Follow_On_Justification_and_Approval_1Oct15_Redacted.pdf

Justification and Approval (J&A) for Other Than Full and Open Competition

NOTE: If a Justification and Approval was approved for the preceding acquisition, a copy of the approved J&A for the predecessor action must be included in the staff package for approval of the instant J&A. This applies to J&A staff packages that are submitted for review and approval at a level above the contracting officer. The predecessor J&A will be used as a reference document by the approving official.

Choose the funding level for this J&A Document:

< $650K > $650K and < $12.5M > $12.5M and < $85.5M > $85.5M

Contracting Activity: AFLCMC/WLZI

Purchase Request / Local ID Number: FA8617-16-C-6208

Program / Project (and PE, if applicable): Afghan Trainer Program

Program Type (PEO or Other Contracting): PEO

Authority (include full title): 10 U.S.C.2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2), Only One Responsible Source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

Estimated Contract Cost (including options): J&A Type: Class Individual

COORDINATION (AFFARS 5306.304(a) )

Date Contracting Officer

LAVONNE WHITELOW

AFLCMC/WLZI, (937)904-4165

Signature

Date Project Lead / Program Mgr / Requiring Activity

TRESSIE EASTERWOOD

AFLCMC/WLZI, (937)904-4159

Signature

Date Local Legal Reviewer

JOHN TAFFANY

AFMC/JANS, (937)904-5472

Signature

Date

30 Sep 2015

Chief of the Contracting Office (COCO)

ROSALIND HARPER

AFLCMC/WLK, (937)656-9476

Signature

Date Competition Advocate

DONALD POOLE

AFLCMC/PK, (937)255-3741

Signature

APPROVAL (AFFARS 5306.304(a) )

Date PEO

KEVIN BUCKLEY

AFLCMC/WL, (937) 255-3900

Signature

I. Contracting Activity.

AFLCMC/WLZI

Training Aircraft Division (TAD) International Support Branch (ISB) Building 11A 1970 Monahan Way Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7211

II. Nature and/or description of the action being processed.

This class J&A pertains to a new Sole Source, Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) follow-on contract with Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) (CAGE: 71379), One Cessna Blvd, Wichita, KS 67215-1400, in support of the Afghan Trainer Program (former name: Afghan Basic Trainer Light Lift (BT/LL Program). The United States Air Force (USAF) will procure commercial Interim Contractor Support (ICS) and training from Cessna Aircraft Company for a period of 18 months. The 18 month Period of Performance (PoP) will consist of a six month base effort, one six month option and FAR 52.217-8, Option to Extend Services. The contracting activity's customer for this acquisition is the Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) represented by Train, Advise, Assist Command -Air (TAAC-A). The anticipated contract number is

FA8617-16-C-6208.

III. Description of supplies/services required to meet agency needs.

The anticipated acquisition will be a FFP commercial contract consisting of a six month base, one six month option and incorporation of FAR 52.217-8, Option to Extend Services. The estimated contract value is based on the Program Office Estimate. The intended acquisition was initiated on 25 June 2015 pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, in response to Memorandum Of Requests (MORs), MOR 15-S1A-673/15-T1A-803 and resultant Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs), LOA J8-D-GAB and J8-D-TAA from Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan (SAO-A).

This acquisition will be for ICS and maintenance training services in support of commercial aircraft and an Aircrew Training Device (ATD) procured under FA8617-11-C-6209 for ICS and maintenance training. The anticipated acquisition will not include controlled information or technology. The purpose of this contract is to meet the requirement as stated above and to ensure no work stoppage prior to conducting a competitive source selection for a future Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) acquisition.

Future CLS efforts will be conducted under normal procedures through Full and Open Competition.

