657-15-106JBJC Electrical Protective Device Coordination Study.pdf

VA Medical Center John Cochran Electrical Protective Device Coordination Study Project Number: 657-15-106JB/JC

Submittal December 23, 2016

Prepared by:

Engineering, Inc.

18207 Edison Avenue Chesterfield, MO 63005-3715 Phone (636) 530-7770 Fax (636) 530-7877

VA Medical Center John Cochran Electrical Protective Device Coordination Study

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Table of Contents Page

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Overview

1.2 Study Scope

1.3 Existing System Overview

1.4 Study Analysis Summary

2 SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

2.1 Overview

2.2 Utility Company Data

2.3 Other Input Parameters

2.4 Short-Circuit Analysis Results and Recommendations

3 ARC FLASH ANALYSIS

3.1 Overview

3.2 Input Parameters

3.3 Arc Flash Analysis Results and Recommendations

4 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION ANALYSIS

4.1 Overview

4.2 Overcurrent Protective Device Coordination Analysis

5 PROTECTIVE DEIVCE SETTINGS RECOMMENDATIONS

6 VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS

7 GROUND RESISTANCE ANALYSIS

7.1 Overview

7.2 Ground Resistance Survey and Analysis

8 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS

9 ATTACHMENT #1 ELECTRICAL ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION PLANS

10 ATTACHMENT #2 SHORT CIRCUIT TABLES

11 ATTACHMENT #3 ARC FLASH REPORTS

12 ATTACHMENT #4 EXISTING COORDINATION CURVES

13 ATTACHMENT #5 PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETTING RECOMMENDATION TABLES

14 ATTACHMENT #6 VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS REPORT

15 ATTACHMENT #7 DATA INPUT REPORT

16 ATTACHMENT #8 ARC FLASH LABELS

17 ATTACHMENT #9 ELECTRICAL ASSESSMENT AND ACTIONS REPORT

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Overview

The VA Medical Center John Cochran (VAJC) in St. Louis, Missouri consists of a main hospital building and a surrounding campus with numerous support buildings. Services offered at the hospital include in patient and outpatient services including an emergency department, surgery, radiology services including advanced CT and MRI scans, intensive care units, clinics, pharmacy, dialysis, dental, and ophthalmology.

SSC Engineering was contracted to analyze the campus’ existing electrical distribution system. Additionally SSC analyzed the electrical distribution with respect to the impact of currently scheduled construction projects to be completed in the near future.

Short circuit, arc flash, overcurrent device coordination, voltage drop, ground resistance and emergency power system analysis has been performed in accordance with NFPA 70E-2015 and relevant IEEE standards.

This section provides a brief summary of the results of the analysis and highlights key issues and findings in the electrical distribution equipment. The full analysis can be found in the main body of the report.

The analysis begins at 34.5kV and 4,160V on the primary side of the utility transformers and at the generators respectively, and ends at significant 480V and 208V loads downstream of the service entrance equipment as shown on the study one-line diagram.

1.2 Study Scope

SSC Engineering, Inc. was commissioned to perform a study of the electrical power distribution system of VA Medical Center John Cochran in St. Louis, Missouri. This study identifies the following:

1. Review of the Existing Electrical Distribution System.

2. Short Circuit Analysis.

3. Arc Flash Analysis.

4. Overcurrent Protective Device Analysis.

5. Protective Device Settings Recommendations.

6. Voltage Drop Analysis.

7. Ground Resistance Analysis.

8. Emergency Power System Analysis

Field visits, review of existing building construction drawings and logging meter studies have been performed.

1.3 Existing System Overview

The campus is served by 34.5kV utility service by Ameren which is then stepped down to 4160V at the outdoor Ameren substation located in the Northwest corner of the campus for distribution throughout the campus.

Individual campus buildings typically have transformers to down the 4160V campus distribution to the building utilization voltage (120/208V; 277/480V). Generators are located in Buildings 1, 1A, 8B and outside Building 3 to provide emergency backup power for the main hospital building and supporting structures.

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1.4 Study Analysis Summary

1.4.1 Short-Circuit Results

After making the calculations, the distribution equipment was checked to determine its adequacy to interrupt or withstand the effects of the calculated maximum short-circuit current at its location. There are many instances where the equipment is not rated to withstand the calculated values.

