remote Interface Units (RIUs). The Stores Control Panel (SCP) provides the means of manually controlling the stores management system and of selecting various modes and options. Repair with minimal amount of remanufacture will consist of major overhaul including complete or substantial disassembly into component parts. Tear-down includes reworking or replacing faulty parts in the XCIU and SCP. Reusable disassembled XCIU and SCP components shall be used as replacement components for restoring functionality of the other XCIU and SCP items. These reusable components are not required to maintain the end item identification. The XCIU and SCP item parts shall be reassembled so as to restore the items to a serviceable condition but not like new cosmetically. The remanufacturing processes used by the contractor shall bring service life back to the reconditioned XCIU and SCP items resembling the originally manufactured item. Contract CLIN Structure will include National Stock Numbers (NSN), D043 Noun, Part Number, Quantity (QTY), and unit price of items as follows:

B. The Air Forces unit repair with minimal remanufacturing costs, quantity are shown below :

Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5

1280-01-121-6879WF

Repair QTY 4 4 4 4 4

1290-01-224-8924WF

Repair QTY 4 4 4 4 4

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1290-01-340-6317WF

Repair QTY 1 1 1 1 1

C. The estimated dollar value is . The above costs are based forecast repair D200A requirements system, September 2019 Computation B-21. The contracting action will use 4930 CSAG-S Working Capital Funds.

IV. Statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition.

10 USC 2304 (c) (1) as implemented by FAR 6.302-(1)(a)(2)(iii), Only one known source responsible and qualified, no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

V. Demonstration that the contractor's unique qualifications or nature of the acquisition requires the use of the authority cited above (applicability of authority).

A. The above authority was selected because the requirement is for unique and highly specialized services. These are unique and highly specialized services because IEI is the only known company capable of repairing the SCP and XCIUs with minimal amount of remanufacturing utilizing a Pneumatic Processors Test Station, which was first used for the SCP in 1993 and has limited current usage.

B. Lockheed Martin Corporation via Elbit Systems of America (ESA) is the original equipment manufacture (OEM) who developed and manufactured these major F-16 Advanced Avionics equipment items. ESA retains the technical data and support equipment, including a Pneumatic Processors Test Station (Part Number 22212400-002), to fill the Government's requirement. The OEM, ESA, possesses critical manufacturing and remanufacturing knowledge and engineering skills to maintain the quality of the parts and equipment. Previously ESA, via Elbit Fort Worth (EFW), both remanufactured and manufactured these parts. All repairs with minimal amount of remanufacturing activity for these items has since transferred to International Enterprises, Inc. or "IEI" another wholly owned subsidiary of Elbit Systems of America. Specialized test equipment is required for repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing of the SCP, and the Government does not have adequate access to the test equipment required to organically repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing this item. The Government currently owns one of the appropriate model Pneumatic Processor tester (the -002); however it is also utilized for the test and repair with minimally amount of remanufacturing of the higher priority assets. Additional sources may be qualified using the one Government tester, however no other sources have been identified that is equipped with their own Lockheed Martin-certified Pneumatic Processor Test Station.

C. The 416 SCMS contacted ESA via IEI to obtain unlimited or Government purpose data rights on 06 March 2020 through a request for a No-Cost Rough Order Of Magnitude in which the contractor declined to provide an estimate based on unwilling to sale the data and it being detrimental to vendor's competitive advantage. Based on projects of similar nature, the 416 SCMS estimates reverse engineering the necessary data to prepare source qualification packages for repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing of these items would exceed the estimated cost by 134% of the estimated 5-year repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing cost, which is prohibited, and the XCIUs usage

March 2018 Security Marking (select from the drop-down list) Page 4 of 6 is limited to the QF-16 special project and a small Navy requirement of less than 2 per year.

D. The 416th Supply Chain Management Squadron believes that award to any other source would result in substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition and unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Air Force's requirement. The approximate cost is for capability to repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing the XCIU and SCP, which is more than the estimated remaining life cycle sustainment repair costs. The amount of time it would take to qualify another repair source and for the new source to develop repair procedures from identification through first article testing in order to fulfill the SCP repair with minimal remanufacturing is estimated at 18 months. It will take approximately 2 months for new source to confirm and certify, 3 months for contractor to repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing first article asset, 2 months for Government to confirm, 2 months for administrative processing, and an additional 6 months to solicit, compete, and award a contract. After award the contractor will have 45 days to repair and deliver the first asset. This 18 month process would significantly degrade the QF-16 mission and would place 5 USAF jets and 4 Navy jets on mission incapable (MICAP) status.