Under the anticipated contract, Cessna will provide the following supplies and services in support of the Afghan Trainer Program. Ancillary supplies and services not explicitly stated but generally included under the definition of “ICS” are considered to be within the scope of this J&A. All required services must commence 1 February 2016 in Afghanistan at Kabul International Airbase (AB) and Kandahar AB:

The contractor shall provide ICS in support of the Afghan Trainer Program C-208B fleet and ATD. The contractor shall sustain and prepare for transition of the Afghan Trainer Program by providing responsive logistics, maintenance, and training for the AAF. This requirement supports continued aircraft flight operations, maintenance, supply chain management, maintenance of aircraft sub-systems, maintenance of aircraft Ground Support Equipment (GSE), maintenance and calibration of special tools and test equipment, repair of reparables, logistics support, maintenance training, monitoring, and mentoring. Specific requirements are as follows:

1. Mission Capable Rate of aircraft will be maintained to at least 80% by Airframe & Powerplant

(A&P) certified mechanics

2. Maintenance training, to include supplemental training

3. Foreign language translation of program documents

4. Maintenance operations

5. Delivery of Ground Support Equipment (GSE) to support launch and recovery in the event of base closure and aircraft transition

ICS shall encompass all launch, recovery, towing and flight line servicing, including actions required for operations and maintenance of aircraft subsystems and support equipment (SE). ICS shall include aircraft maintenance, all materials, inspections and publications; supply of all contractor owned and maintained spares and support equipment, repair and overhaul of all reparable spares, maintenance, repair or replacement of all support equipment, engine repair and engine overhaul.

All aircraft and equipment are to be maintained in accordance with (IAW) the manufacturers Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved instructions for continued Airworthiness (including service bulletins, etc.).

The contractor shall provide the necessary technician and organizational level maintenance training, based on data available under this program, developed and presented IAW specific Afghanistan needs. Training shall consist of formal classroom training, accompanying apprenticeship programs, and supplemental training.

A reserved Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) will be established to procure GSE to support launch and recovery of aircraft in the event of base closure and transition of assets to the Afghan Air Force. These requirements will be incorporated into the initial contract as a reserved CLIN and will include GSE equipment to support launch and recovery estimated at . A listing of all required equipment to support launch and recovery is contained herein, Attachment 1. Upon receipt of firm requirements contained in a LOA with applicable funding, the reserved CLIN will be established, negotiated and exercised.

Estimated effort prices are as follows:

Contract Estimate:

Basic (01 February 2016 -31 July 2016):

FFP - estimated Option 1 - Priced Option (01 August 2016 -31 January 2017) FFP - estimated FAR 52.217-8, Option to Extend Services (01 February 2017- 31 July 2017)

FFP - estimated Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) requirements requested to be incorporated as reserved CLINs:

Tools and Support Equipment - estimated Supply Chain Management Training - estimated

Funds utilized for the base PoP are FY2015 Army Fund Code 2091, Overseas Contingency Operations /Afghanistan Security Forces Funds. This J&A requests approval for more than one fiscal year. Applicable future fiscal year funds will be allocated to the program if options are exercised. The base and options (if utilized) are intended to provide for CLS requirements execution, competitive source selection for a future competitive acquisition currently underway and allocate time for CLS contractor standup while preventing a break-in-service.

IV. Statutory authority permitting Other than Full and Open Competition.

10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2), Only One Responsible Source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

V. Demonstration that the contractor's unique qualifications or nature of the acquisition requires the use of the authority cited above (applicability of authority).

A new requirement was levied on the program office in March 2015 to provide Contractor Logistics Support without any disruptions in support for the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Trainer Program. In order to ensure no work stoppage while conducting a competitive source selection, a follow-on ICS and training contract is required. The intent of this follow-on contract action is to prevent a break-in-service while allocating sufficient time to conduct a competitive source selection for future CLS requirements.

IAW FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii)(B), Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements when award to any other source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency's requirements.

