15-SPEC_JOFOC_for_FBO.pdf

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER (MSFC)

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION (JOFOC)

Pursuant to 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2304 (c) (1) and Federal Acquisition Regulation

(FAR) 6.302-1

Stages Production and Evolution Contract (SPEC)

1. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (1) - Identification of the agency and the contracting activity, and specific identification of the document as a “Justification for other than full and opencompetition:”

This document is a Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition (JOFOC) prepared by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition, and NASA FAR Supplement (NFS) Part 1806.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition.

2. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (2) - Nature and/or description of the action being approved:

NASA’s current Stages contract with The Boeing Corporation, NNM07AB03C, requires the Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E), production, and operation of the Stages launch system through Artemis 1 and 2. The Stages contract is a hybrid contract that includes Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) / Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) / Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) / Cost contract line items.

This justification provides rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition for the continued development, testing, production, and evolution of the Stages launch system.

Approval of this JOFOC will allow MSFC to procure production and evolution support for flights 3 through 12 from Boeing (10 Core Stages). The contemplated acquisition will support the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) architecture through the finalization of known major CS development efforts at flight 4 and transition the program to low rate initial production (LRIP) for flights 5-12. SPEC will support DDT&E efforts for flight 5 (and subsequent as identified/needed flights), so that new capabilities and functions may be added to the base designs of the CS to meet mission-specific requirements and/or upgrades. These capabilities and functions will be defined by NASA during the period of performance, but are not intended to fundamentally alter the base design established by major DDT&E efforts. In order to maximize efficiencies, CS 2 post-delivery support will be included on SPEC.

3. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (3) - A description of the supplies or services required to meet the agency’s needs (including the estimated value):

SLS is the vehicle designed to send people and hardware beyond low earth orbit. The vehicle is an element of the overall ESD architecture that includes the launch vehicles, spacecraft, mission systems and ground systems needed to embark on a robust human solar system exploration program. SLS Stages consists of a CS integrated with Government-furnished engines, and either an upper stage (which may or may not be integrated with Government furnished engines) or an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) (which may be integrated with Government furnished engines). Stages also include all necessary hardware, avionics, and Government-provided software.

This acquisition supports the transition from SLS Block 1 to Block 1B and finally to Block 2.

The initial SLS Block vehicle design, designated SLS Block 1, consists of a CS, ICPS, and two SLS five-segment solid rocket motors (Boosters). The SLS Block 1B configuration has two stages. The “first stage” or boost phase includes one CS and two boosters. One CS consists of a Liquid Oxygen (LOX) and Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) propulsion system integrated with four Government furnished engines, currently RS-25 engines. The vehicle ignites the RS-25 engines seconds before liftoff and then ignites the Boosters at liftoff. The Boosters burn out approximately two minutes into flight, while the RS-25 engines continue to burn until the desired cutoff point is achieved. The “second stage” will include a phase to deliver humans and hardware to Cis Lunar. The SLS Block 2 configuration is similar to the Block 1B version with the exception of the advanced boosters and an updated thrust vector control (TVC) system. The basic CS configuration is flexible for both early flight demonstration with the multi-purpose crew vehicle (MPCV) and for evolving to a 130 metric ton launch capability. Below is a detailed graphic of the CS and its components:

Integrated with the CS is an Avionics System. The Avionics System, along with the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) provided Flight Software, controls the SLS vehicle throughout the mission. The Avionics System consists of the flight controls (flight computers, command and data handling, guidance, navigation & control, and operational flight instrumentation), communications and telemetry system (communications & telemetry controller, radio frequency hardware, engineering flight instrumentation, development flight instrumentation, and motion imagery system), electrical power system and the flight safety system. The Avionics System architecture is a one fault tolerant system for critical functions.

In its most basic form, the CS consist of structural tanks, dry structure, an Avionics System, a Main Propulsion System (MPS), TVC for the engines, and attitude control systems. Both stages provide large volume cryogenic (LOX/LH2) storage and fluid delivery to an engine complement.

Below is a graphic depicting the planned evolution from Block 1 to Block 2.

For Flights 3 – 12, the acquisition will also support sustaining engineering, ground, and flight operations. The estimated value of this action is FOIA Ex.5 with an estimated period of performance from October 1, 2019 through December 31, 2033. The intent is to award a letter contract to Boeing by October 1, 2019, to enable long-lead material subcontracts and Core Stage 3 (CS3) production.

4. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (4) - An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c) (l), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1, "Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements."

5. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (5) - A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited:

The rationale supporting use of 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c) (l) is that the Agency's minimum needs can only be satisfied by unique services, which are available from one source with unique capabilities (reference FAR 6.302-l (b) (l)). SPEC will require continued development and production of a major system that includes highly specialized equipment and major components.

DDT&E Investment

Boeing, as the incumbent contractor, is responsible for the DDT&E of the highly specialized Stages launch system through Artemis 2. In this role, Boeing has developed exclusive and critical knowledge and capabilities which uniquely qualifies them to support ongoing DDT&E efforts under SPEC. Each CS takes 16 months to procure and receive long lead materials and another 36 months to manufacture, test, and deliver to the Kennedy Space Center. With a planned manifest and launch cadence of one flight per year, the Government needs to have three CS in production at any given time. Schedule cannot accommodate the time to complete a new CS stage, fly it, and analyze it, and then begin building the next one. Instead, it is imperative that the Government utilize a contractor with existing specific knowledge of core stage design, development, and flight operations, and the ability to quickly adjust and develop multiple stages throughout the transition to production and thereafter. With the anticipated overlap between the current contract and SPEC, as well as the overlap in production processes to address one flight per year after 2024, Boeing has the distinct expertise as the incumbent DDT&E contractor to ensure that knowledge gained on the current contract is effectively transferred into finalizing DDT&E and shifting the program into LRIP without the introduction of undue risk to crew safety and mission schedules.

NASA has made large investments under the Stages DDT&E contract to develop critical infrastructure and special tooling to produce materials and components for the CS. The critical infrastructure and special tooling are unique to the 8.4-meter diameter SLS launch vehicle and are necessary to assemble the domes, barrels and large cryogenic LH2 and LOX tanks. Boeing has established a workforce that is trained and certified to perform Stages unique processes and operate Stages-unique infrastructure and tooling. Boeing possesses unique knowledge and insight into the CS design, production process, and integration with other ESD systems such as Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS).

NASA critical infrastructure was utilized to accommodate the challenges associated with manufacturing the CS, and critical infrastructure and special tooling are required for performing friction stir welding (FSW) operations at MAF. These tools were developed by Boeing, and Boeing is the only company whose employees have the specialized training and experience to operate these items. The major SLS tools include:

• Vertical Assembly Center (VAC)

• Vertical Weld Center (VWC)

• Segment Ring Tool (SRT)

• Enhanced Robotic Weld Tool (ERWT)

• Circumferential Dome Welding Tool (CDWT)

• Gore Weld Tool (GWT)

• Mobile Plug Weld Tool (PWT)

In order to develop the expertise to operate the above critical infrastructure and special tooling a new contractor would have to manufacture first build articles/structural test articles for testing and validation prior to the manufacture of flight articles. This manufacturing of infrastructure and tooling would generate a substantial duplication of cost and tie up the available machinery as the new contractor processed test articles while Boeing continues to press to launch Artemis 2 in 2022. Furthermore, if the CS were awarded to a source other than Boeing, manufactured in a different facility, the Government would not benefit from the design and manufacturing commonalities that have been incorporated into the design of the flight hardware and special tooling from the beginning. The continued development and production of the CS by Boeing enables manufacturing efficiencies to be realized in the following functions:

• Quality

• Configuration Management

• Data Systems

• Drawing release systems

• Factory management

• Parts storage

• Receiving

• Supply Chain

• Avionics boxes

• Power Distribution Control Unit (PDCU)

• Redundant Inertial Navigation Unit (RINU)

Although a source other than Boeing might be able to perform all of the work necessary to support SPEC, it is likely that no source other than Boeing can do so in a manner that is not unacceptably disruptive to the launch schedule.

Manufacturing Process Investment

Some drawings and manufacturing processes generated under the current DDT&E contract were developed from Boeing-specific material and process standards. If a source other than Boeing were to be selected for award of SPEC, the new contractor would have to rewrite any specification or process that ties back to a Boeing specific material or process standard into a Government-approved specification or standard. This rewrite could jeopardize the current launch manifest since the new SPEC contractor will have to review potentially thousands of documents, rewrite any that tie back to a Boeing standard or process, revalidate with an update that ties to a Government standard or specification, and subsequently perform testing and remapping to replace existing references with the rewritten standard or specification. Since this effort represents work that would only be necessary in the event of selection of a SPEC contractor other than Boeing, all costs associated with such a review and remapping would represent substantial duplication of cost to the Government.

