2. Attachment A SOW Reqs Draft Release V1.pdf

DRAGONFLY MISSION Solicitation #: 80LARC22R0001

Draft Release Version 1

Title: Dragonfly Parachute Decelerator Subsystem – Attachment A: Requirements Page: of 49

PARACHUTE DECELERATOR SUBSYSTEM (PDS)

ATTACHMENT A: REQUIREMENTS

SOLICITATION #: 80LARC22R0001

DRAFT RELEASE VERSION 1

Langley Research Center

Hampton, Virginia

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Requirements are presented in the table below. Statements in italics are for clarification. The verification methods are Test (T), Analysis (A), Demonstration (D), and Inspection (I). More than one verification method may be needed to verify a requirement. Symbols and abbreviations are not defined in the table; the reader should refer to Sections 7 and 8, respectively, of the SOW. References and

Applicable Documents are listed in Sections 9 and 10, respectively, of the SOW. Unless otherwise indicated, the representative for

NASA LaRC in this SOW will be the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer.

Table A1. Requirements.

ID Requirement Verification Method

T A D I

1 ARCHITECTURE, FUNCTIONAL, AND PERFORMANCE

1.1 GENERAL

1.1-1 The Contractor shall design, analyze, fabricate, and qualify a PDS that accomplishes the functions described in Section 1.4, "EDL Concept of Operation," of this SOW.

X X X X

1.1-2 The PDS shall consist of the following components:

• A drogue parachute assembly.

• A mortar assembly, including its cover.

• A drogue parachute release mechanism (including any elements actuated by an electroexplosive device).

• A main parachute assembly.

• A main parachute container assembly, including its cover.

X

1.2 MORTAR ASSEMBLY

1.2-1 The mortar assembly shall be capable of successfully deploying the drogue parachute within the following mortar fire conditions:

• Mach number, M: {1.39 TBC} ≤ M ≤ {1.62 TBC}

• Dynamic pressure, q: {327 Pa TBC} ≤ q ≤ {425 Pa TBC}

• Aeroshell total angle of attack, T: 0° ≤ T ≤ {15° TBC}

• Aeroshell deceleration, aA: {0.464 g TBC} ≤ aA ≤ {0.528 g TBC}

X X

ID Requirement Verification Method

T A D I

The Dragonfly flight mechanics team will be able to provide more details on the mortar fire conditions during execution of the contract.

1.2-2 The mortar assembly shall be capable of sustaining all loads imposed on it during operation.

These loads include those experienced during launch and entry, pressure, inertial forces, loads imposed on it by the drogue and main parachutes.

X X

1.2-3 The mortar sabot shall be constrained in such a way that:

• It does not interfere with the drogue parachute deployment.

• It does not affect the drogue parachute performance.

• It does not interfere with the main parachute deployment.

• It does not affect the main parachute performance.

• Minimizes the risk of sabot recontact with the drogue parachute, main parachute, and aeroshell.

1.2-4 The mortar assembly shall have two redundant initiators of gas generator ignition .

In practice this means that the gas generator shall have two initiators (i.e., NSIs, see

Requirement 1.6-1).

X

1.2-5 The mortar assembly shall perform as required whether only one initiator fires or both initiators fire simultaneously.

X X X

1.2-6 The Contractor shall conduct a test to obtain the data required to determine the shock environment generated by PDS pyrotechnic events.

Details of this test and date by which these data are required will be specified at a later date.

X X X

1.3 DROGUE PARACHUTE ASSEMBLY

1.3-1 The drogue parachute shall be of the Viking-type DGB design with the following geometric characteristics:

• Disk Diameter, DD = 0.72D0

X

Verification Method

T A D I

• Vent Diameter, DV = 0.07D0

• Gap Height, HG = 0.042D0

• Band Diameter, DB = 0.72D0

• Band Height, HB = 0.121D0

• Suspension Lines Length, LS = 1.7D0 where D0 is the drogue parachute's nominal diameter.

1.3-2 The drogue parachute nominal diameter, D0, shall be {5.4 m TBC} ± TBD m. X

1.3-3 The trailing distance of the drogue parachute, XT, shall be {45 m TBC} ± TBD m.

The trailing distance is defined as the distance from the aeroshell's maximum diameter to the skirt of the drogue parachute canopy when it is fully stretched-out along the axis of symmetry of the aeroshell.

X

1.3-4 The fabric(s) used for the drogue parachute shall be selected with the concurrence of the

NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer.

Parachute fabrics have different permeabilities. The drogue parachute fabric(s) permeability is a key factor in the aeroshell/drogue parachute dynamic behavior. There is a need to control the magnitude of this dynamic behavior.

1.3-5 The drogue parachute shall incorporate a swivel.

The purpose of the swivel is to prevent twisting of the suspension lines. The swivel will be provided by APL.

1.3-6 The drogue parachute shall attach to the aeroshell through a triple bridle.

The geometry and attachment points of this triple bridle will be defined at a later date in consultation with LMS and NASA LaRC during the creation of the aeroshell / PDS ICD.

1.3-7 The drogue parachute shall be deployed by a mortar. X

Verification Method

T A D I

1.3-8 The drogue parachute shall be capable of successfully deploying, inflating, and sustaining all the associated loads (aerodynamic and inertial) within the following set of mortar fire conditions:

• Mach number, M: {1.39 TBC} ≤ M ≤ {1.62 TBC}

• Dynamic pressure, q: {327 Pa TBC} ≤ q ≤ {425 Pa TBC}

• Aeroshell total angle of attack, T : 0° ≤ T ≤ {15° TBC}

• Aeroshell deceleration, aA: {0.464 g TBC} ≤ aA ≤ {0.528 g TBC}

The Dragonfly flight mechanics team will be able to provide more details on the mortar fire conditions during execution of the contract.