Cessna is the only source capable of satisfying the complete requirement as requested by TAAC-A through CSTC-A and SAO-A. The subject acquisition prevents a work stoppage and is a follow-on effort to FA8617-14-C-6195 which provided sustainment and preparation for transition to the AAF of the Afghan Trainer Program (C-208B fleet and ATDs) by providing responsive logistics, maintenance, and training for the AAF. This requirement supports aircraft flight operations, maintenance, supply chain management, maintenance of aircraft sub-systems, maintenance of aircraft GSE, maintenance and calibration of special tools and test equipment, repair of reparables, logistics support, maintenance training, monitoring, and mentoring.

CLS requirements did not materialize until March 2015 due to the volatile political climate, national unrest, financial instability, unknown security environment, and ever-changing USG mission objectives due to a constantly fluctuating environment. During each of the issues depicted above and further delineated below, the future state of Afghanistan remained undetermined until March 2015.

Requirement definition was hampered by the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) and Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the USG and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

(GIRoA) past 31 December 2014. The SoFA and BSA were ultimately agreed upon and commenced on 1 January 2015.

Further hindering the formalization of the future of the Afghan Trainer Program were political, cultural and security uncertainties including: the 2014 Afghan presidential elections, the withdrawal of international combat troops by the end of 2014, insurgent forces launching sustained attacks on a number of vital districts, and the transition of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) combat role changed from the NATO-led follow-on mission, to Resolute Support, in January 2015. In April 2015, Operation Resolute Support was confirmed and publicized the future state of the AAF including the Afghan Trainer Program. Additionally, the increase in Islamic State of Iraq and Syria insurgence activities in Afghanistan and continued unstable security environment has also hindered a viable vision for the future of support in Afghanistan. The political fragility and security vulnerabilities continue to pose the greatest obstacles in formulating a long-term future for the AAF and Afghan Trainer Program.

Due to the capricious Afghan dynamics, CLS requirements were received in March 2015 and in order to maintain continuity of services, the ICS/training requirements contemplated herein were received on 25 June 2015. The USG estimates the time-frame required to conduct a source selection for the requirements contained herein to be between 10 and 12 months. Based on market research and history of similar programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USG estimates the time-frame to place new personnel in-country at 6 to 12 weeks and the time-frame for a contractor to procure all necessary equipment and to fully mobilize in-country at four to six months. Further market research has revealed expediting personnel placement and site activation will require a minimum of 45-60 days. In order for the Afghan Trainer Program mission to succeed, program operations must continue without a break-in-service following the completion of FA8617-14-C-6195. The timelines discussed within this paragraph constitute unacceptable delays to the USG as they will result in a break-in-service and early program cessation.

Based on historical data and market research, in the event of base closure and aircraft transition to the AAF, the ability to maintain aircraft launch and recovery operations is paramount to the success of the AAF. Historically, the United States Government (USG) has received an LOA 44 days prior to base closure. In order to prevent fleet grounding in a contingency environment under very restricted time-frames, the USG anticipates the need to procure GSE for launch and recovery activities only. The necessary GSE to support launch and recovery would be comprised of items already onsite. If these items were procured utilizing competitive procedures, the timeline from requirement requisition to induction of items into Kabul, Afghanistan would take 180 days; this does not allocate any additional time for customs issues which are prevalent. Upon receipt of items, the AAF would be required to provide transportation to the end user as base closure restricts security and US/coalition transportation. Current evidence suggests it would take approximately four months for the Afghans to coordinate transportation of necessary GSE/tooling to support launch and recovery for fleet operations in the event of base closure.

Due to length of time, prior to base closure, the fleet must be placed in long-term preservation status.

Based on market research, the associated cost for long-term preservation for 10 aircraft is .

This estimate includes preservation, materials and de-preservation. However, it is unknown if additional time and associated costs would be incurred due to base closure and de-preservation processes as the initial research was based on the assumption that FAA certified trained A&P mechanics would be performing the de-preservation requirements on a secure base. The timelines discussed within this paragraph constitute unacceptable delays and additional costs which would not be recovered utilizing competitive procedures. In addition, the AAF fleet would be reduced by 50%, completely eliminating missions in the region and unable to perform necessary operations to support the warfighter.