Vendor Supply Chain Investment

Boeing has established an extensive supply chain and developed unique expertise, component manufacturing and testing capabilities to meet these requirements. Performance of this supply chain under the current contract has led to the refinement of manufacturing, assembly, integration, and testing processes, thereby improving the reliability and safety of the Stages system. If a new contractor were to utilize alternate sources to those currently performing under the existing contract, additional costs and schedule delays would arise from the time needed to re- compete supplier contracts, establish and complete training of personnel to perform the related processes, and the need to repeat the numerous design and technical reviews and testing required to achieve a certified design for human-rating with new suppliers. In addition, the use of different vendors and processes than those currently utilized on the Stages contract could introduce undue risk to the reliability and safety of future missions.

FAR 6.302-l (a) (2) (ii) (B) - Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements

In December 2017, the President signed Space Policy Directive-1 to return Americans to the moon and prioritize crewed missions to the lunar surface. “The directive I am signing today will refocus America’s space program on human exploration and discovery,” said President Trump. “It marks a first step in returning American astronauts to the Moon for the first time since 1972, for long-term exploration and use. This time, we will not only plant our flag and leave our footprints -- we will establish a foundation for an eventual mission to Mars, and perhaps someday, too many worlds beyond.”

The fifth meeting of the National Space Council took place in Huntsville Alabama on March 26, 2019. The Vice President of the United States, Mr. Michael Pence, chaired that meeting and issued the following direction, “I’m here, on the President’s behalf, to tell the men and women of the Marshall Space Flight Center and the American people that, at the direction of the President of the United States, it is the stated policy of this administration and the United States of America to return American astronauts to the Moon within the next five years.”

It is highly likely that award to a source other than Boeing would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the policy of the current administration and NASA's requirements. The delay estimates, listed below, were developed in conjunction with the Stages program office and support the information provided in response to FAR 6.302-l (a) (2) (ii) (B). They are intended to represent the expected schedule impact resulting from a competition and selection of an awardee other than Boeing. The associated schedule loss is a one-time impact assessed to the Artemis 3 launch date but would subsequently push all following launch dates to the right.

Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Agency's requirements for SLS would result from the: 1) 18 month delay from conducting a full and open competition based on a completed design; 2) 12 month delay resulting from significant critical path delays as a result of awaiting completion of current DDT&E efforts leading to first flight; 3) 12 month delay resulting from the rewriting of manufacturing processes tied to Boeing processes or standards; 4) 24 month delay resulting from the formation of a new vendor supply chain. Although some of the identified delays would run concurrently and begin prior to the end of the current Stages contract, any schedule loss is unacceptable to NASA per the Presidential directives. Below is a timeline of the impacts assessed above and the estimated launch schedule through Artemis 10:

Start Delay Finish Full and Open Competition 12/1/2019 18 Months 08/30/2021 Critical Path Delay 09/01/2021 12 Months 08/31/2022 Manufacturing Processes 09/01/2021 12 Months 08/31/2022 Vendor Supply Chain 09/01/2021 24 Months 08/31/2022 CS - 3 Production Start 08/31/2022 12/31/2026 Current Artemis Launch Date 7/1/2023 Loss of Schedule (Days) 854

Artemis Flights 11 and 12 are covered by the SPEC acquisition but not shown.

6. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (6) - A description of efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as is practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

A Sources Sought RFI was posted to the Government Point of Entry (GPE), Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) webpage http://www.fedbizopps.gov, on October 30, 2017. This notice requested potential sources to express their interest in the SPEC requirements, which would require completion of DDT&E activities and reproduction of the CS and Exploratory Upper Stage (EUS) with Government-provided data.

7. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (7) - A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

A cost and price analysis will be performed in accordance with FAR 15.404-1(a) (3), Proposal Analysis Techniques, to evaluate the reasonableness of individual cost elements and to verify that the overall price is fair and reasonable. Boeing will submit a proposal that will be evaluated and negotiated by the Government. The proposed cost and price will be compared to an Independent Government Estimate and historical data established under the current Stages contract NNM07AB03C.

http://www.fedbizopps.gov/

8. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (8) - A description of the market research conducted (see Part 10) and the results or a statement of the reason market research was not conducted:

For this acquisition, the Government choose to utilize the approach outlined in FAR 10.002(b)

(2) (iii), “Publishing formal requests for information in appropriate technical or scientific journals or business publications.” The request for information was posted in the GPE, FBO, on October 30, 2017. This approach was chosen because it is an effective and cost efficient way to present the requirement to industry. Under FAR 5.102(2) “The contracting officer is encouraged, when practicable and cost-effective, to make accessible through the GPE additional information related to a solicitation.”