X X

1.3-9 The contractor shall calculate the peak aerodynamic load generated by the drogue parachute within the mortar fire conditions specified in Requirement 1.3-8.

The Dragonfly flight mechanics team will perform its own calculation of the drogue parachute peak aerodynamic load. Which of the two values is to be used for design will be determined during execution of the contract.

1.3-10

The drogue parachute shall be capable of withstanding all inertial and aerodynamic loads imposed on it during its operation (i.e., from mortar fire to completion of main parachute deployment).

X X X

1.3-11

The drogue parachute attachment to the aeroshell shall be capable of sustaining the inflation loads through a single leg of its triple bridle.

1.3-12

The packing density of the drogue parachute shall be suitable for deployment of the drogue parachute by a mortar.

1.3-13

The drogue parachute shall be capable of successfully deploying the main parachute within the following set of conditions:

• Dynamic pressure, q: {98.3 Pa TBC} ≤ q ≤ {114.9 Pa TBC}

• Airspeed, V: {6.45 m/s TBC} ≤ V ≤ {7.06 m/s TBC}

• Atmospheric Density, : {4.49 kg/m3 TBC} ≤ ≤ {4.85 kg/m3 TBC}

Verification Method

T A D I

• Atmospheric Temperature, T: {84 K TBC} ≤ T ≤ {94 K TBC}

The Dragonfly flight mechanics team will be able to provide more details on the main parachute deployment initiation conditions during execution of the contract.

1.3-14

The drogue parachute shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after deployment for a period of at least 120 minutes.

This is an estimated maximum descent time under the drogue parachute.

1.4 DROGUE PARACHUTE RELEASE MECHANISM

1.4-1 The drogue parachute release mechanism shall operate on command to initiate the main parachute deployment.

The command signal and power required to initiate the drogue parachute release mechanism is not the responsibility of the PDS Contractor. See Requirement 1.5-7 for the method of main parachute deployment.

X X

1.4-2 The drogue parachute release mechanism shall be capable of sustaining all pressure, inertial, and drogue parachute loads imposed on it during its operation.

X X

1.4-3 The actuation of the drogue parachute release mechanism shall be redundant. In other words, failure of a single element of the drogue parachute release mechanism (e.g., a cutter) shall not compromise its functionality.

X X

1.5 MAIN PARACHUTE ASSEMBLY

1.5-1 The main parachute shall be of a type selected by the Contractor with concurrence of the

It is desired to have a parachute with reliable inflation and with a low tendency to glide in the present application.

X

1.5-2 The main parachute drag area shall be {75.2 m2 TBC} ± TBD m2 within the following operating conditions:

• Dynamic pressure, q: {90.3 Pa TBC} ≤ q ≤ {114.9 Pa TBC}

Verification Method

T A D I

• Airspeed, V: {2.71 m/s TBC} ≤ V ≤ {7.05 m/s TBC}

• Atmospheric density, : {4.49 kg/m3 TBC} ≤ ≤ {5.36 kg/m3 TBC}

• Atmospheric temperature, T: {84 K TBC} ≤ T ≤ {97 K TBC}

1.5-3 The trailing distance of the main parachute, 𝑋T, shall be greater than {36.0 m TBC} but less than {45.0 m TBC}.

The trailing distance is defined as the distance from the aeroshell's maximum diameter to the skirt of the drogue parachute canopy when it is fully stretched-out along the axis of symmetry of the aeroshell.

X

1.5-4 The fabric(s) used for the main parachute shall be selected with the concurrence of the

Parachute fabrics have different permeabilities. The main parachute fabric(s) permeability is a key factor in the aeroshell/drogue parachute dynamic behavior. There is a need to control the magnitude of this dynamic behavior.

1.5-5 The main parachute shall incorporate a swivel.

The purpose of the swivel is to prevent twisting of the suspension lines. The swivel will be provided by APL.

1.5-6 The main parachute shall attach to the aeroshell through a triple bridle.

The geometry and attachment points of this triple bridle will be defined at a later date in consultation with LMS and NASA during the creation of the aeroshell/PDS ICD.

1.5-7 The main parachute shall be deployed using the drogue parachute acting as a pilot parachute.

X X

1.5-8 The main parachute shall be capable of successfully deploying, inflating, and sustaining all the associated loads (aerodynamic and inertial) within the following set of initial deployment conditions:

• Dynamic pressure, q: {98.3 Pa TBC} ≤ q ≤ {114.9 Pa TBC}

Verification Method

T A D I

• Airspeed, V: {6.45 m/s TBC} ≤ V ≤ {7.06 m/s TBC}

• Atmospheric Density, : {4.49 kg/m3 TBC} ≤ ≤ {4.85 kg/m3 TBC}

• Atmospheric Temperature, T: {84 K TBC} ≤ T ≤ {94 K TBC}

The Dragonfly flight mechanics team will be able to provide more details on the main parachute deployment initiation conditions during execution of the contract.

1.5-9 The main parachute shall be capable of withstanding all inertial and aerodynamic loads imposed on it during its operation (i.e., from deployment by the drogue parachute to release of the lander).

X X

1.5-10 The main parachute attachment to the aeroshell shall be capable of sustaining the inflation loads through a single leg of its triple bridle.

X X

1.5-11 The packing density of the main parachute shall be suitable for deployment of the main parachute by the drogue parachute.

X X

1.5-12 The main parachute shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after deployment for a period of at least 45 minutes.

This is an estimated maximum descent time under the main parachute.