The primary mission of the Afghan Trainer Program is to provide platforms for the purpose of Afghan maintenance training. These activities are essential to the long-term viability and success of the AAF. In order for these aircraft to remain operable without a USG presence, an organic maintenance and supply chain management capability is necessary. The requirements, as contained within this J&A, are considered to be of a highly specialized nature due to the need for A&P certified mechanics, management of personnel in a hostile overseas environment, management of an extensive spares and support equipment inventory, and personal interaction with, and training of Afghan students with varying degrees of English language training. Cessna's team includes experienced maintenance, supply chain management, and instructor personnel who are familiar with the AAF, USG processes, and operating in an austere and often hostile environment. Cessna's knowledge and experience of the unique operations of this program are key to maintain and transition the Afghan Trainer Program.

The USG requirement is to provide continuous support commencing 01 February 2016 for the Afghan Trainer Program. In order to do so without a break-in-service and unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency requirements, it is necessary to award a follow-on contract to prevent the break-in-service and allocate time to conduct a competitive source selection for near term future requirements. Market research delineates there are sources capable of performing the government's requirements; however, only one source is capable of performing 100% of the agency's needs in the time required.

A requirement for CY2017 and beyond materialized for CLS. The USG is working to competitively award a CLS contract utilizing full and open competitive procedures for CY2017 and beyond. Market research denotes multiple qualified offerors are anticipated.

VI. Description of efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable.

A. A Request for Information (RFI) was posted on 15 May 2015 through 28 May 2015 for Afghan Trainer Program ICS and maintenance training. Effort advertised by the RFI included a six month base period and three six month options. Only one organization responded to the RFI. Sources with expressed interest are provided in Section VIII and X below.

B. A Sources Sought Synopsis (SSS) for FA8617-16-C-6208 was posted on 08 June 2015 and closed on

09 July 2015. The SSS included a requirement for Afghan Trainer Program ICS and associated training for a six month base period and one six month option. Potential offerors were notified that all services were required to begin by 1 February 2016, at both Afghan locations, in order to maintain continuity of operations. There were a total of seven respondents to the SSS, of which, two respondents provided technical responses. Both respondents provided capability statements addressing the USG requirements as requested in the SSS. Only one respondent (Cessna) clearly delineated 100% of the USG requirements would commence as identified in the SSS on 01 Feb 2016.

Sources with expressed interest are provided in Sections VIII and X below.

C. A Sources Sought Synopsis Amendment for FA8617-16-C-6208 was posted on 04 August 2015 and closed on 14 August 2015. The Amendment requested potential offerors submit a capability statement to perform the requirements specified in the original SSS, posted 08 June 2015, and also added the ability to continue ICS and training services under FAR 52.217-8, Option to Extend Services. In addition, the Amendment requested potential offerors provide a capability statement regarding placement of GSE to prevent fleet grounding in the event of base closure. GSE is required to be onsite 01 February 2016. A total of two companies responded to the 04 August 2015 SSS Amendment. Only one respondent (Cessna) clearly delineated 100% of the USG requirements would commence as identified in the SSS Amendment on 01 Feb 2016. Sources with expressed interest are provided in Sections VIII and X below.

D. This requirement was synopsized in FEDBIZOPPS (FBO) as a notice of contract action IAW with

FAR 5.201. Although the USG does not own data to support repairing these assets from any other source, any source who responded to the USG as a result of the SSS will be identified to the prime contractor as a potential source for subcontracting possibilities.

E. Intent to award sole source will be posted to FBO in order to inform the public of the USG's intention to award this effort sole source. A redacted version of this approved J&A will be attached to the posting. This will allow any potential sources an opportunity to review this requirement and the USG's justification to award this effort sole source. If potential offerors believe the effort can be performed without the schedule delays and associated impacts to cost and war-fighter mission, they will have the opportunity to notify the Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) prior to contract award.