E. IEI is the only known firm that posses critical repair/remanufacture knowledge and engineering skills to maintain the quality of the XCIU and SCP. IEI retains data rights, repair procedures, knowledge, and technical data that are not economically available to the Government and the data is essential to maintaining the quality of the XCIU and SCP. The 416 SCMS estimates that acquiring the technical data and unlimited rights to the data through reverse engineering will cost the government approximately . Furthermore, a positive return on investment is unlikely to be achieved for funds expended on reverse engineering or data acquisition efforts due to the life of the QF-16 special project will come to an end and the Navy requirements is very low demand. IEI is capable of providing the services to repair the assets with minimal amount remanufacturing as described in Section III.

F. The government estimates award to any other vendor would result in substantial duplication of costs to include in non-reoccurring reverse engineering. The costs associated with reverse engineering are unacceptable due to current decrease in system requirements of the QF-16 special project that will be completed within the next five years.

Currently these costs cannot be expected to be recovered through competition without the U.S. Air Force experiencing a substantial duplication of costs and creating unacceptable delays in fulfilling the governments requirement.

G. OO-ALC is not currently a repair source as the Government does not own adequate test equipment or technical data required to qualify additional repair sources.

VI. Description of efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable.

A. Sources Synopsis: A sources sought synopsis for the QF-16 XCIU, SCP was issued 16 Mar 2020 through 17 Apr 2020, requested offerers to demonstrate their capabilities with regard to troubleshooting, testing, and repairing the XCIU and SCP. The sources sought specified the Government's limitation with regards to the data necessary to repair this item. No responses were received.

B. This requirement will be synopsized in Beta.Sam.gov as a notice of contract action IAW FAR 5.201, If other sources express interest, for the reason of this synopsis or other action, this will be listed in the official contract file.

C. Other actions: None

D. Qualifying Country Sources: None

VII. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable.

The following steps will be taken to ensure that the anticipated cost of this acquisition will be fair and reasonable. The contracting Officer will comply with the procedures and criteria contained in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) under Part 30 - Cost Accounting Standards, Part 31- Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, Subparts 15.4 - Contract Pricing; to include technical evaluations and audits, as appropriate. Additional steps to ensure price reasonableness will be under the guidance of the Contract Pricing Reference Guides, jointly developed by the Federal Acquisition Institute and the Air Force Institute of Technology. The Contracting Office will obtain certified cost or pricing data IAW FAR Subpart 15.403, when required. The Final Step is to include the Price Negotiation Memorandum (PNM). This

March 2018 Security Marking (select from the drop-down list) Page 5 of 6 detailed documentation and justification of price reasonableness will be disclosed in the official PNM, to be prepared upon completion of negotiations.

VIII. Description of the market research conducted and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted.

A. As described in Section VI above, market research, in accordance with FAR Part 10, was conducted by synopsis of the proposed acquisition, advising industry of the pending acquisition and soliciting inquires from interested parties.

B. IAW FAR Part 10, and in addition to ongoing market surveillance performed by the integrated product team, acquisition specific market research was conducted by the 416 SCMS engineer, on 16 March 2020. The Market Research Strategy focused on gathering information to support the efficacy of establishing additional repair sources for the F-16 advanced avionic items. Research included vendor surveys, commercial opportunities evaluation, product data and data rights evaluation, review of past and current terms and conditions of repair, performance requirements, engineering skills and techniques required, repair history, and additional and existing sources for each system. The engineer conducted multiple internet based searches of ThomasNet and the IQS Directory. The searches were based on nouns, NSNs, and part numbers. Search results yielded no additional sources, commercial vendors, or substitutable services sufficient to overcome the costs projected for developing full and open competition.

C. Market research concluded that there are no alternate/additional sources capable of meeting the governments requirement at this time and IEI is the only known company capable of satisfying the governments requirements.

D. Based on the market research, no commercial items nor any non-developmental items can satisfy the Government's requirements.

E. No organic capabilities exist for the XCIU and SCP.

IX. Any other facts supporting the use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.

No further information

X. List of any sources that expressed, in writing, an interest in the acquisition.

No sources have expressed interest

XI. A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before making subsequent acquisitions for the supplies or services required.

The 416 SCMS will continue to solicit via betaSAM for vendors seeking to become qualified in repair with minimal amount of remanufacturing of the XCIU-SCP and will continually perform market research. The government will also work with the current contractor to negotiate for data rights and, if cost effective beneficial to the government, procure data rights to enable competitive bidding and/or organic stand up.

Annually we will request data rights from ESA via IEI and annually we will post sources sought synopsis to see if the market place has changed and if there are any interested vendors.

XII. Certification by the Contracting Officer.

The contracting officer's signature on the Coordination and Approval Document evidences that he has determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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XIII. Certification by the technical/requirements personnel.

By their signatures on the Coordination and Approval Document, the technical and/or requirements personnel have certified as accurate and complete all supporting data, which is their responsibility, contained herein IAW FAR 6.303-2(c).