1.6 ELECTROEXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1.6-1 All electroexplosive devices (i.e., initiators) used in the PDS shall be NASA Standard

Initiators-1 (NSI-1).

See “Initiator, NASA Standard,” “Design and Performance Specification for NSI-1, and

“NASA Standard Initiator User’s Guide” in Section 10 of this SOW for information on

NSIs.

X

1.7 ENVIRONMENTS

1.7.1 MISSION DESIGN

1.7.1-1 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after the following time periods: 3 years from delivery to I&T at KSC and 6.5 years in the space environment.

Verification Method

T A D I

1.7.2 PRE-LAUNCH ENVIRONMENTS

1.7.2-1 While not under test or operation, the Flight Unit shall be maintained in a controlled environment as specified below.

• Temperature: +10 °C to +35 °C

• Humidity: between 30% and 55% relative humidity

X

1.7.2-2 The Flight Unit shall not be subjected to acceleration environments during transportation and handling that exceed the quasi-static load factors in Requirement 1.11-1.

X

1.7.2-3 The Flight Unit shall be capable of being stored in any orientation for the time specified in

Requirement 1.7.1-1, and at the conditions specified in Requirement 1.7.2-1 without degradation in its performance.

A preferred storage orientation can be specified by the Contractor.

1.7.3 LAUNCH ENVIRONMENTS

1.7.3-1 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance while sustaining a pressure decay rate of {6895 Pa/s (1 psi/s) TBC}.

This requirement is intended to address the effect of pressure decay rate during launch.

This requirement is subject to revision at a later date once additional information is available on the Launch Vehicle.

X X

1.7.3-2 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining the quasi-static accelerations specified in Requirement 1.11-1. The acceleration load factor shall be applied in both directions of all three orthogonal axes.

X X

1.7.3-3 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining the sine vibration environment specified in Requirement 5.15.4-4. The sine vibration environment shall be applied in all three orthogonal axes.

X

1.7.3-4 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining the launch shock environments. These launch shock environments will be specified in detail at a later date.

Verification Method

T A D I

1.7.3-5 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining the high frequency random vibration environment specified in

Requirement 5.15.4-5.

X

1.7.4 CRUISE ENVIRONMENTS

1.7.4-1 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after venting to a space vacuum environment ( ~10-14 Pa) during cruise.

X

1.7.4-2 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function after having experienced temperatures from {-65 °C TBC} to {70 °C TBC} ({208 K TBC} to {343 K TBC}) during cruise.

This is a survival temperature range, the PDS is not expected to operate in this temperature range.

X X

1.7.4-3 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining shocks associated with the following events:

• Low-Gain Antenna deployment

• Cruise Stage to Aeroshell Thermal loop tube cutting

• Cruise Stage to Entry Vehicle separation

These shocks will be specified in detail at a later date.

1.7.4-4 All materials used in the PDS shall be capable of sustaining a TID radiation of {35 krad

TBC} without deleterious effects on their properties.

The radiation comes from space sources and the MMRTG.

1.7.5 ENTRY AND DESCENT ENVIRONMENTS

1.7.5-1 The mortar assembly shall be capable of deploying the drogue parachute without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-60 °C TBC} to {45 °C

TBC} ({213 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

The EDL Assembly thermal control system will maintain the mortar within the temperature range specified in this requirement up to mortar fire.

Verification Method

T A D I

1.7.5-2 The drogue parachute assembly shall be capable of being deployed, inflated, and sustain all loads imposed on it (inertial and aerodynamic) within the temperature range of

{-118 °C TBC} to {45 °C TBC} ({155 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

X X

1.7.5-3 The drogue parachute assembly shall be capable of performing its function without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-203 °C TBC} to {45 °C

TBC} ({70 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

The temperature range specified in this requirement is that expected for Titan’s atmosphere during the drogue parachute phase. The drogue parachute phase is expected to be no more than 120 minutes long.

X X

1.7.5-4 The drogue parachute release mechanism shall be capable of performing its function without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-60 °C TBC} to

{45 °C TBC} ({213 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

The EDL Assembly thermal control system will maintain the drogue parachute release mechanism within the temperature range specified in this requirement up to the moment that it is actuated.

X X

1.7.5-5 The main parachute assembly shall be capable of being deployed without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-60 °C TBC} to {45 °C TBC} ({213 K

TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

The EDL assembly thermal control system will maintain the main parachute assembly within the temperature range specified in this requirement up to the moment of main parachute deployment.

X X

1.7.5-6 The main parachute assembly shall be capable of performing its function without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-189 °C TBC} to {45 °C

TBC} ({84 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

The temperature range specified in this requirement is that which may be experienced by the main parachute, including the temperatures expected for Titan’s atmosphere during

Verification Method

T A D I the main parachute phase. The main parachute phase is expected to be no more than 45 minutes long.

1.7.5-7 The main parachute container assembly shall be capable of performing its function without degradation in its performance within the temperature range of {-203 °C TBC} to {45 °C

TBC} ({70 K TBC} to {318 K TBC}).

X X

1.7.5-8 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance while sustaining a TBD pressure increase rate during entry and descent.

X X

1.7.5-9 The PDS shall be tolerant of exposure to liquid methane in dew or frost form for a period of up to 20 minutes.

During parachute descent below 40 km the local methane relative humidity may approach

100%, and so the PDS may be exposed to liquid methane.

X

1.7.5-10 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining all self-induced shocks associated with its operation.

Self-induced shocks include mortar firing, drogue parachute inflation, and drogue parachute release.