F. Other Actions: A source selection utilizing full and open competition is anticipated by the USG for the

CLS effort. USG planning activities began in early 2015 with the intention of awarding a competitively sourced contract by 31 January 2016. Due to regional circumstances contained herein, TAAC-Air, formerly NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan, and CSTC-A were unable to fully identify and stabilize requirements until March 2015, as discussed in Section V above. In order to prevent a work stoppage prior to the CLS competitive source selection award, the follow-on ICS and training sole source contract is required. Fully implemented LOAs for the follow-on ICS and training to prevent a break-in-service prior to CLS award were received by the Program Management Office (PMO) from TAAC-Air on 25 June 2015 (ICS) and 22 April 2015 (Training). The LOAs established an initial PoP of six months (1 February 2016 - 31 July 2016). The USG determined the time-line between PMO requirement receipt and contract need date insufficient to allow for a competitive source selection and contractor standup at both base locations in Afghanistan by 01 February 2016 to prevent a break-in-service thereby creating an unacceptable delay in fulfilling the agency's need.

Justification is based on our current contract expiring 31 January 16, creating a need date to commence 100% of contractual support activities on 1 February2016. Market Research delineates that there are sources capable of performing the government's requirements; however, only one source is capable of performing the agency's needs in the time-line required.

G. Qualifying Country Sources: None.

VII. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable.

A. In accordance with FAR 15.402, the PCO shall ensure that this contract is procured at a fair and reasonable price. This effort is solely commercial in nature and, therefore, the contractor will submit a formal price proposal with other than certified cost or pricing data. Sufficient information to support the accuracy and reliability of the estimate will be required. Cessna's proposal shall be reviewed by experienced technical analysts, cost analysts, and contract specialists. The PCO office will utilize, as necessary, price analysis, cost analysis, historical pricing, sales data and publicly available commercial price listings as the basis for negotiating a fair and reasonable price.

B. The original contract FA8617-11-C-6209 with Cessna was achieved in a competitive source selection with Adequate Price Competition (APC). The follow-on contract FA8617-14-C-6195 was achieved utilizing fair and reasonable pricing based on escalation of the originally awarded competitive contract. The pricing of the follow-on effort is anticipated to be commensurate to previously proposed pricing achieved with APC.

VIII. Description of the market research conducted and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted.

Market research was conducted to include posting a RFI, a SSS, and a SSS Amendment of the proposed acquisition, in an effort to advise industry and solicit inquiries from interested parties. In addition, numerous internet queries for responsible sources were conducted. The aforementioned market research techniques utilized included: Central Contractor Registration, Thomas Register, System for Award Management, North American Industry Classification System, Federal Procurement Data System, SBA Quick Market and Dynamic searches, and Google. Additionally, examination of acquisition history and experience with the marketplace under previous acquisitions for the same or similar items was utilized.

The PMO also assessed cost estimates from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and utilized expert opinions from logistics analysts, Air Force Security Assistance and Training analysts, program engineers, and other subject matter experts within AFLCMC familiar with similar requirements occurring in austere and/or hostile conditions. Market research for the previous Afghan Basic Trainer Light Lift (BT/LL) Program, now Afghan Trainer Program by the PMO has been ongoing since 2013.

PMO logistics analysts are actively engaged in sustainment activities, remaining current with industry developments by reviewing industry reports, trends and product developments, communicating with field personnel, reviewing applicable company portfolios on a regular basis, and maintaining an active dialog with the sustainment counterparts.

A Market Research Report was completed for the contemplated contract encompassing a detailed depiction of techniques and findings.