Many existing panelboards do not have a visible AIC rating (Amperes Interrupting Capacity) are shown within this spread sheet as Unknown. It is recommended that these panels are replaced with adequate AIC ratings. More detailed results of the available fault current are included in the Short Circuit Analysis Report.

See Section 2 for a detailed discussion.

1.4.2 Arc Flash Results

The level of arc flash energy was analyzed at 503 locations throughout the electrical distribution system. This analysis is necessary in order to determine the hazard level that a worker could be exposed to during an arch flash event.

See Section 3 for a detailed discussion.

1.4.3 Overcurrent Protective Device Coordination Results

Time-Current Curves were produced down to the last branch-circuit device for the Essential Electrical System and down to the last adjustable device in the Normal Power System with a minimum of two levels down from the building main distribution panel.

There are multiple locations where coordination is not achieved. In some instances, this is unavoidable in order to comply with the utility company’s requirement of maintaining a minimum of 0.3 seconds of separation between the service feeder relays the utility transformer primary fuses.

In other instances, the non-selective coordination is due to the fact that many of the distribution overcurrent protective devices are minimally adjustable thermal magnetic trip units or fuses where the time current characteristic curves overlap. These issues will require modifications to installed equipment to provide satisfactory coordination.

See Section 4 for a detailed discussion.

2 SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

2.1 Overview

The short-circuit study determines the fault currents that flow in the system during two fault condition scenarios. One scenario evaluated the distribution system based on normal power operating conditions with electrical utility services operating, emergency generator inactive, and all automatic transfer switches selecting their respective normal power source. The second scenario evaluated the distribution system based on emergency power operating conditions with the electrical utility services inoperable, emergency generators operating, and all automatic transfer switches selecting their respective emergency power source. The calculated fault currents are used in the device evaluation.

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Electrical equipment ratings were field verified with regards to operating voltage, protective devices, device ratings, manufacturer, catalog number where available, and device number or field markings.

The electrical distribution equipment was modeled and analyzed using SKM Powertools, version 7.0.4.7. Short circuit analysis was performed on the existing electrical distribution system and to account for the conditions after completion of major planned construction projects. The software simulates faults at each piece of equipment and calculates the maximum available short-circuit current at that point. The calculated values are required to be lower than the RMS symmetrical short-circuit ratings of the electrical equipment in order for the protective device to safely interrupt the current without damage. Where the calculated values exceed the ratings of the equipment, corrective actions shall be provided.

2.2 Utility Company Data

The short circuit fault current values are calculated based on the Ameren utility source for the facility. The available primary fault current was provided from Ameren on 4-7-2016 as follows:

Ameren Utility Transformer D Fault Analysis Fault location: Transformer D primary bushings Fault Voltage: 34.5kV 3ph fault current: 20.4kA System X / R ratio: 4.3 L-G fault current: 9.1kA System X0 / R0 ratio: 2.65

Transformer D Information

TLM #: N/A

Voltages: 34.4 - 4.36kV Configuration: Delta / Wye KVA capacity: 6.25 MVA Impedance %Z: 111.69% on 100MVA Base (6.98% on 6.25MVA Base) X/R ratio (if available): N/A

Primary Protection Device Fuse Make: S&C Model: SMD-2C Rating: 150E SLO

TCC: 119-152-150

Ameren Utility Transformer W Fault Analysis Fault location: Transformer W primary bushings Fault Voltage: 34.5kV 3ph fault current: 20.8kA System X / R ratio: 4.57 L-G fault current: 9.5kA System X0 / R0 ratio: 2.7

Transformer W Information

TLM #: N/A

Voltages: 34.4 - 4.36kV Configuration: Delta / Wye KVA capacity: 6.25 MVA Impedance %Z: 111.69% on 100MVA Base (6.98% on 6.25MVA Base) X/R ratio (if available): N/A

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Primary Protection Device Fuse Make: S&C Model: SMD-2C Rating: 150E SLO

TCC: 119-152-150

2.3 Other Input Parameters

Motor contributions of motors greater than 25 HP were individually modeled. Motors less than 25 HP were summed together on a bus for evaluations.