X X

1.7.5-11 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function without degradation in its performance after sustaining external shocks associated with the following five events:

• Heatshield separation

• Aeroshell to Lander thermal loop cutter

• Lander posing release

• Lander posing end-of-travel shock

• Lander separation and umbilical release shock

These shocks will be specified in detail at a later date.

1.7.5-12 The PDS shall be designed to perform its function after having experienced a peak entry acceleration of 12 g (Design Limit Load).

1.8 ENGINEERING MODEL

Verification Method

T A D I

1.8-1 The Contractor shall fabricate and deliver a PDS Engineering Model.

This PDS Engineering Model should represent as closely as possible the PDS Flight Unit.

The PDS Engineering model will be used during testing I&T testing at LMS.

X

1.8-2 The PDS Engineering Model shall have the same external configuration, mass properties, thermal characteristics, and electrical characteristics as the Flight Unit.

X

1.8-3 The PDS Engineering Model shall include fully-rigged drogue and main parachutes. X

1.8-4 The PDS Engineering Model shall have its parachutes (drogue and main) packed in the same manner as intended for the Flight Unit.

1.8-5 The PDS Engineering Model shall have a functional drogue parachute release mechanism.

The Contractor does not need to provide electroexplosive devices (i.e., NSIs) associated with the drogue parachute release mechanism.

X

1.8-6 The PDS Engineering Model shall include swivels (provided to the Contractor by APL). X

1.8-7 The PDS Engineering Model shall include a gas generator without propellant load. X

1.9 SPECIAL TESTS

1.9-1 The PDS shall be developed and qualified without the use of a supersonic flight test.

Development and qualification of the PDS will use available data to meet requirements that occur at supersonic speeds. This requirement mainly applies to the mortar assembly and the drogue parachute assembly.

1.9-2 A complete PDS qualification drop test shall be conducted as described below:

• The test shall be conducted at full-geometric scale, including a simulated

(boilerplate) aeroshell.

• The mass properties of the aeroshell shall be dynamically scaled to simulate operation at 4 km altitude on Titan, at the drogue/main parachutes staging event.

• The test shall include drogue parachute deployment by a flight-like mortar including its cover with TPS.

• The test shall include main parachute deployment by the drogue parachute.

Verification Method

T A D I

• The following parameters shall be measured versus time during this test:

accelerations (3 axes), rotation rates (3 axes), altitude.

• Video of the test (airborne and ground-based) shall be recorded.

• The test plan requires concurrence of the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer.

This test has several purposes.

1) It demonstrates PDS end-to-end operation.

2) It provides data on the dynamics of the drogue parachute/aeroshell system.

3) It provides data on the deployment of the main parachute.

4) It provides data on the inflation of the main parachute.

5) It provides data on the dynamics of the main parachute/aeroshell system.

The estimated mass of the dynamically-scaled aeroshell is 500 kg. The mortar cover TPS will be provided by, and bonded to the mortar cover, by LMS.

1.10 MASS PROPERTIES

1.10-1 The Flight Unit shall have a mass not to exceed {35 kg TBC}. X

1.10-2 The mass of the Flight Unit shall be measured, and reported in the EIDP, to an accuracy of

0.1% of its total value.

X X

1.10-3 The mass moments of inertia of the Flight Unit shall be determined and reported in the

EIDP to an accuracy of 10% of their total values.

X X

1.10-4 The mass moments of inertia shall be reported in the coordinate system agreed to in the

ICD.

X

1.10-5 The center of mass of the Flight Unit shall be determined and reported in the EIDP to within 25 mm.

X X

1.10-6 The center of mass of the Flight Unit shall be reported in the coordinate system agreed to in the ICD.

X

1.11 DESIGN LIMIT LOADS, FACTORS OF SAFETY, AND MARGIN OF SAFETY

1.11-1 Components and subsystems shall be designed to the limit loads in the table below.

Verification Method

T A D I

Quasi Static Design Limit Loads (DLL) for Elements, Components, and Subsystems

Component Weight Limit Load

< 0.1 kg 40 g

0.1 kg to 0.5 kg 35 g

0.5 kg to 1.0 kg 30 g

1.0 kg to 5 kg 25 g

5.0 kg to 10 kg 22 g

10 kg to 25 kg 18.5 g

25 kg to 50 kg 16 g

50 kg to 100 kg 14 g

100 kg to 200 kg 13 g

200 kg to 400 kg, 13 g

The design limit loads specified above may be revised subsequent to the completion of a formal Coupled Loads Analysis produced by the selected LV provider. Design limit loads are maximum expected loads, enveloping all flight and test environments.

1.11-2 The quasi-static limit loads specified in Requirement 1.11-1 shall be applied separately in both in the positive and negative of all three orthogonal axes to the item center of gravity.

X X

1.11-3 Factors of safety (FS), as per the table below shall be applied to the DLL to account for the uncertainty of material properties and for static load testing in accordance with standard design practice.

Component and Subsystem Factors of Safety

Category Factor of Safety

Static Qualification Test 1.25

Metallic Yield 1.25

Metallic Ultimate 1.4

Stability 1.4

Composite Ultimate 1.5

Verification Method

T A D I

Bonded Inserts/Joints Ultimate 1.5

Random Vibration Analysis Yield {1.6 TBC}

Random Vibration Analysis Ultimate {1.8 TBC}

No-test Analysis Yield 2.0

No-test Analysis Ultimate 2.6

1.11-4 Flight hardware pneumatic and hydraulic pressure elements, components, and subsystems shall be designed to the minimum factors shown in the table below.

Pressure Factors of Safety

Item Proof Design Burst

Lines and fittings diameter < 1.5 inches 1.5 4.0

Lines and fittings diameter < 1.5 inches 1.5 2.5

Fluid Return Sections 1.5 3.0

Fluid Return Hose 1.5 5.0

Other Pressure Components 1.5 2.5

1.11-5 Strength analyses shall show all positive margins of safety (MS).

