SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM EXPLORATION UPPER STAGE ENGINES
Added: Jan 20, 2016 9:15 am
NASA/MSFC has a requirement for Exploration Upper Stage Engines (EUSE) for the Space Launch System (SLS). The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed the Agency to develop, as rapidly as possible, a new SLS vehicle leveraging existing propulsion systems capable of providing both human and cargo launch capability to low-Earth orbit and to destinations beyond low-Earth orbit. Additionally, language in the NASA Authorization Act of 2014 includes development of an upper stage capable of performing human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. Specific to the EUSEs, the SLS Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) will utilize RL10 engine hardware to meet lift capability requirements. NASA/MSFC intends to negotiate with Aerojet Rocketdyne only for ten (10) RL10 flight engines, vehicle and program integration, flight support for SLS EM-2 and EM-3, and human rating compliance review. This decision is made pursuant to FAR 6.302-1, only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements, which implements the authority for 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1). Competition is impractical for the following reasons: The SLS Program completed a detailed trade study in May 2014 that determined the appropriate engine(s) to be used in conjunction with the proposed EUS, a liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen upper stage. The results and recommendations of that study and the subsequent SLS Program direction are in alignment with regards to the steps necessary to support EUS design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E), certification, and flight operations. The SLS EUS trade study analyzed technical parameters in terms of thrust, specific impulse, physical envelope, propellant constituency and volume, stage cost (including engine development costs), stage reliability, and similar factors and constraints needed for the upper stage. The study was conducted such that engine choice was the dependent variable that is, the SLS mission requirements, input variables, and constraints were analyzed and resulted in a set of performance parameters for the engine. The resulting performance parameters and other NASA technical requirements best match those delivered by an RL10-class engine (24-35K thrust) in a cluster of four (4) configuration. Further, the trade study determined that a 4-engine cluster is optimal for vehicle loss of mission reliability. In September 2014 a Request For Information (RFI) was issued for an RL10-class EUS engine. NASA received nine (9) responses from eight (8) different companies. Proposed engines were assessed according to the EUS trade study performance parameters. Based on the EUS trade study results and RFI responses, only the Aerojet Rocketdyne RL10 met all the program technical requirements, and was clearly superior in terms of mission capture, performance, cluster configuration, reliability, design maturity, safety, and schedule. All other engine solutions, which could potentially meet requirements, were at a low state of maturity and would require significant government development funding. This would expose the government to a substantial duplication of cost, which cannot be recovered at planned SLS flight rates. It was also estimated that even the most optimistic development programs would delay SLS missions resulting in substantial additional program costs across SLS elements. An alternative to procuring existing RL10 engines for the planned SLS missions would require initiation of a development program for a new liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen engine with form, fit, function, and performance consistent with the RL10. The development of a new engine design consistent with the form, fit, function, and performance of the RL10 would involve significant and inherent technical risks and safety concerns. The RL10 is fully matured from a technical perspective. With over two million seconds of accumulated ground test hot-fire test time, 200,000 seconds of in-space flight time on more than 242 missions, the RL10 design, production processes, and operational procedures have incorporated within them thousands of lessons learned. A new engine would require that the selected contractor design, produce, test and operate the new engine. The current level of performance, safety and mission assurance required are only available with the RL10. Given the technical and safety-related rationale for utilizing the mature RL10 design as the EUS engine, and considering the unique RL10 experience, knowledge, and capabilities possessed by Aerojet Rocketdyne, the RL10 engine is the only available source for the EUS engine. The vehicle and program integration support to be acquired are in support of EUS development. Intimate technical knowledge of engine performance, functional, operational, and physical characteristics are necessary to enable stage development. NASA has not designed a flight stage using RL10 engines since the early 1960s (for the Saturn I vehicle) and the engine has evolved in the 50 years since that time; therefore, it is most efficient and effective to utilize the extensive and thorough knowledge base established with the developer and manufacturer of the engine. This effort entails a detailed assessment of the RL10 with regards to its inclusion as part of the human spaceflight program. While the RL10 meets SLS program technical performance requirements, an assessment is needed to examine the full breadth of human-rating facets including: compliance with NASA and NASA-imposed technical design, construction, and workmanship standards; sufficiency of safety and reliability-related documentation and analyses such as hazards analysis and failure modes and effect analysis; compliance with redundancy requirements; and sufficiency of quality assurance and configuration management systems. This assessment is a joint activity between NASA and the rocket engine developer involving an evaluation of past design analyses, past test history, and manufacturing records. This will require access to company limited rights or proprietary material and technical, programmatic, and historical knowledge of engine performance, functional, operational, and physical characteristics. The Government does not intend to acquire a commercial item using FAR Part 12. Interested organizations may submit their capabilities and qualifications to perform the effort in writing to the identified point of contact not later than 4:30 p.m. local time on February 4, 2016. Such capabilities/qualifications will be evaluated solely for the purpose of determining whether or not to conduct this procurement on a competitive basis. A determination not to compete this proposed effort on a full and open competition basis, based upon responses to this notice, is solely within the discretion of the Government. Oral communications are not acceptable in response to this notice. All responsible sources may submit a response, which will be considered by the agency. NASA Clause 1852.215-84, Ombudsman, is applicable. The Center Ombudsman for this acquisition can be found at http://prod.nais.nasa.gov/pub/p ub_library/Omb.html .
NNM16AA12C National Aeronautics and Space Administration Marshall Space Flight Center
1/20/16, 9:15 AM