The market research to include RFI and SSS postings support that Cessna is the only source capable of accomplishing the work required for this anticipated services contract in the timeframe required based on the following rationale:

Only one company, L3 Vertex Solutions responded to the RFI, but failed to respond to the SSS. The RFI consisted of one six month base and three six month options, whereby the SSS consists of one six month base and one six month option. A logistical technical evaluation of RFI respondent L-3 Vertex determined they have the knowledge and experience, to include FAA licensed A&P maintenance personnel, supply chain management and maintenance training, and the interpreter/translators necessary to support the aircraft (and ATD) flying training program as specified in the RFI.

Of two respondents to the SSS, Cessna alone positively asserted the capability to meet all technical requirements, including training, in the necessary time frame commencing 01 February 2016 and as expressed in the solicitation. Additional market research provided by DynCorp International specified 45-60 days would be required to place contractor personnel in-country at the two locations specified in the SSS to conduct aircraft maintenance training and ICS at 100% of the anticipated requirements contained in the SSS. DynCorp specified this estimate was based on recent placement of personnel in Afghanistan. The USG anticipates that both Cessna Aircraft Company and DynCorp International will compete in the USG source selection for 2017 Afghan Trainer Program CLS and training.

In addition to Cessna, DynCorp International provided a technical response to the SSS. The USG determined DynCorp technically capable to perform the requirements. Based on market research provided by DynCorp, which estimated 45-60 days to stand up both locations in Afghanistan, DynCorp is unable to meet the USG requirement to perform capabilities commencing on 01 February 2016. During this time DynCorp would conduct the Supply Chain transition requirements at the operating locations which would include: inventory, establish connectivity, negotiate purchase of material and equipment, file export license request (if required), and other basic transition requirements. DynCorp is not able to complete 100% of the USG requirements as specified to support up to 26 C-208B aircraft in the time-frame required. The USG anticipates DynCorp will compete in a USG source-selection for 2017 Afghan Trainer Program CLS and training.

Survey of other USG programs operating in austere conditions confirmed historical data specifying 30-90 days to place contractor professionals in-country and an additional four to six months for mobilization.

(Information provided from similar Afghanistan and Iraq acquisitions.)

IX. Any other facts supporting the use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.

IAW Section V, the USAF estimates of the cost and schedule impacts of utilizing a source other than Cessna are as follows:

A. Any occurrence of aircraft not being supported for more than five consecutive days, but less than 90 consecutive days will necessitate aircraft preservation and result in the following costs (data collected from OEM on 6 March 2014, escalated to current prices and compared to historical data for similar programs):

1. Preservation of Afghan Trainer Program fleet:

2. Additional material cost for preservation of fleet:

3. De-Preservation of Afghan Trainer Program fleet:

The total estimated price for preservation and de-preservation of the Afghan Trainer Program fleet, with associated material costs, is .

B. Authority for the contractor to remain in-country will cease with current contract expiration on 31 January 2016. According to the current contract, the contractor must be notified of the need to withdraw from country by 1 December 2015. The timeline for contractor withdrawal from country prior to follow-on support being in place will necessitate occurrence of aircraft preservation on, or around, 1 December 2015. Aircraft preservation activities will occur concurrently with general de-mobilization efforts, effectively ending all Afghan Trainer Program activities 1 December 2015.

Due to the time-frame required to place new personnel and equipment in-country, the USG estimates that the Afghan Trainer Program mission would be placed in abeyance for four to six months. A lapse in training of this duration will necessitate refresher courses for Level 3, Level 2 and Level 1 training. Based on historical data for FA8617-11-C-6209, data collected from OEM on 2 May 13, and data for similar programs obtained from AFSAT, it is estimated that a four month lapse in training would cost approximately in refresher training courses for Level 3, Level 2 and Level 1 students.

C. A delay in training of four to six months will eliminate the USG's ability to effectively and completely train students in Afghanistan by the completion of the base PoP. Lack of completed training will result in unrecoverable costs and will ultimately ground the Afghan Trainer Program fleet as Afghanistan will lack the capability to fully maintain the aircraft. The grounding of aircraft will begin to occur as each aircraft reaches 100 flight hours, or within 6-7 weeks.