With the exception of composites and bonded joints, most materials require calculation of both Yield and Ultimate Margins of Safety.

The general definition for the Margin of Safety is:

Margin of Safety (MS) = (Material Allowable Strength)/(FS • Applied Stress) - 1.0 > 0

X

1.12 STIFFNESS

1.12-1 Goal. Components and subsystems should be designed such that, as a goal, their primary structural vibration modes are above {75 Hz TBC} during exposure to launch environments.

X

1.12-2 Items not meeting the stiffness specification in Requirement 1.12-1 shall obtain concurrence from the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer.

2 INTERFACE CONTROL

Verification Method

T A D I

2-1 The Contractor shall create an ICD defining the interface between PDS and the EDL

Assembly.

X

2-2 The ICD shall be created in coordination with LMS, NASA LaRC, and APL. X

2-3 The PDS/aeroshell ICD shall be approved by NASA LaRC. X

2-4 The ICD shall cover, at a minimum, the following areas:

• Assembly drawings

• Interface control drawings

• Installation procedures

• Coordinate systems

• Mechanical interfaces

• Mass properties (i.e., mass, center of mass, moments and products of inertia)

• Thermal interfaces (e.g., thermal mass properties, mount conductance, emissivity, and absorptivity)

X

2-5 All requirements in the ICD shall become part of the requirements of the present SOW. X

3 PLANETARY PROTECTION

3-1 The contractor shall provide access to its facilities to NASA and APL personnel to collect samples for planetary protection requirements verification.

X

4 UNITS

4-1 Goal. The Dragonfly project should use the International System of Units (SI), except when such use represents a technical risk and/or significantly increases the project cost.

Angles can be shown in degrees rather than the standard SI unit of radians.

4-2 The Dragonfly project will be designed, analyzed, built, assembled, tested, and operated using a hybrid of the SI and U.S. customary systems.

X

4-3 ICDs shall use SI units with U.S. Customary equivalent where necessary (typical of some mechanical items).

Verification Method

T A D I

4-4 Design drawings will show SI units as the primary with U.S. customary units needed for manufacturing.

Manufacturing drawings can be in U.S. Customary units to enable use of U.S.

manufacturing facilities.

X

4-5 All units shall be clearly marked on drawings, documents, and tables. X

5 SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE

5.1 GENERAL

5.1-1 The Contractor shall define and implement a quality management system that is compliant with SAE AS9100D or ISO 9001:2015.

X

5.1-2 The Contractor shall prepare, document, and implement an assurance plan in accordance with the Statement of Work. The assurance plan applies to:

• Flight hardware and software that is designed, built, or provided by the developer and its subcontractors or furnished by the government, from project initiation through launch and mission operations.

• The ground support equipment that interfaces with flight items to the extent necessary to assure the integrity and safety of flight items.

• The ground data system to the extent necessary to assure performance as required by the Statement of Work.

NOTE: A completed requirements compliance matrix, accepted by the NASA LaRC SMA

Representative, may be used in lieu of creating a separate assurance plan.

X

5.1-3 The Contractor shall, in order to manage safety and mission assurance activities, designate an assurance representative that:

• has direct access to organizational management that is independent of project management,

• has functional freedom and authority to interact with all elements of the project, Verification Method

T A D I

• is not responsible for project costs and schedules other than those pertaining to assurance activities,

• is the single point of contact to interface with the NASA LaRC SMA Representative,

• reviews and approves every Dragonfly subcontract solicitation, selection, and award containing mission assurance requirements,

• report any personnel changes to the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA

Representative,

• notify the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative of any changes in post CDR product design, key personnel (e.g., PM, Lead Engineer), plant location, materials, production, scope of processes and/or pending business shutdowns or closures that may affect the procured item as originally specified or quoted.

5.1-4 The Contractor shall obtain the NASA LaRC SMA Representative approval for "comply with caveat" or "do not comply" approach to any mission assurance requirement prior to implementation.

X X

5.1-5 The Contractor shall obtain the NASA LaRC SMA Representative approval for tailoring any mission assurance requirement prior to being flowed to a supplier.

X X

5.1-6 The Contractor shall not subcontract or outsource any part of the approved SOW, unless previously identified, without approval or consent from the NASA LaRC SMA

Representative. If testing or operations occur outside the immediate facility contracted, the

NASA LaRC SMA Representative shall be notified for their approval or consent. This requirement does not include subcontracting of secondary operations or processes such as plating, painting, coatings, etc.

X X

5.1-7 The Contractor shall grant access to the NASA LaRC SMA Representatives to conduct an audit, assessment, inspections, or survey upon notice.

X X

5.1-8 The Contractor shall in accordance with the inspection/acceptance requirements of the

Prime Contract and Task Order (see FAR 52.246-8) and in conjunction with an audit, Verification Method

T A D I assessment, or survey; supply documents, records, equipment, and a suitable work area within the Contractor’s facilities.

5.2 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

5.2-1 The Contractor shall establish, implement, and maintain a documented configuration management process that includes:

• Configuration management planning

• Configuration identification

• Change control (CCB)

• Configuration status accounting

• Configuration audit

• Traceability between the "as-design" and "as-built" PDS

X

5.2-2 The Contractor shall apply their own institutional Configuration Management practices and procedures to configuration items in implementing the applicable CM requirements contained in this matrix.

X

5.2-3 The Contractor shall submit deviations and waivers using the developers documentation to the NASA LaRC SMA Representative for review, disposition, and approval for Class 1 variances, which are defined as variances that affect Statement of Work (SOW), system safety, overall project costs, schedule, external interface.