The Government received two responses to the Sources Sought RFI. A review of the two responses identified several barriers to competition and transition risks which would need to be overcome in order to support a competition. Such barriers and risks include transition; access to drawings, analysis, and other details created under the current Stages DDT&E contract; and finalizing DDT&E. These barriers to competition and transition risks, as well as the cost and schedule impacts of mitigating these barriers, were considered by the Government in the assessment of the available sources in the market for meeting the Agency’s requirement.

In order to support a competition equal access to Stages-unique infrastructure would be required.

Facilities, tooling, and handling equipment that are unique to Stages currently exist, and a potential 2 year overlap exists between the periods of performance (POP) of the current Stages DDT&E contract, Artemis 2 delivery, and the contemplated POP of SPEC. In an effort to ease the transition, the Government could facilitate non-interference use agreements between the incumbent DDT&E contractor and the successful SPEC offeror for use of Government-provided facilities. While possible, this approach would present a number of challenges in areas such as maintaining configuration of tooling and equipment between two prime contractors working on two separate vehicles. This dual usage would potentially reduce efficiency in operations to process specific usage requests to account for the production down-time and schedule conflicts that would likely arise between two prime contractors operating in close proximity for such an extensive period of time.

Loss of critical skills also poses a significant problem for a new prime during transition. Loss of critical knowledge on how a piece of specialized equipment or tooling operates or how to set a specific parameter on a tool could be lost. Retention incentives could be used to keep critical skills from being reassigned to other programs.

The RFI responses also indicated a need to access all drawings, analysis, and other details created under the current Stages DDT&E contract, including those provided with limited rights to the Government. There are numerous areas in which limited rights data have been incorporated into the design of the vehicle as a means to leverage cost savings and existing technology possessed by Boeing and its subcontractors. While the Government has the right to reproduce and use this data, the data may not be used for the purposes of manufacture by a new contractor under SPEC.

In order to fulfill SPEC requirements, a potential offeror would need to establish agreements with all suppliers that currently possess the limited rights data or to redesign those areas of the Stages launch system that were developed utilizing limited rights under the current Stages DDT&E contract. While the establishment of agreements between a new potential offeror and every supplier with limited rights on the current contract is conceivable, it would be challenging. However, the time needed to establish such agreements could reasonably be anticipated to result in an extended phase-in period and potential delay to overall performance on the contract. If a new SPEC contractor choose to redesign or procure subcomponents from vendors other than those currently performing on the Stages DDT&E contract, it will require the SPEC contractor to perform DDT&E and qualification of the new design. The time necessary to complete DDT&E and qualification of new components could vary significantly, depending on the particular design, but it could be expected to extend the normally anticipated 52 month production time substantially.

Major DDT&E of the base vehicle design will continue through Flight 4. Following completion of the initial major DDT&E activities, the program will support a transition to Block 2 at Flight

9. This transition is anticipated to have a notable impact on the base vehicle design as integration of the upgraded capabilities are incorporated and tested. It is imperative that completion of major DDT&E activities tied to early performance and Block 2 are completed under SPEC and that the Stages program transition to LRIP for Flights 5-12. This transition will progressively reduce the risk associated with the transition from DDT&E to LRIP, supporting a competition for a future full- rate production contract.

In summary, the Government assessed the barriers to competition and transition risks identified by the RFI respondents and considered the unique qualifications of the incumbent discussed in section 5 of this document; reviewed the nature of this procurement continuing as DDT&E through Block 1B and Block 2; the overlap of the production process for Flights 2 and 3; and, assessed the anticipated launch at an annual rate thereafter; a result the Government concluded that no other sources are currently available to fulfill the SPEC requirements without introducing unacceptable risks and delays in fulfilling the Government requirement.

Based on the Sources Sought RFI responses, NASA posted a presolicitation synopsis to the GPE on February 23, 2018. NASA received two responses for the production and evolution of the Stages launch system and one alternate response for the upper stage. The alternate approach requires an in-depth engineering and programmatic assessment; therefore, the upper stage will be addressed at a later date.

9. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (9) - Any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

FAR 6.302-l (a) (2) (ii) (A) - Substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition:

To date the Government has invested FOIA EX. 5 in the development and manufacturing of flight hardware for Artemis 1 and 2. Award of a contract to a source other than Boeing for the work described in section 3 would likely result in substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition; the costs not expected to be recovered through competition are related to the DDT&E investment, the manufacturing process investment, and the vendor supply chain investment. Cumulatively, the duplication of cost described below is estimated to be in excess of FOIA EX.5.