Transformers were modeled with regards to their kVA, voltage ratings, percent impedance (%Z), X/R ratios and winding connections.

Generators were modeled with regards to their kW and voltage ratings.

Circuit conductors were modeled with regards to conduit material, feeder sizes, length, and X/R ratios.

The system was modeled and analyzed for worst-case fault currents. Generally, the worst case condition for the majority of the equipment was determined to occur when the normal power utility source is in service.

Under an emergency condition, the generators produce less available fault current than the utility source.

2.4 Short-Circuit Analysis Results and Recommendations

Refer to Attachment #2 – Short Circuit Tables. Numerous pieces of existing electrical equipment do not have visible short circuit withstand ratings. These are noted in Attachment #2 as having “Unknown” short circuit withstand ratings. In several instances equipment with known short circuit withstand ratings are indicated as having calculated short circuit currents in excess of their rating and noted as “Fail” in Attachment #2.

Equipment when exposed to short circuit currents greater than their known or rated short circuit withstand rating can fail dramatically causing injury to any person nearby the equipment during the short circuit event as bus bracing and equipment covers can fail. Equipment indicated as “Fail” in Attachment #2 should be replace with modern equipment that indicates a short circuit withstand rating in excess of the available short circuit current calculated.

3 ARC FLASH ANALYSIS

3.1 Overview

The safest state to work on electrical equipment is in the de-energized state. Often in healthcare environments it is not desirable or practical to interrupt the power to buildings providing patient care. Per NEC 110.16 electrical equipment must be marked with regards to arc-flash hazard to warn qualified personnel before working on live electrical equipment. NFPA 70E provides two methods for selection of appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): (1) Incident Energy Analysis Method utilizing IEEE 1584 and (2) Arc Flash PPE Categories Method. The Method (2) relies on tables for specific tasks and specific electrical system perimeters and is limited in its application and accuracy. Therefore, Method (1) is typically recommended and has been performed for a more accurate analysis of the campus electrical distribution system. The results of the Incident Energy Analysis Method are included in this report.

Electrical maintenance workers should always wear appropriate PPE to safely perform job tasks while the electrical equipment is energized. The facility’s electrical maintenance staff should have procedures in place to utilize NFPA 70E-2015, Annex H, Table H.3(b) to select PPE equipment based on the actual calculated incident energy listed on the equipment labels provided with this report.

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It is important to note that even if the worker is wearing the proper arc flash rated PPE there can still be injuries from and arc flash event. PPE is rated to an energy value (Cal/cm

) that will protect to a 50% probability of a second or third degree burn due to the effects of an arc flash event at the maximum PPE rated energy value. PPE is not rated to protect from other explosive effects of an arc flash event that can produce trauma. Equipment with an incident energy exposure greater than 40 cal/cm is categorized as “Dangerous” and shall not be worked on by maintenance staff while the equipment is energized. All equipment calculated as Dangerous should be de-energized before job tasks are performed.

3.2 Input Parameters

The electrical distribution equipment at VA Medical Center John Cochran was modeled and analyzed using SKM Powertools, version 7.0.4.7. Arc flash analysis was performed on the existing electrical distribution system and to account for the conditions after completion of major planned construction projects. The arc flash analysis was performed for two fault condition scenarios. One scenario evaluated the distribution system based on normal power operating conditions with electrical utility services operating, emergency generator inactive, and all automatic transfer switches selecting their respective normal power source. The second scenario evaluated the distribution system based on emergency power operating conditions with the electrical utility services inoperable, emergency generators operating, and all automatic transfer switches selecting their respective emergency power source.

3.3 Arc Flash Analysis Results and Recommendations

Calculations were performed to determine specific incident energies at each switchboard, panelboard, switch, and generator. The majority of the locations were determined to be below 40 Cal/cm

. This is the highest energy for which a worker can use personal protective equipment PPE for reasonable protection from an arc flash event. Anything above this level is considered “Dangerous” and it is not recommended to perform live work on the equipment. Several locations were determined to be in the Dangerous category. They are as follows:

Building 1: Substation #1A, Substation #1B, Substation #7, Substation #8, Substation #11, Substation # 12, Substation #13 Building 1: GDB1-3, GSWB2 Building 1A CBDP, GDB1A-2, ATS-3A Building 6: Left Building 8: Switchboard CHLRS Building 1 Substation #1A, and Building 1 Substation #1B.