X

5.2-4 The Contractor shall, as part of CCB process, establish how Class 2 variances are processed and distributed. Class 2 variances are defined as those that are not Class 1.

X

5.2-5 The Contractor shall maintain, throughout all phases of assembly and test, the configuration of flight hardware, flight software, and GSE hardware and software, including standard (COTS) and special test equipment and software either developed or procured and used in support of the Dragonfly project.

X

5.2-6 The Contractor shall perform and document physical and functional configuration verification as assemblies are incorporated into higher-level assemblies and at major

Project milestones (i.e., pre-environmental test, pre-ship, pre-launch, etc.).

Verification Method

T A D I

Physical: The objective of the PCA shall be to ensure that the delivered product physical configuration complies with the associated as designed engineering documentation. The

PCA shall be an internal audit of the As-Built version of the product against its As-

Designed technical documentation and associated quality assurance records, performed by the institution in accordance with their internal processes.

Functional: The objective of a FCA shall be to verify that the actual performance of the product complies with its associated requirements. Test data shall be reviewed by the

Contractor Cognizant Engineer and concurred by the organization's SAM to verify that the item has performed as required by its configuration identification (specifications and/or drawings, etc.). The results of all required hardware and software functional and performance tests shall be verified to ensure that the requirements are met.

5.3 SUPPLIER MANAGEMENT

5.3-1 The Contractor shall establish and maintain a process for evaluation and selection of suppliers of flight products or providing services (i.e., testing) of flight product.

X

5.4 SYSTEM SAFETY

5.4-1 The Contractor shall implement an occupational safety and health program compliant with all applicable federal, state, and local safety and health regulations.

5.4-2 The Contractor shall direct the suspension of any work activity that presents a hazard, imminent danger, or future hazard to personnel, property, or mission operations resulting from unsafe acts or conditions that are identified by inspection, test, or analysis.

X X

5.4-3 The Contractor shall adhere to specific detailed safety requirements, including compliance verification that must be met for design elements with hazards that cannot be controlled by failure tolerance. The process by which safety is incorporated into these design elements

(e.g., structures and pressure vessels) is called "Design for Minimum Risk".

X X

5.4-4 The Contractor shall support Dragonfly system safety as required, to include support of safety working group meetings, technical interface meetings, and technical reviews, when requested.

Verification Method

T A D I

5.4-5 The Contractor shall support implementation of the Safety Requirements Compliance

Checklist.

X X

5.4-6 The Contractor shall document non-compliances to safety requirements in waivers. X

5.4-7 The Contractor shall support the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) to obtain an initial risk assessment and to identify safety critical areas of a concept or system.

X X

5.4-8 The Contractor shall implement the following safety requirements for lifting devices and equipment when performing NASA work at non-NASA facilities:

• Ensure that for critical lifts overhead cranes, winches, and hoists have dual holding brakes and dual upper limit switches (dual upper limit switches do not apply to chain hoists) installed as defined in NASA Standard 8719.9B Standard for Lifting

Devices and Equipment, paragraphs 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively. A single holding brake in combination with a motor drive that automatically tests the holding ability of the brake prior to every release of the brake is acceptable as a second brake as long as the crane has a notification device to alert operator of failure of the braking system.

• Perform periodic load testing in accordance with paragraph 4.5 of NASA-STD-

8719.9B for the following lifting devices and equipment: overhead cranes; mobile cranes and derricks; hooks hydra-sets and load measuring devices; and slings and riggings.

• After the initial proof test of the lifting device or equipment (LDE), a load test of the rated safe working load (SWL) LDE shall be performed every four years. Proof tests will be 125% of the SWL for Lifting Devices, such as overhead and mobile cranes and include aerial platforms used near critical hardware. Proof tests will be at

200% of the SWL for Lifting Equipment, such as shackles, turnbuckles and so forth. A load test will be at 100% of the labeled SWL for all LDE. If the LDE is de-rated to a lower SWL because of a lower proof or load test, the LDE shall be labeled as this new SWL and only be used to the maximum capacity as such.

Verification Method

T A D I

• Perform NDT inspections using an American Society of Nondestructive Testing

(ASNT) or equivalently trained inspector on critical lifting hardware/equipment on critical welds (weld failure would result in failure of hardware) after initial proof test and load testing.

• Label and tag lifting devices and equipment per NASA-STD-8719.9B paragraph 4.9 or other acceptable means.

• Alternative local approaches are acceptable with approval of the NASA LaRC SMA

Representative while performing activities at local facilities; also exclude foreign contributions which are governed by local laws and regulations

5.4-9 The Contractor shall, specific to suppliers and subcontractors, support the NASA LaRC

SMA Representative in preparation of an integrated SDP.

X

5.4-10 The Contractor shall support the NASA LaRC SMA Representative in preparation of applicable hazardous procedures that are performed during integration and test activities and pre-launch activities at the launch site.

X X

5.4-11 The Contractor shall report accidents, close calls, or other mishaps including test induced damages promptly to the NASA LaRC SMA Representative in accordance with NPR

8621.1D NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigation, and Recordkeeping.

X X

5.4-12 The Contractor shall provide technical support to the NASA LaRC SMA Representative for safety working group meetings, technical interface meetings, and technical reviews.

X X

5.4-13 The PDS Contractor will identify a SaSE to provide system safety data and support to the

LaRC SMA Representative as specified in their contract. The LaRC SMA Representative will be responsible for identifying specific safety deliverables and coordinating safety-related matters with the subcontractor SaSE counterpart.