NASA Authorization Act of 2010

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed the Agency to develop, as rapidly as possible, replacement vehicles capable of providing both human and cargo launch capabilities to low- Earth orbit and to destinations beyond low-Earth orbit. The Act directed the Administrator to utilize, to the extent practicable investments, workforce, industrial base and capabilities from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), Orion, and Ares I projects for development of the SLS.

Stabilization of the Stages Base Vehicle Design

While the major DDT&E efforts will be completed by Flight 4, the Government anticipates that capability upgrades will be necessary during LRIP to ensure Stage’s ability to meet specific mission requirements which have yet to be defined. Some of these upgrades will have a notable impact on the base vehicle design and integration of the upgraded capabilities will cause evolution of the overall base vehicle design, as opposed to a modular addition to the existing design. It is anticipated that through the LRIP of the Stages launch system the upgrades needed to ensure the vehicle can meet critical mission requirements will be completed and incorporated into the base vehicle design, thereby maturing the design and preparing it for true build-to-print production.

Trained and Certified Workforce

Boeing has established a workforce that is trained and certified to perform Boeing-unique processes, and they possess unique knowledge and insight in the Stages launch system design, production process, and integration with other ESD systems such as Orion and EGS.

In the event a prospective new contractor for Stages were to utilize employees other than those working on the current Stages DDT&E contract during the transition to LRIP, schedule and safety risk would be introduced given the need to train, transfer and recreate knowledge and experience of the Stages launch system. Time would have to be allowed for these employees to become familiar with thousands of highly complex drawings and data that support the production and operations of the launch system.

10. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (10) - A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed, in writing, an interest in the acquisition:

As stated in items 6 and 8, a Sources Sought RFI was posted to the GPE on October 30, 2017.

This notice requested potential sources to express their interest in the SPEC requirements, which would require completion of DDT&E activities and reproduction of the CS and EUS with Government-provided data. Written responses were received from The Boeing Company and

Lockheed Martin Corporation (LM).

As stated in item 8, a presolicitation synopsis was posted to the GPE on February 23, 2018.

Responses were received from The Boeing Company, LM, and Blue Origin.

11. FAR 6.303-2 (b) (11) - A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

Once major DDT&E activities cease, a consistent, stable, and efficient production process will be established as the program transitions from development to LRIP. This will enable finalized CS design drawings and data to be made available to support a future full rate production competition. In addition, this transition will afford NASA the opportunity to obtain the appropriate level of data rights required to effectively compete Stages in the future. NASA may also consider requiring the delivery of detailed supply chain information under SPEC in order to facilitate future potential offerors’ abilities to mitigate cost and schedule risk associated with the establishment of a supply chain for a subsequent acquisition, as well as assess opportunities for licensing arrangements to reduce barriers to competition associated with limited rights data.

These activities will contribute to the reduction of any barriers to competition associated with the incumbent’s unique and critical knowledge of the Stages launch system as the design and process data matured under SPEC can be made available to potential offerors.

12. I hereby certify the facts in this justification and any supporting data used for this justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge.

Julie A. Bassler Date Manager, SLS Stages Element Office

I hereby certify that the above justification is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. In addition, I hereby determine that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable.

Kellie D. Craig Date Contracting Officer

Date: 2019.08.01 10:10:45 -05'00'

-05'00'

Concurrence:

Digitally signed by Jason

Jason Detko �=!�2019.oa.0201,37,35 -05'00'

Jason T. Detko Procurement Officer

Center Competition Advocate

Kenneth Bowersox Acting Associate Administrator for Space Operations Mission Directorate

William Roets Agency Competition Advocate

Approved:

Monica Y. Manning Assistant Administrator for Procurement

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From: Bowersox, Kenneth D. (HQ-CA000) Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2019 1:12 PM To: Cullen, Jeffrey M. (HQ-LP012) Cc: Whitmeyer, Tom (HQ-CM000) ; LaFreniere-Dajc, Jodie (HQ-LP012) Mumford, Altonell L. (HQ-CA000) Subject: Re: JOFOC for Stages Production and Evolution Contract (SPEC)

Concur on moving forward with the SLS stages production and evolution JOFOC. Thanks for letting me take a look at the package.

Ken abarnold Highlight