Labels have been generated for placing on the outside cover of the electrical equipment. The labels indicate the incident energy exposure calculated with Method (1) outlined for use in conjunction with NFPA 70E Table H.3(b) for selecting proper PPE equipment. In addition, the labels indicate the Arc Flash Boundary, Limited Approach Distance, Voltage and Glove Class.

Arc flash risk assessments should update the equipment labels after renovations to the electrical systems and reviewed periodically not to exceed 5 years.

Reference Attachment #3 for Arc Flash Reports for a summary table of all equipment included in the study.

Note: the PPE Category Levels indicated in Attachment #3 are based on the NFPA 70E PPE Matrix Table 130.7(C)(16) and are for reference only to approximate the PPE equipment. The five distinct levels of PPE Categories in Table 130.7(C)(16) are defined as follows:

PPE Category 1: 0 - 4 Cal/cm

PPE Category 2: 4 - 8 Cal/cm

PPE Category 3: 8 - 25 Cal/cm

PPE Category 4: 25 - 40 Cal/cm

Dangerous: Greater than 40 Cal/cm

Always utilize NFPA 70E-2015, Table H.3(b) for proper selection of PPE.

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4 OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION ANALYSIS

4.1 Overview

Coordination of overcurrent devices is a desirable characteristic of an electrical distribution system. A fully coordinated electrical distribution system allows an electrical fault to be cleared by the overcurrent protective device closest to the fault clears the fault by opening and the remaining electrical distribution system is unaffected. In practical applications there are often tradeoffs made for overcurrent device settings that does not allow for a fully coordinated electrical distribution system. In hospitals per the requirements of NFPA 99 overcurrent devices in an Essential Electrical System (EES) for Type 1 systems shall be coordinated to 0.1 seconds.

4.2 Overcurrent Protective Device Coordination Analysis

The electrical distribution equipment at VA Medical Center John Cochran was modeled in SKM software and device coordination analysis was performed using CAPTOR software (Computer-Aided Power System Analysis).

There are many devices that are not selectively coordinated throughout the power system on the campus. An effort has been made to provide recommendations to improve the coordination through the adjustment of circuit breaker settings where feasible. These recommendations are provided in Section 5.

The Time Current Curves (TCC) are provided in Attachment #4. Reference Attachment #1 for the complete electrical one-line diagram.

5 PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETTINGS RECOMMENDATIONS

Tables are provided to show existing settings and new settings for adjustable protective devices where changes are required for proper coordination. See Attachment #5 for summary of coordination issues and Protective Device Setting Recommendation Tables. These recommended setting were adjusted in the field on 12/09/2016.

However, many devices have fixed settings and cannot be adjusted. Where setting adjustments are not available, recommendations have been provided in the Attachment #9 - Electrical Assessment and Actions Report.

6 VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS

Voltage drop calculations are to be performed for all three phase feeder circuits and branch circuits for large motor loads. Engineering judgement was used to estimate loads on the distribution system. Each individual substation transformer was limited to around 80% full load capacity. It was also assumed that the voltage taps for each substation transformer has been chosen to provide nominal voltage on the secondary side. It is recommended to measure the secondary voltage of all substation transformers to verify and adjust taps as required.

Excessive voltage drop is evaluated based on NEC 2014 recommendations: greater than 5% voltage drop for feeders and branch circuits and greater than 3% voltage drop for individual branch circuit. See Attachment #6 for voltage drop tables. All equipment evaluated with less than 5% voltage drop to the farthest panel.

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7 GROUND RESISTANCE ANALYSIS

7.1 Overview

An adequate grounding electrode system consists of ground electrodes consisting of: ground rods, metallic pipes, bonding to structural steel and bonding to building lightning protection system. Per NEC Article 250 if a single ground electrode measures greater than 25 Ohms a secondary ground electrode should be bonded to provide a grounding electrode system. In no instance should secondary ground electrode be provided that is not bonded with the grounding electrode system as a potential for dangerous parallel paths to ground could be created.