D. All SE and spares utilized in support of the Afghan Trainer Program are contractor owned and not deliverable items of contract FA8617-14-C-6195. It is the intention of the USG to procure and transition GSE to support launch and recovery, contained in Attachment 1, for the AAF in the event of base closure as discussed herein.

E. If a source other than Cessna is selected for the effort discussed in this J&A, spares and SE would be necessary to support flight operation. The USG anticipates necessary spares and SE will be procured either from the SE and spares currently used in support of the Afghan Trainer Program in Afghanistan or directly from the OEMs and then shipped to Afghanistan. Currently, all Afghan Trainer Program spares and SE in Afghanistan are the property of Cessna's subcontractor, L-3.

Utilization of either method will place Cessna or L-3 in the role of middle man as a result of status as an OEM (Cessna) or owner of the spares and SE currently in-country (L-3). In either scenario, Cessna or L-3 becomes a supplier to the non-Cessna source, resulting in application of an additional commercial wrap rate. Based upon application of a wrap rate to OEM provided data, the USG estimates this additional cost to range between and .

The grand total of a break-in-service compounded with utilizing a source other than the incumbent for the procurement contained herein is expected to exceed . Of this value, up to is considered a duplication of costs not anticipated to be recovered through utilization of competitive procedures. Furthermore, as depicted above, only one responsible source exists to fulfill the agency's need in the time-frame required or unacceptable delays will occur.

F. The Afghan Trainer Program conducts numerous missions. One of which is the C-208B CASEVAC missions transporting wounded or deceased AAF soldiers from the battlefield. In the event of mission cessation, the potential exists for an international issue due to the missions and capabilities provided to the AAF by the Afghan Trainer Program.

X. List of sources, if any, that expressed interest in the acquisition.

The following contractors submitted technical responses to the SSS Amendment, posted 04 August 2015:

A. Cessna Aircraft Company, One Cessna Blvd, Wichita, KS 67215-1400

B. AAL-USA, 620 Discovery Drive Bldg. 1, Suite 140, Huntsville, AL 35806

The following contractors submitted technical responses to the SSS, posted 08 June 2015:

A. DynCorp International, 13500 Heritage Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177

B. Cessna Aircraft Company, One Cessna Blvd, Wichita, KS 67215-1400

The following contractors were respondents to the SSS, posted 08 June 2015:

A. Areyana Group of Construction Company, House No. 105A, Kolola Pushta Road, Kabul, Afghanistan

B. Automotive Management Services, Jumeirah Lakes Towers, Saba Tower 1, Level 34, Office 3401, Dubai, U.A.E

C. Atta Al-Firdows Company for Trading and General Contracting, Baghdad, Iraq

D. Abdul Malik Jan Construction Company, Afghanistan

E. Brunner Aerospace, LLC, 2666 Indian Trail, Pinckney, MI 48169

The following contractor responded to the RFI, posted 15 May 2015:

L3 Vertex Logistics Solutions, 555 Industrial Drive South, Madison, MS 39110

XI. A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before making subsequent acquisitions for the supplies or services required.

It is the USG's intent to utilize this contract for the purpose of removing current barriers to competition by allowing adequate schedule and time sufficient for the Afghanistan security and political environments to stabilize and for the competitive source selection completion and award to be finalized. It is the intention of the USG to compete any follow-on requirement that materializes and is out of the scope of this J&A. Firm requirements for CLS materialized on 29 June 2015, baseline requirements were received in March 2015. The USG has initiated preliminary source selection activities for the CLS effort as depicted in this J&A.

XII. Certification by the Contracting Officer.

As evidenced by my signature above, I have determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. The PCO's signature on the Coordination and Approval Document evidences that he/she has determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.

XIII. Certification by the technical/requirements personnel.

As evidenced by my (our) signature(s) above, I (we) certify that any supporting data contained herein, which is my (our) responsibility, is both accurate and complete.