X

5.4-14 The PDS Contractor will be responsible for performing a SSHA as required. X

5.4-15 The PDS Contractor will assist in performing an O&SHA as required. X X

5.4-16 Reviews of Contractor, payload element developers, and other organizations will be conducted by the LaRC SMA Representative as required to evaluate safety program status

Verification Method

T A D I and project incompatibilities that require remedial corrective action, or to obtain proper interpretation of safety data.

5.4-17 Design elements with hazards that cannot be controlled by failure tolerance, shall adhere to specific detailed safety requirements, including compliance verification that must be met.

X

5.5 METROLOGY / CALIBRATION

5.5-1 The Contractor shall, per NASA-STD-8739.12-2018-01-23, comply with one of the following standards for the calibration of measuring and test equipment:

• ANSI/NCSL Z540.1-1994 (R2002) Calibration Laboratories & Measuring & Test

Equipment - General Requirements

• ANSI/NCSL Z540.3-2006 (R2013) Requirements for the Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment

• ISO 17025-2017 General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories

X X

5.5-2 The Contractor shall maintain the calibration of test and measuring equipment and safety instruments used for: acceptance testing; accuracy requirements; inspection; maintenance;

flight hardware qualification; measurement where accuracy is essential for the safety of personnel or the public; telecommunication, transmission, and test equipment where exact signal interfaces and circuit confirmations are essential to mission success; development, testing, and special applications where the specifications, end products, or data are accuracy sensitive, including instruments used in hazardous and critical applications.

X X

5.5-3 The developer shall calibrate any article of equipment used to take measurements to meet accuracy requirements within the project to one of the standards in Requirement 5.5-1. The developer may calibrate torque wrenches per one of the standards in Requirement 5.5-1 or may verify against a calibrated torque tester prior to use.

X X

5.5-4 The Contractor shall record the measurements that require accuracy in applicable project build documents (e.g., electronic and hard copy work orders, test plans, or other work execution documents), including the article of calibrated equipment used to take the measurement and its calibration end date.

Verification Method

T A D I

5.5-5 The Contractor shall limit the use of non-calibrated and non-verified instruments to applications where substantiated accuracy is not required and for indication-only purposes in non-hazardous, non-critical applications.

X

5.6 MATERIALS AND PROCESSES

5.6-1 The Contractor shall provide a list of parts, materials, and processes to the NASA LaRC

PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative for review and approval prior to the start of manufacture. This list shall be provided in the specified Materials Identification and Usage

List (MIUL) template.

X X

5.6-2 MIULs shall be submitted to NASA LaRC at the following points:

• A preliminary MIUL prior to the PDR.

• A comprehensive As-Designed MIUL prior to the CDR.

• An As-Built MIUL as a part of the deliverable End-Item Data Package (EIDP).

As-Built documentation is not required for engineering units.

X X

5.6-3 Once approved by the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative, the

Contractor shall not deviate from using the approved parts, materials, and processes without prior written authorization from the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA

Representative.

X X

5.6-4 The Materials and Process Control Board (MPCB) may request documentation for nonstandard material or process applications. If so requested, the Contractor shall provide such documentation for review and approval.

X X

5.6-5 The flight hardware shall not contain the following prohibited materials without the prior written approval of the MPCB:

• Cadmium, selenium, zinc, un-plated brass (copper-zinc alloy)

• Pure tin (<3% Pb), electrodeposited tin plating (e.g., MIL-T-10727 Type I and

ASTM B 545) or hot-dipped tin plating (e.g., MIL-T-10727 Type II)

• Mercury and its salts

Verification Method

T A D I

• One-part RTV silicone sealants/adhesives that cure by reaction with atmospheric moisture to release acetic acid

• Plasticized polyvinyl polymers, e.g., polyvinyl chloride (PVC), with the exception of polyvinylidene fluoride (Kynar)

• Lock washers

• Aluminum wire or cable

• Silicone greases

• Radioactive materials

5.6-6 All parts and materials procured for use on flight hardware shall be certified as to composition, properties, and requirements as identified by the procuring document.

X X

5.6-7 Parts and materials used in critical applications, such as life-limited materials and/or safety- and fracture-critical parts, shall be traceable through all processing steps defined in the engineering drawing to the end-item application.

X

5.6-8 All materials used in flight hardware shall be traceable. X

5.6-9 The manufacture date, batch and/or lot identification, test reports, and expiration date materials shall be included in the MIUL as applicable.

X X

5.6-10 All materials with a limited shelf life shall be handled according to a NASA LaRC PDS

Lead Engineer and SMA Representative approved procedures and processes, and used or applied within the expiry date of the material.

X X

5.6-11 All materials and processes failures found during flight hardware integration and testing shall be reported to the NASA LaRC SMA Representative and shall be dispositioned by the Contractor with the NASA LaRC SMA Representative’s approval. Acceptable documentation for such failures shall be as dictated by the NASA LaRC SMA

Representative.

X X

5.6-12 Packaging materials shall not damage the flight hardware. X X

5.7 NON-CONFORMING MATERIALS

5.7-1 The Contractor shall have a documented closed loop system for identifying, reporting, and correcting product non-conformances.

Verification Method

T A D I

5.7-2 The Contractor shall designate, control, and segregate from normal production flow all material identified as non-conforming.

X

5.7-3 The Contractor shall have a documented process for the establishment and operation of a

MRB or FRB to process non-conformances, including the definitions of major and minor non-conformances.

X

5.7-4 The Contractor shall appoint an SMA MRB chairperson who is responsible for implementing the MRB process that includes functional and project representatives as

MRB members.