Symptoms of inadequate grounding include common mode noise, ground loops, shutdown or damage to electronic equipment, malfunction of circuit protective devices, and undesirable voltage potentials on metallic surfaces. A periodic visual and physical inspection of the grounding and bonding conductors should be performed to insure the reliable operation of the electrical distribution system.

7.2 Ground Resistance Survey and Analysis

A survey of VA Medical Center John Cochran grounding system was performed by SSC with assistance from Bell Electric electrical contractors. Ground resistance was measured at each building main panelboard using an AEMC 6416 clamp on ground test meter and resistance was measured. A visual inspection of the grounding and bonding conductors and connectors was performed at each building main panelboard. Any grounding deficiencies present in the resistance readings and/or condition of the grounding system were noted at the time of the field survey and the issues are summarized below. Recommendations have been provided in the Attachment #9 - Electrical Assessment and Actions Report.

Panelboards, except as noted below, had a copper equipment ground conductor. Some equipment ground conductors were inaccessible and not able to be measured. Issues noted in the field survey of the grounding electrode system:

1. Building 1, Unit Substation #7 (US-7): There was a high leakage current (7.8A) measured on the equipment ground within the substation enclosure. Further investigation is required to track down the source of the leakage current.

2. Building 1, Unit Substation #15 (US-15): There was a high leakage current (2.0A) measured on the equipment ground within the substation. Further investigation is required to track down the source of the leakage current.

3. Building 1, Unit Substation #8 (US-8): There was a high leakage current (2.8A) measured on the equipment ground within the substation. Further investigation is required to track down the source of the leakage current.

4. Building 1A, Panel NDB1A: There was a high leakage current (15A) measured on the equipment ground within the panel. Immediate further investigation is required to track down the source of the leakage current and prevent damage to equipment or harm to personnel.

5. Building 3, Panel MDP: There is not an equipment ground conductor in the panelboard routed from the pad mounted transformer. It is recommended to add a wire type equipment ground conductor to bond the pad-mount transformer to panel MDP to increase reliability of grounding system. The panel shall also be provided with a Grounding Electrode System in accordance with NEC 250.32(2). This shall include bonding together all the grounding electrodes within the building as described in NEC 250.52(A)(1) to form the Grounding Electrode System.

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6. Building 14, Panel RP1: There is not an equipment ground conductor in the panelboard. It is recommended to add a wire type equipment ground conductor to bond the pad-mount transformer to panel RP1 to increase reliability of grounding system. The panel shall also be provided with a Grounding Electrode System in accordance with NEC 250.32. This shall include bonding together all the grounding electrodes as described in NEC 250.52(A)(1) to form the Grounding Electrode System.

7. Building 7, Panel MDP: There is not an equipment ground conductor in the panelboard. It is possible the building is bonded to Building 7 pad-mount transformer by the steel conduit. It is recommended to add a wire type equipment ground conductor to bond the pad-mount transformer to panel MDP to increase reliability of grounding system. The panel shall also be provided with a Grounding Electrode System in accordance with NEC 250.32. This shall include bonding together all the grounding electrodes as described in NEC 250.52(A)(1) to form the Grounding Electrode System.

8 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS

The emergency power system for VA Medical Center John Cochran consists of individual generators and transfer switches. The following is a brief narrative describing the existing emergency power system generators at the medical center describing the physical location, size (kW and ampacity), voltage, configuration (phase, wire), age, and overall condition.

A summary of the average loading on each generator is provided and then compared to projected future loads.

A qualitative narrative on the suitability of the existing generators to meet projected future loads is provided. If existing Emergency Power System (EPS), including generators, is not adequate to meet either current or future demands, recommendations are discussed to ensure adequacy of the current and future EPS.

Building 1 Generator #1 & 2 (Parallel): 1000kW/1250kVA, 1,505FLA, 277/480V., 3Ph. 4W. (Each; Located in Bldg. 1A) Installed in 2014

Serves Building 1:

- ATS-EQ2: 400A (Future Equipment Branch)

- ATS-CR8: 400A (Future Critical Branch)

- ATS-FIRE PUMP 200A (Life Safety)

- ATS-LS1: 600A (Equipment Branch)

- ATS-1(1): 260A (Equipment Branch)

- ATS-CR1: 800A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-CR2: 800A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-CR4: 260A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-CR5: 800A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-3A: 800A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-4: 600A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-ONAN ATS: 600A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-5B: 400A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-2B: 400A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-3B: 400A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-EQ1: 400A (Critical Branch)

Generator power is served to the ATS’s via a 3200A generator distribution panelboard GSWB1A.

