Project Grant 2513504

This $500,000 Project Grant was awarded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under the Computer and Information Science and Engineering (CISE) program (CFDA 47.070) to The Leland Stanford Junior University, also known as Stanford University.

The grant supports research that aims to rigorously quantify the benefit of acquiring additional information in strategic economic environments like auctions. The project develops a formal framework to analyze how different amounts and types of information affect the performance of algorithmic mechanisms, with a focus on objectives such as revenue and welfare. The research investigates mechanisms under informational constraints, evaluates tradeoffs between acquiring information and expanding market participation, and extends the approach to settings beyond auctions. This work contributes to a deeper theoretical understanding of how information shapes mechanism design when mechanisms must remain simple, incentive compatible, and robust to uncertainty. The project also includes educational outreach efforts to increase student interest and involvement in computer science and economics.