X

5.7-5 The Contractor shall, in regard to the non-conformance system, ensure that the adequacy of corrective action is determined by audit, inspection, or test, that objective evidence is collected, and that preventive action is implemented to preclude recurrence.

X

5.7-6 The Contractor shall notify the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative in advance of holding an MRB.

X X

5.7-7 The Contractor shall provide Langley access to the applicable documentation in advance of a scheduled MRB.

X X

5.7-8 The Contractor shall use the following disposition actions if not already captured in the

Contractor MRB/FRB process:

• Scrap — disposal of non-conforming product due to its inability to be economically reworked or repaired

• Re-work — the product will be re-worked to conform to approved design documentation

• Return to supplier — the product will be returned to the supplier

• Standard Repair - pre-reviewed and approved by the procuring entity standard procedures for repairs to product that ensures conformance of the product but may not conform to released engineering documentation, MRB approval required

Verification Method

T A D I

• Non-standard Repair — reserved for restoring the functional or physical fitness for use of non-conforming product, but does not ensure conformance of the product with its applicable drawings or specifications, MRB approval required

• Use as is — for allowing non-conforming product to be used in its application with no additional action, MRB approval required

5.7-9 The Contractor shall provide MRB dispositions to the NASA LaRC PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative. If the MRB was held without LaRC representation, the NASA

LaRC SMA will provide written notice of acceptance or rejection of the MRB decision within three working days. The Contractor may proceed at risk with implementation of

MRB dispositions, other than non-standard repair or use-as-is, without written approval the

NASA LaRC SMA Representative.

X

5.7-10 The Contractor shall provide NASA LaRC access to their material discrepancy-reports. X

5.7-11 The Contractor shall support Dragonfly project level MRBs, as requested. X X

5.7-12 The Contractor shall use the NASA LaRC SMA Representative as the approval authority for accepting the disposition of non-conformances identified, by the subcontractor, after delivery.

X X

5.7-13 The Contractor shall submit a waiver or approved disposition as part of the MRB and non-conformance report approval to requirements to the NASA LaRC SMA for a non-standard repair or use-as-is disposition .

X X

5.7-14 The Contractor shall have a documented process for anomaly and problem/failure reporting and disposition.

X

5.7-15 The Contractor shall report anomalies and problem/failures. X

5.7-16 The Contractor shall, in regard to the anomaly and problem/failure reporting process, establish a failure review board (FRB) whose membership shall include the NASA LaRC

PDS Lead Engineer and SMA Representative as voting members with approval authority for proposed actions on all PFRs

Verification Method

T A D I

• Major anomalies (Problem/Failure - PFR) are those that have resulted in hardware or software test failures and damage or potential damage to hardware. Examples of

PFRs are overvoltage or over current conditions, exceedance of test limits resulting in overstress, and blown fuses.

• Minor anomalies (Anomaly - AR) are those that have not resulted in hardware failure or have caused no damage or stress to hardware or required no change in flight software. Examples of ARs are those that can be resolved immediately, procedural errors, database problems, operator errors, unexpected system responses, and exceedance of test limits that do not affect the end item.

• The Contractor may disposition minor anomalies via the APFR meeting.

5.7-17 The Contractor shall report problem(s) and failure(s) to NASA LaRC within (8) hours for a major anomaly and (24) hours for a minor anomaly of discovery of occurrence.

X

5.7-18 The Contractor shall, assess the problem/failure risk ratings for PFRs in accordance with their institutional closed loop non-conformance tracking system, ensuring that PFRs where no root cause has been identified are tracked with a residual risk.

X

5.8 GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM (GIDEP)

5.8-1 The Contractor shall participate in GIDEP per the GIDEP Operations Manual S0300-BT-

PRO-010 15SEP2010, and GIDEP Requirements Guide S0300-BU-GYD-010

APRIL2008, (Note: these documents are available through http://www.gidep.org).

X X

5.8-2 The Contractor shall review the following, hereafter referred to collectively as Alerts, for effects on EEE parts, materials, equipment, and software used in NASA products: GIDEP

Alerts; GIDEP SAFE-ALERTS; GIDEP Problem Advisories; GIDEP Agency Action

Notices; NASA Advisories.

X

5.8-3 The Contractor shall disposition the item and Alert through the Material Review Board when the developer identifies an item in their as designed or as built configuration that is documented in an Alert.

Verification Method

T A D I

5.8-4 The Contractor shall prepare and submit failure experience data and safety issue reports per the requirements of S0300-BT-PRO-010 and S0300-BU-GYD-010 whenever failed or non-conforming items are available to other buyers.

X

5.8-5 The Contractor shall report the status of project items affected by released Alerts or candidate Alerts generated by the project at status reports as defined by the contract, program milestone reviews and readiness reviews, to include a summary of the review status for EEE parts and materials lists and of actions taken to eliminate or mitigate negative effects.

X

5.8-6 The Contractor shall assess the GIDEP database of product failures from the aerospace and technical community prior to kitting parts and materials into flight builds.

X

5.9 LIMITED LIFE ITEMS

5.9-1 The Contractor shall, define and implement a limited life item (LLI) plan. A limited life item is defined as:

Spaceflight hardware or material that is subject to degradation because of age, operating time, operating conditions, or cycles such that their life expectancy is less than two times mission design life when fabrication, test, storage, and mission operation are combined.

X

5.9-2 The test plans and procedures shall address the life test program for any identified limited life items, per the limited life plan Requirement 5.9-1.

X

5.9-3 The Contractor shall, in regard to records for limited life items, track the usage of identified LLI and report remaining life at PDR, CDR, SIR, PER, and PSR.

X

5.10 CONTAMINATION CONTROL

5.10-1 The level of assembly at which cleanliness control is…