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The existing total average demand load on the generator is approximately 872kW/979kVA, 1906 Amps.

This allows for an estimated spare capacity of 1127kW/1520kVA, 1104A on the existing generators and GSWB1A distribution board. There is enough capacity for current loads but due to the amount of renovations that are currently occurring at the facility the spare generator capacity should be evaluated after the completion of major renovation projects.

These generators were installed approximately 2 years ago. The generators appear to be excellent condition and appears to have greater than half of their expected useful life remaining.

Building 1 Generator #3: 1500kW/1875kVA, 2,258FLA, 277/480V., 3Ph. 4W. (Located in Bldg. 1) Installed in

Serves Building 1:

- ATS-EQ4: 600A (Equipment Branch)

- ATS-CR6: 600A (Critical Branch)

- ATS-EQ3: 600A (Equipment Branch)

- ATS-EQ5: 800A (Equipment Branch)

- ATS-EQ6: 600A (Equipment Branch)

Generator power is served to the ATS’s via a 3000A generator distribution panelboard GSWB2.

The existing total average demand load on the generator is approximately 414kW/572kVA, 688 Amps.

This allows for an estimated spare capacity of 1085kW/1302kVA, 1570A on the existing generator and GSWB2 distribution board. There is enough spare capacity for future loads to be served from this generator.

Generator #3 was installed approximately 2 years ago. The generator appears to be in excellent condition and appears to have greater than half of its expected useful life remaining.

Building 3 Generator: A new 300kW/375kVA 1500kW/1875kVA, 1,041FLA, 120/208., 3Ph. 4W. is currently in the process of being installed. This should be completed by the end of May, 2016. Additionally, the Bldg. 3 data center is in the process of moving, eliminating and shifting data racks within the building. It is anticipated that the overall building load is being reduced. It is recommended that the building existing load be measured after the completion of the new generator installation and data center loads have been removed.

Serves Building 1:

- ATS-1: 800A (Optional Standby System)

- ATS-2: 600A (Critical Branch for Data Center)

It is anticipated that the new emergency power system currently being installed is capable of providing reliable stand by power to the building. The future expansion capabilities will provide sufficient growth potential for the foreseeable future.

Building 8 Generator: 250kW/312.5kVA, 868FLA, 120/208V., 3Ph. 4W. (Located in Bldg. 1) Installed approximately 30 years ago.

Serves Building 1:

- ATS-1: 800A (Equipment Branch)

Generator power is served to the ATS via a feeder from the generator house Building 8B.

The existing total average demand load on the generator is approximately 187kW/234kVA, 282 Amps.

This allows for an estimated spare capacity of 62kW/78kVA, 585A on the existing generator. There is enough capacity for the current load and some additional spare capacity for any future loads to be served

12/23/2016 Page 11 from this generator. However, while the overall generator appears to have spare capacity, the condition of the Emergency Power System equipment is poor.

This generator was installed approximately 30 years ago. The generator appears to be approaching the end of its expected useful life. A generator of this age may require additional maintenance and may operate unreliably. Replacement of the generator should be considered to ensure the plant can maintain reliable power throughout extended power outages.

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9 ATTACHMENT #1 ELECTRICAL ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION PLANS

SEE ELECTRONIC VERSION OF FILE ON ATTACHED CD-ROM DISC

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10 ATTACHMENT #2 SHORT CIRCUIT TABLES

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11 ATTACHMENT #3 ARC FLASH REPORTS

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12 ATTACHMENT #4 EXISTING COORDINATION CURVES

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13 ATTACHMENT #5 PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETTING RECOMMENDATION TABLES

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14 ATTACHMENT #6 VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS REPORT

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15 ATTACHMENT #7 DATA INPUT REPORT

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16 ATTACHMENT #8 ARC FLASH LABELS

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17 ATTACHMENT #9 ELECTRICAL ASSESSMENT AND ACTIONS REPORT